philosophy of right-第13节

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man；　who　is　implicitly　rational；　must　create　himself　by　working　through　and　out　of　himself　and　by
reconstructing　himself　within　himself；　before　he　can　become　also　explicitly　rational。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　11。

The　will；　which　is　at　first　only　implicitly　free；　is　the　direct　or　natural　will。　The
distinctive　phases；　which　the　self…determining　conception　sets　up　in　the　will；
appear　in　the　direct　will；　as　a　directly　present　content。　They　are　impulses；
appetites；　inclinations；　by　which　the　will　finds　itself　determined　by　nature。　Now
this　content；　with　all　its　attendant　phases；　proceeds　from　the　rationality　of　the　will；
and　is　therefore　implicitly　rational；　but　let　loose　in　its　immediate　directness　it　has
not　as　yet　the　form　of　rationality。　The　content　is　indeed　for　me　and　my　own；　but
the　form　and　the　content　are　yet　different。　The　will　is　thus　in　itself　finite。　

Note。　Empirical　psychology　enumerates　and　describes　these　impulses　and　inclinations；　and　the
wants　which　are　based　upon　them。　It　takes；　or　imagines　that　it　takes　this　material　from　experience；
and　then　seeks　to　classify　it　in　the　usual　way。　It　will　be　stated　below；　what　the　objective　side　of
impulse　is；　and　what　impulse　is　in　its　truth；　apart　from　the　form　of　irrationality　which　it　has　as　an
impulse；　and　also　what　shape　it　assumes　when　it　reaches　existence。　

Addition。　Impulse；　appetite；　inclination　are　possessed　by　the　animal　also；　but　it　has　not　will；　it
must　obey　impulse；　if　there　is　no　external　obstacle。　Man；　however；　is　the　completely　undetermined；
and　stands　above　impulse；　and　may　fix　and　set　it　up　as　his。　Impulse　is　in　nature；　but　it　depends　on
my　will　whether　I　establish　it　in　the　I。　Nor　can　the　will　be　unconditionally　called　to　this　action　by　the
fact　that　the　impulse　lies　in　nature。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　12。

The　system　of　this　content；　as　it　occurs　directly　in　the　will；　exists　only　as　a
multitude　or　multiplicity　of　impulses；　every　one　of　which　is　mine　in　a　general　way
along　with　others；　but　is　at　the　same　time　universal　and　undetermined；　having
many　objects　and　ways　of　satisfaction。　The　will；　by　giving　itself　in　this　two…fold
indefiniteness　the　form　of　individuality　（§　7）；　resolves；　and　only　as　resolving　is　it
actual。　

Remark：　Instead　of　to　〃　resolve；〃　i。e。　to　supersede　the　indefinite　condition　in　which　a　content　is
merely　possible；　our　language　has　the　expression　〃decide　〃　（〃　unfold　itself　〃）。　The　indeterminate
condition　of　the　will；　as　neutral　but　infinitely　fruitful　germ　of　all　existence；　contains　within　itself　its
definite　character　and　ends；　and　brings　them　forth　solely　out　of　itself。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　13。

By　resolution；　will　fixes　itself　as　the　will　of　a　definite　individual；　and　as　thereby
distinguishing　itself　from　another。　However　apart　from　this　finite　character　which
it　has　as　consciousness　（§　8）；　the　immediate　will　is　in　virtue　of　the　distinction
between　its　form　and　its　content　formal。　Hence　its　resolution　as　such　is　abstract；
and　its　content　is　not　yet　the　content　and　work　of　its　freedom。　

Remark：　To　the　intelligence；　as　thinking；　the　object　or　content　remains　universal　；　the　intelligence
retains　the　form　merely　of　a　universal　activity。　Now　the　universal　signifies　in　will　that　which　is　mine；
i。e。　it　is　individuality。　And　yet；　also；　the　direct　and　formal　will　is　abstract　；　its　individuality　is　not　yet
filled　with　its　free　universality。　Hence　at　the　beginning　the　peculiar　finitude　of　the　intelligence　is　in
will；　and　only　by　exalting　itself　again　to　thought　and　giving　itself　intrinsic　universality　does　the　will
transcend　the　distinction　of　form　and　content　and　make　itself　objective　infinite　will。　It　is　therefore　a
misunderstanding　of　the　nature　of　thought　and　will　to　suppose　that　in　the　will　man　is　infinite；　while　in
thought　and　even　in　reason　he　is　limited。　In　so　far　as　thought　and　will　are　still　distinct；　the　reverse　is
rather　the　case；　and　thinking　reason；　when　it　becomes　will；　assigns　itself　to　finitude。　

Addition。　A　will　which　resolves　nothing；　is　not　an　actual　will；　that　which　is　devoid　of　definite
character　never　reaches　a　volition。　The　reason　for　hesitation　may　lie　in　a　sensitiveness；　which　is
aware　that　in　determining　itself　it　is　engaged　with　what　is　finite；　is　assigning　itself　a　limit；　and
abandoning　its　infinity　；　it　may　thus　hold　to　its　decision　not　to　renounce　the　totality　which　it　intends。
Such　a　feeling　is　dead；　even　when　it　aims　to　be　something　beautiful。　〃Who　will　be　great；〃　says
Goethe；　〃must　be　able　to　limit　himself。〃　By　volition　alone　man　enters　actuality；　however　distasteful
it　may　be　to　him；　for　indolence　will　not　desert　its　own　self…brooding；　in　which　it　clings　to　a　universal
possibility。　But　possibility　is　not　yet　actuality。　Hence　the　will；　which　is　secure　simply　of　itself；　does
not　as　yet　lose　itself　in　any　definite　reality。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　14。

The　finite　will；　which　has　merely　from　the　standpoint　of　form　doubled　itself　back
upon　itself；　and　has　become　the　infinite　and　self…secluded　I　（§　5）；　stands　above
its　content　of　different　impulses　and　also　above　the　several　ways　by　which　they
are　realised　and　satisfied。　At　the　same　time；　as　it　is　only　formally　infinite；　it　is
confined　to　this　very　content　as　the　decisive　feature　of　its　nature　and　external
actuality；　although　it　is　undetermined　and　not　confined　to　one　content　rather　than
another　（§§　6；　11）。　As　to　the　return　of　the　I　into　itself　such　a　will　is　only　a
possible　will；　which　may　or　may　not　be　mine；　and　the　I　is　only　the　possibility　of
deputing　itself　to　this　or　that　object。　Hence　amongst　these　definite　phases；　which
in　this　light　are　for　the　I　external；　the　will　chooses。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　15。

Freedom　of　the　will　is；　in　this　view　of　it；　caprice；　in　which　are　contained　both　a
reflection；　which　is　free　and　abstracted　from　everything　and　a　dependence　upon　a
content　or　matter　either　internally　or　externally　provided。　Since　the　content　is　in
itself　or　implicitly　necessary　as　all　end；　and　in　opposition　to　this　reflection　is　a
definite　possibility；　caprice；　when　it　is　will；　is　in　its　nature　contingent。　

Remark：　The；　usual　idea　of　freedom　is　that　of　caprice。　It　is　a　midway　stage　of　reflection
between　the　will　as　merely　natural　impulse　and　the　will　as　free　absolutely。　When　it　is　said　that
freedom　as　a；　general　thing　consists　in　doing　what　one　likes；　such　an　idea　must　be　taken　to　imply
an　utter　lack　of　developed　thought；　containing　as　yet　not　even　the　suspicion　of　what　is　meant　by
the　absolutely　free　will；　right；　the　ethical　system；　etc。　Reflection；　being　the　formal　universality　and　I
unity　of　self…consciousness；　is　the　will's　abstract　certitude　of　its　freedom；　but　it　is　not　yet　the　truth
of　it；　because　it　has　not　as　yet　itself　for　content　and　end；　the　subjective　side　is　still　different　from　the
objective。　Thus　the　content　in　such　a　case　remains　purely　and　completely　finite。　Caprice；　instead　of
being　will　in　its　truth；　is　rather　will　in　its　contradiction。　

In　the　controversy　carried　on；　especially　at　the　time　of　the　metaphysic　of　Wolf；　as　to　whether　the
will　is　really　free　or　our　consciousness　of　its　freedom　is　a　delusion；　it　was　this　caprice；　which　was　in
the　minds　of　both　parties。　Against　the　certitude　of　abstract　self…direction；　determinism　rightly
opposed　a　content；　which　was　externally　presented；　and　not　being　contained　in　this　certitude　came
from　without。　It　did　not　matter　whether　this　〃without〃　were　impulse；　imagination；　or　in　general　a
consciousness　so　filled　that　the　content　was　not　the　peculiar　possession　of　the　self…activity　as　such。
Since　only　the　formal　element　of　free　self…direction　is　immanent　in　caprice；　while　the　other　element
is　something　given　to　it　from　without；　to　take　caprice　as　freedom　may　fairly　be　named　a　delusion。
Freedom　in　every　philosophy　of　reflection；　whether　it　be　the　Kantian　or　the　Friesian；　which　is　the
Kantian　superficialised；　is　nothing　more　than　this　formal　self…activity。　

Addition。　Since　I　have　the　possibility　of　determining　himself　in　this　or　that　way；　since　I　have　the
power　of　choice；　possess　caprice；　or　what　is　commonly　called　freedom。　This　choice　is　due　to　the
universality　of　the　will；　enabling　me　to　make　my　own　this　thing　or　another。　This　possession　is　a
particular　content；　which　is　therefore　not　adequate　to　me；　but　separated　from　me；　and　is　mine　only
in　possibility；　just　as　I　am　the　possibility　of　bringing　myself　into　coincidence　with　it。　Hence　choice　is
due　to　the　indeterminateness　of　the　I；　and　to　the　determinateness　of　a　content。　But　as　to　this
content　the　will　is　not　free；　although　it　has　in　itself　formally　the　side　of　infinitude。　No　such　content
corresponds　to　will　；　in　no　content　can　it　truly　find　itself。　In　caprice　it　is　involved　that　the　content　is
not　formed　by　the　nature　of　my　will；　but　by　contingency。　I　am　dependent　upon　this　content。　This　is
the　contradiction　contained　in　caprice。　Ordinary　man　believes　that　he　is　free；　when　lie　is　allowed　to
act　capriciously；　but　precisely　in　caprice　is　it　inherent　that　he　is　not　free。　When　I　will　the　rational；　I
do　not　act　as　a　particular　individual　but　according　to　the　conceptio