philosophy of right-第46节

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decision　pertains　to　abstract　subjectivity；　to　formal　self…certainty；　which　may　decide　either　by
simply　holding　to　its　power　（within　that　limit）　of　settling　the　matter　by　merely　terminating
deliberation　and　thereby　dismissing　it　out　of　hand；　or　else　by　adopting　some　reason　for　decision
such　as　keeping　to　round　numbers　or　always　adopting；　say　thirty…nine。　

It　is　true　that　the　law　does　not　settle　these　ultimate　decisions　required　by　actual　life；　it　leaves　them
instead　to　the　judge’s　discretion；　merely　limiting　him　by　a　maximum　and　minimum。　But　this　does
not　affect　the　point　at　issue；　because　the　maximum　and　minimum　are　themselves　in　every　instance
only　round　numbers　once　more。　To　fix　them；　therefore；　does　not　exempt　the　judge　from　making　a
finite；　purely　positive；　decision；　since　on　the　contrary　such　a　decision　is　still　left　to　him　by　the
necessities　of　the　case。　

Addition：　There　is　one　essential　element　in　law　and　the　administration　of　justice　which　contains
a　measure　of　contingency　and　which　arises　from　the　fact　that　the　law　is　a　universal　prescription
which　has　to　be　applied　to　the　single　case。　If　you　wished　to　declare　yourself　against　this
contingency；　you　would　be　talking　in　abstractions。　The　measure　of　a　man’s　punishment；　for
example；　cannot　be　made　equivalent　to　any　determination　of　the　concept　of　punishment；　and　the
decision　made；　whatever　it　be；　is　from　this　point　of　view　arbitrary　always。　But　this　contingency　is
itself　necessary；　and　if　you　argue　against　having　a　code　at　all　on　the　ground　that　any　code　is
incomplete；　you　are　overlooking　just　that　element　of　law　in　which　completion　is　not　to　be　achieved
and　which　therefore　must　just　be　accepted　as　it　stands。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（b）　Law　determinately　existent
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　215。

If　laws　are　to　have　a　binding　force；　it　follows　that；　in　view　of　the　right　of
self…consciousness　（see　§　132　and　the　Remark　thereto）　they　must　be　made
universally　known。　

Remark：　To　hang　the　laws　so　high　that　no　citizen　could　read　them　（as　Dionysius　the　Tyrant　did）
is　injustice　of　one　and　the　same　kind　as　to　bury　them　in　row　upon　row　of　learned　tomes；
collections　of　dissenting　judgments　and　opinions；　records　of　customs；　&c。；　and　in　a　dead　language
too；　so　that　knowledge　of　the　law　of　the　land　is　accessible　only　to　those　who　have　made　it　their
professional　study。　Rulers　who　have　given　a　national　law　to　their　peoples　in　the　form　of　a
well…arranged　and　clear…cut　legal　code　or　even　a　mere　formless　collection　of　laws；　like　Justinian’s
—　have　been　the　greatest　benefactors　of　their　peoples　and　have　received　thanks　and　praise　for
their　beneficence。　But　the　truth　is　that　their　work　was　at　the　same　time　a　great　act　of　justice。　

Addition：　The　legal　profession；　possessed　of　a　special　knowledge　of　the　law；　often　claims　this
knowledge　as　its　monopoly　and　refuses　to　allow　any　layman　to　discuss　the　subject。　Physicists
similarly　have　taken　amiss　Goethe’s　theory　about　colours　because　he　did　not　belong　to　their　craft
and　was　a　poet　into　the　bargain。　But　we　do　not　need　to　be　shoemakers　to　know　if　our　shoes　fit；
and　just　as　little　have　we　any　need　to　be　professionals　to　acquire　knowledge　of　matters　of
universal　interest。　Law　is　concerned　with　freedom；　the　worthiest　and　holiest　thing　in　man；　the　thing
man　must　know　if　it　is　to　have　obligatory　force　for　him。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　216。

For　a　public　legal　code；　simple　general　laws　are　required；　and　yet　the　nature　of　the
finite　material　to　which　law　is　applied　leads　to　the　further　determining　of　general
laws　ad　infinitum。　On　the　one　hand；　the　law　ought　to　be　a　comprehensive　whole；
closed　and　complete；　and　yet；　on　the　other　hand；　the　need　for　further
determinations　is　continual。　But　since　this　antinomy　arises　only　when　universal
principles；　which　remain　fixed　and　unchanged；　are　applied　to　particular　types　of
case；　the　right　to　a　complete　legal　code　remains　unimpaired；　like　the　right　that
these　simple　general　principles　should　be　capable　of　being　laid　down　and
understood　apart　and　in　distinction　from　their　application　to　such　particular　types。　

Remark：　A　fruitful　source　of　complexity　in　legislation　is　the　gradual　intrusion　of　reason；　of　what
is　inherently　and　actually　right；　into　primitive　institutions　which　have　something　wrong　at　their　roots
and　so　are　purely　historical　survivals。　This　occurred　in　Roman　law；　as　was　remarked　above　（see
Remark　to　§　180）；　in　medieval　feudal　law；　&c。　It　is　essential　to　notice；　however；　that　the　very
nature　of　the　finite　material　to　which　law　is　applied　necessarily　entails　an　infinite　progress　in　the
application　to　it　of　principles　universal　in　themselves　and　inherently　and　actually　rational。　

It　is　misunderstanding　which　has　given　rise　alike　to　the　demand　—　a　morbid　craving　of　German
scholars　chiefly　—　that　a　legal　code　should　be　something　absolutely　complete；　incapable　of　any
fresh　determination　in　detail；　and　also　to　the　argument　that　because　a　code　is　incapable　of　such
completion；　therefore　we　ought　not　to　produce　something　‘incomplete’；　i。e。　we　ought　not　to
produce　a　code　at　all。　The　misunderstanding　rests　in　both　cases　on　a　misconception　of　the　nature
of　a　finite　subject…matter　like　private　law；　whose　so…called　‘completeness’　is　a　perennial
approximation　to　completeness；　on　a　misconception　of　the　differences　between　the　universal　of
reason　and　the　universal　of　the　Understanding；　and　also　in　the　application　of　the　latter　to　the
material　of　finitude　and　atomicity　which　goes　on　for　ever。　—　Le　plus　grand　ennemi　du　Bien；
c’est　le　Meilleur　is　the　utterance　of　true　common　sense　against　the　common　sense　of　idle
argumentation　and　abstract　reflection。　

Addition：　Completeness　means　the　exhaustive　collection　of　every　single　thing；　pertaining　to　a
given　field；　and　no　science　or　branch　of　knowledge　can　be　complete　in　this　sense。　Now　。　if　we　say
that　philosophy　or　any　one　of　the　sciences　is　incomplete；　we　are　not　far　from　holding　that　we　must
wait　until　the　deficiency　is　made　up；　since　the　best　part　may　still　be　wanting。　But　take　up　this
attitude　and　advance　is　impossible；　either　in　geometry；　which　seems　to　be　a　closed　science
although　new　propositions　do　arise；　or　in　philosophy；　which　is　always　capable　of　freshness　in　detail
even　though　its　subject　is　the　universal　Idea。　In　the　past；　the　universal　law　always　consisted　of　the
ten　commandments；　now　we　can　see　at　once　that　not　to　lay　down　the　law　‘Thou　shalt　not　kill’；
on　the　ground　that　a　legal　code　cannot　be　complete；　is　an　obvious　absurdity。　Any　code　could　be
still　better　—　no　effort　of　reflection　is　required　to　justify　this　affirmation；　we　can　think　of　the　best；
finest；　and　noblest　as　still　better；　finer；　and　nobler。　But　a　big　old　tree　puts　forth　more　and　more
branches　without　thereby　becoming　a　new　tree；　though　it　would　be　silly　to　refuse　to　plant　a　tree　at
all　simply　because　it　might　produce　new　branches。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　217。

The　principle　of　rightness　passes　over　in　civil　society　into　law。　My　individual
right；　whose　embodiment　has　hitherto　been　immediate　and　abstract；　now　similarly
becomes　embodied　in　the　existent　will　and　knowledge　of　everyone；　in　the　sense
that　it　becomes　recognised。　Hence　property　acquisitions　and　transfers　must　now
be　undertaken　and　concluded　only　in　the　form　which　that　embodiment　gives　to
them。　In　civil　society；　property　rests　on　contract　and　on　the　formalities　which
make　ownership　capable　of　proof　and　valid　in　law。　

Remark：　Original；　i。e。　direct；　titles　and　means　of　acquisition　（see　§§　54　ff。）　are　simply　discarded
in　civil　society　and　appear　only　as　isolated　accidents　or　as　subordinated　factors　of　property
transactions。　It　is　either　feeling；　refusing　to　move　beyond　the　subjective；　or　reflection；　clinging　to　its
abstract　essences；　which　casts　formalities　aside；　while　the　dry…as…dust　Understanding　may　for　its
part　cling　to　formalities　instead　of　the　real　thing　and　multiply　them　indefinitely。　

Apart　from　this；　however；　the　march　of　mental　development　is　the　long　and　hard　struggle　to　free　a
content　from　its　sensuous　and　immediate　form；　endow　it　with　its　appropriate　form　of　thought；　and
thereby　give　it　simple　and　adequate　expression。　It　is　because　this　is　the　case　that　when　the
development　of　law　is　just　beginning；　ceremonies　and　formalities　are　more　circumstantial　and　count
rather　as　the　thing　itself　than　as　its　symbol。　Thus　even　in　Roman　law；　a　number　of　forms　and
especially　phrases　were　retained　from　old…fashioned　ceremonial　usages；　instead　of　being　replaced
by　intelligible　forms　and　phrases　adequately　expressing　them。　

Addition：　Law　and　the　right　are　identical　in　the　sense　that　what　is　implicitly　right　is　posited　in　the
law。　I　possess　something；　own　a　property；　which　I　occupied　when　it　was　ownerless。　This
possession　must　now　further　be　recognised　and　posited　as　mine。　Hence　in　civil　society　formalities
arise　in　connection　with　property。　Boundary　stones　are　erected　as　a　symbol　for　others　to
recognise。　Entries　are　made　in　mortgage　and　property　registers。　Most　property　in　civil　society　is
held　on　contract；　and　contractual　forms　are　fixed　and　determinate。　Now　we　may　have　an　antipathy