lecture18-第7节

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＇300＇　A。　C。　Fraser：　　Philosophy　of　Theism；　second　edition；



Edinburgh　and　London；　1899；　especially　part　ii；　chaps。　vii。　and



viii。　　A。　Seth　＇Pringle…Pattison＇：　　Hegelianism　and　Personality；



Ibid。；　1890；　passim。















The　most　persuasive　arguments　in　favor　of　a　concrete　individual



Soul　of　the　world；　with　which　I　am　acquainted；　are　those　of　my



colleague；　Josiah　Royce；　in　his　Religious　Aspect　of　Philosophy；



Boston；　1885；　in　his　Conception　of　God；　New　York　and　London；



1897；　and　lately　in　his　Aberdeen　Gifford　Lectures；　The　World　and



the　Individual；　2　vols。；　New　York　and　London；　1901…02。　　I



doubtless　seem　to　some　of　my　readers　to　evade　the　philosophic



duty　which　my　thesis　in　this　lecture　imposes　on　me；　by　not　even



attempting　to　meet　Professor　Royce's　arguments　articulately。　　I



admit　the　momentary　evasion。　　In　the　present　lectures；　which　are



cast　throughout　in　a　popular　mould；　there　seemed　no　room　for



subtle　metaphysical　discussion；　and　for　tactical　purposes　it　was



sufficient　the　contention　of　philosophy　being　what　it　is　（namely；



that　religion　can　be　transformed　into　a　universally　convincing



science）；　to　point　to　the　fact　that　no　religious　philosophy　has



actually　convinced　the　mass　of　thinkers。　　Meanwhile　let　me　say



that　I　hope　that　the　present　volume　may　be　followed　by　another；



if　I　am　spared　to　write　it；　in　which　not　only　Professor　Royce's



arguments；　but　others　for　monistic　absolutism　shall　be　considered



with　all　the　technical　fullness　which　their　great　importance



calls　for。　　At　present　I　resign　myself　to　lying　passive　under　the



reproach　of　superficiality。







What　religion　reports；　you　must　remember；　always　purports　to　be　a



fact　of　experience：　　the　divine　is　actually　present；　religion



says；　and　between　it　and　ourselves　relations　of　give　and　take　are



actual。　　If　definite　perceptions　of　fact　like　this　cannot　stand



upon　their　own　feet；　surely　abstract　reasoning　cannot　give　them



the　support　they　are　in　need　of。　　Conceptual　processes　can　class



facts；　define　them；　interpret　them；　but　they　do　not　produce　them；



nor　can　they　reproduce　their　individuality。　　There　is　always　a



PLUS；　a　THISNESS；　which　feeling　alone　can　answer　for。　　Philosophy



in　this　sphere　is　thus　a　secondary　function；　unable　to　warrant



faith's　veracity；　and　so　I　revert　to　the　thesis　which　I　announced



at　the　beginning　of　this　lecture。







In　all　sad　sincerity　I　think　we　must　conclude　that　the　attempt　to



demonstrate　by　purely　intellectual　processes　the　truth　of　the



deliverances　of　direct　religious　experience　is　absolutely



hopeless。







It　would　be　unfair　to　philosophy；　however；　to　leave　her　under



this　negative　sentence。　　Let　me　close；　then；　by　briefly



enumerating　what　she　CAN　do　for　religion。　　If　she　will　abandon



metaphysics　and　deduction　for　criticism　and　induction；　and



frankly　transform　herself　from　theology　into　science　of



religions；　she　can　make　herself　enormously　useful。







The　spontaneous　intellect　of　man　always　defines　the　divine　which



it　feels　in　ways　that　harmonize　with　its　temporary　intellectual



prepossessions。　　Philosophy　can　by　comparison　eliminate　the　local



and　the　accidental　from　these　definitions。　　Both　from　dogma　and



from　worship　she　can　remove　historic　incrustations。　　By



confronting　the　spontaneous　religious　constructions　with　the



results　of　natural　science；　philosophy　can　also　eliminate



doctrines　that　are　now　known　to　be　scientifically　absurd　or



incongruous。



　



Sifting　out　in　this　way　unworthy　formulations；　she　can　leave　a



residuum　of　conceptions　that　at　least　are　possible。　With　these



she　can　deal　as　HYPOTHESES；　testing　them　in　all　the　manners；



whether　negative　or　positive；　by　which　hypotheses　are　ever



tested。　　She　can　reduce　their　number；　as　some　are　found　more　open



to　objection。　　She　can　perhaps　become　the　champion　of　one　which



she　picks　out　as　being　the　most　closely　verified　or　verifiable。　



She　can　refine　upon　the　definition　of　this　hypothesis；



distinguishing　between　what　is　innocent　over…belief　and　symbolism



in　the　expression　of　it；　and　what　is　to　be　literally　taken。　　As　a



result；　she　can　offer　mediation　between　different　believers；　and



help　to　bring　about　consensus　of　opinion。　　She　can　do　this　the



more　successfully；　the　better　she　discriminates　the　common　and



essential　from　the　individual　and　local　elements　of　the　religious



beliefs　which　she　compares。







I　do　not　see　why　a　critical　Science　of　Religions　of　this　sort



might　not　eventually　command　as　general　a　public　adhesion　as　is



commanded　by　a　physical　science。　　Even　the　personally



non…religious　might　accept　its　conclusions　on　trust；　much　as



blind　persons　now　accept　the　facts　of　opticsit　might　appear　as



foolish　to　refuse　them。　　Yet　as　the　science　of　optics　has　to　be



fed　in　the　first　instance；　and　continually　verified　later；　by



facts　experienced　by　seeing　persons；　so　the　science　of　religions



would　depend　for　its　original　material　on　facts　of　personal



experience；　and　would　have　to　square　itself　with　personal



experience　through　all　its　critical　reconstructions。　　It　could



never　get　away　from　concrete　life；　or　work　in　a　conceptual



vacuum。　　It　would　forever　have　to　confess；　as　every　science



confesses；　that　the　subtlety　of　nature　flies　beyond　it；　and　that



its　formulas　are　but　approximations。　Philosophy　lives　in　words；



but　truth　and　fact　well　up　into　our　lives　in　ways　that　exceed



verbal　formulation。　　There　is　in　the　living　act　of　perception



always　something　that　glimmers　and　twinkles　and　will　not　be



caught；　and　for　which　reflection　comes　too　late。　　No　one　knows



this　as　well　as　the　philosopher。　　He　must　fire　his　volley　of　new



vocables　out　of　his　conceptual　shotgun；　for　his　profession



condemns　him　to　this　industry；　but　he　secretly　knows　the



hollowness　and　irrelevancy。　His　formulas　are　like　stereoscopic　or



kinetoscopic　photographs　seen　outside　the　instrument；　they　lack



the　depth；　the　motion；　the　vitality。　　In　the　religious　sphere；　in



particular；　belief　that　formulas　are　true　can　never　wholly　take



the　place　of　personal　experience。







In　my　next　lecture　I　will　try　to　complete　my　rough　description　of



religious　experience；　and　in　the　lecture　after　that；　which　is　the



last　one；　I　will　try　my　hand　at　formulating　conceptually　the



truth　to　which　it　is　a　witness。