philosophy of right-第47节

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


held　on　contract；　and　contractual　forms　are　fixed　and　determinate。　Now　we　may　have　an　antipathy
to　formalities　of　this　kind　and　we　may　suppose　that　they　only　exist　to　bring　in　money　to　the
authorities；　we　may　even　regard　them　as　something　offensive　and　a　sign　of　mistrust　because　they
impair　the　validity　of　the　saying：　‘A　man　is　as　good　as　his　word。’　But　the　formality　is　essential
because　what　is　inherently　right　must　also　be　posited　as　right。　My　will　is　a　rational　will；　it　has
validity；　and　its　validity　should　be　recognised　by　others。　At　this　point；　then；　my　subjectivity　and　that
of　others　must　be　set　aside　and　the　will　must　achieve　the　security；　stability；　and　objectivity　which
can　be　attained　only　through　such　formalities。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　218。

Since　property　and　personality　have　legal　recognition　and　validity　in　civil　society；
wrongdoing　now　becomes　an　infringement；　not　merely　of　what　is　subjectively
infinite；　but　of　the　universal　thing　which　is　existent　with　inherent　stability　and
strength。　Hence　a　new　attitude　arises：　the　action　is　seen　as　a　danger　to　society　and
thereby　the　magnitude　of　the　wrongdoing　is　increased。　On　the　other　hand；
however；　the　fact　that　society　has　become　strong　and　sure　of　itself　diminishes　the
external　importance　of　the　injury　and　so　leads　to　a　mitigation　of　its　punishment。　

Remark：　The　fact　that　an　injury　to　one　member　of　society　is　an　injury　to　all　others　does　not　alter
the　conception　of　wrongdoing；　but　it　does　alter　it　in　respect　of　its　outward　existence　as　an　injury
done；　an　injury　which　now　affects　the　mind　and　consciousness　of　civil　society　as　a　whole；　not
merely　the　external　embodiment　of　the　person　directly　injured。　In　heroic　times；　as　we　see　in　the
tragedy　of　the　ancients；　the　citizens　did　not　feel　themselves　injured　by　wrongs　which　members　of
the　royal　houses　did　to　one　another。　

Implicitly；　crime　is　an　infinite；　injury；　but　as　an　existent　fact　it　must　be　measured　in　quantity　and
quality　（see　§　96）；　and　since　its　field　of　existence　here　has　the　essential　character　of　affecting　an
idea　and　consciousness　of　the　validity　of　the　laws；　its　danger　to　civil　society　is　a　determinant　of　the
magnitude　of　a　crime；　or　even　one　of　its　qualitative　characteristics。　

Now　this　quality　or　magnitude　varies　with　the　state　of　civil　society；　and　this　is　the　justification　for
sometimes　attaching　the　penalty　of　death　to　a　theft　of　a　few　pence　or　a　turnip；　and　at　other　times　a
light　penalty　to　a　theft　of　a　hundred　or　more　times　that　amount。　If　we　consider　its　danger　to
society；　this　seems　at　first　sight　to　aggravate　the　crime；　but　in　fact　it　is　just　this　which　has　been　the
prime　cause　of　the　mitigation　of　its　punishment。　A　penal　code；　then；　is　primarily　the　child　of　its　age
and　the　state　of　civil　society　at　the　time。　

Addition：　It　seems　to　be　a　contradiction　that　a　crime　committed　in　society　appears　more
heinous　and　yet　is　punished　more　leniently。　But　while　it　would　be　impossible　for　society　to　leave　a
crime　unpunished；　since　that　would　be　to　posit　it　as　right；　still　since　society　is　sure　of　itself；　a　crime
must　always　be　something　idiosyncratic　in　comparison；　something　unstable　and　exceptional。　The
very　stability　of　society　gives　a　crime　the　status　of　something　purely　subjective　which　seems　to　be
the　product　rather　of　natural　impulse　than　of　a　prudent　will。　In　this　light；　crime　acquires　a　milder
status；　and　for　this　reason　its　punishment　too　becomes　milder。　If　society　is　still　internally　weak；　then
an　example　must　be　made　by　inflicting　punishments；　since　punishment　is　itself　an　example　over
against　the　example　of　crime。　But　in　a　society　which　is　internally　strong；　the　commission　of　crime　is
something　so　feeble　that　its　annulment　must　be　commensurable　with　its　feebleness。　Harsh
punishments；　therefore；　are　not　unjust　in　and　by　themselves；　they　are　related　to　contemporary
conditions。　A　criminal　code　cannot　hold　good　for　all　time；　and　crimes　are　only　shows　of　reality
which　may　draw　on　themselves　a　greater　or　lesser　degree　of　disavowal。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（c）　The　Court　of　Justice
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　219。

By　taking　the　form　of　law；　right　steps　into　a　determinate　mode　of　being。　It　is　then
something　on　its　own　account；　and　in　contrast　with　particular　willing　and　opining
of　the　right；　it　is　self…subsistent　and　has　to　vindicate　itself　as　something　universal。；
This　is　achieved　by　recognising　it　and　making　it　actual　in　a　particular　case　without
the　subjective　feeling　of　private　interest；　and　this　is　the　business　of　a　public
authority　—　the　court　of　justice。　

Remark：　The　historical　origin　of　the　judge　and　his　court　may　have　had　the　form　of　a　patriarch’s
gift　to　his　people　or　of　force　or　free　choice；　but　this　makes　no　difference　to　the　concept　of　the
thing。　To　regard　the　introduction　of　a　legal　system　as　no　more　than　an　optional　act　of　grace　or
favour　on　the　part　of　monarchs　and　governments　（as　Herr　von　Haller　does　in　his　Restauration　der
Staatswissenschaft）　is　a　piece　of　the　mere　thoughtlessness　which　has　no　inkling　of　the　point　at
issue　in　a　discussion　of　law　and　the　state。　The　point　is　that　legal　and　political　institutions　are　rational
in　principle　and　therefore　absolutely　necessary；　and　the　question　of　the　form　in　which　they　arose　or
were　introduced　is　entirely　irrelevant　to　a　consideration　of　their　rational　basis。　

At　the　other　extreme　from　Herr　von　Haller’s　point　of　view　is　the　barbarous　nation　that　the
administration　of　justice　is　now；　as　it　was　in　the　days　when　might　was　right；　an　improper　exercise
of　force；　a　suppression　of　freedom；　and　a　despotism。　The　administration　of　justice　must　be
regarded　as　the　fulfilment　of　a　duty　by　the　public　authority；　no　less　than　as　the　exercise　of　a　right；
and　so　far　as　it　is　a　right；　it　does　not　depend　upon　an　optional　delegation　to　one　authority　by　the
individual　members　of　society。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　220。

When　the　right　against　crime　has　the　form　of　revenge　（see　§　102）；　it　is　only　right
implicit；　not　right　in　the　form　of　right；　i。e。　no　act　of　revenge　is　justified。　Instead　of
the　injured　party；　the　injured　universal　now　comes　on　the　scene；　and　this　has　its
proper　actuality　in　the　court　of　law。　It　takes　over　the　pursuit　and　the　avenging　of
crime；　and　this　pursuit　consequently　ceases　to　be　the　subjective　and　contingent
retribution　of　revenge　and　is　transformed　into　the　genuine　reconciliation　of　right
with　itself；　i。e。　into　punishment。　Objectively；　this　is　the　reconciliation　of　the　law
with　itself；　by　the　annulment　of　the　crime；　the　law　is　restored　and　its　authority　is
thereby　actualised。　Subjectively；　it　is　the　reconciliation　of　the　criminal　with
himself；　i。e。　with　the　law　known　by　him　as　his　own　and　as　valid　for　him　and　his
protection；　when　this　law　is　executed　upon　him；　he　himself　finds　in　this　process
the　satisfaction　of　justice　and　nothing　save　his　own　act。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　221。

A　member　of　civil　society　has　the　right　in　judicio　stare　and；　correspondingly；　the
duty　of　acknowledging　the　jurisdiction　of　the　court　and　accepting　its　decision　as
final　when　his　own　rights　are　in　dispute。　

Addition：　Since　any　individual　has　the　right　in　judicio　stare；　he　must　also　know　what　the　law　is
or　otherwise　this　privilege　would　be　useless　to　him。　But　it　is　also　his　duty　to　stand　his　trial。　Under
the　feudal　system；　the　nobles　often　refused　to　stand　their　trial。　They　defied　the　court　and　alleged
that　the　court　was　wrong　to　demand　their　appearance。　Feudal　conditions；　however；　contravened
the　very　idea　of　a　court。　Nowadays　monarchs　have　to　recognise　the　jurisdiction　of　the　court　in
their　private　affairs；　and　in　free　states　they　commonly　lose　their　case。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　222。

In　court　the　specific　character　which　rightness　acquires　is　that　it　must　be
demonstrable。　When　parties　go　to　law；　they　are　put　in　the　position　of　having　to
make　good　their　evidence　and　their　claims　and　to　make　the　judge　acquainted　with
the　facts。　These　steps　in　a　legal　process　are　themselves　rights；　and　their　course
must　therefore　be　fixed　by　law。　They　also　constitute　an　essential　part　of
jurisprudence。　

Addition：　A　man　may　be　indignant　if　a　right　which　he　knows　he　has　is　refused　him　because　he
cannot　prove　it。　But　if　I　have　a　right；　it　must　at　the　same　time　be　a　right　posited　in　law。　I　must　be
able　to　explain　and　prove　it；　and　its　validity　can　only　be　recognised　in　society　if　its　rightness　in
principle　is　also　made　a　posited　rightness　in　law。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　223。

These　steps　in　a　legal　process　are　subdivided　continually　within　no　fixed　limits
into　more　and　more　actions；　each　being　distinct　in　itself　and　a　right。　Hence　a　legal
process；　in；　itself　in　any　case　a　means；　now　begins　to　be　something　external　to　its
end　and　contrasted　with　it。　This　long　course　of　formalities　is　a　right　of　the　parties
at　law　and　they　have　the　right　to　traverse　it　from　beginning　to　end。　Still；　it　may　be
turned　into　an　evil；　and　even　an　instrument　of　wrong；　and　for　this　reason　it　is　by
law　made　the　duty　of　the　parties　to　submit　themselves　to　the　simple　process　of
arbitration　（before　a　tribunal　of　ar