philosophy of right-第25节

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revenge。　If　he　were；　he　would　be　an　animal　which　would　have　to　be　knocked　on　the　head　as
dangerous　and　unsafe　because　of　its　liability　to　fits　of　madness。　

The　claim　is　made　that　the　criminal　in　the　moment　of　his　action　must　have　had　a　'clear　idea'　of　the
wrong　and　its　culpability　before　it　can　be　imputed　to　him　as　a　crime。　At　first　sight；　this　claim　seems
to　preserve　the　right　of　his　subjectivity；　but　the　truth　is　that　it　deprives　him　of　his　indwelling　nature
as　intelligent；　a　nature　whose　effective　presence　is　not　confined　to　the　'clear　ideas'　of　Wolff's
psychology；　and　only　in　cases　of　lunacy　is　it　so　deranged　as　to　be　divorced　from　the　knowing　and
doing　of　isolated　things。　

The　sphere　in　which　these　extenuating　circumstances　come　into　consideration　as　grounds　for　the
mitigation　of　punishment　is　a　sphere　other　than　that　of　rights；　the　sphere　of　pardon。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　133。　

The　particular　subject　is　related　to　the　good　as　to　the　essence　of　his　will；　and
hence　his　will's　obligation　arises　directly　in　this　relation。　Since　particularity　is
distinct　from　the　good　and　falls　within　the　subjective　will；　the　good　is
characterised　to　begin　with　only　as　the　universal　abstract　essentiality　of　the　will；
i。e。　as　duty。　Since　duty　is　thus　abstract　and　universal　in　character；　it　should　be
done　for　duty's　sake。　

Addition：　From　my　point　of　view　the　essence　of　the　will　is　duty。　Now　if　my　knowledge　stops　at
the　fact　that　the　good　is　my　duty；　I　am　still　going　no　further　than　the　abstract　character　of　duty。　I
should　do　my　duty　for　duty's　sake；　and　when　I　do　my　duty　it　is　in　a　true　sense　my　own　objectivity
which　I　am　bringing　to　realisation。　In　doing　my　duty；　I　am　by　myself　and　free。　To　have　emphasised
this　meaning　of　duty　has　constituted　the　merit　of　Kant's　moral　philosophy　and　its　loftiness　of
outlook。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　134。　

Because　every　action　explicitly　calls　for　a　particular　content　and　a　specific　end；
while　duty　as　an　abstraction　entails　nothing　of　the　kind；　the　question　arises：　what
is　my　duty？　As　an　answer　nothing　is　so　far　available　except：　（a）　to　do　the　right；
and　（b）　to　strive　after　welfare；　one's　own　welfare；　and　welfare　in　universal　terms；
the　welfare　of　others　（see　§　119）。　

Addition：　This　is　the　same　question　as　was　put　to　Jesus　when　someone　wished　to　learn　from
him　what　he　should　do　to　inherit　eternal　life。　Good　as　a　universal　is　abstract　and　cannot　be
accomplished　so　long　as　it　remains　abstract。　To　be　accomplished　it　must　acquire　in　addition　the
character　of　particularity。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　135。　

These　specific　duties；　however；　are　not　contained　in　the　definition　of　duty　itself；
but　since　both　of　them　are　conditioned　and　restricted；　they　eo　ipso　bring　about
the　transition　to　the　higher　sphere　of　the　unconditioned；　the　sphere　of　duty。　Duty
itself　in　the　moral　self…consciousness　is　the　essence　or　the　universality　of　that
consciousness；　the　way　in　which　it　is　inwardly　related　to　itself　alone；　all　that　is　left
to　it；　therefore；　is　abstract　universality；　and　for　its　determinate　character　it　has
identity　without　content；　or　the　abstractly　positive；　the　indeterminate。　

Remark：　However　essential　it　is　to　give　prominence　to　the　pure　unconditioned
self…determination　of　the　will　as　the　root　of　duty；　and　to　the　way　in　which　knowledge　of　the　will；
thanks　to　Kant's　philosophy；　has　won　its　firm　foundation　and　starting…point　for　the　first　time　owing
to　the　thought　of　its　infinite　autonomy；　still　to　adhere　to　the　exclusively　moral　position；　without
making　the　transition　to　the　conception　of　ethics；　is　to　reduce　this　gain　to　an　empty　formalism；　and
the　science　of　morals　to　the　preaching　of　duty　for　duty's　sake。　From　this　point　of　view；　no
immanent　doctrine　of　duties　is　possible；　of　course；　material　may　be　brought　in　from　outside　and
particular　duties　may　be　arrived　at　accordingly；　but　ff　the　definition　of　duty　is　taken　to　be　the
absence　of　contradiction；　formal　correspondence　with　itself　…　which　is　nothing　but　abstract
indeterminacy　stabilised　…　then　no　transition　is　possible　to　the　specification　of　particular　duties　nor；
if　some　such　particular　content　for　acting　comes　under　consideration；　is　there　any　criterion　in　that
principle　for　deciding　whether　it　is　or　is　not　a　duty。　On　the　contrary；　by　this　means　any　wrong　or
immoral　line　of　conduct　may　be　justified。　

Kant's　further　formulations　the　possibility　of　visualising　an　action　as　a　universal　maxim；　does　lead
to　the　more　concrete　visualisation　of　a　situation；　but　in　itself　it　contains　no　principle　beyond
abstract　identity　and　the　'absence　of　contradiction'　already　mentioned。　

The　absence　of　property　contains　in　itself　just　as　little　contradiction　as　the　non…existence　of　this　or
that　nation；　family；　&c。；　or　the　death　of　the　whole　human　race。　But　if　it　is　already　established　on
other　grounds　and　presupposed　that　property　and　human　life　are　to　exist　and　be　respected；　then
indeed　it　is　a　contradiction　to　commit　theft　or　murder；　a　contradiction　must　be　a　contradiction　of
something；　i。e。　of　some　content　presupposed　from　the　start　as　a　fixed　principle。　It　is　to　a　principle
of　that　kind　alone；　therefore；　that　an　action　can　be　related　either　by　correspondence　or
contradiction。　But　if　duty　is　to　be　willed　simply　for　duty's　sake　and　not　for　the　sake　of　some
content；　it　is　only　a　formal　identity　whose　nature　it　is　to　exclude　all　content　and　specification。　

The　further　antinomies　and　configurations　of　this　never…ending　ought…to…be；　in　which　the
exclusively　moral　way　of　thinking　…　thinking　in　terms　of　relation　…　just　wanders　to　and　fro　without
being　able　to　resolve　them　and　get　beyond　the　ought…to…be；　I　have　developed　in　my
Phenomenology　of　Mind。　

Addition：　While　we　laid　emphasis　above　on　the　fact　that　the　outlook　of　Kant's　philosophy　is　a
high　one　in　that　it　propounds　a　correspondence　between　duty　and　rationality；　still　we　must　notice
here　that　this　point　of　view　is　defective　in　lacking　all　articulation。　The　proposition：　'Act　as　if　the
maxim　of　thine　action　could　be　laid　down　as　a　universal　principle'；　would　be　admirable　if　we
already　had　determinate　principles　of　conduct。　That　is　to　say；　to　demand　of　a　principle　that　it　shall
be　able　to　serve　in　addition　as　a　determinant　of　universal　legislation　is　to　presuppose　that　it　already
possesses　a　content。　Given　the　content；　then　of　course　the　application　of　the　principle　would　be　a
simple　matter。　In　Kant's　case；　however；　the　principle　itself　is　still　not　available　and　his　criterion　of
non…contradiction　is　productive　of　nothing；　since　where　there　is　nothing；　there　can　be　no
contradiction　either。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　136。　

Because　of　the　abstract　characterisation　of　the　good；　the　other　moment　of　the
Idea　…　particularity　in　general　…　falls　within　subjectivity。　Subjectivity　in　its
universality　reflected　into　itself　is　the　subject's　absolute　inward　certainty
（Gewissheit）　of　himself；　that　which　establishes　the　particular　and　is　the
determining　and　decisive　element　in　him；　his　conscience　（Gewissen）。　

Addition：　We　may　speak　in　a　very　lofty　strain　about　duty；　and　talk　of　the　kind　is　uplifting　and
broadens　human　sympathies；　but　if　it　never　comes　to　anything　specific　it　ends　in　being　wearisome。
Mind　demands　particularity　and　is　entitled　to　it。　But　conscience　is　this　deepest　inward　solitude　with
oneself　where　everything　external　and　every　restriction　has　disappeared　…　this　complete　withdrawal
into　oneself。　As　conscience；　man　is　no　longer　shackled　by　the　aims　of　particularity；　and
consequently　in　attaining　that　position　he　has　risen　to　higher　ground；　the　ground　of　the　modern
world；　which　for　the　first　time　has　reached　this　consciousness；　reached　this　sinking　into　oneself。
The　more　sensuous　consciousness　＇For　the　distinction　between　sense…consciousness　and　'more
highly　developed　types　of　consciousness'；　see　Remarks　to　§§　21　and　35。＇　of　earlier　epochs　had
something　external　and　given　confronting　it；　either　religion　or　law。　But　conscience　knows　itself　as
thinking　and　knows　that　what　alone　has　obligatory　force　for　me　is　this　that　I　think。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　137。　

True　conscience　is　the　disposition　to　will　what　is　absolutely　good。　It　therefore　has
fixed　principles　and　it　is　aware　of　these　as　its　explicitly　objective　determinants　and
duties。　In　distinction　from　this　its　content　（i。e。　truth）；　conscience　is　only　the
formal　side　of　the　activity　of　the　will；　which　as　this　will　has　no　special　content　of
its　own。　But　the　objective　system　of　these　principles　and　duties；　and　the　union　of
subjective　knowing　with　this　system；　is　not　present　until　we　come　to　the
standpoint　of　ethical　life。　Here　at　the　abstract　standpoint　of　morality；　conscience
lacks　this　objective　content　and　so　its　explicit　character　is　that　of　infinite　abstract
self…certainty；　which　at　the　same　time　is　for　this　very　reason　the　self…certainty　of
this　subject。　

Remark：　Conscience　is　the　expression　of　the　absolute　title　of　subjective　self…consciousness　to
know　in　itself　and　from　within　itself　what　is　right　and　obligatory；　to　give　recognition　only　to　what　it
thus　knows　as　good；　and　at　the　same　time