thoughts on the present discontents-第24节

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secure　them。　　If　so；　very　ill　would　the　purchase　of　Magna　Charta
have　merited　the　deluge　of　blood；　which　was　shed　in　order　to　have
the　body　of　English　privileges　defined　by　a　positive　written　law。
This　charter；　the　inestimable　monument　of　English　freedom；　so　long
the　boast　and　glory　of　this　nation；　would　have　been　at　once　an
instrument　of　our　servitude；　and　a　monument　of　our　folly；　if　this
principle　were　true。　　The　thirty　four　confirmations　would　have　been
only　so　many　repetitions　of　their　absurdity；　so　many　new　links　in
the　chain；　and　so　many　invalidations　of　their　right。

You　cannot　open　your　statute　book　without　seeing　positive　provisions
relative　to　every　right　of　the　subject。　　This　business　of　juries　is
the　subject　of　not　fewer　than　a　dozen。　　To　suppose　that　juries　are
something　innate　in　the　Constitution　of　Great　Britain；　that　they
have　jumped；　like　Minerva；　out　of　the　head　of　Jove　in　complete
armour；　is　a　weak　fancy；　supported　neither　by　precedent　nor　by
reason。　　Whatever　is　most　ancient　and　venerable　in　our　Constitution；
royal　prerogative；　privileges　of　parliament；　rights　of　elections；
authority　of　courts；　juries；　must　have　been　modelled　according　to
the　occasion。　　I　spare　your　patience；　and　I　pay　a　compliment　to　your
understanding；　in　not　attempting　to　prove　that　anything　so　elaborate
and　artificial　as　a　jury　was　not　the　work　of　chance；　but　a　matter　of
institution；　brought　to　its　present　state　by　the　joint　efforts　of
legislative　authority　and　juridical　prudence。　　It　need　not　be
ashamed　of　being　（what　in　many　parts　of　it　at　least　it　is）　the
offspring　of　an　Act　of　Parliament；　unless　it　is　a　shame　for　our　laws
to　be　the　results　of　our　legislature。　　Juries；　which　sensitively
shrank　from　the　rude　touch　of　parliamentary　remedy；　have　been　the
subject　of　not　fewer　than；　I　think；　forty…three　Acts　of　Parliament；
in　which　they　have　been　changed　with　all　the　authority　of　a　creator
over　its　creature；　from　Magna　Charta　to　the　great　alterations　which
were　made　in　the　29th　of　George　II。

To　talk　of　this　matter　in　any　other　way　is　to　turn　a　rational
principle　into　an　idle　and　vulgar　superstition；　like　the　antiquary；
Dr。　Woodward；　who　trembled　to　have　his　shield　scoured；　for　fear　it
should　be　discovered　to　be　no　better　than　an　old　pot…lid。　　This
species　of　tenderness　to　a　jury　puts　me　in　mind　of　a　gentleman　of
good　condition；　who　had　been　reduced　to　great　poverty　and　distress；
application　was　made　to　some　rich　fellows　in　his　neighbourhood　to
give　him　some　assistance；　but　they　begged　to　be　excused　for　fear　of
affronting　a　person　of　his　high　birth；　and　so　the　poor　gentleman　was
left　to　starve　out　of　pure　respect　to　the　antiquity　of　his　family。
From　this　principle　has　risen　an　opinion　that　I　find　current　amongst
gentlemen；　that　this　distemper　ought　to　be　left　to　cure　itself；　that
the　judges　having　been　well　exposed；　and　something　terrified　on
account　of　these　clamours；　will　entirely　change；　if　not　very　much
relax　from　their　rigour；　if　the　present　race　should　not　change；　that
the　chances　of　succession　may　put　other　more　constitutional　judges
in　their　place；　lastly；　if　neither　should　happen；　yet　that　the
spirit　of　an　English　jury　will　always　be　sufficient　for　the
vindication　of　its　own　rights；　and　will　not　suffer　itself　to　be
overborne　by　the　bench。　　I　confess　that　I　totally　dissent　from　all
these　opinions。　　These　suppositions　become　the　strongest　reasons
with　me　to　evince　the　necessity　of　some　clear　and　positive
settlement　of　this　question　of　contested　jurisdiction。　　If　judges
are　so　full　of　levity；　so　full　of　timidity；　if　they　are　influenced
by　such　mean　and　unworthy　passions；　that　a　popular　clamour　is
sufficient　to　shake　the　resolution　they　build　upon　the　solid　basis
of　a　legal　principle；　I　would　endeavour　to　fix　that　mercury　by　a
positive　law。　　If　to　please　an　administration　the　judges　can　go　one
way　to…day；　and　to　please　the　crowd　they　can　go　another　to…morrow；
if　they　will　oscillate　backward　and　forward　between　power　and
popularity；　it　is　high　time　to　fix　the　law　in　such　a　manner　as　to
resemble；　as　it　ought；　the　great　Author　of　all　law；　in　〃whom　there
is　no　variableness　nor　shadow　of　turning。〃

As　to　their　succession；　I　have　just　the　same　opinion。　　I　would　not
leave　it　to　the　chances　of　promotion；　or　to　the　characters　of
lawyers；　what　the　law　of　the　land；　what　the　rights　of　juries；　or
what　the　liberty　of　the　press　should　be。　　My　law　should　not　depend
upon　the　fluctuation　of　the　closet；　or　the　complexion　of　men。
Whether　a　black…haired　man　or　a　fair…haired　man　presided　in　the
Court　of　King's　Bench；　I　would　have　the　law　the　same：　　the　same
whether　he　was　born　in　domo　regnatrice；　and　sucked　from　his　infancy
the　milk　of　courts；　or　was　nurtured　in　the　rugged　discipline　of　a
popular　opposition。　　This　law　of　court　cabal　and　of　party；　this　mens
quaedam　nullo　perturbata　affectu；　this　law　of　complexion；　ought　not
to　be　endured　for　a　moment　in　a　country　whose　being　depends　upon　the
certainty；　clearness；　and　stability　of　institutions。

Now　I　come　to　the　last　substitute　for　the　proposed　bill；　the　spirit
of　juries　operating　their　own　jurisdiction。　　This；　I　confess；　I
think　the　worst　of　all；　for　the　same　reasons　on　which　I　objected　to
the　others；　and　for　other　weighty　reasons　besides　which　are　separate
and　distinct。　　First；　because　juries；　being　taken　at　random　out　of　a
mass　of　men　infinitely　large；　must　be　of　characters　as　various　as
the　body　they　arise　from　is　large　in　its　extent。　　If　the　judges
differ　in　their　complexions；　much　more　will　a　jury。　　A　timid　jury
will　give　way　to　an　awful　judge　delivering　oracularly　the　law；　and
charging　them　on　their　oaths；　and　putting　it　home　to　their
consciences；　to　beware　of　judging　where　the　law　had　given　them　no
competence。　　We　know　that　they　will　do　so；　they　have　done　so　in　a
hundred　instances；　a　respectable　member　of　your　own　house；　no　vulgar
man；　tells　you　that　on　the　authority　of　a　judge　he　found　a　man
guilty；　in　whom；　at　the　same　time；　he　could　find　no　guilt。　　But
supposing　them　full　of　knowledge　and　full　of　manly　confidence　in
themselves；　how　will　their　knowledge；　or　their　confidence；　inform　or
inspirit　others？　　They　give　no　reason　for　their　verdict；　they　can
but　condemn　or　acquit；　and　no　man　can　tell　the　motives　on　which　they
have　acquitted　or　condemned。　　So　that　this　hope　of　the　power　of
juries　to　assert　their　own　jurisdiction　must　be　a　principle　blind；
as　being　without　reason；　and　as　changeable　as　the　complexion　of　men
and　the　temper　of　the　times。

But；　after　all；　is　it　fit　that　this　dishonourable　contention　between
the　court　and　juries　should　subsist　any　longer？　　On　what　principle
is　it　that　a　jury　refuses　to　be　directed　by　the　court　as　to　his
competence？　　Whether　a　libel　or　no　libel　be　a　question　of　law　or　of
fact　may　be　doubted；　but　a　question　of　jurisdiction　and　competence
is　certainly　a　question　of　law；　on　this　the　court　ought　undoubtedly
to　judge；　and　to　judge　solely　and　exclusively。　　If　they　judge　wrong
from　excusable　error；　you　ought　to　correct　it；　as　to…day　it　is
proposed；　by　an　explanatory　bill；　or　if　by　corruption；　by　bill　of
penalties　declaratory；　and　by　punishment。　　What　does　a　juror　say　to
a　judge　when　he　refuses　his　opinion　upon　a　question　of　judicature？
You　are　so　corrupt；　that　I　should　consider　myself　a　partaker　of　your
crime；　were　I　to　be　guided　by　your　opinion；　or　you　are　so　grossly
ignorant；　that　I；　fresh　from　my　bounds；　from　my　plough；　my　counter；
or　my　loom；　am　fit　to　direct　you　in　your　profession。　　This　is　an
unfitting；　it　is　a　dangerous；　state　of　things。　　The　spirit　of　any
sort　of　men　is　not　a　fit　rule　for　deciding　on　the　bounds　of　their
jurisdiction。　　First；　because　it　is　different　in　different　men；　and
even　different　in　the　same　at　different　times；　and　can　never　become
the　proper　directing　line　of　law；　next；　because　it　is　not　reason；
but　feeling；　and　when　once　it　is　irritated；　it　is　not　apt　to　confine
itself　within　its　proper　limits。　　If　it　becomes；　not　difference　in
opinion　upon　law；　but　a　trial　of　spirit　between　parties；　our　courts
of　law　are　no　longer　the　temple　of　justice；　but　the　amphitheatre　for
gladiators。　　NoGod　forbid！　　Juries　ought　to　take　their　law　from
the　bench　only；　but　it　is　our　business　that　they　should　hear　nothing
from　the　bench　but　what　is　agreeable　to　the　principles　of　the
Constitution。　　The　jury　are　to　hear　the　judge；　the　judge　is　to　hear
the　law　where　it　speaks　plain；　where　it　does　not；　he　is　to　hear　the
legislature。　　As　I　do　not　think　these　opinions　of　the　judges　to　be
agreeable　to　those　principles；　I　wish　to　take　the　only　method　in
which　they　can　or　ought　to　be　corrected；　by　bill。

Next；　my　opinion　is；　that　it　ought　to　be　rather　by　a　bill　for
removing　controversies　than　by　a　bill　in　the　state　of　manifest　and
express　declaration；　and　in　words　de　praeterito。　　I　do　this　upon
reasons　of　equity　and　constitutional　policy。　　I　do　not　want　to
censure　the　present　judges。　　I　think　them　to　be　excused　for　their
error。　　Ignorance　is　no　excuse　for　a　judge：　　it　is　changing　the
nature　of　his　crimeit　is　not　absolving。　　It　must　be　such　error　as
a　wise　and　conscientious　judge　may　possibly　fall　into；　and　must
arise　from　one　or　both　these　cause