philosophy of right-第31节

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


every　action　has　a　positive　aspect；　and　since　the　category　of　good　as　opposed　to　evil　is　likewise
reduced　to　positivity；　I　may　claim　that　my　action　in　its　bearing　on　my　intention　is　good。　Thus　evil
has　good　linked　with　it　not　only　in　my　consciousness　but　also　if　we　look　at　my　action　on　its　positive
side。　When　self…consciousness　gives　out；　to　others　only；　that　its　action　is　good；　this　form　of
subjectivism　is　hypocrisy。　But　if　it　goes　so　far　as　to　claim　that　the　deed　is　good　in　its　own　eyes
also；　then　we　have　a　still　higher　peak　of　the　subjectivism　which　knows　itself　as　absolute。　For　this
type　of　mind　absolute　good　and　absolute　evil　have　both　vanished；　and　the　subject　is　therefore　at
liberty　to　pass　himself　off　at　discretion　as　anything　he　likes。　This　is　the　position　of　the　absolute
sophistry　which　usurps　the　office　of　lawgiver　and　rests　the　distinction　between　good　and　evil　on　its
own　caprice。　The　chief　hypocrites　are　the　pious　ones　（the　Tartuffes）　who　are　punctilious　in　every
ritual　observance　and　may　even　be　religious　to　all　appearance；　while　yet　they　do　just　as　they
please。　There　is　little　mention　of　hypocrites　nowadays；　partly　because　the　accusation　of　hypocrisy
seems　to　be　too　harsh；　partly；　however；　because　hypocrisy　in　its　naive　form　has　more　or　less
disappeared。　This　downright　falsehood；　this　veneer　of　goodness；　has　now　become　too　transparent
not　to　be　seen　through；　and　the　divorce　between　doing　good　with　one　hand　and　evil　with　the　other
no　longer　occurs；　since　advancing　culture　has　weakened　the　opposition　between　these　categories。　

Instead；　hypocrisy　has　now　assumed　the　subtler　form　of　Probabilism；　which　involves　the　agent's
attempt　to　represent　a　transgression　as　something　good　from　the　point　of　view　of　his　private
conscience。　This　doctrine　can　only　arise　when　the　moral　and　the　good　are　determined　by　authority；
with　the　result　that　there　are　as　many　reasons　as　there　are　authorities　for　supposing　that　evil　is
good。　Casuist　theologians；　Jesuits　especially；　have　worked　up　these　cases　of　conscience　and
multiplied　them　ad　infinitum。　

These　cases　have　now　been　elaborated　to　such　a　high　degree　of　subtlety　that　numerous　clashes
have　arisen　between　them；　and　the　opposition　between　good　and　evil　has　become　so　weak　that　in
single　instances　they　appear　to　turn　into　one　another。　The　only　desideratum　now　is　probability；　i。e。
something　approximately　good；　something　which　may　be　supported　by　any　single　reason　or
authority。　Thus　the　special　characteristic　of　this　attitude　is　that　its　content　is　purely　abstract；　it　sets
up　the　concrete　content　as　something　inessential　or　rather　abandons　it　to　bare　opinion。　On　this
principle；　anyone　may　have　committed　a　crime　and　yet　have　willed　the　good。　For　example；　if　a
bad　character　is　murdered；　the　positive　side　of　the　action　may　be　given　out　to　be　the　withstanding
of　evil　and　the　will　to　diminish　it。　

Now　the　next　step　beyond　Probabilism　is　that　it　is　no　longer　a　question　of　someone　else's
statement　or　authority；　it　is　a　question　only　of　the　subject　himself；　i。e。　of　his　own　convictions
conviction　which　alone　is　able　to　make　a　thing　good。　The　defect　here　is　that　everything　is　supposed
to　fall　within　the　orbit　of　conviction　alone　and　that　the　absolutely　right；　for　which　this　conviction
should　be　only　the　form；　no　longer　exists。　It　is　certainly　not　a　matter　of　indifference　whether　I　do
something　by　habit　and　custom　or　because　I　am　actuated　throughout　by　the　truth　which　underlies
these。　But　objective　truth　is　still　different　from　my　conviction；　because　conviction　lacks　the
distinction　between　good　and　evil。　Conviction　always　remains　conviction；　and　the　bad　could　only
be　that　of　which　I　am　not　convinced。　

Now　while　this　obliteration　of　good　and　evil　implies　a　very　lofty　attitude；　there　is　involved　in　this
attitude　the　admission　that　it　is　subject　to　error；　and　to　that　extent　it　is　brought　down　from　its
pedestal　into　mere　fortuitousness　and　seems　undeserving　of　respect。　Now　this　form　of　subjectivism
is　irony；　the　consciousness　that　this　principle　of　conviction　is　not　worth　much　and　that；　lofty
criterion　though　it　be；　it　is　only　caprice　that　governs　it。　This　attitude　is　really　a　product　of　Fichte's
philosophy；　which　proclaims　that　the　Ego　is　absolute；　i。e。　is　absolute　certainty；　the　'universal
self…hood'　which　advances　through　a　course　of　further　development　to　objectivity。　Of　Fichte
himself　it　cannot　property　be　said　that　he　made　subjective　caprice　a　guiding　principle　in　ethics；　but；
later　on；　this　principle　of　the　mere　particular；　in　the　sense　of　'particular　self…hood'；　was　deified　by
Friedrich　von　Schlegel　with　reference　to　the　good　and　the　beautiful。　As　a　result；　he　made　objective
goodness　only　an　image　of　my　conviction；　receiving　support　from　my　efforts　alone；　and　dependent
for　its　appearance　and　disappearance　on　me　as　its　lord　and　master。　If　I　relate　myself　to　something
objective；　it　vanishes　at　the　same　moment　before　my　eyes；　and　so　I　hover　over　a　pit　of
nothingness；　summoning　shapes　from　the　depths　and　annihilating　them。　This　supreme　type　of
subjectivism　can　emerge　only　in　a　period　of　advanced　culture　when　faith　has　lost　its　seriousness；
and　its　essence　is　simply　'all　is　vanity'。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Transition　from　Morality　to　Ethical　Life

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　141。

For　the　good　as　the　substantial　universal　of　freedom；　but　as　something　still
abstract；　there　are　therefore　required　determinate　characteristics　of　some　sort　and
the　principle　for　determining　them；　though　a　principle　identical　with　the　good
itself。　For　conscience　similarly；　as　the　purely　abstract　principle　of　determination；　it
is　required　that　its　decisions　shall　be　universal　and　objective。　If　good　and
conscience　are　each　kept　abstract　and　thereby　elevated　to　independent　totalities；
then　both　become　the　indeterminate　which　ought　to　be　determined。　But　the
integration　of　these　two　relative　totalities　into　an　—　absolute　identity　has　already
been　implicitly　achieved　in　that　this　very　subjectivity　of　pure　self…certainty；　aware
in　its　vacuity　of　its　gradual　evaporation；　is　identical　with　the　abstract　universality
of　the　good。　The　identity　of　the　good　with　the　subjective　will；　an　identity　which
therefore　is　concrete　and　the　truth　of　them　both；　is　Ethical　Life。　

Remark：　The　details　of　such　a　transition　of　the　concept　are　made　intelligible　in　logic。　Here；
however；　it　need　only　be　said　that　it　is　the　nature　of　the　restricted　and　the　finite　（i。e。　here　the
abstract　good　which　only　ought　to　：be　＇but　is　not＇；　and　the　equally　abstract　subjectivity　which　only
ought　'to　be　good　＇but　is　not＇）　to　have　its　opposite　implicit　within　it；　the　good　its　actuality；　and
subjectivity　（the　moment　in　which　ethical　life　is　actual）　the　good；　but　since　they　are　one…sided　they
are　not　yet　posited　in　accordance　with　their　implicit　nature。　They　become　so　posited　in　their
negation。　That　is　to　say；　in　their　one…sidedness；　when　each　is　bent　on　declining　to　have　in　it　what　is
in　it　implicitly　—　when　the　good　is　without　subjectivity　and　a　determinate　character；　and　the
determining　principle；　subjectivity；　is　without　what　is　implicit　within　it　—　and　when　both　build
themselves　into　independent　totalities；　they　are　annulled　and　thereby　reduced　to　moments；　to
moments　of　the　concept　which　becomes　manifest　as　their　unity　and；　having　acquired　reality
precisely　through　this　positing　of　its　moments；　is　now　present　as　Idea　—　as　the　concept　which　has
matured　its　determinations　to　reality　and　at　the　same　time　is　present　in　their　identity　as　their　implicit
essence。　

The　embodiment　of　freedom　which　was　＇a＇　first　of　all　immediate　as　right；　is　＇b＇　characterised　in　the
reflection　of　self…consciousness　as　good。　＇c＇　The　third　stage；　originating　here；　in　its　transition　from
＇b＇　to　ethical　life；　as　the　truth　of　good　and　subjectivity；　is　therefore　the　truth　both　of　subjectivity
and　right。　Ethical　life　is　a　subjective　disposition；　but　one　imbued　with　what　is　inherently　right。　The
fact　that　this　Idea　is　the　truth　of　the　concept　of　freedom　is　something　which；　in　philosophy；　must　be
proved；　not　presupposed；　not　adopted　from　feeling　or　elsewhere。　This　demonstration　is　contained
only　in　the　fact　that　right　and　the　moral　self…consciousness　both　display　in　themselves　their
regression　to　this　Idea　as　their　outcome。　Those　who　hope　to　be　able　to　dispense　with　proof　and
demonstration　in　philosophy　show　thereby　that　they　are　still　far　from　knowing　the　first　thing　about
what　philosophy　is。　On　other　topics　argue　they　may；　but　in　philosophy　they　have　no　right　to　join　in
the　argument　if　they　wish　to　argue　without　the　concept。　

Addition：　Each　of　the　two　principles　hitherto　discussed；　namely　good　in　the　abstract　and
conscience；　is　defective　in　lacking　its　opposite。　Good　in　the　abstract　evaporates　into　something
completely　powerless；　into　which　I　may　introduce　any　and　every　content；　while　the　subjectivity　of
mind　becomes　just　as　worthless　because　it　lacks　any　objective　significance。　Thus　a　longing　may
arise　for　an　objective　order　in　which　man　gladly　degrades　himself　to　servitude　and　total　subjection；
if　only　to　escape　the　torment　of　vacuity　and　negation。　Many　Protestants　have　recently　gone　over　t