philosophy of right-第45节

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


and　indeed　must；　be　acquired　simply　by　reading　the　numerous　quartos　which　it　fills。　The　monstrous
confusion；　however；　which　prevails　both　in　English　law　and　its　administration　is　graphically
portrayed　by　those　acquainted　with　the　matter。　In　particular；　they　comment　on　the　fact　that；　since
this　unwritten　law　is　contained　in　court　verdicts　and　judgments；　the　judges　are　continually
legislators。　The　authority　of　precedent　is　binding　on　them；　since　their　predecessors　have　done
nothing　but　give　expression　to　the　unwritten　law；　and　yet　they　are　just　as　much　exempt　from　its
authority；　because　they　are　themselves　repositories　of　the　unwritten　law　and　so　have　the　right　to
criticise　previous　judgments　and　pronounce　whether　they　accorded　with　the　unwritten　law　or　not。　

A　similar　confusion　might　have　arisen　in　the　legal　system　of　the　later　Roman　Empire　owing　to　the
different　but　authoritative　judgments　of　all　the　famous　jurists。　An　Emperor　met　the　situation；
however；　by　a　sensible　expedient　when；　by　what　was　called　the　Law　of　Citations；　he　set　up　a　kind
of　College　of　the　jurists　who　were　longest　deceased。　There　was　a　President；　and　the　majority　vote
was　accepted。　

No　greater　insult　could　be　offered　to　a　civilised　people　or　to　its　lawyers　than　to　deny　them　ability
to　codify　their　law；　for　such　ability　cannot　be　that　of　constructing　a　legal　system　with　a　novel
content；　but　only　that　of　apprehending；　i。e。　grasping　in　thought；　the　content　of　existing　laws　in　its
determinate　universality　and　then　applying　them　to　particular　cases。　

Addition：　The　sun　and　the　planets　have　their　laws　too；　but　they　do　not　know　them。　Savages　are
governed　by　impulses；　customs；　and　feelings；　but　they　are　unconscious　of　this。　When　right　is
posited　as　law　and　is　known；　every　accident　of　feeling　vanishes　together　with　the　form　of　revenge；
sympathy；　and　selfishness；　and　in　this　way　the　right　attains　for　the　first　time　its　true　determinacy　and
is　given　its　due　honour。　It　is　as　a　result　of　the　discipline　of　comprehending　the　right　that　the　right
first　becomes　capable　of　universality。　In　the　course　of　applying　the　laws；　clashes　occur；　and　in
dealing　with　these　the　judge’s　intelligence　has　its　proper　scope；　this　is　quite　inevitable；　because
otherwise　carrying　out　the　law　would　be　something　mechanical　from　start　to　finish。　But　to　go　so　far
as　to　get　rid　of　clashes　altogether　by　leaving　much　to　the　judge’s　discretion　is　a　far　worse　solution；
because　even　the　clash　is　intrinsic　to　thought；　to　conscious　thinking　and　its　dialectic；　while　the　mere
fiat　of　a　judge　would　be　arbitrary。　

It　is　generally　alleged　in　favour　of　customary　law　that　it　is　‘living’；　but　this　vitality；　i。e。　the　identity
between　the　subject　and　what　the　law　provides；　is　not　the　whole　essence　of　the　matter。　Law
（Recht）　must　be　known　by　thought；　it　must　be　a　system　in　itself；　and　only　as　such　can　it　be
recognised　in　a　civilised　country。　The　recent　denial　that　nations　‘have　a　vocation　to　codify　their
laws’　is　not　only　an　insult；　it　also　implies　the　absurdity　of　supposing　that　not　a　single　individual　has
been　endowed　with　skill　enough　to　bring　into　a　coherent　system　the　endless　mass　of　existing　laws。
The　truth　is　that　it　is　just　systematisation；　i。e。　elevation　to　the　universal；　which　our　time　is　pressing
for　without　any　limit。　A　similar　view　is　that　collections　of　judgments；　like　those　available　in　a
Corpus　juris；　are　far　superior　to　a　code　worked　out　in　the　most　general　way。　The　reason　alleged
is　that　such　judgments　always　retain　a　certain　particularity　and　a　certain　reminiscence　of　history
which　men　are　unwilling　to　sacrifice。　But　the　mischievousness　of　such　collections　is　made　clear
enough　by　the　practice　of　English　law。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　212。

It　is　only　because　of　this　identity　between　its　implicit　and　its　posited　character　that
positive　law　has　obligatory　force　in　virtue　of　its　rightness。　In　being　posited　in
positive　law；　the　right　acquires　determinate　existence。　Into　such　existence　there
may　enter　the　contingency　of　self…will　and　other　particular　circumstances　and
hence　there　may　be　a　discrepancy　between　the　content　of　the　law　and　the
principle　of　rightness。　

Remark：　In　positive　law；　therefore；　it　is　the　legal　which　is　the　source　of　our　knowledge　of　what
is　right；　or；　more　exactly；　of　our　legal　rights　（Rechtens）。　Thus　the　science　of　positive　law　is　to　that
extent　an　historical　science　with　authority　as　its　guiding　principle。　Anything　over　and　above　this
historical　study　is　matter　for　the　Understanding　and　concerns　the　collection　of　laws；　their
classification　on　external　principles；　deductions　from　them；　their　application　to　fresh　details；　&c。
When　the　Understanding　meddles　with　the　nature　of　the　thing　itself；　its　theories；　e。g。　of　criminal
law；　show　what　its　deductive　argumentation　can　concoct。　

The　science　of　positive　law　has　not　only　the　right；　but　even　the　inescapable　duty；　to　study　given
laws；　to　deduce　from　its　positive　data　their　progress　in　history；　their　applications　and　subdivisions；
down　to　the　last　detail；　and　to　exhibit　their　implications。　On　the　other　hand；　if；　after　all　these
deductions　have　been　proved；　the　further　question　about　the　rationality　of　a　specific　law　is　still
raised；　the　question　may　seem　perverse　to　those　who　are　busied　with　these　pursuits；　but　their
astonishment　at　it　should　at　least　stop　short　of　dismay。　

With　this　Remark；　compare　what　was　said　in　the　Remark　to　§　3　about　‘understanding’　the　law。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　213。

Right　becomes　determinate　in　the　first　place　when　it　has　the　form　of　being　posited
as　positive　law；　it　also　becomes　determinate　in　content　by　being　applied　both　to
the　material　of　civil　society　（i。e。　to　the　endlessly　growing　complexity　and
subdivision　of　social　ties　and　the　different　species　of　property　and　contract　within
the　society）　and　also　to　ethical　ties　based　on　the　heart；　on　love　and　trust；　though
only　in　so　far　as　these　involve　abstract　right　as　one　of　their　aspects　（see　§　159）　—
Morality　and　moral　commands　concern　the　will　on　its　most　private；　subjective；
and　particular　side；　and　so　cannot　be　a　matter　for　positive　legislation。　Further
material　for　the　determinate　content　of　law　is　provided　by　the　rights　and　duties
which　have　their　source　in　the　administration　of　justice　itself；　in　the　state；　and　so
forth。　

Addition：　In　the　higher　relationships　of　marriage；　love；　religion；　and　the　state；　the　only　aspects
which　can　become　the　subject　of　legislation　are　those　of　such　a　nature　as　to　permit　of　their　being　in
principle　external。　Still；　in　this　respect　there　is　a　wide　difference　between　the　laws　of　different
peoples。　The　Chinese；　for　instance；　have　a　law　requiring　a　husband　to　love　his　first　wife　more　than
his　other　wives。　If　he　is　convicted　of　doing　the　opposite；　corporal　punishment　follows。　Similarly；
the　legislation　of　the　ancients　in　earlier　times　was　full　of　precepts　about　uprightness　and　integrity
which　are　unsuited　by　nature　to　legal　enactment　because　they　fall　wholly　within　the　field　of　the　inner
life。　It　is　only　in　the　case　of　the　oath；　whereby　things　are　brought　home　to　conscience；　that
uprightness　and　integrity　must　be　taken　into　account　as　the　substance　of　the　matter。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　214。

But　apart　from　being　applied　to　particular　instances；　right　by　being　embodied　in
positive　law　becomes　applicable　to　the　single　case。　Hence　it　enters　the　sphere
where　quantity；　not　the　concept；　is　the　principle　of　determination。　This　is　the
sphere　of　the　quantitative　as　such；　of　the　quantitative　as　that　which　determines　the
relative　value　in　exchange　of　qualia。　In　this　sphere；　the　concept　merely　lays　down
a　general　limit；　within　which　vacillation　is　still　allowed。　This　vacillation　must　be
terminated；　however；　in　the　interest　of　getting　something　done；　and　for　this　reason
there　is　a　place　within　that　limit　for　contingent　and　arbitrary　decisions。　

Remark：　The　purely　positive　side　of　law　lies　chiefly　in　this　focusing　of　the　universal　not　merely　on
a　particular　instance；　but　on　an　isolated　case；　i。e。　in　its　direct　application。　Reason　cannot
determine；　nor　can　the　concept　provide　any　principle　whose　application　could　decide　whether
justice　requires　for　an　offence　（i）　a　corporal　punishment　of　forty　lashes　or　thirty…nine；　or　（ii）　a　fine
of　five　dollars　or　four　dollars　ninety…three；　four；　&c。；　cents；　or　（iii）　imprisonment　of　a　year　or　three
hundred　and　sixty…four；　three；　&c。；　days；　or　a　year　and　one；　two；　or　three　days。　And　yet　injustice
is　done　at　once　if　there　is　one　lash　too　many；　or　one　dollar　or　one　cent；　one　week　in　prison　or　one
day；　too　many　or　too　few。　

Reason　itself　requires　us　to　recognise　that　contingency；　contradiction；　and　show　have　a　sphere　and
a　right　of　their　own；　restricted　though　it　be；　and　it　is　irrational　to　strive　to　resolve　and　rectify
contradictions　within　that　sphere。　Here　the　only　interest　present　is　that　something　be　actually　done；
that　the　matter　be　settled　and　decided　somehow；　no　matter　how　（within　a　certain　limit）。　This
decision　pertains　to　abstract　subjectivity；　to　formal　self…certainty；　which　may　decide　either　by
simply　holding　to　its　power　（within　that