philosophy of right-第36节

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parties　is　crystallised　out　of　its　physical　and　subjective　mode　and　lifted　to　the　thought　of　what　is
substantive；　instead　of　continually　reserving　to　itself　the　contingency　and　caprice　of　bodily　desire；　it
removes　the　marriage　bond　from　the　province　of　this　caprice；　surrenders　to　the　substantive；　and
swears　allegiance　to　the　Penates；　the　physical　moment　it　subordinates　until　it　becomes　something
wholly　conditioned　by　the　true　and　ethical　character　of　the　marriage　relation　and　by　the　recognition
of　the　bond　as　an　ethical　one。　It　is　effrontery　and　its　buttress；　the　Understanding；　which　cannot
apprehend　the　speculative　character　of　the　substantial　tie；　nevertheless；　with　this　speculative
character　there　correspond　both　ethical　purity　of　heart　and　the　legislation　of　Christian　peoples。　

Addition：　Friedrich　von　Schlegel　in　his　Lucinde；　and　a　follower　of　his　in　the　Briefe　eines
Ungenannten；　I　have　put　forward　the　view　that　the　wedding　ceremony　is　superfluous　and　a
formality　which　might　be　discarded。　Their　reason　is　that　love　is；　so　they　say；　the　substance　of
marriage　and　that　the　celebration　therefore　detracts　from　its　worth。　Surrender　to　sensual　impulse　is
here　represented　as　necessary　to　prove　the　freedom　and　inwardness　of　love　…　an　argument　not
unknown　to　seducers。　

It　must　be　noticed　in　connection　with　sex…relations　that　a　girl　in　surrendering　her　body　loses　her
honour。　With　a　man；　however；　the　case　is　otherwise；　because　he　has　a　field　for　ethical　activity
outside　the　family。　A　girl　is　destined　in　essence　for　the　marriage　tie　and　for　that　only；　it　is　therefore
demanded　of　her　that　her　love　shall　take　the　form　of　marriage　and　that　the　different　moments　in
love　shall　attain　their　true　rational　relation　to　each　other。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　165。　

The　difference　in　the　physical　characteristics　of　the　two　sexes　has　a　rational　basis
and　consequently　acquires　an　intellectual　and　ethical　significance。　This
significance　is　determined　by　the　difference　into　which　the　ethical　substantiality；
as　the　concept；　internally　sunders　itself　in　order　that　its　vitality　may　become　a
concrete　unity　consequent　upon　this　difference。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　166。　

Thus　one　sex　is　mind　in　its　self…diremption　into　explicit　personal　self…subsistence
and　the　knowledge　and　volition　of　free　universality；　i。e。　the　self…consciousness　of
conceptual　thought　and　the　volition　of　the　objective　final　end。　The　other　sex　is
mind　maintaining　itself　in　unity　as　knowledge　and　volition　of　the　substantive；　but
knowledge　and　volition　in　the　form　of　concrete　individuality　and　feeling。　In
relation　to　externality；　the　former　is　powerful　and　active；　the　latter　passive　and
subjective。　It　follows　that　man　has　his　actual　substantive　life　in　the　state；　in
learning；　and　so　forth；　as　well　as　in　labour　and　struggle　with　the　external　world
and　with　himself　so　that　it　is　only　out　of　his　diremption　that　he　fights　his　way　to
self…subsistent　unity　with　himself。　In　the　family　he　has　a　tranquil　intuition　of　this
unity；　and　there　he　lives　a　subjective　ethical　life　on　the　plane　of　feeling。　Woman；
on　the　other　hand；　has　her　substantive　destiny　in　the　family；　and　to　be　imbued
with　family　piety　is　her　ethical　frame　of　mind。　

Remark：　For　this　reason；　family　piety　is　expounded　in　Sophocles'　Antigone　…　one　of　the　most
sublime　presentations　of　this　virtue　…　as　principally　the　law　of　woman；　and　as　the　law　of　a
substantiality　at　once　subjective　and　on　the　plane　of　feeling；　the　law　of　the　inward　life；　a　life　which
has　not　yet　attained　its　full　actualisation；　as　the　law　of　the　ancient　gods；　'the　Gods　of　the
underworld；　as　'an　everlasting　law；　and　no　man　knows　at　what　time　it　was　first　put　forth'。　This　law
is　there　displayed　as　a　law　opposed　to　public　law；　to　the　law　of　the　land。　This　is　the　supreme
opposition　in　ethics　and　therefore　in　tragedy；　and　it　is　individualised　in　the　same　play　in　the
opposing　natures　of　man　and　woman。　

Addition：　Women　are　capable　of　education；　but　they　are　not　made　for　activities　which　demand
a　universal　faculty　such　as　the　more　advanced　sciences；　philosophy；　and　certain　forms　of　artistic
production。　Women　may　have　happy　ideas；　taste；　and　elegance；　but　they　cannot　attain　to　the　ideal。
（Ideale。　By　this　word　Hegel　means　'the　Beautiful　and　whatever　tends　thither'　（Science　of　Logic；　i。
163；　footnote）。　It　is　to　be　distinguished；　therefore；　from　Ideelle＇　The　difference　between　men　and
women　is　like　that　between　animals　and　plants。　Men　correspond　to　animals；　while　women
correspond　to　plants　because　their　development　is　more　placid　and　the　principle　that　underlies　it　is
the　rather　vague　unity　of　feeling。　When　women　hold　the　helm　of　government；　the　state　is　at　once　in
jeopardy；　because　women　regulate　their　actions　not　by　the　demands　of　universality　but　by
arbitrary　inclinations　and　opinions。　Women　are　educated　…　who　knows　how？　…　as　it　were　by
breathing　in　ideas；　by　living　rather　than　by　acquiring　knowledge。　The　status　of　manhood；　on　the
other　hand；　is　attained　only　by　the　stress　of　thought　and　much　technical　exertion。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　167。　

In　essence　marriage　is　monogamy　because　it　is　personality　…　immediate　exclusive
individuality　…　which　enters　into　this　tie　and　surrenders　itself　to　it；　and　hence　the
tie's　truth　and　inwardness　（i。e。　the　subjective　form　of　its　substantiality）　proceeds
only　from　the　mutual；　whole…hearted；　surrender　of　this　personality。　Personality
attains　its　right　of　being　conscious　of　itself　in　another　only　in　so　far　as　the　other　is
in　this　identical　relationship　as　a　person；　i。e。　as　an　atomic　individual。　

Remark：　Marriage；　and　especially　monogamy；　is　one　of　the　absolute　principles　I　on　which　the
ethical　life　of　a　community　depends。　Hence　marriage　comes　to　be　recorded　as　one　of　the　moments
in　the　founding　of　states　by　gods　or　heroes。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　168。　

Further；　marriage　results　from　the　free　surrender　by　both　sexes　of　their
personality　…　a　personality　in　every　possible　way　unique　in　each　of　the　parties。
Consequently；　it　ought　not　to　be　entered　by　two　people　identical　in　stock　who　are
already　acquainted　and　perfectly　known　to　one　another；　for　individuals　in　the
same　circle　of　relationship　have　no　special　personality　of　their　own　in　contrast
with　that　of　others　in　the　same　circle。　On　the　contrary；　the　parties　should　be
drawn　from　separate　families　and　their　personalities　should　be　different　in　origin。
Since　the　very　conception　of　marriage　is　that　it　is　a　freely　undertaken　ethical
transaction；　not　a　tie　directly　grounded　in　the　physical　organism　and　its　desires；　it
follows　that　the　marriage　of　blood…relations　runs　counter　to　this　conception　and　so
also　to　genuine　natural　feeling。　

Remark：　Marriage　itself　is　sometimes　said　to　he　grounded　not　in　natural　rights　but　simply　in
instinctive　sexual　impulses；　or　again　it　is　treated　as　a　contract　with　an　arbitrary　basis。　External
arguments　in　support　of　monogamy　have　been　drawn　from　physical　considerations　such　as　the
number　of　men　and　women。　Dark　feelings　of　repulsion　are　advanced　as　the　sole　ground　for
prohibiting　consanguineous　marriage。　the　basis　of　all　these　views　is　the　fashionable　idea　of　a　state
of　nature　and　a　natural　origin　for　rights；　and　the　lack　of　the　concept　of　rationality　and　freedom。　

Addition：　A　sense　of　shame　…　to　go　no　farther　…　is　a　bar　to　consanguineous　marriage。　But　this
repugnance　finds　justification　in　the　concept　of　the　thing。　What　is　already　united；　I　mean；　cannot　be
united　for　the　first　time　by　marriage。　It　is　a　commonplace　of　stock…breeding　that　the　offspring　is
comparatively　weak　when　animals　of　the　same　stock　arc　mated；　since　if　there　is　to　be　unification
there　must　first　be　division。　The　force　of　generation；　as　of　mind；　is　all　the　greater；　the　greater　the
oppositions　out　of　which　it　is　reproduced。　Familiarity；　close　acquaintance；　the　habit　of　common
pursuits；　should　not　precede　marriage；　they　should　come　about　for　the　first　time　within　it。　And　their
development　has　all　the　more　value；　the　richer　it　is　and　the　more　facets　it　has。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　169。　

The　family；　as　person；　has　its　real　external　existence　in　property；　and　it　is　only
when　this　property　takes　the　form　of　capital　that　it　becomes　the　embodiment　of
the　substantial　personality　of　the　family。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　B。　The　Family　Capital
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　170。　

It　is　not　merely　property　which　a　family　possesses；　as　a　universal　and　enduring
person；　it　requires　possessions　specifically　determined　as　permanent　and　secure；
i。e。　it　requires　capital。　The　arbitrariness　of　a　single　owner's　particular　needs　is　one
moment　in　property　taken　abstractly；　but　this　moment；　together　with　the
selfishness　of　desire；　is　here　transformed　into　something　ethical；　into　labour　and
care　for　a　common　possession。　

Remark：　In　the　sagas　of　the　founding　of　states；　or　at　least　of　a　social　and　orderly　life；　the
introduction　of　permanent　property　is　linked　with　the　introduction　of　marriage。　The　nature　of　this
capital；　however；　and　the　proper　means　of　its　consolidation　will　appear　in　the　section　on　civil
society。