thoughts on the present discontents-第8节

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


nothing　to　do　with　the　Earl　of　Bute。　　It　matters　little　whether　he
be　the　friend　or　the　enemy　of　that　particular　person。　　But　let　him
be　who　or　what　he　will；　he　abets　a　faction　that　is　driving　hard　to
the　ruin　of　his　country。　　He　is　sapping　the　foundation　of　its
liberty；　disturbing　the　sources　of　its　domestic　tranquillity；
weakening　its　government　over　its　dependencies；　degrading　it　from
all　its　importance　in　the　system　of　Europe。

It　is　this　unnatural　infusion　of　a　SYSTEM　OF　FAVOURITISM　into　a
Government　which　in　a　great　part　of　its　constitution　is　popular；
that　has　raised　the　present　ferment　in　the　nation。　　The　people；
without　entering　deeply　into　its　principles；　could　plainly　perceive
its　effects；　in　much　violence；　in　a　great　spirit　of　innovation；　and
a　general　disorder　in　all　the　functions　of　Government。　　I　keep　my
eye　solely　on　this　system；　if　I　speak　of　those　measures　which　have
arisen　from　it；　it　will　be　so　far　only　as　they　illustrate　the
general　scheme。　　This　is　the　fountain　of　all　those　bitter　waters　of
which；　through　a　hundred　different　conducts；　we　have　drunk　until　we
are　ready　to　burst。　　The　discretionary　power　of　the　Crown　in　the
formation　of　Ministry；　abused　by　bad　or　weak　men；　has　given　rise　to
a　system；　which；　without　directly　violating　the　letter　of　any　law；
operates　against　the　spirit　of　the　whole　constitution。

A　plan　of　Favouritism　for　our　executory　Government　is　essentially　at
variance　with　the　plan　of　our　Legislature。　　One　great　end
undoubtedly　of　a　mixed　Government　like　ours；　composed　of　Monarchy；
and　of　controls；　on　the　part　of　the　higher　people　and　the　lower；　is
that　the　Prince　shall　not　be　able　to　violate　the　laws。　　This　is
useful　indeed　and　fundamental。　　But　this；　even　at　first　view；　is　no
more　than　a　negative　advantage；　an　armour　merely　defensive。　　It　is
therefore　next　in　order；　and　equal　in　importance；　THAT　THE
DISCRETIONARY　POWERS　WHICH　ARE　NECESSARILY　VESTED　IN　THE　MONARCH；
WHETHER　FOR　THE　EXECUTION　OF　THE　LAWS；　OR　FOR　THE　NOMINATION　TO
MAGISTRACY　AND　OFFICE；　OR　FOR　CONDUCTING　THE　AFFAIRS　OF　PEACE　AND
WAR；　OR　FOR　ORDERING　THE　REVENUE；　SHOULD　ALL　BE　EXERCISED　UPON
PUBLIC　PRINCIPLES　AND　NATIONAL　GROUNDS；　AND　NOT　ON　THE　LIKINGS　OR
PREJUDICES；　THE　INTRIGUES　OR　POLICIES　OF　A　COURT。　　This；　I　said；　is
equal　in　importance　to　the　securing　a　Government　according　to　law。
The　laws　reach　but　a　very　little　way。　　Constitute　Government　how　you
please；　infinitely　the　greater　part　of　it　must　depend　upon　the
exercise　of　the　powers　which　are　left　at　large　to　the　prudence　and
uprightness　of　Ministers　of　State。　　Even　all　the　use　and　potency　of
the　laws　depends　upon　them。　　Without　them；　your　Commonwealth　is　no
better　than　a　scheme　upon　paper；　and　not　a　living；　active；　effective
constitution。　　It　is　possible；　that　through　negligence；　or
ignorance；　or　design　artfully　conducted；　Ministers　may　suffer　one
part　of　Government　to　languish；　another　to　be　perverted　from　its
purposes：　　and　every　valuable　interest　of　the　country　to　fall　into
ruin　and　decay；　without　possibility　of　fixing　any　single　act　on
which　a　criminal　prosecution　can　be　justly　grounded。　　The　due
arrangement　of　men　in　the　active　part　of　the　state；　far　from　being
foreign　to　the　purposes　of　a　wise　Government；　ought　to　be　among　its
very　first　and　dearest　objects。　　When；　therefore；　the　abettors　of
new　system　tell　us；　that　between　them　and　their　opposers　there　is
nothing　but　a　struggle　for　power；　and　that　therefore　we　are　no…ways
concerned　in　it；　we　must　tell　those　who　have　the　impudence　to　insult
us　in　this　manner；　that；　of　all　things；　we　ought　to　be　the　most
concerned；　who　and　what　sort　of　men　they　are；　that　hold　the　trust　of
everything　that　is　dear　to　us。　　Nothing　can　render　this　a　point　of
indifference　to　the　nation；　but　what　must　either　render　us　totally
desperate；　or　soothe　us　into　the　security　of　idiots。　　We　must　soften
into　a　credulity　below　the　milkiness　of　infancy；　to　think　all　men
virtuous。　　We　must　be　tainted　with　a　malignity　truly　diabolical；　to
believe　all　the　world　to　be　equally　wicked　and　corrupt。　　Men　are　in
public　life　as　in　privatesome　good；　some　evil。　　The　elevation　of
the　one；　and　the　depression　of　the　other；　are　the　first　objects　of
all　true　policy。　　But　that　form　of　Government；　which；　neither　in　its
direct　institutions；　nor　in　their　immediate　tendency；　has　contrived
to　throw　its　affairs　into　the　most　trustworthy　hands；　but　has　left
its　whole　executory　system　to　be　disposed　of　agreeably　to　the
uncontrolled　pleasure　of　any　one　man；　however　excellent　or　virtuous；
is　a　plan　of　polity　defective　not　only　in　that　member；　but
consequentially　erroneous　in　every　part　of　it。

In　arbitrary　Governments；　the　constitution　of　the　Ministry　follows
the　constitution　of　the　Legislature。　　Both　the　Law　and　the
Magistrate　are　the　creatures　of　Will。　　It　must　be　so。　　Nothing；
indeed；　will　appear　more　certain；　on　any　tolerable　consideration　of
this　matter；　than　that　EVERY　SORT　OF　GOVERNMENT　OUGHT　TO　HAVE　ITS
ADMINISTRATION　CORRESPONDENT　TO　ITS　LEGISLATURE。　　If　it　should　be
otherwise；　things　must　fall　into　a　hideous　disorder。　　The　people　of
a　free　Commonwealth；　who　have　taken　such　care　that　their　laws　should
be　the　result　of　general　consent；　cannot　be　so　senseless　as　to
suffer　their　executory　system　to　be　composed　of　persons　on　whom　they
have　no　dependence；　and　whom　no　proofs　of　the　public　love　and
confidence　have　recommended　to　those　powers；　upon　the　use　of　which
the　very　being　of　the　State　depends。

The　popular　election　of　magistrates；　and　popular　disposition　of
rewards　and　honours；　is　one　of　the　first　advantages　of　a　free　State。
Without　it；　or　something　equivalent　to　it；　perhaps　the　people　cannot
long　enjoy　the　substance　of　freedom；　certainly　none　of　the　vivifying
energy　of　good　Government。　　The　frame　of　our　Commonwealth　did　not
admit　of　such　an　actual　election：　　but　it　provided　as　well；　and
（while　the　spirit　of　the　constitution　is　preserved）　better；　for　all
the　effects　of　it；　than　by　the　method　of　suffrage　in　any　democratic
State　whatsoever。　　It　had　always；　until　of　late；　been　held　the　first
duty　of　Parliament　TO　REFUSE　TO　SUPPORT　GOVERNMENT；　UNTIL　POWER　WAS
IN　THE　HANDS　OF　PERSONS　WHO　WERE　ACCEPTABLE　TO　THE　PEOPLE；　OR　WHILE
FACTIONS　PREDOMINATED　IN　THE　COURT　IN　WHICH　THE　NATION　HAD　NO
CONFIDENCE。　　Thus　all　the　good　effects　of　popular　election　were
supposed　to　be　secured　to　us；　without　the　mischiefs　attending　on
perpetual　intrigue；　and　a　distinct　canvass　for　every　particular
office　throughout　the　body　of　the　people。　　This　was　the　most　noble
and　refined　part　of　our　constitution。　　The　people；　by　their
representatives　and　grandees；　were　intrusted　with　a　deliberative
power　in　making　laws；　the　King　with　the　control　of　his　negative。
The　King　was　intrusted　with　the　deliberative　choice　and　the　election
to　office；　the　people　had　the　negative　in　a　Parliamentary　refusal　to
support。　　Formerly　this　power　of　control　was　what　kept　Ministers　in
awe　of　Parliaments；　and　Parliaments　in　reverence　with　the　people。
If　the　use　of　this　power　of　control　on　the　system　and　persons　of
Administration　is　gone；　everything　is　lost；　Parliament　and　all。　　We
may　assure　ourselves；　that　if　Parliament　will　tamely　see　evil　men
take　possession　of　all　the　strongholds　of　their　country；　and　allow
them　time　and　means　to　fortify　themselves；　under　a　pretence　of
giving　them　a　fair　trial；　and　upon　a　hope　of　discovering；　whether
they　will　not　be　reformed　by　power；　and　whether　their　measures　will
not　be　better　than　their　morals；　such　a　Parliament　will　give
countenance　to　their　measures　also；　whatever　that　Parliament　may
pretend；　and　whatever　those　measures　may　be。

Every　good　political　institution　must　have　a　preventive　operation　as
well　as　a　remedial。　　It　ought　to　have　a　natural　tendency　to　exclude
bad　men　from　Government；　and　not　to　trust　for　the　safety　of　the
State　to　subsequent　punishment　alonepunishment　which　has　ever　been
tardy　and　uncertain；　and　which；　when　power　is　suffered　in　bad　hands；
may　chance　to　fall　rather　on　the　injured　than　the　criminal。

Before　men　are　put　forward　into　the　great　trusts　of　the　State；　they
ought　by　their　conduct　to　have　obtained　such　a　degree　of　estimation
in　their　country　as　may　be　some　sort　of　pledge　and　security　to　the
public　that　they　will　not　abuse　those　trusts。　　It　is　no　mean
security　for　a　proper　use　of　power；　that　a　man　has　shown　by　the
general　tenor　of　his　actions；　that　the　affection；　the　good　opinion；
the　confidence　of　his　fellow…citizens　have　been　among　the　principal
objects　of　his　life；　and　that　he　has　owed　none　of　the　gradations　of
his　power　or　fortune　to　a　settled　contempt　or　occasional　forfeiture
of　their　esteem。

That　man　who；　before　he　comes　into　power；　has　no　friends；　or　who；
coming　into　power；　is　obliged　to　desert　his　friends；　or　who；　losing
it；　has　no　friends　to　sympathise　with　him；　he　who　has　no　sway　among
any　part　of　the　landed　or　commercial　interest；　but　whose　whole
importance　has　begun　with　his　office；　and　is　sure　to　end　with　it；　is
a　person　who　ought　never　to　be　suffered　by　a　controlling　Parliament；
to　continue　in　any　of　those　situations　which　confer　the　lead　and
direction　of　all　our　public　affairs；　because　such　a　man　HAS　NO