philosophy of right-第10节

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false　witness。　But　the　remark　of　Mr。　Hugo　that；　Phavorinus　bad　not　understood　the　law　is　not　to
be　passed　over。　Now　any　schoolboy　can　understand　the　law　just　quoted；　and　better　than　anyone
else　would　Shylock　have　understood　what　was　to　him　of　such　advantage。　Hence；　by　〃understand〃
Mr。　Hugo　must　mean　that　form　of　understanding　which　consists　in　brining　to　the　support　of　a　law　a
good　reason。　Another　failure　to　understand；　asserted　by　Caecilius　of　Phavorinus；　a　philosopher　at
any　rate　may　without　blushing　acknowledge：　jumentum；　which　without　any　arcera　was　the　only
legal　way　to　bring　a　sick　man　into　court　as　a　witness；　was　held　to　mean　not　only　t　horse　but　also　a
carriage　or　wagon。　Further　on　in　this　raw　Caecilius　found　more　evidence　of　the　excellence　and
accuracy　of　the　old　statutes；　which　for　the　purpose　of　non…suiting　a　sick　man　at　court　distinguished
not　only　between　a　horse　and　a　wagon；　but　also；　as　Caecilius　explains；　between　a　wagon　covered
and　cushioned　and　one　not　so　comfortably　equipped。　Thus　one　would　have　the　choice　between
utter　severity　on　one　side；　and　on　the　other　senseless　details。　But　to　exhibit　fully　the　absurdity　of
these　laws　and　the　pedantic　defence　offered　in　their　behalf　would　give　rise　to　an　invincible
repugnance　to　all　scholarship　of　that　kind。　

But　in　his　manual　Mr。　Hugo　speaks　also　of　rationality　in　（connection　with　Roman　law；　and　I　have
been　struck　with　the　following　remarks。　He　first　of　all　treats　of　the　epoch　extending　from　the　origin
of　the　Republic　to　the　twelve　tables　（§§　38；　39）；　noticing　that　in　Rome　people　had　many　wants；
and　were　compelled　in　their　labour　to　use　draught　animals　and　beasts　of　burden；　as　we　ourselves
do；　and　that　the　ground　was　an　alternation　of　hill　and　valley　that　the　city　was　set　upon　a　hill；　etc。
These　statements　might；　perhaps；　have　answered　to　the　sense　of　Montesquieu's　thought；　though　in
them　it　would　be　well…nigh　impossible　to　find　his　genius。　But　after　these　preliminary　paragraphs；　he
goes　on　to　say　in　§　40；　that　the　condition　of　the　law　was　still　very　far　from　satisfying　the　highest
demands　of　reason。　This　remark　is　wholly　in　place；　as　the　Roman　family…right；　slavery；　etc。；　give
no　satisfaction　to　the　smallest　demands　of　reason。　Yet　when　discussing　the　succeeding　epochs；
Mr。　Hugo　forgets　to　tell　us　in　what　particulars；　if　any；　the　Roman　law　has　satisfactorily　met　the
highest　demands　of　reason。　Still　of　the　classic　jurists。　who　flourished　in　the　era　of　the　greatest
expansion　of　Roman　law　as　a；　science；　it　is　said　（§　289）　that　〃it　has　been　long　since　been
observed　that　the　Roman　jurists　were　educated　in　philosophy；〃　but　〃few　know〃　（more　will　know
now　through　the　numerous　editions　of　Mr。　Hugo's　manual）　〃that　there　is　no　class　of　writers；　who；
as　regards　deduction　from　principles；　deserved　to　be　placed　beside　the　mathematicians；　and　also；
as　regards　the　quite　remarkable　way　in　which　they　develop　their　conceptions；　beside　the　modern
founder　of　metaphysic　；　as　voucher　for　this　assertion　is　the　notable　fact　that　nowhere　do　so　many
trichotomies　occur　as　in　the　classic　jurists　and　in　Kant。〃　

This　form　of　logical　reasoning；　extolled　by　Leibnitz；　is　certainly　an　essential　feature　of　the　science
of　right；　as　it　is　of　mathematics　and　every　other　intelligible　science；　but　the　logical　procedure　of　the
mere　understanding；　spoken　of　by　Mr。　Hugo；　has　nothing　to　do　with　the　satisfaction　of　the　claims
of　reason　and　with　philosophic　science。　Moreover；　the　very　lack　of　logical　procedure；　which　is
characteristic　of　the　Roman　jurists　and　proctors；　is　to　be　esteemed　as　one　of　their　chief　virtues；
since　by　means　of　it　they　obviated　the　consequences　of　unrighteous　and　horrible　institutions。
Through　their　want　of　logic　they　were　compelled　callide　to　put　sense　into　mere　verbal　distinctions；
as　they　did　when　they　identified　Bonorum　possessio　with　inheritance；　and　also　into　silly　evasions；
for　silliness　is　a　defect　of　logic；　in　order　to　save　the　letter　of　the　tables；　as　was　done　in　the　fictio　or
hypokrisis　that　a　filia　patroni　was　a　filius　（Heineec。　Antiq。　Rom。；　lib。　i。　tit。　ii。　§　24）。　But　it　is
absurd　to　place　the　classic　jurists；　with　their　use　of　trichotomy；　along　with　Kant；　and　in　that　way　to
discern　in　them　the　promise　of　the　development　of　conceptions。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　4。

The　territory　of　right　is　in　general　the　spiritual；　and　its　more　definite　place　and
origin　is　the　will；　which　is　free。　Thus　freedom　constitutes　the　substance　and
essential　character　of　the　will；　and　the　system　of　right　is　the　kingdom　of　actualised
freedom。　It　is　the　world　of　spirit；　which　is　produced　out　of　itself；　and　is　a　second
nature。　

Addition。　Freedom　of　will　is　best　explained　by　reference　to　physical　nature。　Freedom　is　a；
fundamental　phase　of　will；　as　weight　is　of　bodies。　When　it　is　said　that　matter　is　heavy；　it　might　be
meant　that　the　predicate　is　an　attribute；　but　such　is　not　the　case；　for　in　matter　there　is　nothing　which
has　not　weight；　in　fact；　matter　is　weight。　That　which　is　heavy　constitutes　the　body；　and　is　the　body。
Just　so　is　it　with　freedom　and　the　will；　that　which　is　free　is　the　will。　Will　without　freedom　is　an
empty　word；　and　freedom　becomes　actual　only　as　will；　as　subject。　A　remark　may　also　be　made　as
to　the　connection　of　willing　and　thinking。　Spirit；　in　general；　is　thought；　and　by　thought　man　is
distinguished　from　the　animal。　But　we　must　not　imagine　that　man　is　on　one　side　thinking　and　on
another　side　willing；　as　though　he　had　will　in　one　pocket　and　thought　in　another。　Such　an　idea　is
vain。　The　distinction　between　thought　and　will　is　only　that　between　a　theoretical　and　a　practical
relation。　They　are　not　two　separate　faculties。　The　will　is　a　special　way　of　thinking；　it　is　thought
translating　itself　into　reality；　it　is　the　impulse　of　thought　to　give　itself　reality。　The　distinction　between
thought　and　will　may　be　expressed　in　this　way。　When　I　think　an　object；　I　make　of　it　a　thought；　and
take　from　it　the　sensible。　Thus　I　make　of　it　something　which　is　essentially　and　directly　mine。　Only　in
thought　am　I　self…contained。　Conception　is　the　penetration　of　the　object；　which　is　then　no　longer
opposed　to　me。　From　it　I　have　taken　its　own　peculiar　nature；　which　it　had　as　an　independent
object　in　opposition　to　me。　As　Adam　said　to　Eve；　〃thou　art　flesh　of　my　flesh　and　bone　of　my
bone；〃　so　says　the　spirit；　〃This　object　is　spirit　of　my　spirit；　and　all　alienation　has　disappeared。〃　Any
idea　is　a　universalising；　and　this　process　belongs　to　thinking。　To　make　something　universal　is　to
think。　The　〃I〃　is　thought　and　the　universal。　When　I　say　〃I；〃　I　let　fall　all　particularity　of　character；
natural　endowment；　knowledge；　age。　The　I　is　empty；　a　point　and　simple；　but　in　its　simplicity　active。
The　gaily　coloured　world　is　before　me　；　I　stand　opposed　to　it；　and　in　this　relation　I　cancel　and
transcend　the　opposition；　and　make　the　content　my　own。　The　I　is　at　home　in　the　world；　when　it
knows　it；　and　still　more　when　it　has　conceived　it。　

So　much　for　the　theoretical　relation。　The　practical；　on　the　other　hand；　begins　with　thinking；　with　the
I　itself。　It　thus　appears　first　of　all　as　placed　in　opposition；　because　it　exhibits；　as　it　were；　a
separation。　As　I　am　practical；　I　am　；active；　I　act　and　determine　myself；　and　to　determine　myself
means　to　set　up　a　distinction。　But　these　distinctions　are　again　mine；　my　own　determinations　come
to　me；　and　the　ends　are　mine；　to　which　I　am　impelled。　Even　when　I　let　these　distinctions　and
determinations　go；　setting　them　in　the　so…called　external　world；　they　remain　mine。　They　are　that
which　I　have　done　and　made；　and　bear　the　trace　of　my　spirit。　That　is　the　distinction　to　be　drawn
between　the　theoretical　and　the　practical　relations。　

And　now　the　connection　of　the　two　must　be　also　stated。　The　theoretical　is　essentially　contained　in
the　practical。　Against　the　idea　that　the　two　are　separate　runs　the　fact　that　man　has　no　will　without
intelligence。　The　will　holds　within　itself　the　theoretical；　the　will　determines　itself；　and　this
determination　is　in　the　first　instance　internal。　That　which　I　will　I　place　before　my　mind；　and　it　is　an
object　for　me。　The　animal　acts　according　to　instinct；　is　impelled　by　something　internal；　and　so　is
also　practical。　But　it　has　no　will；　because　it　cannot　place　before　its　mind　what　it　desires。　Similarly
man　cannot　use　his　theoretic　faculty　or　think　without　will；　for　in　thinking　we　are　active。　The　content
of　what　is　thought　receives；　indeed；　the　form　of　something　existing；　but　this　existence　is　occasioned
by　our　activity　and　by　it；　established。　These　distinctions　of　theoretical　and　practical　are　inseparable
；　they　are　one　and　the　same；　and　in　every　activity；　whether　of　thought　or　will；　both　these　elements
are　found。　

It　is　worth　while　to　recall　the　older　way　of　proceeding　with　regard　to　the　freedom　of　the　will。　First
of　all；　the　idea　of　the　will　was　assumed；　and　then　an　effort　was　made　to　deduce　from　it　and
establish　a　definition　of　the　will。　Next；　the　method　of　the　older　empirical　psychology　was　adopted；
and　different　perceptions　and　general　phenomena　of　the　ordinary　consciousness　were　collected；
such　as　remorse；　guilt；　and　the　like；　on　the　ground　that　these　could　be