philosophy of right-第19节

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


opposition　between　the　implicit　universal　will　and　the　single　explicitly　independent
will；　and　then；　through　the　supersession　of　this　opposition　（through　the　negation
of　the　negation）；　it　determines　itself　in　its　existence　as　a　will；　so　that　it　is　a　free　will
not　only　in　itself　but　for　itself　also；　i。e。　it　determines　itself　as　self…related
negativity。　Its　personality　—　and　in　abstract　right　the　will　is　personality　and　no
more　—　it　now　has　for　its　object；　the　infinite　subjectivity　of　freedom；　a
subjectivity　become　explicit　in　this　way；　is　the　principle　of　the　moral　standpoint　。　

Remark：　Let　us　look　back　more　closely　over　the　moments　through　which　the　concept　of
freedom　develops　itself　from　the　will's　determinate　character　as　originally　abstract　to　its　character
as　self…related；　and　so　at　this　point　to　its　self…determination　as　subjectivity。　In　property　this
determinate　character　is　the　abstract　one；　'mine'；　and　is　therefore　found　in　an　external　thing。　In
contract；　'mine'　is　mediated　by　the　wills　of　the　parties　and　means　only　something　common。　In
wrong　the　will　of　the　sphere　of　right　has　its　abstract　character　of　implicit　being　or　immediacy
posited　as　contingency　through　the　act　of　a　single　will；　itself　a　contingent　will。　At　the　moral
standpoint；　the　abstract　determinacy　of　the　will　in　the　sphere　of　right　has　been　so　far　overcome　that
this　contingency　itself　is；　as　reflected　in　upon　itself　and　self…identical；　the　inward　infinite　contingency
of　the　will；　i。e。　its　subjectivity。　

Addition：　Truth　entails　that　the　concept　shall　be；　and　that　this　existence　shall　correspond　with
the　concept。　In　the　sphere　of　right；　the　will　is　existent　in　something　external；　but　the　next
requirement　is　that　the　will　should　be　existent　in　something　inward；　in　itself。　It　must　in　its　own　eyes
be　subjectivity；　and　have　itself　as　its　own　object。　This　relation　to　itself　is　the　moment　of　affirmation；
but　it　can　attain　it　only　by　superseding　its　immediacy。　The　immediacy　superseded　in　crime　leads；
then；　through　punishment；　i。e。　through　the　nullity　of　this　nullity；　to　affirmation；　i。e。　to　morality。　



Second　Part：　Morality

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　105。

The　standpoint　of　morality　is　the　standpoint　of　the　will　which　is　infinite　not
merely　in　itself　but　for　itself　（see　§　104）。　In　contrast　with　the　will's　implicit　being；
with　its　immediacy　and　the　determinate　characteristics　developed　within　it　at　that
level；　this　reflection　of　the　will　into　itself　and　its　explicit　awareness　of　its　identity
makes　the　person　into　the　subject。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　106。

It　is　as　subjectivity　that　the　concept　has　now　been　determined；　and　since
subjectivity　is　distinct　from　the　concept　as　such；　i。e。　from　the　implicit　principle　of
the　will；　and　since　furthermore　it　is　at　the　same　time　the　will　of　the　subject　as　a
single　individual　aware　of　himself　（i。e。　still　has　immediacy　in　him）；　it　constitutes
the　determinate　existence　of　the　concept。　In　this　way　a　higher　ground　has　been
assigned　to　freedom；　the　Idea's　existential　aspect；　or　its　moment　of　reality；　is　now
the　subjectivity　of　the　will。　Only　in　the　Will　as　subjective　can　freedom　or　the
implicit　principle　of　the　will　be　actual。　

Remark：　The　second　sphere；　—　Morality；　therefore　throughout　portrays　the　real　aspect　of　the
concept　of　freedom；　and　the　movement　of　this　sphere　is　as　follows：　the　will；　which　at　the　start　is
aware　only　of　its　independence　and　which　before　it　is　mediated　is　only　implicitly　identical　with　the
universal　will　or　the　principle　of　the　will；　is　raised　beyond　its　＇explicit＇　difference　from　the　universal
will；　beyond　this　situation　in　which　it　sinks　deeper　and　deeper　into　itself；　and　is　established　as
explicitly　identical　with　the　principle　of　the　will。；　—　This　process　is　accordingly　the　cultivation　of　the
ground　in　which　freedom　is　now　set；　i。e。　subjectivity。　What　happens　is　that　subjectivity；　which　is
abstract　at　the　start；　i。e。　distinct　from　the　concept；　becomes　likened　to　it；　and　thereby　the　Idea
acquires　its　genuine　realisation；　The　result　is　that　the　subjective…will　determines　itself　as　objective
too　and　so　as　truly　concrete。　

Addition：　So　far　as　right　in　the　strict　sense　was　concerned；　it　was　of　no　importance　what　my
intention　or　my　principle　was。　This　question　about　the　self…determination　and　motive　of　the　will；
like　the　question　about　its　purpose；　now　enters　at　this　point　in　connection　with　morality。　Since　man
wishes　to　be　judged　in　accordance　with　his　own　self…determined　choices；　he　is　free　in　this　relation
to　himself　whatever　the　external　situation　may　impose　upon　him。　No　one　can　break　in　upon　this
inner　conviction　of　mankind；　no　violence　can　be　done　to　it；　and　the　moral　will；　therefore；　is
inaccessible。　Man's　worth　is　estimated　by　reference　to　his　inward　action　and　hence　the　standpoint
of　morality　is　that　of　freedom　aware　of　itself。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　107。

The　self…determination　of　the　will　is　at　the　same　time　a　moment　in　the　concept　of
the　will；　and　subjectivity　is　not　merely　its　existential　aspect　but　its　own
determinate　character　（see　§　104）。　The　will　aware　of　its　freedom　and　determined
as　subjective　is　at　the　start　concept　alone；　but　itself　has　determinate　existence　in
order　to　exist　as　Idea。　The　moral　standpoint　therefore　takes　shape　as　the　right　of
the　subjective　Will。　In　accordance　with　this　right；　the　will　recognises　something
and　is　something；　only　in　so　far　as　the　thing　is　its　own　and　as　the　will　is　present　to
itself　there　as　something　subjective。　

The　same　process　through　which　the　moral　attitude　develops　（see　the　Remark　to
the　preceding　Paragraph）　has　from　this　point　of　view　the　form　of　being　the
development　of　the　right　of　the　subjective　will；　or　of　the　mode　of　its　existence。　In
this　process　the　subjective　will　further　determines　what　it　recognises　as　its　own　in
its　object　（Gegenstand）；　so　that　this　object　becomes　the　will's　own　true　concept；
becomes　objective　（objektiv）　as　the　expression　of　the　will's　own　universality。　

Addition：　This　entire　category　of　the　subjectivity　of　the　will　is　once　again　a　whole　which；　as
subjectivity；　must　also　have　objectivity。　It　is　in　a　subject　that　freedom　can　first　be　realised；　since
the　subjective　is　the　true　material　for　this　realisation。　But　this　embodiment　of　the　will　which　we　have
called　subjectivity　is　different　from　the　will　which　has　developed　all　its　potentialities　to　actuality。
That　is　to　say；　the　will　must　free　itself　from　this　second　one…sidedness　of　pure　subjectivity　in　order
to　become　the　fully　actualised　will。　In　morality；　it　is　man's　private　interest　that　comes　into　question；
and　the　high　worth　of　this　interest　consists　precisely　in　the　fact　that　man　knows　himself　as　absolute
and　is　self…determined。　The　uneducated　man　allows　himself　to　be　constrained　in　everything　by
brute　force　and　natural　factors；　children　have　no　moral　will　but　leave　their　parents　to　decide　things
for　them。　The　educated　man；　however；　develops　an　inner　life　and　wills　that　he　himself　shall　be　in
everything　he　does。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　108。　

The　subjective　will；　directly　aware　of　itself；　and　distinguished　from　the　principle
of　the　will　（see　Remark　to　§　106）；　is　therefore　abstract；　restricted；　and　formal。
But　not　merely　is　subjectivity　itself　formal；　in　addition；　as　the　infinite
self…determination　of　the　will；　it　constitutes　the　form　of　all　willing。　In　this；　its　first
appearance　in　the　single　will；　this　form　has　not　yet　been　established　as　identical
with　the　concept　of　the　will；　and　therefore　the　moral　point　of　view　is　that　of
relation；　of　ought…to…be；　or　demand。　And　since　the　self…difference　of　subjectivity
involves　at　the　same　time　the　character　of　being　opposed　to　objectivity　as　external
fact；　it　follows　that　the　point　of　view　of　consciousness　comes　on　the　scene　here
too　（see　§　8）。　The　general　point　of　view　here　is　that　of　the　will's　self…difference；
finitude；　and　appearance。　

Remark：　The　moral　is　not　characterised　primarily　by　its　having　already　been　opposed　to　the
immoral；　nor　is　right　directly　characterised　by　its　opposition　to　wrong。　The　point　is　rather　that　the
general　characteristics　of　morality　and　immorality　alike　rest　on　the　subjectivity　of　the　will。　

Addition：　In　morality；　self…determination　is　to　be　thought　of　as　the　pure　restlessness　and　activity
which　can　never　arrive　at　anything　that　is。　It　is　in　the　sphere　of　ethical　life　that　the　will　is　for　the　first
time　identical　with　the　concept　of　the　will　and　has　this　concept　alone　as　its　content。　In　the　moral
sphere　the　will　still　relates　itself　to　its　implicit　principle　and　consequently　its　position　is　that　of
difference。　The　process　through　which　this　position　develops　is　that　whereby　the　subjective　will
becomes　identified　with　its　concept。　Therefore　the　'ought…to…be'　which　is　never　absent　from　the
moral　sphere　becomes　an　'is'　only　in　ethical　life。　Further；　this　'other'　in　relation　to　which　the
subjective　will　stands　is　two…sided：　first；　it　is　what　is　substantive；　the　concept；　secondly；　it　is
external　fact。　Even　if　the　good　were　posited　in　the　subjective　will；　that　still　would　not　give　it
complete　realisation。