philosophy of right-第55节

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of　the　'incredible'　influence　on　it　of　the　errors　of　false　philosophy　（though　in　this　instance　at　any　rate　the　fault
cannot　be　ascribed　to　Kant's　philosophy；　a　topic　on　which　Herr　von　Haller　is　at　his　angriest）；　especially　where
it　speaks　of　the　state；　the　resources　of　the　state；　the　end　of　the　state；　the　head　of　the　state；　his　duties；　and
those　of　civil　servants；　and　so　forth。　Herr　von　Haller　finds　particularly　mischievous　'the　right　of　defraying　the
expenses　of　the　state　by　levying　taxes　on　the　private　wealth　of　individuals；　on　their　businesses；　on　goods
produced　or　consumed。　Under　those　circumstances；　neither　the　king　himself　（since　the　resources　of　the　state
belong　to　the　state　and　are　not　the　private　property　of　the　king）；　nor　the　Prussian　citizens　can　call　anything
their　own；　neither　their　person　nor　their　property；　and　all　subjects　are　bondslaves　to　the　law；　since　they　may
not　withdraw　themselves　from　the　service　of　the　state。'　

In　this　welter　of　incredible　crudity；　what　is　perhaps　most　comical　of　all　is　the　emotion　with　which　Herr　von
Haller　describes　his　unspeakable　pleasure　in　his　discoveries　…　'a　joy　such　as　only　the　friend　of　truth　can　feel
when　after　honest　search　he　has　become　confident　that　he　has　found　as　it　were'　（yes　indeed？　'is　it　were'　is
right！）　'the　voice　of　nature；　the　very　word　of　God'。　（The　truth　is　that　the　word　of　God　very　clearly　distinguishes
its　revelations　from　the　voices　of　nature　and　unregenerate　man。）　'The　author　could　have　sunk　to　the　ground　in
open　amazement；　a　stream　of　joyful　tears　burst　from　his　eyes；　and　living　religious　feeling　sprang　up　in　him　there
and　then。；　Herr　von　Haller　might　have　discovered　by　his　'religious　feeling'　that　he　should　rather　bewail　his
condition　as　the　hardest　chastisement　of　God。　For　the　hardest　thing　which　man　can　experience　is　to　be　so　far
excluded　from　thought　and　reason；　from　respect　for　the　laws；　and　from　knowing　how　infinitely　important　and
divine　it　is　that　the　duties　of　the　state　and　the　rights　of　the　citizens；　as　well　as　the　rights　of　the　state　and　the
duties　of　the　citizens；　should　be　defined　by　law　…　to　be　so　far　excluded　from　all　this　that　absurdity　can　foist
itself　upon　him　as　the　word　of　God。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　259。

The　Idea　of　the　state：　

　　　　　（A）　has　immediate　actuality　and　is　the　individual　state　as　a　self…dependent
　　　　　organism　…　the　Constitution　or　Constitutional　Law；　

　　　　　（B）　passes　over　into　the　relation　of　one　state　to　other　states　…　International
　　　　　Law；　

　　　　　（C）　is　the　universal　Idea　as　a　genus　and　as　an　absolute　power　over　individual
　　　　　states　…　the　mind　which　gives　itself　its　actuality　in　the　process　of
　　　　　World…History。　

Remark：　The　state　in　its　actuality　is　essentially　an　individual　state；　and　beyond　that　a　particular
state。　Individuality　is　to　be　distinguished　from　particularity。　The　former　is　a　moment　in　the　very　Idea
of　the　state；　while　the　latter　belongs　to　history。　States　as　such　are　independent　of　one　another；　and
therefore　their　relation　to　one　another　can　only　be　an　external　one；　so　that　there　must　be　a　third
thing　standing　above　them　to　bind　them　together。　Now　this　third　thing　is　the　mind　which　gives　itself
actuality　in　world…history　and　is　the　absolute　judge　of　states。　Several　states　may　form　an　alliance　to
be　a　sort　of　court　with　jurisdiction　over　others；　there　may　be　confederations　of　states；　like　the　Holy
Alliance　for　example；　but　these　are　always　relative　only　and　restricted；　like　perpetual　peace'。　The
one　and　only　absolute　judge；　which　makes　itself　authoritative　against　the　particular　and　at　all　times；
is　the　absolute　mind　which　manifests　itself　in　the　history　of　the　world　as　the　universal　and　as　the
genus　there　operative。　

　A。　Constitutional　Law

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　260。

The　state　is　the　actuality　of　concrete　freedom。　But　concrete　freedom　consists　in
this；　that　personal　individuality　and　its　particular　interests　not　only　achieve　their
complete　development　and　gain　explicit　recognition　for　their　right　（as　they　do　in
the　sphere　of　the　family　and　civil　society）　but；　for　one　thing；　they　also　pass　over
of　their　own　accord　into　the　interest　of　the　universal；　and；　for　another　thing；　they
know　and　will　the　universal；　they　even　recognise　it　as　their　own　substantive　mind；
they　take　it　as　their　end　and　aim　and　are　active　in　its　pursuit。　The　result　is　that　the
universal　does　not　prevail　or　achieve　completion　except　along　with　particular
interests　and　through　the　co…operation　of　particular　knowing　and　willing；　and
individuals　likewise　do　not　live　as　private　persons　for　their　own　ends　alone；　but　in
the　very　act　of　willing　these　they　will　the　universal　in　the　light　of　the　universal；
and　their　activity　is　consciously　aimed　at　none　but　the　universal　end。　The　principle
of　modern　states　has　prodigious　strength　and　depth　because　it　allows　the　principle
of　subjectivity　to　progress　to　its　culmination　in　the　extreme　of　self…subsistent
personal　particularity；　and　yet　at　the　same　time　brings　it　back　to　the　substantive
unity　and　so　maintains　this　unity　in　the　principle　of　subjectivity　itself。　

Addition：　The　Idea　of　the　state　in　modern　times　has　a　special　character　in　that　the　state　is　the
actualisation　of　freedom　not　in　accordance　with　subjective　whim　but　in　accordance　with　the
concept　of　the　will；　i。e。　in　accordance　with　its　universality　and　divinity。　Immature　states　are　those　in
which　the　Idea　of　the　state　is　still　veiled　and　where　its　particular　determinations　have　not　yet
attained　free　self…subsistence。　In　the　states　of　classical　antiquity；　universality　was　present；　but
particularity　had　not　then　been　released；　given　free　scope；　and　brought　back　to　universality；　i。e。　to
the　Universal　end　of　the　whole。　The　essence　of　the　modern　state　is　that　the　universal　be　bound　up
with　the　complete　freedom　of　its　particular　members　and　with　private　well…being；　that　thus　the
interests　of　family　and　civil　society　must　concentrate　themselves　on　the　state；　although　the
…universal　end　cannot　be　advanced　without　the　personal　knowledge　and　will　of　its　particular
members；　whose　own　rights　must　be　maintained。　Thus　the　universal　must　be　furthered；　but
subjectivity　on　the　other　hand　must　attain　its　full　and　living　development。　It　is　only　when　both　these
moments　subsist　in　their　strength　that　the　state　can　be　regarded　as　articulated　and　genuinely
organised。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　261。　

In　contrast　with　the　spheres　of　private　rights　and　private　welfare　（the　family　and
civil　society）；　the　state　is　from　one　point　of　view　an　external　necessity　and　their
higher　authority；　its　nature　is　such　that　their　laws　and　interests　are　subordinate　to
it　and　dependent　on　it。　On　the　other　hand；　however；　it　is　the　end　immanent　within
them；　and　its　strength　lies　in　the　unity　of　its　own　universal　end　and　aim　with　the
particular　interest　of　individuals；　in　the　fact　that　individuals　have　duties　to　the　state
in　proportion　as　they　have　rights　against　it　（see　§　155）。　

Remark：　In　the　Remark　to　§　3　above；　reference　was　made　to　the　fact　that　it　was　Montesquieu
above　all　who；　in　his　famous　work　L’Esprit　des　Lois；　kept　in　sight　and　tried　to　work　out　in　detail
both　the　thought　of　the　dependence　of　laws　…　in　particular；　laws　concerning　the　rights　of　persons　…
on　the　specific　character　of　the　state；　and　also　the　philosophic　notion　of　always　treating　the　part　in
its　relation　to　the　whole。　

Duty　is　primarily　a　relation　to　something　which　from　my　point　of　view　is　substantive；　absolutely
universal。　A　right；　on　the　other　hand；　is　simply　the　embodiment　of　this　substance　and　thus　is　the
particular　aspect　of　it　and　enshrines　my　particular　freedom。　Hence　at　abstract　levels；　right　and　duty
appear　parcelled　out　on　different　sides　or　in　different　persons。　In　the　state；　as　something　ethical；　as
the　inter…penetration　of　the　substantive　and　the　particular；　my　obligation　to　what　is　substantive　is　at
the　same　time　the　embodiment　of　my　particular　freedom。　This　means　that　in　the　state　duty　and　right
are　united　in　one　and　the　same　relation。　But　further；　since　none　the　less　the　distinct　moments
acquire　in　the　state　the　shape　and　reality　peculiar　to　each；　and　since　therefore　the　distinction
between　right　and　duty　enters　here　once　again；　it　follows　that　while　implicitly；　i。e。　in　form；　identical；
they　at　the　same　time　differ　in　content。　In　the　spheres　of　personal　rights　and　morality；　the　necessary
bearing　of　right　and　duty　on　one　another　falls　short　of　actualisation；　and　hence　there　is　at　that　point
only　an　abstract　similarity　of　content　between　them；　i。e。　in　those　abstract　spheres；　what　is　one
man's　right　ought　also　to　be　another's；　and　what　is　one　man's　duty　ought　also　to　be　another's。　The
absolute　identity　of　right　and　duty　in　the　state　is　present　in　these　spheres　not　as　a　genuine　identity
but　only　as　a　similarity　of　content；　because　in　them　this　content　is　determined　as　quite　general　and
is　simply　the　fundamental　principle　of　both　right　and　duty；　i。e。　the　principle　that　men；　as　persons；
are　free。　Slaves；　therefore；　have　no　duties　because　they　have　no　rights；　and　vice　versa。　（Religious
duties　are　not　here　in　point。）　

In　the　course　of　the　inward　d