philosophy of right-第38节

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stand　on　their　own　feet；　and　so　are　leaving　their　parents　behind　them。　The　parents；　on　the　other
hand；　possess　in　their　children　the　objective　embodiment　of　their　union。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　176。　

Marriage　is　but　the　ethical　Idea　in　its　immediacy　and　so　has　its　objective　actuality
only　in　the　inwardness　of　subjective　feeling　and　disposition。　In　this　fact　is　rooted
the　fundamental　contingency　of　marriage　in　the　world　of　existence。　There　can　be
no　compulsion　on　people　to　marry；　and；　on　the　other　hand；　there　is　no　merely
legal　or　positive　bond　which　can　hold　the　parties　together　once　their　dispositions
and　actions　have　become　hostile　and　contrary。　A　third　ethical　authority；　however；
is　called　for　to　maintain　the　right　of　marriage　…　an　ethical　substantiality　…　against
the　mere　whims　of　hostile　disposition　or　the　accident　of　a　purely　passing　mood；
and　so　forth。　Such　an　authority　distinguishes　these　from　the　total　estrangement　of
the　two　parties　and　may　not　grant　divorce　until　it　is　satisfied　that　the　estrangement
is　total。　

Addition：　It　is　because　marriage　depends　entirely　on　feeling；　something　subjective　and
contingent；　that　it　may　be　dissolved。　The　state；　on　the　other　hand；　is　not　subject　to　partition；
because　it　rests　on　law。　To　be　sure；　marriage　ought　to　be　indissoluble；　but　here　again　we　have　to
stop　at　this　'ought'；　yet；　since　marriage　is　an　ethical　institution；　it　cannot　be　dissolved　at　will　but　only
by　an　ethical　authority；　whether　the　church　or　the　law…court。　If　the　parties　are　completely
estranged；　e。g。　owing　to　adultery；　then　even　the　ecclesiastical　authority　must　permit　divorce。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　177。　

The　ethical　dissolution　of　the　family　consists　in　this；　that　once　the　children　have
been　educated　to　freedom　of　personality；　and　have　come　of　age；　they　become
recognised　as　persons　in　the　eyes　of　the　law　and　as　capable　of　holding　free
property　of　their　own　and　founding　families　of　their　own；　the　sons　as　heads　of
new　families；　the　daughters　as　wives。　They　now　have　their　substantive　destiny　in
the　new　family；　the　old　family　on　the　other　hand　falls　into　the　background　as
merely　their　ultimate　basis　and　origin；　while　a　fortiori　the　clan　is　an　abstraction；
devoid　of　rights。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　178。　

The　natural　dissolution　of　the　family　by　the　death　of　the　parents；　particularly　the
father；　has　inheritance　as　its　consequence　so　far　as　the　family　capital　is
concerned。　The　essence　of　inheritance　is　the　transfer　to　private　ownership　of
property　which　is　in　principle　common。　When　comparatively　remote　degrees　of
kinship　are　in　question；　and　when　persons　and　families　are　so　dispersed　in　civil
society　that　they　have　begun　to　gain　self…subsistence；　this　transfer　becomes　the
less　hard　and　fast　as　the　sense　of　family　unity　fades　away　and　as　every　marriage
becomes　the　surrender　of　previous　family　relationships　and　the　founding　of　a　new
self…subsistent　family。　

Remark：　It　has　been　suggested　I　that　the　basis　of　inheritance　ties　in　the　fact　that；　by　a　man's
death；　his　property　becomes　wealth　without　an　owner；　and　as　such　falls　to　the　first　person　who
takes　possession　of　it；　because　；of　course　it　is　the　relatives　who　are　normally　nearest　a　man's
death…bed　and　so　they　are　generally　the　first　to　take　possession。　Hence　it　is　supposed　that　this
customary　occurrence　is　made　a　rule　by　positive　legislation　in　the　interests　of　orderliness。　This
ingenious　idea　disregards　the　；nature　of　family　relationship。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　179。　

The　result　of　this　disintegration　of　the　family　is　that　a　man　may　at　will　either
squander　his　capital　altogether；　mainly　in　accordance　with　his　private　caprices；
opinions；　and　ends；　or　else　look　upon　a　circle　of　friends　and　acquaintances；　&c。；
as　if　they　were　his　family　and　make　a　will　embodying　a　declaration　to　that　effect；
with　the　result　that　they　become　his　legal　heirs。　

Remark：　The　ethical　justification　of　freedom　to　dispose　of　one's　property　by　'will　to　a　circle　of
friends　would　depend　on　the　formation　of　such　a　circle；　there　goes　to　its　formation　so　much
accident；　arbitrariness；　and　self…seeking；　&c。　…　especially　since　testamentary　hopes　have　a　bearing
on　readiness　to　enter　it　…　that　the　ethical　moment　in　it　is　only　something　very　vague。　Further；　the
recognition　of　a　man's　competence　to　bequeath　his　property　arbitrarily　is　much　more　likely　to　be
an　occasion　for　breach　of　ethical　obligations　and　for　mean　exertions　and　equally　mean
subservience；　and　it　also　provides　opportunity　and　justification　for　the　folly；　caprice；　and　malice　of
attaching　to　professed　benefactions　and　gifts　vain；　tyrannical；　and　vexatious　conditions　operative
after　the　testator's　death　and　so　in　any　case　after　his　property　ceases　to　be　his。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　180。　

The　principle　that　the　members　of　the　family　grow　up　to　be　self…subsistent
persons　in　the　eyes　of　the　law　（see　§　177）　lets　into　the　circle　of　the　family
something　of　the　same　arbitrariness　and　discrimination　among　the　natural　heirs；
though　its　exercise　there　must　be　restricted　to　a　minimum　in　order　to　prevent
injury　to　the　basic　family　relationship。　

Remark：　The　mere　downright　arbitrariness　of　the　deceased　cannot　be　made　the　principle
underlying　the　right　to　make　a　will；　especially　if　it　runs　counter　to　the　substantive　right　of　the　family。
For　after　all　no　respect　would　be　forthcoming　for　his　wishes　after　his　death；　if　not　from　the　family's
love　and　veneration　for　its　deceased　fellow…member。　Such　arbitrariness　by　itself　contains　nothing
worthy　of　higher　respect　than　the　right　of　the　family　as　such　…　on　the　contrary。　

The　other　ground　for　the　validity　of　testamentary　disposition　would　consist　simply　in　its　arbitrary
recognition　by　others。　But　such　an　argument　may　prima　facie　be　admitted　only　when　family　ties；　to
which　testamentary　disposition　is　intrinsic；　become　remoter　and　more　ineffective。　If　they　are
actually　present；　however；　without　being　effective；　the　situation　is　unethical；　and　to　give　extended
validity　to　arbitrary　dispositions　at　the　expense　of　family　ties　eo　ipso　weakens　the　ethical　character
of　the　latter。　

To　make　the　father's　arbitrary　will　within　the　family　the　main　principle　of　inheritance　was　part　of　the
harsh　and　unethical　legal　system　of　Rome　to　which　reference　has　been　made　already。　That　system
even　gave　a　father　power　to　sell　his　son；　and　if　the　son　was　manumitted　by　a　third　party；　he　came
under　his　father's　potestas　once　more。　Not　until　he　was　manumitted　a　third　time　was　he　actually
and　finally　free。　The　son　never　attained　his　majority　de　jure　nor　did　he　become　a　person　in　law；
the　only　property　he　could　hold　was　booty　won　in　war　（peculium　castrense）。　If　he　passed　out　of
his　father's　potestas　after　being　thrice　sold　and　manumitted；　he　did　not　inherit　along　with　those
who　had　continued　in　bondage　to　the　head　of　the　family；　unless　the　will　specifically　so　provided。
Similarly；　a　wife　remained　attached　to　her　family　of　origin　rather　than　to　the　new　family　which　by
her　marriage　she　had　helped　to　found；　and　which　was　now　properly　her　own；　and　she　was
therefore　precluded　from　inheriting　any　share　of　the　goods　of　what　was　properly　her　own　family；
for　neither　wife　nor　mother　shared　in　the　distribution　of　an　estate。　

Later；　with　the　growing　feeling　for　rationality；　the　unethical　provisions　of　laws　such　as　these　and
others　were　evaded　in　the　course　of　their　administration；　for　example　with　the　help　of　the
expression　bonorum　possessio　instead　of　hereditas；　and　through　the　fiction　of　nicknaming　a　filia
a　filius。　This　was　referred　to　above　（see　Remark　to　§　3）　as　the　sad　necessity　to　which　the　judge
was　reduced　in　the　face　of　bad　laws　…　the　necessity　of　smuggling　reason　into　them　on　the　sly；　or　at
least　into　some　of　their　consequences。　Connected　with　this　were　the　terrible　instability　of　the　chief
political　institutions　and　a　riot　of　legislation　to　stem　the　outbreak　of　resulting　evils。　

From　Roman　history　and　the　writings　of　Lucian　and　others；　we　are　sufficiently　familiar　with　the
unethical　consequences　of　giving　the　head　of　a　Roman　family　the　right　to　name　whom　he　pleased
as　his　heir。　

Marriage　is　ethical　life　at　the　level　of　immediacy；　in　the　very　nature　of　the　case；　therefore；　it　must
be　a　mixture　of　a　substantial　tie　with　natural　contingency　and　inner　arbitrariness。　Now　when　by　the
slave…status　of　children；　by　legal　provisions　such　as　those　mentioned　above　as　well　as　others
consequential　upon　them；　and　in　addition　by　the　ease　of　Roman　divorce；　pride　of　place　is　given　to
arbitrariness　instead　of　to　the　right　of　the　substantial　（so　that　even　Cicero　…　and　what　fine　writing
about　the　Honestum　and　Decorum　there　is　in　his　De　Officiis　and　in　all　sorts　of　other　places！　…
even　Cicero　divorced　his　wife　as　a　business　speculation　in　order　to　pay　his　debts　with　his　new
wife's　dowry）；　then　a　legal　road　is　paved　to　the　corruption　of　manners；　or　rather　the　laws
themselves　necessitate　such　corruption。　

The　institution　of　heirs…at…law　with　a　view　to　preserving　the　family　and　its　splendour　by　means　of
fideicommissa　and　substitutiones　（in　order　to　favour　sons　by　excluding　da