philosophy of right-第26节

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know　in　itself　and　from　within　itself　what　is　right　and　obligatory；　to　give　recognition　only　to　what　it
thus　knows　as　good；　and　at　the　same　time　to　maintain　that　whatever　in　this　way　it　knows　and　wills
is　in　truth　right　and　obligatory。　Conscience　as　this　unity　of　subjective　knowing　with　what　is　absolute
is　a　sanctuary　which　it　would　be　sacrilege　to　violate。　But　whether　the　conscience　of　a　specific
individual　corresponds　with　this　Idea　of　conscience；　or　whether　what　it　takes　or　declares　to　be
good　is　actually　so；　is　ascertainable　only　from　the　content　of　the　good　it　seeks　to　realise。　What　is
right　and　obligatory　is　the　absolutely　rational　element　in　the　will's　volitions　and　therefore　it　is　not　in
essence　the　particular　property　of　an　individual；　and　its　form　is　not　that　of　feeling　or　any　other
private　（i。e。　sensuous）　type　of　knowing；　but　essentially　that　of　universals　determined　by　thought；
i。e。　the　form　of　laws　and　principles。　Conscience　is　therefore　subject　to　the　judgement　of　its　truth　or
falsity；　and　when　it　appeals　only　to　itself　for　a　decision；　it　is　directly　at　variance　with　what　it　wishes
to　be；　namely　the　rule　for　a　mode　of　conduct　which　is　rational；　absolutely　valid；　and　universal。　For
this　reason；　the　state　cannot　give　recognition　to　conscience　in　its　private　form　as　subjective
knowing；　any　more　than　science　can　grant　validity　to　subjective　opinion；　dogmatism；　and　the
appeal　to　a　subjective　opinion。　In　true　conscience；　its　elements　are　not　different；　but　they　may
become　so；　and　it　is　the　determining　element；　the　subjectivity　of　willing　and　knowing；　which　can
sever　itself　from　the　true　content　of　conscience；　establish　its　own　independence；　and　reduce　that
content　to　a　form　and　a　show。　The　ambiguity　in　connection　with　conscience　lies　therefore　in　this：　it
is　presupposed　to　mean　the　identity　of　subjective　knowing　and　willing　with　the　true　good；　and　so
is　claimed　and　recognised　to　be　something　sacrosanct；　and　yet　at　the　same　time；　as　the　mere
subjective　reflection　of　self…consciousness　into　itself；　it　still　claims　for　itself　the　title　due；　solely　on
the　strength　of　its　absolutely　valid　rational　content；　to　that　identity　alone。　

At　the　level　of　morality；　distinguished　as　it　is　in　this　book　from　the　level　of　ethics；　it　is　only　formal
conscience　that　is　to　be　found。　True　conscience　has　been　mentioned　only　to　indicate　its　distinction
from　the　other　and　to　obviate　the　possible　misunderstanding　that　here；　where　it　is　only　formal
conscience　that　is　under　consideration；　the　argument　is　about　true　conscience。　The　latter　is　part　of
the　ethical　disposition　which　comes　before　us　for　the　first　time　in　the　following　section。　The
religious　conscience；　however；　does　not　belong　to　this　sphere　at　all。　

Addition：　When　we　speak　of　conscience；　it　may　easily　be　thought　that；　in　virtue　of　its　form；
which　is　abstract　inwardness；　conscience　is　at　ties　point　without　more　ado　true　conscience。　But
true　conscience　determines　itself　to　will　what　is　absolutely　good　and　obligatory　and　is　this
self…determination。　So　far；　however；　it　is　only　with　good　in　the　abstract　that　we　have　to　do　and
conscience　is　still　without　this　objective　content　and　is　but　the　infinite　certainty　of　oneself。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　138。　

This　subjectivity；　qua　abstract　self…determination　and　pure　certainty　of　oneself
alone；　as　readily　evaporates　into　itself　the　whole　determinate　character　of　right；
duty；　and　existence；　as　it　remains　both　the　power　to　judge；　to　determine　from
within　itself　alone；　what　is　good　in　respect　of　any　content；　and　also　the　power　to
which　the　good；　at　first　only　an　ideal　and　an　ought…to…be；　owes　its　actuality。　

Remark：　The　self…consciousness　which　has　attained　this　absolute　reflection　into　itself　knows
itself　in　this　reflection　to　be　the　kind　of　consciousness　which　is　and　should　be　beyond　the　reach　of
every　existent　and　given　specific　determination。　As　one　of　the　commoner　features　of　history　（e。g。　in
Socrates；40　the　Stoics；　and　others）；　the　tendency　to　look　deeper　into　oneself　and　to　know　and
determine　from　within　oneself　what　is　right　and　good　appears　in　ages　when　what　is　recognised　as
right　and　good　in　contemporary　manners　cannot　satisfy　the　will　of　better　men。　When　the　existing
world　of　freedom　has　become　faithless　to　the　will　of　better　men；　that　will　fails　to　find　itself　in　the
duties　there　recognised　and　must　try　to　find　in　the　ideal　world　of　the　inner　life　alone　the　harmony
which　actuality　has　lost。　Once　self…consciousness　has　grasped　and　secured　its　formal　right　in　this
way；　everything　depends　on　the　character　of　the　content　which　it　gives　to　itself。　

Addition：　If　we　look　more　closely　at　this　process　of　evaporation　and　see　how　all　specific
determinations　disappear　into　this　simple　concept　and　then　have　to　be　condensed　out　of　it　again；
what　we　find　is　that　it　is　primarily　due　to　the　fact　that　everything　recognised　as　right　and　duty　may
be　proved　by　discursive　thinking　to　be　nugatory；　restricted；　and　in　all　respects　not　absolute。　On　the
other　hand；　just　as　subjectivity　evaporates　every　content　into　itself；　so　it　may　develop　it　out　of　itself
once　more。　Everything　which　arises　in　the　ethical　sphere　is　produced　by　this　activity　of　mind。　The
moral　point　of　view；　however；　is　defective　because　it　is　purely　abstract。　When　I　am　aware　of　my
freedom　as　the　substance　of　my　being；　I　am　inactive　and　do　nothing。　But　if　I　proceed　to　act　and
look　for　principles　on　which　to　act；　I　grope　for　something　determinate　and　then　demand　its
deduction　from　the　concept　of　the　free　will。　While；　therefore；　it　is　right　enough　to　evaporate　right
and　duty　into　subjectivity；　it　is　wrong　if　this　abstract　groundwork　is　not　then　condensed　out　again。
It　is　only　in　times　when　the　world　of　actuality　is　hollow；　spiritless；　and　unstable；　that　an　individual
may　be　allowed　to　take　refuge　from　actuality　in　his　inner　life。　Socrates　lived　at　the　time　of　the　ruin
of　the　Athenian　democracy。　His　thought　vaporised　the　world　around　him　and　he　withdrew　into
himself　to　search　there　for　the　right　and　the　good。　Even　in　our　day　there　are　cases　when　reverence
for　the　established　order　is　more　or　less　lacking；　man　insists　on　having　the　authoritative　as　his　will；
as　that　to　which　he　has　granted　recognition。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　139。　

Once　self…consciousness　has　reduced　all　otherwise　valid　duties　to　emptiness　and
itself　to　the　sheer　inwardness　of　the　will；　it　has　become　the　potentiality　of　either
making　the　absolutely　universal　its　principle；　or　equally　well　of　elevating　above　the
universal　the　self…will　of　private　particularity；　taking　that　as　its　principle　and
realising　it　through　its　actions；　i。e。　it　has　become　potentially　evil。　

Remark：　To　have　a　conscience；　if　conscience　is　only　formal　subjectivity；　is　simply　to　be　on　the
verge　of　slipping　into　evil；　in　independent　self…certainty；　with　its　independence　of　knowledge　and
decision；　both　morality　and　evil　have　their　common　root。　

The　origin　of　evil　in　general　is　to　be　found　in　the　mystery　of　freedom　（i。e。　in　the　speculative　aspect
of　freedom）；　the　mystery　whereby　freedom　of　necessity　arises　out　of　the　natural　level　of　the　will
and　is　something　inward　in　comparison　with　that　level。　It　is　this　natural　level　of　the　will　which
comes　into　existence　as　a　self…contradiction；　as　incompatible　with　itself　in　this　opposition；　and　so　it
is　just　this　particularity　of　the　will　which　later　makes　itself　evil。　That　is　to　say；　particularity　is　always
duality；　here　it　is　the　opposition　of　the　natural　level　and　the　inwardness　of　the　will。　In　this
opposition；　the　latter　is　only　a　relative　and　abstract　subjectivity　which　can　draw　its　content　only
from　the　determinate　content　of　the　natural　will；　from　desire；　impulse；　inclination；　&c。　Now　it　is
said　of　these　desires；　impulses；　&c。；　that　they　may　be　either　good　or　evil。　But　since　the　will　here
makes　into　a　determinant　of　its　content　both　these　impulses　in　this　contingent　character　which　they
possess　as　natural；　and　also；　therefore；　the　form　which　it　has　at　this　point；　the　form　of　particularity
itself；　it　follows　that　it　is　set　in　opposition　to　the　universal　as　inner　objectivity；　to　the　good；　which
comes　on　the　scene　as　the　opposite　extreme　to　immediate　objectivity；　the　natural　pure　and　simple；
as　soon　as　the　will　is　reflected　into　itself　and　consciousness　is　a　knowing　consciousness。　It　is　in　this
opposition　that　this　inwardness　of　the　will　is　evil。　Man　is　therefore　evil　by　a　conjunction　between
his　natural　or　undeveloped　character　and　his　reflection　into　himself；　and　therefore　evil　belongs
neither　to　nature　as　such　by　itself　…　unless　nature　were　supposed　to　be　the　natural　character　of　the
will　which　rests　in　its　particular　content　…　nor　to　introverted　reflection　by　itself；　i。e。　cognition　in
general；　unless　this　were　to　maintain　itself　in　that　opposition　to　the　universal。　

With　this　facet　of　evil；　its　necessity；　there　is　inevitably　combined　the　fact　that　this　same　evil　is
condemned　to　be　that　which　of　necessity　ought　not　to　be；　i。e。　the　fact　that　evil　ought　to　be
annulled。　It　is　not　that　there　ought　never　to　be　a　diremption　of　any　sort　in　the　will　…　on　the　contrary；
it　is　just　this　level　of　dirempti