philosophy of right-第59节
按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页,按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页,按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部!
————未阅读完?加入书签已便下次继续阅读!
been allowed them; they have been exempted from taking the oath。 They fulfil their direct duties to the state in
a passive way; one of the most important of these duties; the defence of the state against its enemies; they
refuse outright to fulfil; and their refusal may perhaps be admitted provided they perform some other service
instead。 To sects of this kind; the state's attitude is toleration in the strict sense of the word; because since
they decline to recognise their duty to the state; they may not claim the rights of citizenship。 On one occasion
when the abolition of the slave…trade was being pressed with great vigour in the American Congress; a member
from one of the Southern States made the striking retort: 'Give us our slaves; and you may keep your Quakers。'
Only if the state is otherwise strong can it overlook and suffer such anomalies; because it can then rely
principally on the strength of custom and the inner rationality of its institutions to diminish and close the gap
between the existence of anomalies and the full assertion of its own strict rights。 Thus technically it may have
been right to refuse a grant of even civil rights to the Jews on the ground that they should be regarded as
belonging not merely to a religious sect but to a foreign race。 But the fierce outcry raised against the Jews;
from that point of view and others; ignores the fact that they are; above all; nien; and manhood; so far from
being a mere superficial; abstract quality (see Remark to § 209); is on the contrary itself the basis of the fact
that what civil rights rouse in their possessors is the feeling of oneself as counting in civil society as a person
with rights; and this feeling of self…hood; infinite and free from all restrictions; is the root from which the
desired similarity indisposition and ways of thinking comes into being。 To exclude the Jews from rights; on the
other hand; would rather be to confirm the isolation with which they have been reproached … a result for which
the state refusing them rights would be blamable and reproachable; because by so refusing; it would
misunderstood its own basic principle; its nature as an objective and powerful institution (compare the end of
the Remark to § 268)。 The exclusion of the Jews from civil rights may be supposed to be a right of the highest
kind and may be demanded on that ground; but experience has shown that so to exclude them is the silliest
folly; and the way in which governments now treat them has proved itself to be both prudent and dignified。
Remark: But since the church owns property and carries on besides the practice of worship;
and since therefore it must have people in its service; it forsakes the inner for the worldly life and
therefore enters the domain of the state; and eo ipso comes under its laws。 The oath and ethical
ties generally; like the marriage bond; entail that inner permeation and elevation of sentiment
which acquires its deepest confirmation through religion。 But since ethical ties are in essence ties
within the actual rational order; the first thing is to affirm within that order the rights which it
involves。 Confirmation of these rights by the church is secondary and is only the inward;
comparatively abstract; side of the matter。
As for the other ways in which an ecclesiastical communion gives expression to itself; so far as
doctrine is concerned the inward preponderates over the outward to a greater extent than is the
case with acts of worship and other lines of conduct connected with these; in which the legal side
at least seems at once to be a matter for the state。 (It is true; of course; that churches have
managed to exempt their ministers and property from the power and jurisdiction of the state; and
they have even arrogated to themselves jurisdiction over laymen as well in matters in which religion
co…operates; such as divorce and the taking of the oath; &c。) Public control of actions of this kind
is indeterminate in extent; but this is due to the nature of public control itself and obtains similarly in
purely civil transactions (see § 234)。 When individuals; holding religious views in common; form
themselves into a church; a Corporation; they fall under the general control and oversight of the
higher state officials。 Doctrine as such; however; has its domain in conscience and falls within the
right of the subjective freedom of self…consciousness; the sphere of the inner life; which as such is
not the domain of the state。 Yet the state; too; has a doctrine; since its organisation and whatever
rights and constitution are authoritative within it exist essentially in the form of thought as law。 And
since the state is not a mechanism but the rational life of self…conscious freedom; the system of the
ethical world; it follows that an essential moment in the actual state is the mental attitude of the
citizens; and so their consciousness of the principles which this attitude implies。 On the other
hand; the doctrine of the church is not purely and simply an inward concern of conscience。 As
doctrine it is rather the expression of something; in fact the expression of a subject…matter which is
most closely linked; or even directly concerned; with ethical principles and the law of the land。
Hence at this point the paths of church and state either coincide or diverge at right angles。 The
difference of their two domains may be pushed by the church into sheer antagonism since; by
regarding itself as enshrining the content of religions content which is absolute … it may claim as its
portion mind; in general and so the whole ethical sphere; and conceive the state as a mere
mechanical scaffolding for the attainment of external; non … mental; ends。 It may take itself to be
the Kingdom of God; or at least as the road to it or its vestibule; while it regards the state as the
kingdom of this world; i。e。 of the transient and the finite。 In a word; it may think that it is an end in
itself; while the state is a mere means。 These claims produce the demand; in connection with
doctrinal instruction; that the state should not only allow the church to do as it likes with complete
freedom; but that it should pay unconditional respect to the church's doctrines as doctrines;
whatever their character; because their determination is supposed to be the task of the church
alone。 The church bases this claim on the wide ground that the whole domain of mind (Geist) is its
property。 But science and all types of knowledge also have a footing in that domain and; like a
church; they build themselves into a whole with a guiding principle of its own; and; with even better
justification; may regard themselves as occupying the position which the church claims。 Hence
science also may in the same way demand to be independent of the state; which is then supposed
to be a mere means with the task of providing for science as though science were an end in itself。
Further; for determining the relation between church and state; it makes no difference whether the
leaders of congregations or individuals ordained to the service of the church feel impelled to
withdraw from the state and lead a sort of secluded life of their own; so that only the other church
members are subject to the state's control; or whether they remain within the state except in their
capacity as ecclesiastics; a capacity which they take to be but one side of their life。 the most
striking thing about such a … conception of the church's relation to the state is that it implies the idea
… that the state's specific function consists in protecting and securing everyone's life; property; and
caprice; in so far as these do not encroach upon the life; property; and caprice of others。 The state
from this point of view is treated simply as an organisation to satisfy men's necessities。 In this way
the element of absolute truth; of mind in its higher development; is placed; as subjective religious
feeling or theoretical science; beyond the reach of the state。 The state; as the laity pure and simple;
is confined to paying its respects to this element and so is entirely deprived of any strictly ethical
character。 Now it is; of course; a matter of history that in times and under conditions of barbarism;
all higher forms of intellectual life had their seat only in the church; while the state was a mere
mundane rule of force; caprice; and passion。 At such times it was the abstract opposition of state
and church which was the main underlying principle of history (see § 359)。 But it is far too blind
and shallow a proceeding to declare that this situation is the one which truly corresponds with the
Idea。 The development of this Idea has proved this rather to be the truth; that mind; as free and
rational; is implicitly ethical; while the Idea in its truth is rationality actualised; and this it is which
exists as the state。 Further; this Idea has made it no less clearly evident that the ethical truth in it is
present to conscious thought as a content worked up into the form of universality; i。e。 as law … in
short; that the state knows its aims; apprehends and gives practical proof of them with a clear …
cut consciousness and in accordance with principles。 Now; as I