philosophy of right-第35节

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particular　inclination　of　the　two　persons　who　are　entering　upon　the　marriage　tie；
or　in　the　foresight　and　contrivance　of　the　parents；　and　so　forth。　But　its　objective
source　lies　in　the　free　consent　of　the　persons；　especially　in　their　consent　to　make
themselves　one　person；　to　renounce　their　natural　and　individual　personality　to　this
unity　of　one　with　the　other。　From　this　point　of　view；　their　union　is　a
self…restriction；　but　in　fact　it　is　their　liberation；　because　in　it　they　attain　their
substantive　self…consciousness。　

Remark：　Our　objectively　appointed　end　and　so　our　ethical　duty　is　to　enter　the　married　state。
The　external　origin　of　any　particular　marriage　is　in　the　lure　of　the　case　contingent；　and　it　depends
principally　on　the　extent　which　reflective　thought　has　been　developed。　At　one　extreme；　the　step　is
that　the　marriage　is　arranged　by　the　contrivance　of　benevolent　parents；　the　appointed　end　of　the
parties　is　a　union　of　mutual　love；　their　inclination　to　marry　arises　from　the　fact　that　each　grows
acquainted　with　the　other　from　the　first　as　a　destined　partner。　At　the　other　extreme；　it　is　the
inclination　of　the　parties　which　comes　first；　appearing　in　them　as　these　two　infinitely　particularised
individuals。　The　more　ethical　way　to　matrimony　may　be　taken　to　be　the　former　extreme　or　any
way　at　all　whereby　the　decision　to　marry　comes　first　and　the　inclination　to　do　so　follows；　so　that　in
the　actual　wedding　both　decision　and　inclination　coalesce。　In　the　latter　extreme；　it　is　the　uniqueness
of　the　infinitely　particularised　which　makes　good　its　claims　in　accordance　with　the　subjective
principle　of　the　modern　world　（see　Remark　to　§　124）。　

But　those　works　of　modern　art；　dramatic　and　other；　in　which　the　love　of　the　sexes　is　the　main
interest；　are　pervaded　by　a　chill　despite　the　heat　of　passion　they　portray；　for　they　associate　the
passion　with　accident　throughout　and　represent　the　entire　dramatic　interest　as　if　it　rested　solely　on
the　characters　as　these　individuals；　what　rests　on　them　may　indeed　be　of　infinite　importance　to
them；　but　is　of　none　whatever　in　itself。　

Addition：　Amongst　peoples　who　hold　the　female　sex　in　scant　respect；　marriages　are　arranged
by　the　parents　at　will　without　consulting　the　young　people。　The　latter　raise　no　objection；　since　at
that　level　of　culture　the　particularity　of　feeling　makes　no　claims　for　itself。　For　the　woman　it　is　only　a
matter　of　getting　a　husband；　for　the　man；　of　getting　a　wife。　In　other　social　conditions；
considerations　of　wealth；　connections；　political　ends；　may　be　the　determining　factor。　In　such
circumstances；　great　hardships　may　arise　through　making　marriage　a　means　to　other　ends。
Nowadays；　however；　the　subjective　origin　of　marriage；　the　state　of　being　in　love；　is　regarded　as
the　only　important　originating　factor。　Here　the　position　is　represented　to　be　that　a　man　must　wait
until　his　hour　has　struck　and　that　he　can　bestow　his　love　only　on　one　specific　individual。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　163。　

The　ethical　aspect　of　marriage　consists　in　the　parties'　consciousness　of　this　unity
as　their　substantive　aim；　and　so　in　their　love；　trust；　and　common　sharing　of　their
entire　existence　as　individuals。　When　the　parties　are　in　this　frame　of　mind　and
their　union　is　actual；　their　physical　passion　sinks　to　the　level　of　a　physical
moment；　destined　to　vanish　in　its　very　satisfaction。　On　the　other　hand；　the
spiritual　bond　of　union　secures　its　rights　as　the　substance　of　marriage　and　thus
rises；　inherently　indissoluble；　to　a　plane　above　the　contingency　of　passion　and　the
transience　of　particular　caprice。　

Remark：　It　was　noted　above　（in　§　75）　that　marriage；　so　far　as　its　essential　basis　is　concerned；　is
not　a　contractual　relation。　On　the　contrary；　though　marriage　begins　in　contract；　it　is　precisely　a
contract　to　transcend　the　standpoint　of　contract；　the　standpoint　from　which　persons　are　regarded
in　their　individuality　as　self…subsistent　units。　The　identification　of　personalities；　whereby　the　family
becomes　one　person　and　its　members　become　its　accidents　（though　substance　is　in　essence　the
relation　of　accidents　to　itself）；　is　the　ethical　mind。　Taken　by　itself　and　stripped　of　the　manifold
externals　of　which　it　is　possessed　owing　to　its　embodiment　in　these　individuals　and　the　interests　of
the　phenomenal　realm；　interests　limited　in　time　and　numerous　other　ways；　this　mind　emerges　in　a
shape　for　representative　thinking　and　has　been　revered　as　Penates；　&c。；　and　in　general　it　is　in　this
mind　that　the　religious　character　of　marriage　and　the　family；　or　pietas；　is　grounded。　It　is　a　further
abstraction　still　to　separate　the　divine；　or　the　substantive；　from　its　body；　and　then　to　stamp　it；
together　with　the　feeling　and　consciousness　of　mental　unity；　as　what　is　falsely　called　'Platonic'　love。
This　separation　is　in　keeping　with　the　monastic　doctrine　which　characterises　the　moment　of
physical　life　as　purely　negative　and　which；　precisely　by　thus　separating　the　physical　from　the
mental；　endows　the　former　by　itself　with　infinite　importance。　

Addition：　The　distinction　between　marriage　and　concubinage　is　that　the　latter　is　chiefly　a　matter
of　satisfying　natural　desire；　while　this　satisfaction　is　made　secondary　in　the　former。　It　is　for　this
reason　that　physical　experiences　may　be　mentioned　in　married　life　without　a　blush；　although
outside　the　marriage　tie　their　mention　would　produce　a　sense　of　shame。　But　it　is　on　this　account；
too；　that　marriage　must　be　regarded　as　in　principle　indissoluble；　for　the　end　of　marriage　is　the
ethical　end；　an　end　so　lofty　that　everything　else　is　manifestly　powerless　against　it　and　made　subject
to　it。　Marriage　is　not　to　be　dissolved　because　of　passion；　since　passion　is　subordinate　to　it。　But　it　is
not　indissoluble　except　in　principle；　since　as　Christ　says；　only　'for　the　hardness　of　your　heart'　is
divorce　established。　Since　marriage　has　feeling　for　one　of　its　moments；　it　is　not　absolute　but　weak
and　potentially　dissoluble。　Legislators；　however；　must　make　its　dissolution　as　difficult　as　possible
and　uphold　the　right　of　the　ethical　order　against　caprice。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　164。　

Mere　agreement　to　the　stipulated　terms　of　a　contrast　in　itself　involves　the　genuine
transfer　of　the　property　in　question　（see　§　79）。　Similarly；　the　solemn　declaration
by　the　parties　of　their　consent　to　enter　the　ethical　bond　of　marriage；　and　its
corresponding　recognition　and　confirmation　by　their　family　and　community；
constitutes　the　formal　completion　and　actuality　of　marriage。　The　knot　is　tied　and
made　ethical　only　after　this　ceremony；　whereby　through　the　use　of　signs；　i。e。　of
language　（the　most　mental　embodiment　of　mind　…　see　§　78）；　the　substantial　thing
in　the　marriage　is　brought　completely　into　being。　As　a　result；　the　sensuous
moment；　the　one　proper　to　physical　life；　is　put　into　its　ethical　place　as　something
only　consequential　and　accidental；　belonging　to　the　external　embodiment　of　the
ethical　bond；　which　indeed　can　subsist　exclusively　in　reciprocal　love　and　support。　

Remark：　If　with　a　view　to　framing　or　criticising　legal　enactments；　the　question　is　asked：　what
should　be　regarded　as　the　chief　end　of　marriage？；　the　question　may　be　taken　to　mean：　which　single
facet　of　marriage　in　its　actuality　is　to　be　regarded　as　the　most　essential　one？　No　one　facet　by　itself；
however；　makes　up　the　whole　range　of　its　implicit　and　explicit　content；　i。e。　of　its　ethical　character；
and　one　or　other　of　its　facets　may　be　lacking　in　an　existing　marriage　without　detriment　to　the
essence　of　marriage　itself。　

It　is　in　the　actual　conclusion　of　a　marriage；　i。e。　in　the　wedding；　that　the　essence　of　the　tie　is
expressed　and　established　beyond　dispute　as　something　ethical；　raised　above　the　contingency　of
feeling　and　private　inclination。　If　this　ceremony　is　taken　as　an　external　formality；　a　mere　so…called
'civil　requirement'；　it　is　thereby　stripped　of　all　significance　except　perhaps　that　of　serving　the
purpose　of　edification　and　attesting　the　civil　relation　of　the　parties。　It　is　reduced　indeed　to　a　mere
fiat　of　a　civil　or　ecclesiastical　authority。　As　such　it　appears　as　something　not　merely　indifferent　to
the　true　nature　of　marriage；　but　actually　alien　to　it。　The　heart　is　constrained　by　the　law　to　attach　a
value　to　the　formal　ceremony　and　the　latter　is　looked　upon　merely　as　a　condition　which　must
precede　the　complete　mutual　surrender　of　the　parties　to　one　another。　As　such　it　appears　to　bring
disunion　into　their　loving　disposition　and；　like　an　alien　intruder；　to　thwart　the　inwardness　of　their
union。　Such　a　doctrine　；。pretentiously　claims　to　afford　the　highest　conception　of　the　freedom；
'inwardness；　and　perfection　of　love；　but　in　fact　it　is　a　travesty　of　the　ethical　aspect　of　love；　the
higher　aspect　which　restrains　purely　sensual　impulse　and　puts　it　in　the　background。　Such　restraint　is
already　present　at　the　instinctive　level　in　shame；　and　it　rises　to　chastity　and　modesty　as
consciousness　becomes　more　specifically　intelligent。　In　particular；　the　view　just　criticised　casts
aside　marriage's　specifically　ethical　character；　which　consists　in　this；　that　the　consciousness　of　the
parties　is　crystallised　out　of　its　physical　and　subjective　m