philosophy of right-第32节

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if　only　to　escape　the　torment　of　vacuity　and　negation。　Many　Protestants　have　recently　gone　over　to
the　Roman　Catholic　Church；　and　they　have　done　so　because　they　found　their　inner　life　worthless
and　grasped　at　something　fixed；　at　a　support；　an　authority；　even　if　it　was　not　exactly　the　stability　of
thought　which　they　caught。　

The　unity　of　the　subjective　with　the　objective　and　absolute　good　is　ethical　life；　and　in　it　we　find　the
reconciliation　which　accords　with　the　concept。　Morality　is　the　form　of　the　will　in　general　on　its
subjective　side。　Ethical　life　is　more　than　the　subjective　form　and　the　self…determination　of　the　will；
in　addition　it　has　as　its　content　the　concept　of　the　will；　namely　freedom。　The　right　and　the　moral
cannot　exist　independently；　they　must　have　the　ethical　as　their　support　and　foundation；　for　the　right
lacks　the　moment　of　subjectivity；　while　morality　in　turn　possesses　that　moment　alone；　and
consequently　both　the　right　and　the　moral　lack　actuality　by　themselves。　Only　the　infinite；　the　Idea；
is　actual。　Right　exists　only　as　a　branch　of　a　whole　or　like　the　ivy　which　twines　itself　round　a　tree
firmly　rooted　on　its　own　account。　




Third　Part：　Ethical　Life

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　142。

Ethical　life　is　the　Idea　of　freedom　in　that　on　the　one　hand　it　is　the　good　become
alive　—　the　good　endowed　in　self…consciousness　with　knowing　and　willing　and
actualised　by　self…conscious　action　—　while　on　the　other　hand　self…consciousness
has　in　the　ethical　realm　its　absolute　foundation　and　the　end　which　actuates　its
effort。　Thus　ethical　life　is　the　concept　of　freedom　developed　into　the　existing
world　and　the　nature　of　self…consciousness。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　143。

Since　this　unity　of　the　concept　of　the　will　with　its　embodiment　—　i。e。　the　particular
will　—　is　knowing；　consciousness　of　the　distinction　between　these　two　moments
of　the　Idea　is　present；　but　present　in　such　a　way　that　now　each　of　these　moments
is　in　its　own　eyes　the　totality　of　the　Idea　and　has　that　totality　as　its　foundation　and
content。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　144。

＇a＇　The　objective　ethical　order；　which　comes　on　the　scene　in　place　of　good　in　the
abstract；　is　substance　made　concrete　by　subjectivity　as　infinite　form。　Hence　it
posits　within　itself　distinctions　whose　specific　character　is　thereby　determined　by
the　concept；　and　which　endow　the　ethical　order　with　a　stable　content
independently　necessary　and　subsistent　in　exaltation　above　subjective　opinion　and
caprice。　These　distinctions　are　absolutely　valid　laws　and　institutions。　

Addition：　Throughout　ethical　life　the　objective　and　subjective　moments　are　alike　present；　but
both　of　them　are　only　its　forms。　Its　substance　is　the　good；　i。e。　the　objective　is　filled　with
subjectivity。　If　we　consider　ethical　life　from　the　objective　standpoint；　we　may　say　that　in　it　we　are
ethical　unselfconsciously。　In　this　sense；　Antigone　proclaims　that　'no　one　knows　whence　the　laws
come；　they　are　everlasting'；　i。e。　their　determinate　character　is　absolute　and　has　its　source　in　the
nature　of　the　thing。　None　the　less；　however；　the　substance　of　ethical　life　has　a　consciousness　also；
though　the　status　of　this　consciousness　is　never　higher　than　that　of　being　one　moment。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　145。

It　is　the　fact　that　the　ethical　order　is　the　system　of　these　specific　determinations　of
the　Idea　which　constitutes　its　rationality。　Hence　the　ethical　order　is　freedom　or　the
absolute　will　as　what　is　objective；　a　circle　of　necessity　whose　moments　are　the
ethical　powers　which　regulate　the　life　of　individuals。　To　these　powers　individuals
are　related　as　accidents　to　substance；　and　it　is　in　individuals　that　these　powers　are
represented；　have　the　shape　of　appearance；　and　become　actualised。　

Addition：　Since　the　laws　and　institutions　of　the　ethical　order　make　up　the　concept　of　freedom；
they　are　the　substance　or　universal　essence　of　individuals；　who　are　thus　related　to　them　as
accidents　only。　Whether　the　individual　exists　or　not　is　all　one　to　the　objective　ethical　order。　It　alone
is　permanent　and　is　the　power　regulating　the　life　of　individuals。　Thus　the　ethical　order　has　been
represented　by　mankind　as　eternal　justice；　as　gods　absolutely　existent；　in　contrast　with　which　the
empty　business　of　individuals　is　only　a　game　of　see…saw。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　146。

＇b＇　The　substantial　order；　in　the　self…consciousness　which　it　has　thus　actually
attained　in　individuals；　knows　itself　and　so　is　an　object　of　knowledge。　This　ethical
substance　and　its　laws　and　powers　are　on　the　one　hand　an　object　over　against　the
subject；　and　from　his　point　of　view　they　are　—　are　in　the　highest　sense　of
self…subsistent　being。　This　is　an　absolute　authority　and　power　infinitely　more
firmly　established　than　the　being　of　nature。　

Remark：　The　sun；　the　moon；　mountains；　rivers；　and　the　natural　objects　of　all　kinds　by　which　we
are　surrounded；　are。　For　consciousness　they　have　the　authority　not　only　of　mere　being　but　also　of
possessing　a　particular　nature　which　it　accepts　and　to　which　it　adjusts　itself　in　dealing　with　them；
using　them；　or　in　being　otherwise　concerned　with　them。　The　authority　of　ethical　laws　is　infinitely
higher；　because　natural　objects　conceal　rationality　under　the　cloak　of　contingency　and　exhibit　it
only　in　their　utterly　external　and　disconnected　way。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　147。

On　the　other　hand；　they　are　not　something　alien　to　the　subject。　On　the　contrary；
his　spirit　bears　witness　to　them　as　to　its　own　essence；　the　essence　in　which　he　has
a　feeling　of　his　selfhood；　and　in　which　he　lives　as　in　his　own　element　which　is　not
distinguished　from　himself。　The　subject　is　thus　directly　linked　to　the　ethical　order
by　a　relation　which　is　more　like　an　identity　than　even　the　relation　of　faith　or　trust。　

Remark：　Faith　and　trust　emerge　along　with　reflection；　they　presuppose　the　power　of　forming
ideas　and　making　distinctions。　For　example；　it　is　one　thing　to　be　a　pagan；　a　different　thing　to
believe　in　a　pagan　religion。　This　relation　or　rather　this　absence　of　relation；　this　identity　in　which　the
ethical　order　is　the　actual　living　soul　of　self…consciousness；　can　no　doubt　pass　over　into　a　relation
of　faith　and　conviction　and　into　a　relation　produced　by　means　of　further　reflection；　i。e。　into　an
insight　due　to　reasoning　starting　perhaps　from　some　particular　purposes　interests；　and
considerations；　from　fear　or　hope；　or　from　historical　conditions。　But　adequate　knowledge　of　this
identity　depends　on　thinking　in　terms　of　the　concept。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　148。

As　substantive　in　character；　these　laws　and　institutions　are　duties　binding　on　the
will　of　the　individual；　because　as　subjective；　as　inherently　undetermined；　or
determined　as　particular；　he　distinguishes　himself　from　them　and　hence　stands
related　to　them　as　to　the　substance　of　his　own　being。　

Remark：　The　'doctrine　of　duties'　in　moral　philosophy　（I　mean　the　objective　doctrine；　not　that
which　is　supposed　to　be　contained　in　the　empty　principle　of　moral　subjectivity；　because　that
principle　determines　nothing　—　（see　§　134）　is　therefore　comprised　in　the　systematic　development
of　the　circle　of　ethical　necessity　which　follows　in　this　Third　Part。　The　difference　between　the
exposition　in　this　book　and　the　form　of　a　'doctrine　of　duties'　lies　solely　in　the　fact　that；　in　what
follows；　the　specific　types　of　ethical　life　turn　up　as　necessary　relationships；　there　the　exposition
ends；　without　being　supplemented　in　each　case　by　the　addition　that　'therefore　men　have　a　duty　to
conform　to　this　institution'。　

A　'doctrine　of　duties'　which　is　other　than　a　philosophical　science　takes　its　material　from　existing
relationships　and　shows　its　connection　with　the　moralist's　personal　notions　or　with　principles　and
thoughts；　purposes；　impulses；　feelings；　&c。；　that　are　forthcoming　everywhere；　and　as　reasons　for
accepting　each　duty　in　turn；　it　may　tack　on　its　further　consequences　in　their　bearing　on　the　other
ethical　relationships　or　on　welfare　and　opinion。　But　an　immanent　and　logical　'doctrine　of　duties'　can
be　nothing　except　the　serial　exposition　of　the　relationships　which　are　necessitated　by　the　Idea　of
freedom　and　are　therefore　actual　in　their　entirety；　to　within　the　state。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　149。

The　bond　of　duty　can　appear　as　a　restriction　only　on　indeterminate　subjectivity　or
abstract　freedom；　and　on　the　impulses　either　of　the　natural　will　or　of　the　moral
will　which　determines　its　indeterminate　good　arbitrarily。　The　truth　is；　however；
that　in　duty　the　individual　finds　his　liberation；　first；　liberation　from　dependence　on
mere　natural　impulse　and　from　the　depression　which　as　a　particular　subject　he
cannot　escape　in　his　moral　reflections　on　what　ought　to　be　and　what　might　be；
secondly；　liberation　from　the　indeterminate　subjectivity　which；　never　reaching
reality　or　the　objective　determinacy　of　action；　remains　self…enclosed　and　devoid　of
actuality。　In　duty　the　individual　acquires　his　substantive　freedom。　

Addition：　Duty　is　a　restriction　only　on　the　self…will　of　subjectivity。　It　stands　in　the　way　only　of
that　abstract　good　to　wh