thoughts on the present discontents-第25节

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a　wise　and　conscientious　judge　may　possibly　fall　into；　and　must
arise　from　one　or　both　these　causes：　　first；　a　plausible　principle
of　law；　secondly；　the　precedents　of　respectable　authorities；　and　in
good　times。　　In　the　first；　the　principle　of　law；　that　the　judge　is
to　decide　on　law；　the　jury　to　decide　on　fact；　is　an　ancient　and
venerable　principle　and　maxim　of　the　law；　and　if　supported　in　this
application　by　precedents　of　good　times　and　of　good　men；　the　judge；
if　wrong；　ought　to　be　corrected；　he　ought　not　to　be　reproved；　or　to
be　disgraced；　or　the　authority　or　respect　to　your　tribunals　to　be
impaired。　　In　cases　in　which　declaratory　bills　have　been　made；　where
by　violence　and　corruption　some　fundamental　part　of　the　Constitution
has　been　struck　at；　where　they　would　damn　the　principle；　censure　the
persons；　and　annul　the　acts；　but　where　the　law　having　been；　by　the
accident　of　human　frailty；　depraved；　or　in　a　particular　instance
misunderstood；　where　you　neither　mean　to　rescind　the　acts；　nor　to
censure　the　persons；　in　such　cases　you　have　taken　the　explanatory
mode；　and；　without　condemning　what　is　done；　you　direct　the　future
judgment　of　the　court。

All　bills　for　the　reformation　of　the　law　must　be　according　to　the
subject…matter；　the　circumstances；　and　the　occasion；　and　are　of　four
kinds：…　1。　　Either　the　law　is　totally　wanting；　and　then　a　new
enacting　statute　must　be　made　to　supply　that　want；　or；　2。　　It　is
defective；　then　a　new　law　must　be　made　to　enforce　it。　3。　　Or　it　is
opposed　by　power　or　fraud；　and　then　an　act　must　be　made　to　declare
it。　4　　Or　it　is　rendered　doubtful　and　controverted；　and　then　a　law
must　be　made　to　explain　it。　　These　must　be　applied　according　to　the
exigence　of　the　case；　one　is　just　as　good　as　another　of　them。
Miserable；　indeed；　would　be　the　resources；　poor　and　unfurnished　the
stores　and　magazines　of　legislation；　if　we　were　bound　up　to　a　little
narrow　form；　and　not　able　to　frame　our　acts　of　parliament　according
to　every　disposition　of　our　own　minds；　and　to　every　possible
emergency　of　the　commonwealth；　to　make　them　declaratory；　enforcing；
explanatory；　repealing；　just　in　what　mode；　or　in　what　degree　we
please。

Those　who　think　that　the　judges；　living　and　dead；　are　to　be
condemned；　that　your　tribunals　of　justice　are　to　be　dishonoured；
that　their　acts　and　judgments　on　this　business　are　to　be　rescinded；
they　will　undoubtedly　vote　against　this　bill；　and　for　another　sort。

I　am　not　of　the　opinion　of　those　gentlemen　who　are　against
disturbing　the　public　repose；　I　like　a　clamour　whenever　there　is　an
abuse。　　The　fire…bell　at　midnight　disturbs　your　sleep；　but　it　keeps
you　from　being　burned　in　your　bed。　　The　hue　and　cry　alarms　the
county；　but　it　preserves　all　the　property　of　the　province。　　All
these　clamours　aim　at　redress。　　But　a　clamour　made　merely　for　the
purpose　of　rendering　the　people　discontented　with　their　situation；
without　an　endeavour　to　give　them　a　practical　remedy；　is　indeed　one
of　the　worst　acts　of　sedition。

I　have　read　and　heard　much　upon　the　conduct　of　our　courts　in　the
business　of　libels。　　I　was　extremely　willing　to　enter　into；　and　very
free　to　act　as　facts　should　turn　out　on　that　inquiry；　aiming
constantly　at　remedy　as　the　end　of　all　clamour；　all　debate；　all
writing；　and　all　inquiry；　for　which　reason　I　did　embrace；　and　do　now
with　joy；　this　method　of　giving　quiet　to　the　courts；　jurisdiction　to
juries；　liberty　to　the　press；　and　satisfaction　to　the　people。　　I
thank　my　friends　for　what　they　have　done；　I　hope　the　public　will　one
day　reap　the　benefit　of　their　pious　and　judicious　endeavours。　　They
have　now　sown　the　seed；　I　hope　they　will　live　to　see　the　flourishing
harvest。　　Their　bill　is　sown　in　weakness；　it　will；　I　trust；　be
reaped　in　power；　and　then；　however；　we　shall　have　reason　to　apply　to
them　what　my　Lord　Coke　says　was　an　aphorism　continually　in　the　mouth
of　a　great　sage　of　the　law；　〃Blessed　be　not　the　complaining　tongue；
but　blessed　be　the　amending　hand。〃



SPEECH　ON　A　BILL　FOR　SHORTENING　THE　DURATION　OF　PARLIAMENTS



It　is　always　to　be　lamented　when　men　are　driven　to　search　into　the
foundations　of　the　commonwealth。　　It　is　certainly　necessary　to
resort　to　the　theory　of　your　government　whenever　you　propose　any
alteration　in　the　frame　of　it；　whether　that　alteration　means　the
revival　of　some　former　antiquated　and　forsaken　constitution　of
state；　or　the　introduction　of　some　new　improvement　in　the
commonwealth。　　The　object　of　our　deliberation　is；　to　promote　the
good　purposes　for　which　elections　have　been　instituted；　and　to
prevent　their　inconveniences。　　If　we　thought　frequent　elections
attended　with　no　inconvenience；　or　with　but　a　trifling
inconvenience；　the　strong　overruling　principle　of　the　Constitution
would　sweep　us　like　a　torrent　towards　them。　　But　your　remedy　is　to
be　suited　to　your　diseaseyour　present　disease；　and　to　your　whole
disease。　　That　man　thinks　much　too　highly；　and　therefore　he　thinks
weakly　and　delusively；　of　any　contrivance　of　human　wisdom；　who
believes　that　it　can　make　any　sort　of　approach　to　perfection。　　There
is　not；　there　never　was；　a　principle　of　government　under　heaven；
that　does　not；　in　the　very　pursuit　of　the　good　it　proposes；
naturally　and　inevitably　lead　into　some　inconvenience；　which　makes
it　absolutely　necessary　to　counterwork　and　weaken　the　application　of
that　first　principle　itself；　and　to　abandon　something　of　the　extent
of　the　advantage　you　proposed　by　it；　in　order　to　prevent　also　the
inconveniences　which　have　arisen　from　the　instrument　of　all　the　good
you　had　in　view。

To　govern　according　to　the　sense　and　agreeably　to　the　interests　of
the　people　is　a　great　and　glorious　object　of　government。　　This
object　cannot　be　obtained　but　through　the　medium　of　popular
election；　and　popular　election　is　a　mighty　evil。　　It　is　such；　and　so
great　an　evil；　that　though　there　are　few　nations　whose　monarchs　were
not　originally　elective；　very　few　are　now　elected。　　They　are　the
distempers　of　elections；　that　have　destroyed　all　free　states。　　To
cure　these　distempers　is　difficult；　if　not　impossible；　the　only
thing　therefore　left　to　save　the　commonwealth　is　to　prevent　their
return　too　frequently。　　The　objects　in　view　are；　to　have　parliaments
as　frequent　as　they　can　be　without　distracting　them　in　the
prosecution　of　public　business；　on　one　hand；　to　secure　their
dependence　upon　the　people；　on　the　other　to　give　them　that　quiet　in
their　minds；　and　that　ease　in　their　fortunes；　as　to　enable　them　to
perform　the　most　arduous　and　most　painful　duty　in　the　world　with
spirit；　with　efficiency；　with　independency；　and　with　experience；　as
real　public　counsellors；　not　as　the　canvassers　at　a　perpetual
election。　　It　is　wise　to　compass　as　many　good　ends　as　possibly　you
can；　and　seeing　there　are　inconveniences　on　both　sides；　with
benefits　on　both；　to　give　up　a　part　of　the　benefit　to　soften　the
inconvenience。　　The　perfect　cure　is　impracticable；　because　the
disorder　is　dear　to　those　from　whom　alone　the　cure　can　possibly　be
derived。　　The　utmost　to　be　done　is　to　palliate；　to　mitigate；　to
respite；　to　put　off　the　evil　day　of　the　Constitution　to　its　latest
possible　hour；　and　may　it　be　a　very　late　one！

This　bill；　I　fear；　would　precipitate　one　of　two　consequences；　I　know
not　which　most　likely；　or　which　most　dangerous：　　either　that　the
Crown　by　its　constant　stated　power；　influence；　and　revenue；　would
wear　out　all　opposition　in　elections；　or　that　a　violent　and　furious
popular　spirit　would　arise。　　I　must　see；　to　satisfy　me；　the
remedies；　I　must　see；　from　their　operation　in　the　cure　of　the　old
evil；　and　in　the　cure　of　those　new　evils；　which　are　inseparable　from
all　remedies；　how　they　balance　each　other；　and　what　is　the　total
result。　　The　excellence　of　mathematics　and　metaphysics　is　to　have
but　one　thing　before　you；　but　he　forms　the　best　judgment　in　all
moral　disquisitions；　who　has　the　greatest　number　and　variety　of
considerations；　in　one　view　before　him；　and　can　take　them　in　with
the　best　possible　consideration　of　the　middle　results　of　all。

We　of　the　opposition；　who　are　not　friends　to　the　bill；　give　this
pledge　at　least　of　our　integrity　and　sincerity　to　the　people；　that
in　our　situation　of　systematic　opposition　to　the　present　ministers；
in　which　all　our　hope　of　rendering　it　effectual　depends　upon　popular
interest　and　favour；　we　will　not　flatter　them　by　a　surrender　of　our
uninfluenced　judgment　and　opinion；　we　give　a　security；　that　if　ever
we　should　be　in　another　situation；　no　flattery　to　any　other　sort　of
power　and　influence　would　induce　us　to　act　against　the　true
interests　of　the　people。

All　are　agreed　that　parliaments　should　not　be　perpetual；　the　only
question　is；　what　is　the　most　convenient　time　for　their　duration？
On　which　there　are　three　opinions。　　We　are　agreed；　too；　that　the
term　ought　not　to　be　chosen　most　likely　in　its　operation　to　spread
corruption；　and　to　augment　the　already　overgrown　influence　of　the
crown。　　On　these　principles　I　mean　to　debate　the　question。　　It　is
easy　to　pretend　a　zeal　for　liberty。　　Those　who　think　themselves　not
likely　to　be　encumbered　with　the　performance　of　their　promises；
either　from　their　known　inability；　or　total　indifference　about　the
performance；　never　fai