philosophy of right-第44节

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into　classes　came　about　objectively　of　itself；　because　it　is　inherently　rational；　but　the　principle　of
subjective　particularity　was　at　the　same　time　denied　its　rights；　in　that；　for　example；　the　allotment　of
individuals　to　classes　was　left　to　the　ruling　class；　as　in　Plato’s　Republic；　or　to　the　accident　of　birth；
as　in　the　Indian　caste…system。　Thus　subjective　particularity　was　not　incorporated　into　the
organisation　of　society　as　a　whole；　it　was　not　reconciled　in　the　whole；　and　therefore　—　since　as　an
essential　moment　it　emerges　there　in　any　event　—　it　shows　itself　there　as　something　hostile；　as　a
corruption　of　the　social　order　（see　Remark　to　§　185）Either　it　overthrows　society；　as　happened　in
the　Greek　states　and　in　the　Roman　Republic；　or　else；　should　society　preserve　itself　in　being　as　a
force　or　as　a　religious　authority；　for　instance；　it　appears　as　inner　corruption　and　complete
degeneration；　as　was　the　case　to　some　extent　in　Sparta　and　is　now　altogether　the　case　in　India。　

But　when　subjective　particularity　is　upheld　by　the　objective　order　in　conformity　with　it　and　is　at　the
same　time　allowed　its　rights；　then　it　becomes　the　animating　principle　of　the　entire　civil　society；　of
the　development　alike　of　mental　activity；　merit；　and　dignity。　The　recognition　and　the　right　that　what
is　brought　about　by　reason　of　necessity　in　civil　society　and　the　state　shall　at　the　same　time　be
effected　by　the　mediation　of　the　arbitrary　will　is　the　more　precise　definition　of　what　is　primarily
meant　by　freedom　in　common　parlance　（see　§　121）。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　207。

A　man　actualises　himself　only　in　becoming　something　definite；　i。e。　something
specifically　particularised；　this　means　restricting　himself　exclusively　to　one　of　the
particular　spheres　of　need。　In　this　class…system；　the　ethical　frame　of　mind
therefore　is　rectitude　and　esprit　de　corps；　i。e。　the　disposition　to　make　oneself　a
member　of　one　of　the　moments　of　civil　society　by　one’s　own　act；　through　one’s
energy；　industry；　and　skill；　to　maintain　oneself　in　this　position；　and　to　fend　for
oneself　only　through　this　process　of　mediating　oneself　with　the　universal；　while　in
this　way　gaining　recognition　both　in　one’s　own　eyes　and　in　the　eyes　of　others。
Morality　has　its　proper　place　in　this　sphere　where　the　paramount　thing　is
reflection　on　one’s　doings；　and　the　quest　of　happiness　and　private　wants；　and
where　the　contingency　in　satisfying　these　makes　into　a　duty　even　a　single　and
contingent　act　of　assistance。　

Remark：　At　first　（i。e。　especially　in　youth）　a　man　chafes　at　the　idea　of　resolving　on　a　particular
social　position；　and　looks　upon　this　as　a　restriction　on　his　universal　character　and　as　a　necessity
imposed　on　him　purely　ab　extra。　This　is　because　his　thinking　is　still　of　that　abstract　kind　which
refuses　to　move　beyond　the　universal　and　so　never　reaches　the　actual。　It　does　not　realise　that　if　the
concept　is　to　be　determinate；　it　must　first　of　all　advance　into　the　distinction　between　the　concept
and　its　real　existence　and　thereby　into　determinacy　and　particularity　（see　§　7）　—　It　is　only　thus　that
the　concept　can　win　actuality　and　ethical　objectivity。　

Addition：　When　we　say　that　a　man　must　be　a　‘somebody’；　we　mean　that　he　should　belong　to
some　specific　social　class；　since　to　be　a　somebody　means　to　have　substantive　being。　A　man　with
no　class　is　a　mere　private　person　and　his　universality　is　not　actualised。　On　the　other　hand；　the
individual　in　his　particularity　may　take　himself　as　the　universal　and　presume　that　by　entering　a　class
he　is　surrendering　himself　to　an　indignity。　This　is　the　false　idea　that　in　attaining　a　determinacy
necessary　to　it；　a　thing　is　restricting　and　surrendering　itself。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　208。

As　the　private　particularity　of　knowing　and　willing；　the　principle　of　this　system　of
needs　contains　absolute　universality；　the　universality　of　freedom；　only　abstractly
and　therefore　as　the　right　of　property。　At　this　point；　however；　this　right　is　no
longer　merely　implicit　but　has　attained　its　recognised　actuality　as　the　protection　of
property　through　the　administration　of　justice。　

　　　　　B。　Administration　of　Justice

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　a：　Right　as　Law　　　　　b：　Determinate　Law　　　　　c：　Courts　　


　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　209。

The　relatedness　arising　from　the　reciprocal　bearing　on　one　another　of　needs　and
labour　to　satisfy　these　is　first　of　all　reflected　into　itself　as　infinite　personality；　as
abstract　right。　But　it　is　this　very　sphere　of　relatedness　—　a　sphere　of　education；
which　gives　abstract　right　the　determinate　existence　of　being　something
universally　recognised；　known；　and　willed；　and　having　a　validity　and　an　objective
actuality　mediated　by　this　known　and　willed　character。　

Remark：　It　is　part　of　education；　of　thinking　as　the　consciousness　of　the　single　in　the　form　of
universality；　that　the　ego　comes　to　be　apprehended　as　a　universal　person　in　which　all　are　identical。
A　man　counts　as　‘a　man　in　virtue　of　his　manhood　alone；　not　because　he　is　a　Jew；　Catholic；
Protestant；　German；　Italian；　&c。　This　is　an　assertion　which　thinking　ratifies　and　to　be　conscious　of
it　is　of　infinite　importance。　It　is　defective　only　when　it　is　crystallised；　e。g。　as　a　cosmopolitanism　in
opposition　to　the　concrete　life　of　the　state。　

Addition：　From　one　point　of　view；　it　is　through　the　working　of　the　system　of　particularity　that
right　becomes　an　external　compulsion　as　a　protection　of　particular　interests。　Even　though　this　result
is　due　to　the　concept；　right　none　the　less　only　becomes　something　existent　because　this　is　useful　for
men’s　needs。　To　become　conscious　in　thought　of　his　right；　man　must　be　trained　to　think　and　give
up　dallying　with　mere　sensation。　We　must　invest　the　objects　of　our　thought　with　the　form　of
universality　and　similarly　we　must　direct　our　willing　by　a　universal　principle。　It　is　only　after　man　has
devised　numerous　needs　and　after　their　acquisition　has　become　intertwined　with　his　satisfaction；
that　he　can　frame　laws　for　himself。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　210。

The　objective　actuality　of　the　right　consists；　first；　in　its　existence　for
consciousness；　in　its　being　known　in　some　way　or　other；　secondly；　in　its
possessing　the　power　which　the　actual　possesses；　in　its　being　valid；　and　so　also　in
its　becoming　known　as　universally　valid。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（a）　Right　as　Law
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　211。

The　principle　of　rightness　becomes　the　law　（Gesetz）　when；　in　its　objective
existence；　it　is　posited　（gesetzt）；　i。e。　when　thinking　makes　it　determinate　for
consciousness　and　makes　it　known　as　what　is　right　and　valid；　and　in　acquiring　this
determinate　character；　the　right　becomes　positive　law　in　general。　

Remark：　To　posit　something　as　universal；　i。e。　to　bring　it　before　consciousness　as　universal；　is；　I
need　hardly　say；　to　think　（compare　Remarks　to　§§　13　and　21）。　Thereby　its　content　is　reduced　to
its　simplest　form　and　so　is　given　its　final　determinacy。　In　becoming　law；　what　is　right　first　time　not
only　the　form　proper　to　its　universality；　but　also　its　determinacy。　Hence　making　a　law　is　not　to　be
represented　as　merely　the　expression　of　a　rule　of　behaviour；　valid　for　everyone；　though　that　is　one
moment　in　legislation；　the　more　important　moment；　the　inner　essence　of　the　matter；　is　knowledge
of　the　content　of　the　law　in　its　determinate　universality。　

Since　it　is　only　animals　which　have　their　law　as　instinct；　while　it　is　man　alone　who　has　law　as
custom；　even　systems　of　customary　law　contain　the　moment　of　being　thoughts　and　being　known。
Their　difference　from　positive　law　consists　solely　in　this；　that　they　are　known　only　in　a　subjective
and　accidental　way；　with　the　result　that　in　themselves　they　are　less　determinate　and　the　universality
of　thought　is　less　clear　in　them。　（And　apart　from　this；　knowledge　of　a　system　of　law　either　in
general　or　in　its　details；　is　the　accidental　possession　of　a　few。）　The　supposition　that　it　is　customary
law；　on　the　strength　of　its　character　as　custom；　which　possesses　the　privilege　of　having　become
part　of　life　is　a　delusion；　since　he　valid　laws　of　a　nation　do　not　cease　to　be　its　customs　by　being
written　and　codified　—　and　besides；　it　is　as　a　rule　precisely　those　versed　in　the　deadest　of　topics
and　the　deadest　of　thoughts　who　talk　nowadays　of　‘life’　and　of　‘becoming　part　of　life’。　When
a　nation　begins　to　acquire　even　a　little　culture；　its　customary　law　must　soon　come　to　be　collected
and　put　together。　Such　a　collection　is　a　legal　code；　but　one　which；　as　a　mere　collection；　is
markedly　formless；　indeterminate；　and　fragmentary。　The　main　difference　between　it　and　a　code
properly　so…called　is　that　in　the　latter　the　principles　of　jurisprudence　in　their　universality；　and　so　in
their　determinacy；　have　been　apprehended　in　terms　of　thought　and　expressed。　English　national　law
or　municipal　law　is　contained；　as　is　well　known；　in　statutes　（written　laws）　and　in　so…called
‘unwritten’　laws。　This　unwritten　law；　however；　is　as　good　as　written；　and　knowledge　of　it　may；
and　indeed　must；　be　acquired　simply　by　reading　the　numerous　quartos　which　it　fills。　The　monstrous
confusion；　however；　which　prevails　both　i