philosophy of right-第12节

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negation。　The　indefinite　will　is　thus　quite　as　much　one…sided　as　the　will；　which　continues　merely　in
the　definite。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　7。

＇c＇　The　will　is　the　unity　of　these　two　elements。　It　is　particularity　turned　back
within　itself　and　thus　led　back　to　universality；　it　is　individuality；　it　is　the
self…direction　of　the　I。　Thus　at　one　and　the　same　time　it　establishes　itself　as　its
own　negation；　that　is　to　say；　as　definite　and　limited；　and　it　also　abides　by　itself；　in
its　self…identity　and　universality；　and　in　this　position　remains　purely　self…enclosed。
The　I　determines　itself　in　so　far　as　it　is　the　reference　of　negativity　to　itself　；　and
yet　in　this　self…reference　it　is　indifferent　to　its　own　definite　character。　This　it
knows　as　its　own；　that　is；　as　an　ideal　or　a　mere　possibility；　by　which　it　is　not
bound；　but　rather　exists　in　it　merely　because　it　establishes　itself　there。　This　is　the
freedom　of　the　will；　constituting　its　conception　or　substantive　reality。　It　is　its
gravity；　as　it　were；　just　as　gravity　is　the　substantive　reality　of　a　body。　

Remark：　Every　self…consciousness　knows　itself　as　at　once　universal；　or　the　possibility　of
abstracting　itself　from　everything　definite；　and　as　particular；　with　a　fixed　object；　content　or　aim。
These　two　elements；　however；　are　only　abstractions。　The　concrete　and　true；　and　all　that　is　true　is
concrete；　is　the　universality；　to　which　the　particular　is　at　first　opposed；　but；　when　it　has　been　turned
back　into　itself；　is　in　the　end　made　equal。　This　unity　is　individuality；　but　it　is　not　a　simple　unit　as　is
the　individuality　of　imaginative　thought；　but　a　unit　in　terms　of　the　conception　（Encyclopaedia　of
the　Philosophical　Sciences；　§§　112…114）。　In　other　words；　this　individuality　is　properly　nothing
else　than　the　conception。　The　first　two　elements　of　the　will；　that　it　can　abstract　itself　from
everything；　and　that　it　is　definite　through　either　its　own　activity　or　something　else；　are　easily
admitted　and　comprehended；　because　in　their　separation　they　are　untrue；　and　characteristic　of　the
mere　understanding。　But　into　the　third；　the　true　and　speculative　…　and　all　truth；　as　far　as　it　is
conceived；　must　be　thought　speculatively　…　the　understanding　declines　to　venture；　always　calling
the　conception　the　inconceivable。　The　proof　and　more　detailed　explanation　of　this　inmost　reserve
of　speculation；　of　infinitude　as　the　negativity　which　refers　itself　to　itself；　and　of　this　ultimate　source
of　all　activity；　life　and　consciousness；　belong　to　logic；　as　the　purely　speculative　philosophy。　Here　it
can　be　noticed　only　in　passing　that；　in　the　sentences；　〃The　will　is　universal。　。。。　The　will　directs
itself；〃　the　will　is　already　regarded　as　presupposed　subject　or　substratum；　but　it　is　not　something
finished　and　universal　before　it　determines　itself；　nor　yet　before　this　determination　is　superseded
and　idealised。　It　is　will　only　when　its　activity　is　self…occasioned；　and　it　has　returned　into　itself。　

Addition。　What　we　properly　call　will　contains　the　two　above…mentioned　elements。　The　I　is；　first
of　all；　as　such；　pure　activity；　the　universal　which　is　by　itself。　Next　this　universal　determines　itself；
and　so　far　is　no　longer　by　itself；　but　establishes　itself　as　another；　and　ceases　to　be　the　universal。
The　third　step　is　that　the　will；　while　in　this　limitation；　i。e。；　in　this　other；　is　by　itself。　While　it　limits
itself；　it　yet　remains　with　itself；　and　does　not　lose　its　hold　of　the　universal。　This　is；　then；　the　concrete
conception　of　freedom；　while　the　other　two　elements　have　been　thoroughly　abstract　and
one…sided。　But　this　concrete　freedom　we　already　have　in　the　form　of　perception；　as　in　friendship
and　love；　Here　a　man　is　not　one…sided；　but　limits　himself　willingly　in　reference　to　another；　and　yet
in　this　limitation　knows　himself　as　himself。　In　this　determination　he　does　not　feel　himself　determined；
but　in　the　contemplation　of　the　other　as　another　has　the　feeling　of　himself。　Freedom　also　lies　neither
in　indeterminateness　nor　in　determinateness；　but　in　both。　。　The　wilful　man　has　a　will　which　limits
itself　wholly　to　a　particular　object；　and　if　he　has　not　this　will；　be　supposes　himself　not　to　be　free。
But　the　will　is　not　bound　to　a　particular　object；　but　must　go　further；　for　the　nature　of　the　will　is　not
to　be　one…sided　and　confined。　Free　will　consists　in　willing　a　definite　object；　but　in　so　doing　to　be
by　itself　and　to　return　again　into　the　universal。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　8。

If　we　define　this　particularising　（＇b＇　§　6）　further；　we　reach　a　distinction　in　the
forms　of　the　will。　（a）　In　so　far　as　the　definite　character　of　the　will　consists　in　the
formal　opposition　of　the　subjective　to　the　objective　or　external　direct　existence；
we　have　the　formal　will　as　a　self　consciousness　which　finds　an　outer　world　before
it。　The　process　by　which　individuality　turns　back　in　its　definiteness　into　itself；　is
the　translation　of　the　subjective　end；　through　the　intervention　of　an　activity　and　a
means；　into　objectivity。　In　the　absolute　spirit；　in　which　all　definite　character　is
thoroughly　its　own　and　true　（Encyclopaedia。　§　363）；　consciousness　is　only　one
side；　namely；　the　manifestation　or　appearance　of　the　will；　a　phase　which　does　not
require　detailed　consideration　here。　

Addition。　The　consideration　of　the　definite　nature　of　the　will　belongs　to　the　understanding；　and
is　not　in　the　first　instance　speculative。　The　will　as　a　whole；　not　only　in　the　sense　of　its　content；　but
also　in　the　sense　of　its　form；　is　determined。　Determinate　character　on　the　side　of　form　is　the　end；
and　the　execution　of　the　end。　The　end　is　at　first　merely　something　internal　to　me　and　subjective；　but
it　is　to　be　also　objective　and　to　cast　away　the　defect　of　mere　subjectivity。　It　may　be　asked；　why　it
has　this　defect。　When　that　which　is　deficient　does　not　at　the　same　time　transcend　its　defect；　the
defect　is　for　it　not　a　defect　at　all。　The　animal　is　to　us　defective；　but　not　for　itself。　The　end；　in　so　far
as　it　is　at　first　merely　ours；　is　for　us　a　defect；　since　freedom　and　will　are　for　us　the　unity　of
subjective　and　objective。　The　end　must　also　be　established　as　objective；　but　does　not　in　that　way
attain　a　new　one…sided　character；　but　rather　its　realisation。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　9

（b）。　In　so　far　as　the　definite　phases　of　will　are　its　own　peculiar　property　or　its
particularisation　turned　back　into　itself；　they　are　content。　This　content；　as　content
of　the　will；　is　for　it；　by　virtue　of　the　form　given　in　（a）；　an　end；　which　exists　on　its
inner　or　subjective　side　as　the　imaginative　will；　but　by　the　operation　of　the
activity；　which　converts　the　subjective　into　the　objective；　it　is　realised；　completed
end。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　10。

The　content　or　determinate　phase　of　will　is　in　the　first　instance　direct　or
immediate。　Then　the　will　is　free　only　in　itself　or　for　us；　i。e。；　it　is　the　will　in　its
conception。　Only　when　it　has　itself　as　an　object　is　it　also　for　itself；　and　its　implicit
freedom　becomes　realised。　

Remark：　At　this　standpoint　the　finite　implies　that　whatever　is　in　itself；　or　according　to　its
conception；　has　an　existence　or　manifestation　different　from　what　it　is　for　itself。　For　example　the
abstract　separateness　of　nature　is　in　itself　space；　but　for　itself　time。　Here；　two　things　are　to　be
observed；　

　　　1。that　because　the　truth　is　the　idea；　when　any　object　or　phase　is　apprehended　only　as　it　is　in
　　　　　itself　or　in　conception；　it　is　not　as　yet　apprehended　in　its　truth；　and　yet　
　　　2。that；　whatever　exists　as　conception　or　in　itself；　at　the　same　time　exists；　and　this　existence　is　a
　　　　　peculiar　form　of　the　object；　as　e。g。　space。　

The　separation　of　existence　in…itself　or　implicit　existence　from　existence…for…itself　or　explicit
existence　is　a　characteristic　of　the　finite；　and　constitutes　its　appearance　or　merely　external　reality。
An　example　of　this　is　to　hand　in　the　separation　of　the　natural　will　from　formal　right。　The
understanding　adheres　to　mere　implicit　existence；　and　in　accordance　with　this　position　calls
freedom　a　capacity；　since　it　is　at　this　point　only　a　possibility。　But　the　understanding；　regards　this
phase　as　absolute　and　perennial；　and　considers　the　relation　of　the　will　to　what　it　wills　or　reality　as
an　application　to　a　given　material；　which　does　not　belong　to　the　essence　of　freedom。　In　this　way
the　understanding　occupies　itself　with　mere　abstractions；　and　not　with　the　idea　and　truth。　

Addition。　The　will；　which　is　will　only　according　to　the　conception；　is　free　implicitly；　but　is　at　the
same　time　not　free。　To　be　truly　free。　it　must　have　a　truly　fixed　content；　then　it　is　explicitly　free；　has
freedom　for　its　object；　and　is　freedom。　What　is　at　first　merely　in　conception；　i。e。；　implicit；　is　only
direct　and　natural；　We　are　familiar　with　this　in　pictorial　thought　also。　The　child　is　implicitly　a　man；　at
first　has　reason　implicitly；　and　is　at　first　the　possibility　of　reason　and　freedom。　He　is　thus　free
merely　according　to　the　conception。　That　which　is　only　implicit　does　not　yet　exist　in　actuality。　A
man；　who　is　implicitly　rational；　must　create　himself　by　working　through　and　out　of　himself　and　by
reconstructing　him