philosophy of right-第15节

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visible　externality　is　internal　to　itself。　

Remark：　Hence　when　the　free　will　is　spoken　of　without　the　qualification　of　absolute　freedom；
only　the　capacity　of　freedom　is　meant；　or　the　natural　and　finite　will　（§　11）；　and；　notwithstanding　all
words　and　opinions　to　the　contrary；　not　the　free　will。　Since　the　understanding　comprehends　the
infinite　only　in　its　negative　aspect；　and　hence　as　a　beyond；　it　thinks　to　do　the　infinite　all　the　more
honour　the　farther　it　removes　it　into　the　vague　distance；　and　the　more　it　takes　it　as　a　foreign　thing。
In　free　will　the　true　infinite　is　present　and　real；　it　is　itself　the　actually　present　self…contained　idea。　

Addition。　The　infinite　has　rightly　been　represented　as　a　circle。　The　straight　line　goes　out　farther
and　farther；　and　symbolises　the　merely　negative　and　bad　infinite；　which；　unlike　the　true；　does　not
return　into　itself。　The　free　will　is　truly　infinite；　for　it　is　not　a　mere　possibility　or　disposition。　Its
external　reality　is　its　own　inner　nature；　itself。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　23。

Only　in　this　freedom　is　the　will　wholly　by　itself；　because　it　refers　to　nothing　but
itself；　and　all　dependence　upon　any　other　thing　falls　away。　The　will　is　true；　or
rather　truth　itself；　because　its　character　consists　in　its　being　in　its　manifested
reality；　or　correlative　opposite；　what　it　is　in　its　conception。　In　other　words；　the
pure　conception　has　the　perception　or　intuition　of　itself　as　its　end　and　reality。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　24。

The　will　is　universal；　because　in　it　all　limitation　and　particular　individuality　are
superseded。　These　one…sided　phases　are　found　only　in　the　difference　between　the
conception　and　its　object　or　content；　or；　from　another　standpoint；　in　the
difference　between　the　conscious　independent　existence　of　the　subject；　and　the
will's　implicit；　or　self…involved　existence；　or　between　its　excluding　and　concluding
individuality；　and　its　universality。　

Remark：　The　different　phases　of　universality　are　tabulated　In　the　logic　（Encyclopaedia。　of　the
Phil。　Sciences；　§§　118…126）。　Imaginative　thinking　always　takes　universality　in　an　abstract　and
external　way。　But　absolute　universality　is　not　to　be　thought　of　either　as　the　universality　of　reflection；
which　is　a　kind　of　consensus　or　generality；　or；　as　the　abstract　universality　and　self…identity；　which　is
fashioned　by　the　understanding　（§　6；　note）；　and　keeps　aloof　from　the　individual。　It　is　rather　the
concrete；　self…contained；　and　self…referring　universality；　which　is　the　substance；　intrinsic　genus；　or
immanent　idea　of　self…consciousness。　It　is　a　conception　of　free　will　as　the　universal；　transcending　its
object；　passing　through　and　beyond　its　own　specific　character；　and　then　becoming　identical　with
itself。　This　absolute　universal　is　what　is　in　general　called　the　rational；　and　is　to　be　apprehended　only
in　this　speculative　way。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　25。

The　subjective　side　of　the　will　is　the　side　of　its　self…consciousness　and
individuality　（§　7）；　as　distinguished　from　its　implicit　conception。　This　subjectivity
is　

＇a＇　pure　form　or　absolute　unity　of　self…consciousness　with　itself。　This　unity　is　the
equation　〃　I　=　I；〃　consciousness　being　characterised　by　a　thoroughly　inward　and
abstract　self…dependence。　It　is　pure　certitude　of　itself　in　contrast　with　the　truth；　

＇b＇　particularity　of　will；　as　caprice　with　its　accidental　content　of　pleasurable　ends；　

＇c＇　in　general　a　one…sided　form　（§　8）；　in　so　far　as　that　which　is　willed　is　at　first　an
unfulfilled　end；　or　a　content　which　simply　belongs　to　self…consciousness。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　26。

＇a＇　In　so　far　as　free　will　is　determined　by　itself；　and　is　in　accord　with　its
conception　and　true；　it　is　wholly　objective　will。　＇b＇　But　objective
self…consciousness；　which　has　not　the　form　of　the　infinite；　is　a　will　sunk　in　its
object　or　condition；　whatever　the　content　of　that　may　be。　It　is　the　will　of　the
child；　or　the　will　present　in　slavery　or　superstition。　＇c＇　Objectivity　is　finally　a
one…sided　form　in　opposition　to　the　subjective　phase　of　will　；　it　is　direct　reality；　or
external　existence。　In　this　sense　the　will　becomes　objective　only　by　the　execution
of　its　ends。　

Remark：　These　logical　phases　of　subjectivity　and　objectivity；　since　they　are　often　made　use　of　in
the　sequel；　are　here　exposed；　with　the　express　purpose　of　noting　that　it　happens　with　them　as　with
other　distinctions　and　opposed　aspects　of　reflection；　they　by　virtue　of　their　finite　and　dialectic
character　pass　over　into　their　opposites。　For　imagination　and　understanding　the　meanings　of
antithetic　phases　are　not　convertible；　because　their　identity　is　still　internal。　But　in　will；　on　the
contrary；　these　phases；　which　ought　to　be　at　once　abstract　and　yet　also　sides　of　that　which　can　be
known　only　as　concrete；　lead　of　themselves　to　identity；　and　to　an　exchange　of　meaning。　To　the
understanding　this　is　unintelligible。　Thus；　e。g。；　the　will；　as　a　freedom　which　exists　in　itself；　is
subjectivity　itself；　thus　subjectivity　is　the　conception　of　the　will；　and　therefore　its　objectivity。　But
subjectivity　is　finite　in　opposition　to　objectivity；　yet　in　this　opposition　the　will　is　＇lot　isolated；　but　in
intricate　union　with　the　object　；　and　thus　its　finitude　consists　quite　as　much　in　its　not　being
subjective；　etc。　What　in　the　sequel　is　to　be　meant　by　the　subjective　or　the　objective　side　of　the　will；
has　each　time　to　be　made　clear　from　the　context；　which　will　supply　their　positions　in　relation　to　the
totality。　

Addition。　It　is　ordinarily　supposed　that　subjective　and　objective　are　blank　opposites　；　but　this　is
not　the　case。　Rather　do　they　pass　into　one　another；　for　they　are　not　abstract　aspects　like　positive
and　negative；　but　have　already　a　concrete　significance。　To　consider　in　the　first　instance　the
expression　〃subjective；〃　this　may　mean　an　end　which　is　merely　the　end　of　a　certain　subject。　In　this
sense　a　poor　work　of　art；　that　is　not　adequate　to　the　thing　is　merely　subjective。　But；　further；　this
expression　may　point　to　the　content　of　the　will；　and　is　then　of　about　the　same　meaning　as
capricious；　the　subjective　content　then　is　that　which　belongs　merely　to　the　subject。　In　this　sense
bad　acts　are　merely　subjective。　Further；　the　pure；　empty　I　may　be　called　subjective；　as　it　has　only
itself　as　an　object；　and　possesses　the　power　of　abstraction　from　all　further　content。　Subjectivity
has；　moreover；　a　wholly　particular　and　correct　meaning　in　accordance　with　which　anything；　in
order　to　win　recognition　from　me；　has　to　become　mine　and　seek　validity　in　me。　This　is　the　infinite
avarice　of　subjectivity；　eager　to　comprehend　and　consume　everything　within　the　simple　and　pure　I。

Similarly　we　may　take　the　objective　in　different　ways。　By　it　we　may　understand　anything　to　which
we　give　existence　in　contrast　to　ourselves；　whether　it　be　an　actual　thing　or　a　mere　thought；　which
we　place　over　against　ourselves。　By　it　also　we　understand　the　direct　reality；　in　which　the　end　is　to
be　realised。　Although　the　end　itself　is　quite　particular　and　subjective；　we　yet　name　it　objective　after
it　has　made　its　appearance。　Further；　the　objective　will　is　also　that　in　which　truth　is；　thus；　God's　will；
the　ethical　will　also；　are　objective。　Lastly；　we　may　call　the　will　objective；　when　it　is　wholly
submerged　in　its　object；　as；　e。g。；　the　child's　will；　which　is　confiding　and　without　subjective
freedom；　and　the　slave's　will；　which　does　not　know　itself　as　free；　and　is　thus　a　will…less　will。　In　this
sense　any　will　is　objective；　if　it　is　guided　in　its　action　by　a　foreign　authority；　and　has　not　yet
completed　the　infinite　return　into　itself。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　27。

The　absolute　character　or；　if　you　like；　the　absolute　impulse　of　the　free　spirit　（§
21）　is；　as　has　been　observed；　that　its　freedom　shall　be　for　it　an　object。　It　is　to　be
objective　in　a　two…fold　sense：　it　is　the　rational　system　of　itself；　and　this　system　is
to　be　directly　real　（§　26）。　There　is　thus　actualised　as　idea　what　the　will　is
implicitly。　Hence；　the　abstract　conception　of　the　idea　of　the　will　is　in　general　the
free　will　which　wills　the　free　will。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　28。

The　activity　of　the　will；　directed　to　the　task　of　transcending　the　contradiction
between　subjectivity　and　objectivity；　of　transferring　its　end　from　subjectivity　into
objectivity；　and　yet　while　in　objectivity　of　remaining　with　itself；　is　beyond　the
formal　method　of　consciousness　（§　8）；　in　which　objectivity　is　only　direct
actuality。　This　activity　is　the　essential　development　of　the　substantive　content　of
the　idea　（§　21）。　In　this　development　the　conception　moulds　the　idea；　which　is　in
the　first　instance　abstract；　into　the　totality　of　a　system。　This　totality　as　substantive
is　independent　of　the　opposition　between　mere　subjective　end　and　its　realisation；
and　in　both　of　these　forms　is　the　same。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　29。

That　a　reality　is　the　realisation　of　the　free　will；　this　is　what　is　meant　by　a　right。
Right；　therefore；　is；　in　general；　freedom　as　idea。　

Remark：　In　the　Kantian　doctrine　（Introduction　to　Kant's　Theory　of　Right）；　now　generally
accepted；　〃th