philosophy of right-第22节

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character　is　not　an　isolated　content　limited　to　an　external　unit；　but　a　universal
content；　comprising　in　itself　the　complex　of　connected　parts。　Purpose；　as　issuing
from　a　thinker；　comprises　more　than　the　mere　unit；　essentially　it　comprises　that
universal　side　of　the　action；　i。e。　the　intention。　

Remark：　Etymologically；　Absicht　（intention）　implies　abstraction；　either　the　form　of　universality
or　the　extraction　of　a　particular　aspect　of　the　concrete　thing。　The　endeavour　to　justify　an　action　by
the　intention　behind　it　involves　the　isolation　of　one　or　other　of　its　single　aspects　which　is　alleged　to
be　the　essence　of　the　action　on　its　subjective　side。　

To　judge　an　action　as　an　external　deed　without　yet　determining　its　rightness　or　wrongness　is　simply
to　bestow　on　it　a　universal　predicate；　i。e。　to　describe　it　as　burning；　killing；　&c。　

The　discrete　character　of　the　external　world　shows　what　the　nature　of　that　world　is；　namely　a　chain
of　external　relations。　Actuality　is　touched　in　the　first　instance　only　at　a　single　point　（arson；　for
instance；　directly　concerns　only　a　tiny　section　of　the　firewood；　i。e。　is　describable　in　a　proposition；
not　a　judgment）；　but　the　universal　nature　of　this　point　entails　its　expansion。　In　a　living　thing；　the
single　part　is　there　in　its　immediacy　not　as　a　mere　part；　but　as　an　organ　in　which　the　universal　is
really　present　as　the　universal；　hence　in　murder；　it　is　not　a　piece　of　flesh；　as　something　isolated；
which　is　injured；　but　life　itself　which　is　injured　in　that　piece　of　flesh。　It　is　subjective　reflection；
ignorant　of　the　logical　nature　of　the　single　and　the　universal；　which　indulges　ad　libitum　in　the
subdivision　of　single　parts　and　consequences；　and　yet　it　is　the　nature　of　the　finite　deed　itself　to
contain　such　separable　contingencies。　The　device　of　dolus　indirectus　has　its　basis　in　these
considerations。　

Addition：　It　happens　of　course　that　circumstances　may　make　an　action　miscarry　to　a　greater　or
lesser　degree。　In　a　case　of　arson；　for　instance；　the　fire　may　not　catch　or　alternatively　it　may　take
hold　further　than　the　incendiary　intended。　In　spite　of　this；　however；　we　must　not　make　this　a
distinction　between　good　and　bad　luck；　since　in　acting　a　man　must　lay　his　account　with　externality。
The　old　Proverb　is　correct：　'A　flung　stone　is　the　devil's。'　To　act　is　to　expose　oneself　to　bad　luck。
Thus　bad　luck　has　a　right　over　me　and　is　an　embodiment　of　my　own　willing。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　120。　

The　right　of　intention　is　that　the　universal　quality　of　the　action　shall　not　merely　be
implicit　but　shall　be　known　by　the　agent；　and　so　shall　have　lain　from　the　start　in
his　subjective　will。　Vice　versa；　what　may　be　called　the　right　of　the　objectivity　of
action　is　the　right　of　the　action　to　evince　itself　as　known　and　willed　by　the　subject
as　a　thinker。　

Remark：　This　right　to　insight　of　this　kind　entails　the　complete；　or　almost　complete；
irresponsibility　of　children；　imbeciles；　lunatics；　&c。；　for　their　actions。　But　just　as　actions　on　their
external　side　as　events　include　accidental　consequences；　so　there　is　involved　in　the　subjective
agent　an　indeterminacy　whose　degree　depends　on　the　strength　and　force　of　his　self…consciousness
and　circumspection。　This　indeterminacy；　however；　may　not　be　taken　into　account　except　in
connection　with　childhood　or　imbecility；　lunacy；　&c。；　since　it　is　only　such　well　marked　states　of
mind　that　nullify　the　trait　of　thought　and　freedom　of　will；　and　permit　us　to　treat　the　agent　as　devoid
of　the　dignity　of　being　a　thinker　and　a　will。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　121。　

The　universal　quality　of　the　action　is　the　manifold　content　of　the　action　as　such；
reduced　to　the　simple　form　of　universality。　But　the　subject；　an　entity　reflected
into　himself　and　so　particular　in　correlation　with　the　particularity　of　his　object；　has
in　his　end　his　own　particular　content；　and　this　content　is　the　soul　of　the　action　and
determines　its　character。　The　fact　that　this　moment　of　the　particularity　of　the
agent　is　contained　and　realised　in　the　action　constitutes　subjective　freedom　in　its
more　concrete　sense；　the　right　of　the　subject　to　find　his　satisfaction　in　the　action。　

Addition：　In　my　own　eyes；　reflected　into　myself；　I　am　a　particular　in　correlation　with　the
externality　of　my　action。　My　end　constitutes　the　content　of　the　action；　the　content　determinant　of
the　action。　Murder　and　arson；　for　example；　are　universals　and　so　are　not　the　positive　content　of
my　action　qua　the　action　of　a　subject。　If　one　of　these　crimes　has　been　committed；　its　perpetrator
may　be　asked　why　he　committed　it。　The　murder　was　not　done　for　the　sake　of　murdering；　the
murderer　had　in　View　some　particular　positive　end。　But　if　we　were　to　say　that　he　murdered　for　the
mere　pleasure　of　murdering；　then　the　purely　positive　content　of　the　subject　would　surely　be
pleasure；　and　if　that　is　the　case　then　the　deed　is　the　satisfaction　of　the　subject's　will。　Thus　the
motive　of　an　act　is；　more　particularly；　what　is　called　the　'moral'　factor；　and　this　has　in　that　case　the
double　meaning　of　the　universal　implicit　in　the　purpose　and　the　particular　aspect　of　the　intention。
It　is　a　striking　modem　innovation　to　inquire　continually　about　the　motives　of　men's　actions。
Formerly；　the　question　was　simply：　'Is　he　an　honest　man？　Does　he　do　his　duty？'　Nowadays　we
insist　on　looking　into　men's　hearts　and　so　we　presuppose　a　gulf　between　the　objectivity　of　actions
and　their　inner　side；　the　subjective　motives。　To　be　sure；　the　subject's　volition　must　be　considered；
he　wills　something　and　the　reason　for　what　he　wills　lies　within　himself；　he　wills　the　satisfaction　of　his
desire；　the　gratification　of　his　passion。　None　the　less；　the　good　and　the　right　are　also　a　content　of
action；　a　content　not　purely　natural　but　put　there　by　my　rationality。　To　make　my　freedom　the
content　of　what　I　will　is　a　plain　goal　of　my　freedom　itself。　Therefore　it　is　to　take　higher　moral
ground　to　find　satisfaction　in　the　action　and　to　advance　beyond　the　gulf　between　the
self…consciousness　of　a　man　and　the　objectivity　of　his　deed；　even　though　to　treat　action　as　if　it
involved　such　a　gulf　is　a　way　of　looking　at　the　matter　characteristic　of　certain　epochs　in　world
history　and　in　individual　biography。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　122。　

It　is　on　the　strength　of　this　particular　aspect　that　the　action　has　subjective　worth
or　interest　for　me。　In　contrast　with　this　end　…　the　content　of　the　intention　…　the
direct　character　of　the　action　in　its　further　content　is　reduced　to　a　means。　In　so
far　as　such　an　end　is　something　finite；　it　may　in　its　turn　be　reduced　to　a　means　to
some　further　intention　and　so　on　ad　infinitum。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　123。　

For　the　content　of　these　ends　nothing　is　available　at　this　point　except　＇a＇　pure
activity　itself；　i。e。　the　activity　present　owing　to　the　fact　that　the　subject　puts
himself　into　whatever　he　is　to　look　upon　and　promote　as　his　end。　Men　are　willing
to　be　active　in　pursuit　of　what　interests　them；　or　should　interest　them；　as
something　which　is　their　own。　＇b＇　A　more　determinate　content；　however；　the　still
abstract　and　formal　freedom　of　subjectivity　possesses　only　in　its。　natural。
subjective　embodiment；　i。e。　in　needs；　inclinations；　passions；　opinions；　fancies；　&c。
The　satisfaction　of　these　is　welfare　or　happiness；　both　in　general　and　in　its
particular　species　…　the　ends　of　the　whole　sphere　of　finitude。　

Remark：　Here　…　the　standpoint　of　relation　（see　§　108）；　when　the　subject　is　characterised　by　his
self…difference　and　so　counts　as　a　particular　…　is　the　place　where　the　content　of　the　natural　will　（see
§　11）。　comes　on　the　scene。　But　the　will　here　is　not　as　it　is　in　its　immediacy；　on　the　contrary；　this
content　now　belongs　to　a　will　reflected　into　itself　and　so　is　elevated　to　become　a　universal　end；　the
end　of　welfare　or　happiness；　this　happens　at　the　level　of　the　thinking　which　does　not　yet　apprehend
the　will　in　its　freedom　but　reflects　on　its　content　as　on　one　natural　and　given　…　the　level；　for
example；　of　the　time　of　Croesus　and　Solon。　

Addition：　Since　the　specifications　of　happiness　are　given；　they　are　not　true　specifications　of
freedom；　because　freedom　is　not　genuinely　free　in　its　own　eyes　except　in　the　good；　i。e。　except
when　it　is　its　own　end。　Consequently　we　may　raise　the　question　whether　a　man　has　the　right　to　set
before　himself　ends　not　freely　chosen　but　resting　solely　on　the　fact　that　the　subject　is　a　living　being。
The　fact　that　man　is　a　living　being；　however；　is　not　fortuitous；　but　in　conformity　with　reason；　and　to
that　extent　he　has　a　right　to　make　his　needs　his　end。　There　is　nothing　degrading　in　being　alive；　and
there　is　no　mode　of　intelligent　being　higher　than　life　in　which　existence　would　be　possible。　It　is　only
the　raising　of　the　given　to　something　self…created　which　yields　the　higher　orbit　of　the　good；　although
this　distinction　implies　no　incompatibility　between　the　two　levels。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　124。　

Since　the　subjective　satisfaction　of　the　individual　himself　（including　the
recognition　which　he　receives　by　way　of　honour　and　fame）　is　also　part　and　parcel
of　the　achievement　of　ends　of　absolute　worth；　it