philosophy of right-第30节

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ethics　and　of　man's　supreme　value；　and　is　thus　pronounced　the　supreme　and　the　sacrosanct；　at
another；　all　we　have　to　do　with　is　error；　and　my　conviction　is　something　trivial　and　casual；　in　fact
something　strictly　external；　which　may　turn　out　this　way　or　that。　Really；　my　being　convinced　is
something　supremely　trivial　if　I　cannot　know　the　truth；　for　then　it　is　a　matter　of　indifference　how　I
think；　and　all　that　is　left　to　my　thinking　is　that　empty　good；　the　abstraction　to　which　the
Understanding　reduces　the　good。　

One　other　point。　It　follows　further；　on　this　principle　of　justification　by　conviction；　that　logic　requires
me；　in　dealing　with　the　way　others　act　against　my　action；　to　admit　that　they　are　quite　in　the　right　…
so　far　at　any　rate　as　they　maintain　with　faith　and　conviction　that　my　action　is　criminal。　On　such
logic；　not　merely　do　I　gain　nothing；　I　am　even　deposed　from　the　post　of　liberty　and　honour　into　a
situation　of　slavery　and　dishonour。　Justice；　which　in　the　abstract　is　mine　as　well　as　theirs；　I　feel　only
as　a　foreign　subjective　conviction；　and　when　it　is　executed　on　me；　I　fancy　myself　to　be　treated　only
by　an　external　force。　

（f）　Finally；　the　supreme　form　in　which　this　subjectivism　is　completely　comprised　and　expressed　is
the　phenomenon　which　has　been　called　by　a　name　borrowed　from　Plato　…　'Irony'。　The　name　alone；
however；　is　taken　from　Plato；　he　used　it　to　describe　a　way　of　speaking　which　Socrates　employed
in　conversation　when　defending　the　Idea　of　truth　and　justice　against　the　conceit　of　the　Sophists　and
the　uneducated。　What　he　treated　ironically；　however；　was　only　their　type　of　mind；　not　the　Idea
itself。　Irony　is　only　a　manner　of　talking　against　people。　Except　as　directed　against　persons；　the
essential　movement　of　thought　is　dialectic；　and　Plato　was　so　far　from　regarding　the　dialectical　in
itself；　still　less　irony；　as　the　last　word　in　thought　and　a　substitute　for　the　Idea；　that　he　terminated　the
flux　and　reflux　of　thinking；　let　alone　of　a　subjective　opinion；　and　submerged　it　in　the　substantiality　of
the　Idea。　

Footnote：　My　colleague；　the　late　Professor　Solger；　adopted　the　word　'irony'　which　Friedrich　von　Schlegel
brought　into　use　at　a　comparatively　early　period　of　his　literary　career　and　enhanced　to　equivalence　with　the
said　principle　of　subjectivity　knowing　itself　as　supreme。　But　Solger's　finer　mind　was　above　such　an
exaggeration；　he　had　philosophic　insight　and　so　seized　upon；　emphasised；　and　retained　only　that　part　of
Schlegel's　view　which　was　dialectic　in　the　strict　sense；　i。e。　dialectic　as　the　pulsating　drive　of　speculative
inquiry。　His　last　publication；　a　solid　piece　of　work；　a　thorough　Kritik　über　die　Vorlesungen　des　Herrn　August
Wilhelm　von　Schlegel　über　dramatische　Kunst　und　Literatur；　I　find　somewhat　obscure；　however；　and　I　cannot
agree　with　the　argument　which　he　develops。　'True　irony'；　he　says；　'arises　from　the　view　that　so　long　as　man
lives　in　this　present　world；　it　is　only　in　this　world　that　he　can　fulfil　his　〃appointed　task〃　no　matter　how　elevated
a　sense　we　give　to　this　expression。　Any　hope　we　may　have　of　transcending　finite　ends　is　foolish　and　empty
conceit。　'Even　the　highest　is　existent　for　our　conduct　only　in　a　shape　that　is　limited　and　finite。'　Rightly
understood；　this　is　Platonic　doctrine；　and　a　true　remark　in　rejection　of　what　he　has　referred　to　earlier；　the　empty
striving　towards　the　（abstract）　infinite。　But　to　say　that　the　highest　is　existent　in　a　limited　and　finite　shape；　like
the　ethical　order　（and　that　order　is　in　essence　actual　life　and　action）；　is　very　different　from　saving　that　the
highest　thing　is　a　finite　end。　The　outward　shape；　the　form　of　finitude；　in　no　way　deprives　the　content　of　ethical
life　of　its　substantiality　and　the　infinity　inherent　within　it。　Solger　continues：　'And　just　for　this　reason　the
highest　is　in　us　as　negligible　as　the　lowest　and　perishes　of　necessity　with　us　and　our　nugatory　thoughts　and
feelings。　The　highest　is　truly　existent　in　God　alone；　and　as　it　perishes　in　us　it　is　transfigured　into　something
divine；　a　divinity　in　which　we　would　have　had　no　share　but　for　its　immediate　presence　revealed　in　the　very
disappearance　of　our　actuality；　now　the　mood　to　which　this　process　directly　comes　home　in　human　affairs　is
tragic　irony。'　The　arbitrary　name　'irony'　would　be　of　no　importance；　but　there　is　an　obscurity　here　when　it　is　said
that　it　is　'the　highest'　which　perishes　with　our　nothingness　and　that　it　is　in　the　disappearance　of　our　actuality
that　the　divine　is　first　revealed；　e。g。　again　（ibid。；　p。　91）：'We　see　heroes　beginning　to　wonder　whether　they　have
erred　in　the　noblest　and　finest　elements　of　their　feelings　and　sentiments；　not　only　in　regard　to　their　successful
issue；　but　also　to　their　source　and　their　worth；　indeed；　what　elevates　us　is　the　destruction　of　the　best　itself。'
（The　just　destruction　of　utter　scoundrels　and　criminals　who　flaunt　their　villainy　—　the　hero　of　a　modern　tragedy
Die　Schuld；　is　one　—　has　an　interest　for　criminal　law；　but　none　at　all　for　art　proper　which　is　what　is　in　question
here。）　The　tragic　destruction　of　figures　whose　ethical　life　is　on　the　highest　plane　can　interest　and　elevate　us
and　reconcile　us　to　its　occurrence　only　in　so　far　as　they　come　on　the　scene　in　opposition　to　one　another
together　with　equally　justified　but　different　ethical　powers　which　have　come　into　collision　through　misfortune；
because　the　result　is　that　then　these　figures　acquire　guilt　through　their　opposition　to　an　ethical　law。　Out　of　this
situation　there　arises　the　right　and　wrong　of　both　parties　and　therefore　the　true　ethical　Idea；　which；　purified　and
in　triumph　over　this　one…sidedness；　is　thereby　reconciled　in　us。　Accordingly；　it　is　not　the　highest　in　us　which
perishes；　we　are　elevated　not　by　the　destruction　of　the　best　but　by　the　triumph　of　the　true。　This　it　is　which
constitutes　the　true；　purely　ethical；　interest　of　ancient　tragedy　（in　romantic　tragedy　the　character　of　the　interest
undergoes　a　certain　modification）。　All　this　I　have　worked　out　in　detail　in　my　Phenomenology　of　Mind　。　But　the
ethical　Idea　is　actual　and　pregnant　in　the　world　of　social　institutions　without　the　misfortune　of　tragic　clashes
and　the　destruction　of　individuals　overcome　by　this　misfortune。　And　this　Idea's　（the　highest's）　revelation　of
itself　in　its　actuality　as　anything　but　a　nullity　is　what　the　external　embodiment　of　ethical　life；　the　state；　purposes
and　effects；　and　what　the　ethical　self…consciousness　possesses；　intuits；　and　knows　in　the　state　and　what　the
thinking　mind　comprehends　there。　

The　culminating　form　of　this　subjectivity　which　conceives　itself　as　the　final　court　of　appeal　—　our
topic　here　—　can　be　nothing　except　what　was　implicitly　present　already　in　its　preceding　forms；
namely　subjectivity　knowing　itself　as　the　arbiter　and　judge　of　truth；　right；　and　duty。　It　consists　then
in　this；　that　it　knows　the　objective　ethical　principles；　but　fails　in　self…forgetfulness　and
self…renunciation　to　immerse　itself　in　their　seriousness　and　to　base　action　upon　them。　Although
related　to　them；　it　holds　itself　aloof　from　them　and　knows　itself　as　that　which　wills　and　decides
thus；　although　it　may　equally　well　will　and　decide　otherwise。　You　actually　accept　a　law；　it　says；　and
respect　it　as　absolute。　So　do　1；　but　I　go　further　than　you；　because　I　am　beyond　this　law　and　can
make　it　to　suit　myself　It　is　not　the　thing　that　is　excellent；　but　I　who　am　so；　as　the　master　of　law　and
thing　alike；　I　simply　play　with　them　as　with　my　caprice；　my　consciously　ironical　attitude　lets　the
highest　perish　and　I　merely　hug　myself　at　the　thought。　This　type　of　subjectivism　not　merely
substitutes　a　void　for　the　whole　content　of　ethics；　right；　duties；　and　laws　—　and　so　is　evil；　in　fact
evil　through　and　through　and　universally　—　but　in　addition　its　form　is　a　subjective　void；　i。e。　it　knows
itself　as　this　contentless　void　and　in　this　knowledge　knows　itself　as　absolute。　

In　my　Phenomenology　of　Mind；　I　have　shown　how　this　absolute　self…complacency　fails　to　rest　in
a　solitary　worship　of　itself　but　builds　up　a　sort　of　community　whose　bond　and　substance　is；　e。g。；
the　'mutual　Asseveration　of　conscientiousness　and　good　intentions；　the　enjoyment　of　this　mutual
purity'；　but　is　above　all　'the　refreshment　derived　from　the　glory　of　this　self…knowledge　and
self…expression；　from　the　glory　of　fostering　and　cherishing　this　experience'。　I　have　shown　also　how
what　has　been　called　a　'beautiful　soul'　—　that　still　nobler　type　of　subjectivism　which　empties　the
objective　of　all　content　and　so　fades　away　until　it　loses　all　actuality　—　is　a　variation　of　subjectivism
like　other　forms　of　the　same　phenomenon　akin　to　the　series　of　them　here　considered。　What　is　said
here　may　be　compared　with　the　entire　section　（C）；　'Conscience'；　in　the　Phenomenology；
especially　the　part　dealing　with　the　transition　to　a　higher　stage　—　a　stage；　however；　there　different
in　characters　

Addition：　Representative　thinking　may　go　further　and　pervert　the　evil　will　into　a　show　of
goodness。　Although　it　cannot　alter　the　nature　of　evil；　it　can　invest　it　with　a　show　of　goodness。　Since
every　action　has　a　positive　aspect；　and　since　the　category　of　good　as　opposed　to　evil　is　likewise
reduced　to　posi