thoughts on the present discontents-第23节

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the　progress　of　an　encroaching　jurisdiction　（for　it　is　in　its　nature
to　encroach；　when　once　it　has　passed　its　limits）　coming　to　confine
the　juries；　case　after　case；　to　the　corporeal　fact；　and　to　that
alone；　and　excluding　the　intention　of　mind；　the　only　source　of　merit
and　demerit；　of　reward　or　punishment；　juries　become　a　dead　letter　in
the　constitution。

For　which　reason　it　is　high　time　to　take　this　matter　into　the
consideration　of　Parliament；　and　for　that　purpose　it　will　be
necessary　to　examine；　first；　whether　there　is　anything　in　the
peculiar　nature　of　this　crime　that　makes　it　necessary　to　exclude　the
jury　from　considering　the　intention　in　it；　more　than　in　others。　　So
far　from　it；　that　I　take　it　to　be　much　less　so　from　the　analogy　of
other　criminal　cases；　where　no　such　restraint　is　ordinarily　put　upon
them。　　The　act　of　homicide　is　prima　facie　criminal。　　The　intention
is　afterwards　to　appear；　for　the　jury　to　acquit　or　condemn。　　In
burglary　do　they　insist　that　the　jury　have　nothing　to　do　but　to　find
the　taking　of　goods；　and　that；　if　they　do；　they　must　necessarily
find　the　party　guilty；　and　leave　the　rest　to　the　judge；　and　that
they　have　nothing　to　do　with　the　word　felonice　in　the　indictment？

The　next　point　is　to　consider　it　as　a　question　of　constitutional
policy；　that　is；　whether　the　decision　of　the　question　of　libel　ought
to　be　left　to　the　judges　as　a　presumption　of　law；　rather　than　to　the
jury　as　matter　of　popular　judgment；　as　the　malice　in　the　case　of
murder；　the　felony　in　the　case　of　stealing。　　If　the　intent　and
tendency　are　not　matters　within　the　province　of　popular　judgment；
but　legal　and　technical　conclusions；　formed　upon　general　principles
of　law；　let　us　see　what　they　are。　　Certainly　they　are　most
unfavourable；　indeed；　totally　adverse；　to　the　Constitution　of　this
country。

Here　we　must　have　recourse　to　analogies；　for　we　cannot　argue　on
ruled　cases　one　way　or　the　other。　　See　the　history。　　The　old　books；
deficient　in　general　in　Crown　cases　furnish　us　with　little　on　this
head。　　As　to　the　crime；　in　the　very　early　Saxon　Law；　I　see　an
offence　of　this　species；　called　Folk…leasing；　made　a　capital
offence；　but　no　very　precise　definition　of　the　crime；　and　no　trial
at　all：　　see　the　statute　of　3rd　Edward　I。　cap。　34。　　The　law　of
libels　could　not　have　arrived　at　a　very　early　period　in　this
country。　　It　is　no　wonder　that　we　find　no　vestige　of　any
constitution　from　authority；　or　of　any　deductions　from　legal　science
in　our　old　books　and　records　upon　that　subject。　　The　statute　of
scandalum　magnatum　is　the　oldest　that　I　know；　and　this　goes　but　a
little　way　in　this　sort　of　learning。　　Libelling　is　not　the　crime　of
an　illiterate　people。　　When　they　were　thought　no　mean　clerks　who
could　read　and　write；　when　he　who　could　read　and　write　was
presumptively　a　person　in　holy　orders；　libels　could　not　be　general
or　dangerous；　and　scandals　merely　oral　could　spread　little；　and　must
perish　soon。　　It　is　writing；　it　is　printing　more　emphatically；　that
imps　calumny　with　those　eagle　wings；　on　which；　as　the　poet　says；
〃immortal　slanders　fly。〃　　By　the　press　they　spread；　they　last；　they
leave　the　sting　in　the　wound。　　Printing　was　not　known　in　England
much　earlier　than　the　reign　of　Henry　VII。；　and　in　the　third　year　of
that　reign　the　Court　of　Star　Chamber　was　established。　　The　press　and
its　enemy　are　nearly　coeval。　　As　no　positive　law　against　libels
existed；　they　fell　under　the　indefinite　class　of　misdemeanours。　　For
the　trial　of　misdemeanours　that　court　was　instituted；　their　tendency
to　produce　riots　and　disorders　was　a　main　part　of　the　charge；　and
was　laid；　in　order　to　give　the　court　jurisdiction　chiefly　against
libels。　　The　offence　was　new。　　Learning　of　their　own　upon　the
subject　they　had　none；　and　they　were　obliged　to　resort　to　the　only
emporium　where　it　was　to　be　had；　the　Roman　Law。　　After　the　Star
Chamber　was　abolished　in　the　10th　of　Charles　I。　its　authority　indeed
ceased；　but　its　maxims　subsisted　and　survived　it。　　The　spirit　of　the
Star　Chamber　has　transmigrated　and　lived　again；　and　Westminster　Hall
was　obliged　to　borrow　from　the　Star　Chamber；　for　the　same　reasons　as
the　Star　Chamber　had　borrowed　from　the　Roman　Forum；　because　they　had
no　law；　statute；　or　tradition　of　their　own。　　Thus　the　Roman　Law　took
possession　of　our　courts；　I　mean　its　doctrine；　not　its　sanctions；
the　severity　of　capital　punishment　was　omitted；　all　the　rest
remained。　　The　grounds　of　these　laws　are　just　and　equitable。
Undoubtedly　the　good　fame　of　every　man　ought　to　be　under　the
protection　of　the　laws　as　well　as　his　life；　and　liberty；　and
property。　　Good　fame　is　an　outwork；　that　defends　them　all；　and
renders　them　all　valuable。　　The　law　forbids　you　to　revenge；　when　it
ties　up　the　hands　of　some；　it　ought　to　restrain　the　tongues　of
others。　　The　good　fame　of　government　is　the　same；　it　ought　not　to　be
traduced。　　This　is　necessary　in　all　government；　and　if　opinion　be
support；　what　takes　away　this　destroys　that　support；　but　the　liberty
of　the　press　is　necessary　to　this　government。

The　wisdom；　however；　of　government　is　of　more　importance　than　the
laws。　　I　should　study　the　temper　of　the　people　before　I　ventured　on
actions　of　this　kind。　　I　would　consider　the　whole　of　the　prosecution
of　a　libel　of　such　importance　as　Junius；　as　one　piece；　as　one
consistent　plan　of　operations；　and　I　would　contrive　it　so　that；　if　I
were　defeated；　I　should　not　be　disgraced；　that　even　my　victory
should　not　be　more　ignominious　than　my　defeat；　I　would　so　manage；
that　the　lowest　in　the　predicament　of　guilt　should　not　be　the　only
one　in　punishment。　　I　would　not　inform　against　the　mere　vender　of　a
collection　of　pamphlets。　　I　would　not　put　him　to　trial　first；　if　I
could　possibly　avoid　it。　　I　would　rather　stand　the　consequences　of
my　first　error；　than　carry　it　to　a　judgment　that　must　disgrace　my
prosecution；　or　the　court。　　We　ought　to　examine　these　things　in　a
manner　which　becomes　ourselves；　and　becomes　the　object　of　the
inquiry；　not　to　examine　into　the　most　important　consideration　which
can　come　before　us；　with　minds　heated　with　prejudice　and　filled　with
passions；　with　vain　popular　opinions　and　humours；　and　when　we
propose　to　examine　into　the　justice　of　others；　to　be　unjust
ourselves。

An　inquiry　is　wished；　as　the　most　effectual　way　of　putting　an　end　to
the　clamours　and　libels；　which　are　the　disorder　and　disgrace　of　the
times。　　For　people　remain　quiet；　they　sleep　secure；　when　they
imagine　that　the　vigilant　eye　of　a　censorial　magistrate　watches　over
all　the　proceedings　of　judicature；　and　that　the　sacred　fire　of　an
eternal　constitutional　jealousy；　which　is　the　guardian　of　liberty；
law；　and　justice；　is　alive　night　and　day；　and　burning　in　this　house。
But　when　the　magistrate　gives　up　his　office　and　his　duty；　the　people
assume　it；　and　they　inquire　too　much；　and　too　irreverently；　because
they　think　their　representatives　do　not　inquire　at　all。

We　have　in　a　libel；　1st。　　The　writing。　　2nd。　　The　communication；
called　by　the　lawyers　the　publication。　　3rd。　　The　application　to
persons　and　facts。　　4th。　　The　intent　and　tendency。　　5th。　　The
matterdiminution　of　fame。　　The　law　presumptions　on　all　these　are
in　the　communication。　　No　intent　can；　make　a　defamatory　publication
good；　nothing　can　make　it　have　a　good　tendency；　truth　is　not
pleadable。　　Taken　juridically；　the　foundation　of　these　law
presumptions　is　not　unjust；　taken　constitutionally；　they　are
ruinous；　and　tend　to　the　total　suppression　of　all　publication。　　If
juries　are　confined　to　the　fact；　no　writing　which　censures；　however
justly；　or　however　temperately；　the　conduct　of　administration；　can
be　unpunished。　　Therefore；　if　the　intent　and　tendency　be　left　to　the
judge；　as　legal　conclusions　growing　from　the　fact；　you　may　depend
upon　it　you　can　have　no　public　discussion　of　a　public　measure；　which
is　a　point　which　even　those　who　are　most　offended　with　the
licentiousness　of　the　press　（and　it　is　very　exorbitant；　very
provoking）　will　hardly　contend　for。

So　far　as　to　the　first　opinion；　that　the　doctrine　is　right　and　needs
no　alteration。　2nd。　　The　next　is；　that　it　is　wrong；　but　that　we　are
not　in　a　condition　to　help　it。　　I　admit；　it　is　true；　that　there　are
cases　of　a　nature　so　delicate　and　complicated；　that　an　Act　of
Parliament　on　the　subject　may　become　a　matter　of　great　difficulty。
It　sometimes　cannot　define　with　exactness；　because　the　subject…
matter　will　not　bear　an　exact　definition。　　It　may　seem　to　take　away
everything　which　it　does　not　positively　establish；　and　this　might　be
inconvenient；　or　it　may　seem　vice　versa　to　establish　everything
which　it　does　not　expressly　take　away。　　It　may　be　more　advisable　to
leave　such　matters　to　the　enlightened　discretion　of　a　judge；　awed　by
a　censorial　House　of　Commons。　　But　then　it　rests　upon　those　who
object　to　a　legislative　interposition　to　prove　these　inconveniences
in　the　particular　case　before　them。　　For　it　would　be　a　most
dangerous；　as　it　is　a　most　idle　and　most　groundless；　conceit　to
assume　as　a　general　principle；　that　the　rights　and　liberties　of　the
subject　are　impaired　by　the　care　and　attention　of　the　legislature　to
secure　them。　　If　so；　very　ill　would　the　purchase　of　Magna　Charta
have　merited　the　deluge　of　blood；