lecture18-第1节

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Lecture　XVIII







PHILOSOPHY







The　subject　of　Saintliness　left　us　face　to　face　with　the



question；　Is　the　sense　of　divine　presence　a　sense　of　anything



objectively　true？　　We　turned　first　to　mysticism　for　an　answer；



and　found　that　although　mysticism　is　entirely　willing　to



corroborate　religion；　it　is　too　private　（and　also　too　various）　in



its　utterances　to　be　able　to　claim　a　universal　authority。　　But



philosophy　publishes　results　which　claim　to　be　universally　valid



if　they　are　valid　at　all；　so　we　now　turn　with　our　question　to



philosophy。　　Can　philosophy　stamp　a　warrant　of　veracity　upon　the



religious　man's　sense　of　the　divine？







I　imagine　that　many　of　you　at　this　point　begin　to　indulge　in



guesses　at　the　goal　to　which　I　am　tending。　　I　have　undermined　the



authority　of　mysticism；　you　say；　and　the　next　thing　I　shall



probably　do　is　to　seek　to　discredit　that　of　philosophy。　



Religion；　you　expect　to　hear　me　conclude；　is　nothing　but　an



affair　of　faith；　based　either　on　vague　sentiment；　or　on　that



vivid　sense　of　the　reality　of　things　unseen　of　which　in　my　second



lecture　and　in　the　lecture　on　Mysticism　I　gave　so　many　examples。　



It　is　essentially　private　and　individualistic；　it　always　exceeds



our　powers　of　formulation；　and　although　attempts　to　pour　its



contents　into　a　philosophic　mould　will　probably　always　go　on；　men



being　what　they　are；　yet　these　attempts　are　always　secondary



processes　which　in　no　way　add　to　the　authority；　or　warrant　the



veracity；　of　the　sentiments　from　which　they　derive　their　own



stimulus　and　borrow　whatever　glow　of　conviction　they　may



themselves　possess。　　







In　short；　you　suspect　that　I　am　planning　to　defend　feeling　at　the



expense　of　reason；　to　rehabilitate　the　primitive　and



unreflective；　and　to　dissuade　you　from　the　hope　of　any　Theology



worthy　of　the　name。







To　a　certain　extent　I　have　to　admit　that　you　guess　rightly。　I　do



believe　that　feeling　is　the　deeper　source　of　religion；　and　that



philosophic　and　theological　formulas　are　secondary　products；　like



translations　of　a　text　into　another　tongue。　　But　all　such



statements　are　misleading　from　their　brevity；　and　it　will　take



the　whole　hour　for　me　to　explain　to　you　exactly　what　I　mean。







When　I　call　theological　formulas　secondary　products；　I　mean　that



in　a　world　in　which　no　religious　feeling　had　ever　existed；　I



doubt　whether　any　philosophic　theology　could　ever　have　been



framed。　　I　doubt　if　dispassionate　intellectual　contemplation　of



the　universe；　apart　from　inner　unhappiness　and　need　of



deliverance　on　the　one　hand　and　mystical　emotion　on　the　other；



would　ever　have　resulted　in　religious　philosophies　such　as　we　now



possess。　　Men　would　have　begun　with　animistic　explanations　of



natural　fact；　and　criticised　these　away　into　scientific　ones；　as



they　actually　have　done。　In　the　science　they　would　have　left　a



certain　amount　of　〃psychical　research；〃　even　as　they　now　will



probably　have　to　re…admit　a　certain　amount。　　But　high…flying



speculations　like　those　of　either　dogmatic　or　idealistic



theology；　these　they　would　have　had　no　motive　to　venture　on；



feeling　no　need　of　commerce　with　such　deities。　　These



speculations　must；　it　seems　to　me；　be　classed　as　over…beliefs；



buildings…out　performed　by　the　intellect　into　directions　of　which



feeling　originally　supplied　the　hint。







But　even　if　religious　philosophy　had　to　have　its　first　hint



supplied　by　feeling；　may　it　not　have　dealt　in　a　superior　way　with



the　matter　which　feeling　suggested？　　Feeling　is　private　and　dumb；



and　unable　to　give　an　account　of　itself。　　It　allows　that　its



results　are　mysteries　and　enigmas；　declines　to　justify　them



rationally；　and　on　occasion　is　willing　that　they　should　even



pass　for　paradoxical　and　absurd。　　Philosophy　takes　just　the



opposite　attitude。　　Her　aspiration　is　to　reclaim　from　mystery　and



paradox　whatever　territory　she　touches。　　To　find　an　escape　from



obscure　and　wayward　personal　persuasion　to　truth　objectively



valid　for　all　thinking　men　has　ever　been　the　intellect's　most



cherished　ideal。　　To　redeem　religion　from　unwholesome　privacy；



and　to　give　public　status　and　universal　right　of　way　to　its



deliverances；　has　been　reason's　task。







I　believe　that　philosophy　will　always　have　opportunity　to　labor



at　this　task。＇288＇　We　are　thinking　beings；　and　we　cannot　exclude



the　intellect　from　participating　in　any　of　our　functions。　　Even



in　soliloquizing　with　ourselves；　we　construe　our　feelings



intellectually。　　Both　our　personal　ideals　and　our　religious　and



mystical　experiences　must　be　interpreted　congruously　with　the



kind　of　scenery　which　our　thinking　mind　inhabits。　　The



philosophic　climate　of　our　time　inevitably　forces　its　own



clothing　on　us。　　Moreover；　we　must　exchange　our　feelings　with　one



another；　and　in　doing　so　we　have　to　speak；　and　to　use　general　and



abstract　verbal　formulas。　Conceptions　and　constructions　are　thus



a　necessary　part　of　our　religion；　and　as　moderator　amid　the　clash



of　hypotheses；　and　mediator　among　the　criticisms　of　one　man's



constructions　by　another；　philosophy　will　always　have　much　to　do。







It　would　be　strange　if　I　disputed　this；　when　these　very　lectures



which　I　am　giving　are　（as　you　will　see　more　clearly　from　now



onwards）　a　laborious　attempt　to　extract　from　the　privacies　of



religious　experience　some　general　facts　which　can　be　defined　in



formulas　upon　which　everybody　may　agree。







＇288＇　Compare　Professor　W。　Wallace's　Gifford　Lectures；　in



Lectures　and　Essays；　Oxford；　1898；　pp。　17　ff。















Religious　experience；　in　other　words；　spontaneously　and



inevitably　engenders　myths；　superstitions；　dogmas；　creeds；　and



metaphysical　theologies；　and　criticisms　of　one　set　of　these　by



the　adherents　of　another。　　Of　late；　impartial　classifications　and



comparisons　have　become　possible；　alongside　of　the　denunciations



and　anathemas　by　which　the　commerce　between　creeds　used



exclusively　to　be　carried　on。　　We　have　the　beginnings　of　a



〃Science　of　Religions；〃　so…called；　and　if　these　lectures　could



ever　be　accounted　a　crumb…like　contribution　to　such　a　science；　I



should　be　made　very　happy。







But　all　these　intellectual　operations；　whether　they　be



constructive　or　comparative　and　critical；　presuppose　immediate



experiences　as　their　subject…matter。　　They　are　interpretative　and



inductive　operations；　operations　after　the　fact；　consequent　upon



religious　feeling；　not　coordinate　with　it；　not　independent　of



what　it　ascertains。







The　intellectualism　in　religion　which　I　wish　to　discredit



pretends　to　be　something　altogether　different　from　this。　　It



assumes　to　construct　religious　objects　out　of　the　resources　of



logical　reason　alone；　or　of　logical　reason　drawing　rigorous



inference　from　non…subjective　facts。　　It　calls　its　conclusions



dogmatic　theology；　or　philosophy　of　the　absolute；　as　the　case　may



be；　it　does　not　call　them　science　of　religions。　　It　reaches　them



in　an　a　priori　way；　and　warrants　their　veracity。







Warranted　systems　have　ever　been　the　idols　of　aspiring　souls。　



All…inclusive；　yet　simple；　noble；　clean；　luminous；　stable；



rigorous；　true；what　more　ideal　refuge　could　there　be　than　such



a　system　would　offer　to　spirits　vexed　by　the　muddiness　and



accidentality　of　the　world　of　sensible　things？　Accordingly；　we



find　inculcated　in　the　theological　schools　of　to…day；　almost　as



much　as　in　those　of　the　fore…time；　a　disdain　for　merely　possible



or　probable　truth；　and　of　results　that　only　private　assurance　can



grasp。　Scholastics　and　idealists　both　express　this　disdain。　



Principal　John　Caird；　for　example；　writes　as　follows　in　his



Introduction　to　the　Philosophy　of　Religion：







〃Religion　must　indeed　be　a　thing　of　the　heart；　but　in　order　to



elevate　it　from　the　region　of　subjective　caprice　and　waywardness；



and　to　distinguish　between　that　which　is　true　and　false　in



religion；　we　must　appeal　to　an　objective　standard。　　That　which



enters　the　heart　must　first　be　discerned　by　the　intelligence　to



be　TRUE。　　It　must　be　seen　as　having　in　its　own　nature　a　RIGHT　to



dominate　feeling；　and　as　constituting　the　principle　by　which



feeling　must　be　judged。＇289＇　In　estimating　the　religious



character　of　individuals；　nations；　or　races；　the　first　question



is；　not　how　they　feel；　but　what　they　think　and　believenot



whether　their　religion　is　one　which　manifests　itself　in　emotions；



more　or　less　vehement　and　enthusiastic；　but　what　are　the



CONCEPTIONS　of　God　a