philosophy of right-第56节

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duties　are　not　here　in　point。）　

In　the　course　of　the　inward　development　of　the　concrete　Idea；　however；　its　moments　become
distinguished　and　their　specific　determinacy　becomes　at　the　same　time　a　difference　of　content。　In
the　family；　the　content　of　a　son's　duties　to　his　father　differs　from　the　content　of　his　rights　against
him；　the　content　of　the　rights　of　a　member　of　civil　society　is　not　the　same　as　the　content　of　his
duties　to　his　prince　and　government。　

This　concept　of　the　union　of　duty　and　right　is　a　point　of　vital　importance　and　in　it　the　inner　strength
of　states　is　contained。　

Duty　on　its　abstract　side　goes　no　farther　than　the　persistent　neglect　and　proscription　of　a　man's
particular　interest；　on　the　ground　that　it　is　the　inessential；　even　the　discreditable；　moment　in　his　life。
Duty；　taken　concretely　as　Idea；　reveals　the　moment　of　particularity　as　itself　essential　and　so
regards　its　satisfaction　as　indisputably　necessary。　In　whatever　way　an　individual　may　fulfil　his　duty；
he　must　at　the　same　time　find　his　account　therein　and　attain　his　personal　interest　and　satisfaction。
Out　of　his　position　in　the　state；　a　right　must　accrue　to　him　whereby　public　affairs　shall　be　his　own
particular　affair。　Particular　interests　should　in　fact　not　be　set　aside　or　completely　suppressed；
instead；　they　should　be　put　in　correspondence　with　the　universal；　and　thereby　both　they　and　the
universal　are　upheld。　The　isolated　individual；　so　far　as　his　duties　are　concerned；　is　in　subjection；
but　as　a　member　of　civil　society　he　finds　in　fulfilling　his　duties　to　it　protection　of　his　person　and
property；　regard　for　his　private　welfare；　the　satisfaction　of　the　depths　of　his　being；　the
consciousness　and　feeling　of　himself　as　a　member　of　the　whole；　and；　in　so　far　as　he　completely
fulfils　his　duties　by　performing　tasks　and　services　for　the　state；　he　is　upheld　and　preserved。　Take
duty　abstractly；　and　the　universal's　interest　would　consist　simply　in　the　completion　as　duties　of　the
tasks　and　services　which　it　exacts。　

Addition：　In　the　state　everything　depends　on　the　unity　of　universal　and　particular。　In　the　states
of　antiquity；　the　subjective　end　simply　coincided　with　the　state's　will。　In　modern　times；　however；
we　make　claims　for　private　judgement；　private　willing；　and　private　conscience。　The　ancients　had
none　of　these　in　the　modern　sense；　the　ultimate　thing　with　them　was　the　will　of　the　state。　Whereas
under　the　despots　of　Asia　the　individual　had　no　inner　life　and　no　justification　in　himself；　in　the
modern　world　Man　insists　on　respect　being　paid　to　his　inner　life。　The　conjunction　of　duty　and　right
has　a　twofold　aspect：　what　the　state　demands　from　us　as　a　duty　is　eo　ipso　our　right　as　individuals；
since　the　state　is　nothing　but　the　articulation　of　the　concept　of　freedom。　The　determinations　of　the
individual　will　are　given　an　objective　embodiment　through　the　state　and　thereby　they　attain　their
truth　and　their　actualisation　for　the　first　time。　The　State　is　the　one　and　only　prerequisite　of　the
attainment　of　particular　ends　and　welfare。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　262。　

The　actual　Idea　is　mind；　which；　sundering　itself　into　the　two　ideal　spheres　of　its
concept；　family　and　civil　society；　enters　upon　its　finite　phase；　but　it　does　so　only
in　order　to　rise　above　its　ideality　and　become　explicit　as　infinite　actual　mind。　It　is
therefore　to　these　ideal　spheres　that　the　actual　Idea　assigns　the　material　of　this　its
finite　actuality；　viz。　human　beings　as　a　mass；　in　such　a　way　that　the　function
assigned　to　any　given　individual　is　visibly　mediated　by　circumstances；　his　caprice
and　his　personal　choice　of　his　station　in　life　（see　§　185　and　the　Remark　thereto）。　

Addition：　In　Plato's　state；　subjective　freedom　does　not　count；　because　people　have　their
occupations　assigned　to　them　by　the　Guardians。　In　many　oriental　states；　this　assignment　is
determined　by　birth。　But　subjective　freedom；　which　must　be　respected；　demands　that　individuals
should　have　free　choice　in　this　matter。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　263。　

In　these　spheres　in　which　its　moments；　particularity　and　individuality；　have　their
immediate　and　reflected　reality；　mind　is　present　as　their　objective　universality
glimmering　in　them　as　the　power　of　reason　in　necessity　（see　§　184）；　i。e。　as　the
institutions　considered　above。　

Addition：　The　state；　as　mind；　sunders　itself　into　the　particular　determinations　of　its　concept；　of
its　mode　of　being。　We　might　use　here　an　illustration　drawn　from　nature。　The　nervous　system　is　the
sensitive　system　proper；　it　is　the　abstract　moment；　the　moment　of　being　by　oneself　and　so　of
having　identity　with　oneself。　But　analysis　of　sensation　reveals；　that　it　has　two　aspects　and　these　are
distinct　in　such　a　way　that　each　of　them　seems　to　be　a　whole　system　by　itself　The　first　is　feeling　in
the　abstract；　keeping　oneself　self…enclosed；　the　dull　movement　which　goes　on　internally；
reproduction；　internal　self…nutrition；　growth；　and　digestion。　The　second　moment　is　that　this
self…related　existence　has　over　against　it　the　moment　of　difference；　a　movement　outwards。　This　is
irritability；　sensation　moving　outwards。　This　constitutes　a　system　of　its　own；　and　there　are　some　of
the　lower　types　of　animals　which　have　developed　this　system　alone；　while　they　lack　the
soul…charged　unity　of　inner　sensation。　If　we　compare　these　natural　features　with　those　of　mind；
then　the　family　must　be　paralleled　with　sensibility　and　civil　society　with　irritability。　Now　the　third　is
the　state；　the　nervous　system　as　I　a　whole；　something　inwardly　organised；　but　this　lives　only　in　so
far　as　both　moments　（in　this　case　family　and　civil　society）　are　developed　within　it。　The　laws
regulating　family　and　civil　society　are　the　institutions　of　the　rational　order　which　glimmers　in　them。
But　the　ground　and　final　truth　of　these　institutions　is　mind；　their　universal　end　and　known　objective。
The　family　too　is　ethical；　only　its　end　is　not　known　as　such；　while　it　is　the　separation　between　one
man　and　another　which　makes　civil　society　what　it　is。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　264。

Mind　is　the　nature　of　human　beings　en　masse　and　their　nature　is　therefore
twofold：　（i）　at　one　extreme；　explicit　individuality　of　consciousness　and　will；　and
（ii）　at　the　other　extreme；　universality　which　knows　and　wills　what　is　substantive。
Hence　they　attain　their　right　in　both　these　respects　only　in　so　far　as　both　their
private　personality　and　its　substantive　basis　are　actualised。　Now　in　the　family　and
civil　society　they　acquire　their　right　in　the　first　of　these　respects　directly　and　in　the
second　indirectly；　in　that　（i）　they　find　their　substantive　self…consciousness　in　social
institutions　which　are　the　universal　implicit　in　their　particular　interests；　and　（ii）　the
Corporation　supplies　them　with　an　occupation　and　an　activity　directed　on　a
universal　end。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　265。

These　institutions　are　the　components　of　the　constitution　（i。e。　of　rationality
developed　and　actualised）　in　the　sphere　of　particularity。　They　are；　therefore；　the
firm　foundation　not　only　of　the　state　but　also　of　the　citizen's　trust　in　it　and
sentiment　towards　it。　They　are　the　pillars　of　public　freedom　since　in　them
particular　freedom　is　realised　and　rational；　and　therefore　there　is　implicitly　present
even　in　them　the　union　of　freedom　and　necessity。　

Addition：　As　was　remarked　earlier　on；　the　sanctity　of　marriage　and　the　institutions　in　which　civil
society　is　an　appearance　of　ethical　life　constitute　the　stability　of　the　whole；　i。e。　stability　is　secured
when　universal　affairs　are　the　affairs　of　each　member　in　his　particular　capacity。　What　is　of　the
utmost　importance　is　that　the　law　of　reason　should　be　shot　through　and　through　by　the　law　of
particular　freedom；　and　that　my　particular　end　should　become　identified　with　the　universal　end；　or
otherwise　the　state　is　left　in　the　air。　The　state　is　actual　only　when　its　members　have　a　feeling　of　their
own　self…hood　and　it　is　stable　only　when　public　and　private　ends　are　identical。　It　has　often　been
said　that　the　end　of　the　state　is　the　happiness　of　the　citizens。　That　imperfectly　true。　If　all　is　not　well
with　them；　if　their　subjective　aims　are　not　satisfied；　if　they　do　not　find　that　the　state　as　such　is　the
means　to　their　satisfaction；　then　the　footing　of　the　state　itself　is　insecure。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　266。

But　mind　is　objective　and　actual　to　itself　not　merely　as　this　necessity　and　as　a
realm　of　appearance；　but　also　as　the　ideality　and　the　heart　of　this　necessity。　Only
in　this　way　is　this　substantive　universality　aware　of　itself　as　its　own　object　and
end；　with　the　result　that　the　necessity　appears　to　itself　in　the　shape　of　freedom　as
well。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　267。　

This　necessity　in　ideality　is　the　inner　self…development　of　the　Idea。　As　the
substance　of　the　individual　subject；　it　is　his　political　sentiment　＇patriotism＇；　in
distinction　therefrom；　as　the　substance　of　the　objective　world；　it　is　the　organism
of　the　state；　i。e。　it　is　the　strictly　political　state　and　its　constitution。　

Addition：　The　unity　of　the　freedom　which　knows　and　wills　itself　is　present　first　of　all　as
necessity。