thoughts on the present discontents-第21节

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seek　a　support　in　an　abject　and　unnatural　dependence　somewhere　else。
When；　through　the　medium　of　this　just　connection　with　their
constituents；　the　genuine　dignity　of　the　House　of　Commons　is
restored；　it　will　begin　to　think　of　casting　from　it；　with　scorn；　as
badges　of　servility；　all　the　false　ornaments　of　illegal　power；　with
which　it　has　been；　for　some　time；　disgraced。　　It　will　begin　to　think
of　its　old　office　of　CONTROL。　　It　will　not　suffer　that　last　of　evils
to　predominate　in　the　country；　men　without　popular　confidence；
public　opinion；　natural　connection；　or　natural　trust；　invested　with
all　the　powers　of　Government。

When　they　have　learned　this　lesson　themselves；　they　will　be　willing
and　able　to　teach　the　Court；　that　it　is　the　true　interest　of　the
Prince　to　have　but　one　Administration；　and　that　one　composed　of
those　who　recommend　themselves　to　their　Sovereign　through　the
opinion　of　their　country；　and　not　by　their　obsequiousness　to　a
favourite。　　Such　men　will　serve　their　Sovereign　with　affection　and
fidelity；　because　his　choice　of　them；　upon　such　principles；　is　a
compliment　to　their　virtue。　　They　will　be　able　to　serve　him
effectually；　because　they　will　add　the　weight　of　the　country　to　the
force　of　the　executory　power。　　They　will　be　able　to　serve　their　King
with　dignity；　because　they　will　never　abuse　his　name　to　the
gratification　of　their　private　spleen　or　avarice。　　This；　with
allowances　for　human　frailty；　may　probably　be　the　general　character
of　a　Ministry；　which　thinks　itself　accountable　to　the　House　of
Commons；　when　the　House　of　Commons　thinks　itself　accountable　to　its
constituents。　　If　other　ideas　should　prevail；　things　must　remain　in
their　present　confusion；　until　they　are　hurried　into　all　the　rage　of
civil　violence；　or　until　they　sink　into　the　dead　repose　of
despotism。



SPEECH　ON　THE　MIDDLESEX　ELECTION
FEBRUARY；　1771



Mr。　Speaker；In　every　complicated　Constitution　（and　every　free
Constitution　is　complicated）　cases　will　arise；　when　the　several
orders　of　the　State　will　clash　with　one　another；　and　disputes　will
arise　about　the　limits　of　their　several　rights　and　privileges。　　It
may　be　almost　impossible　to　reconcile　them。

Carry　the　principle　on　by　which　you　expelled　Mr。　Wilkes；　there　is
not　a　man　in　the　House；　hardly　a　man　in　the　nation；　who　may　not　be
disqualified。　　That　this　House　should　have　no　power　of　expulsion　is
a　hard　saying。　　That　this　House　should　have　a　general　discretionary
power　of　disqualification　is　a　dangerous　saying。　　That　the　people
should　not　choose　their　own　representative；　is　a　saying　that　shakes
the　Constitution。　　That　this　House　should　name　the　representative；
is　a　saying　which；　followed　by　practice；　subverts　the　constitution。
They　have　the　right　of　electing；　you　have　a　right　of　expelling；　they
of　choosing；　you　of　judging；　and　only　of　judging；　of　the　choice。
What　bounds　shall　be　set　to　the　freedom　of　that　choice？　　Their　right
is　prior　to　ours；　we　all　originate　there。　　They　are　the　mortal
enemies　of　the　House　of　Commons；　who　would　persuade　them　to　think　or
to　act　as　if　they　were　a　self…originated　magistracy；　independent　of
the　people　and　unconnected　with　their　opinions　and　feelings。　　Under
a　pretence　of　exalting　the　dignity；　they　undermine　the　very
foundations　of　this　House。　　When　the　question　is　asked　here；　what
disturbs　the　people；　whence　all　this　clamour；　we　apply　to　the
treasury…bench；　and　they　tell　us　it　is　from　the　efforts　of　libellers
and　the　wickedness　of　the　people；　a　worn…out　ministerial　pretence。
If　abroad　the　people　are　deceived　by　popular；　within　we　are　deluded
by　ministerial；　cant。　　The　question　amounts　to　this；　whether　you
mean　to　be　a　legal　tribunal；　or　an　arbitrary　and　despotic　assembly。
I　see　and　I　feel　the　delicacy　and　difficulty　of　the　ground　upon
which　we　stand　in　this　question。　　I　could　wish；　indeed；　that　they
who　advised　the　Crown　had　not　left　Parliament　in　this　very
ungraceful　distress；　in　which　they　can　neither　retract　with　dignity
nor　persist　with　justice。　　Another　parliament　might　have　satisfied
the　people　without　lowering　themselves。　　But　our　situation　is　not　in
our　own　choice：　　our　conduct　in　that　situation　is　all　that　is　in　our
own　option。　　The　substance　of　the　question　is；　to　put　bounds　to　your
own　power　by　the　rules　and　principles　of　law。　　This　is；　I　am
sensible；　a　difficult　thing　to　the　corrupt；　grasping；　and　ambitious
part　of　human　nature。　　But　the　very　difficulty　argues　and　enforces
the　necessity　of　it。　　First；　because　the　greater　the　power；　the　more
dangerous　the　abuse。　　Since　the　Revolution；　at　least；　the　power　of
the　nation　has　all　flowed　with　a　full　tide　into　the　House　of
Commons。　　Secondly；　because　the　House　of　Commons；　as　it　is　the　most
powerful；　is　the　most　corruptible　part　of　the　whole　Constitution。
Our　public　wounds　cannot　be　concealed；　to　be　cured；　they　must　be
laid　open。　　The　public　does　think　we　are　a　corrupt　body。　　In　our
legislative　capacity　we　are；　in　most　instances；　esteemed　a　very　wise
body。　　In　our　judicial；　we　have　no　credit；　no　character　at；　all。
Our　judgments　stink　in　the　nostrils　of　the　people。　　They　think　us　to
be　not　only　without　virtue；　but　without　shame。　　Therefore；　the
greatness　of　our　power；　and　the　great　and　just　opinion　of　our
corruptibility　and　our　corruption；　render　it　necessary　to　fix　some
bound；　to　plant　some　landmark；　which　we　are　never　to　exceed。　　That
is　what　the　bill　proposes。　　First；　on　this　head；　I　lay　it　down　as　a
fundamental　rule　in　the　law　and　constitution　of　this　country；　that
this　House　has　not　by　itself　alone　a　legislative　authority　in　any
case　whatsoever。　　I　know　that　the　contrary　was　the　doctrine　of　the
usurping　House　of　Commons　which　threw　down　the　fences　and　bulwarks
of　law；　which　annihilated　first　the　lords；　then　the　Crown；　then　its
constituents。　　But　the　first　thing　that　was　done　on　the　restoration
of　the　Constitution　was　to　settle　this　point。　　Secondly；　I　lay　it
down　as　a　rule；　that　the　power　of　occasional　incapacitation；　on
discretionary　grounds；　is　a　legislative　power。　　In　order　to
establish　this　principle；　if　it　should　not　be　sufficiently　proved　by
being　stated；　tell　me　what　are　the　criteria；　the　characteristics；　by
which　you　distinguish　between　a　legislative　and　a　juridical　act。　　It
will　be　necessary　to　state；　shortly；　the　difference　between　a
legislative　and　a　juridical　act。　　A　legislative　act　has　no　reference
to　any　rule　but　these　two：　　original　justice；　and　discretionary
application。　　Therefore；　it　can　give　rights；　rights　where　no　rights
existed　before；　and　it　can　take　away　rights　where　they　were　before
established。　　For　the　law；　which　binds　all　others；　does　not　and
cannot　bind　the　law…maker；　he；　and　he　alone；　is　above　the　law。　　But
a　judge；　a　person　exercising　a　judicial　capacity；　is　neither　to
apply　to　original　justice；　nor　to　a　discretionary　application　of　it。
He　goes　to　justice　and　discretion　only　at　second　hand；　and　through
the　medium　of　some　superiors。　　He　is　to　work　neither　upon　his
opinion　of　the　one　nor　of　the　other；　but　upon　a　fixed　rule；　of　which
he　has　not　the　making；　but　singly　and　solely　the　application　to　the
case。

The　power　assumed　by　the　House　neither　is；　nor　can　be；　judicial
power　exercised　according　to　known　law。　　The　properties　of　law　are；
first；　that　it　should　be　known；　secondly；　that　it　should　be　fixed
and　not　occasional。　　First；　this　power　cannot　be　according　to　the
first　property　of　law；　because　no　man　does　or　can　know　it；　nor　do
you　yourselves　know　upon　what　grounds　you　will　vote　the　incapacity
of　any　man。　　No　man　in　Westminster　Hall；　or　in　any　court　upon　earth；
will　say　that　is　law；　upon　which；　if　a　man　going　to　his　counsel
should　say　to　him；　〃What　is　my　tenure　in　law　of　this　estate？〃　he
would　answer；　〃Truly；　sir；　I　know　not；　the　court　has　no　rule　but　its
own　discretion：　　they　will　determine。〃　　It　is　not　a；　fixed　law；
because　you　profess　you　vary　it　according　to　the　occasion；　exercise
it　according　to　your　discretion；　no　man　can　call　for　it　as　a　right。
It　is　argued　that　the　incapacity　is　not　originally　voted；　but　a
consequence　of　a　power　of　expulsion：　　but　if　you　expel；　not　upon
legal；　but　upon　arbitrary；　that　is；　upon　discretionary　grounds；　and
the　incapacity　is　ex　vi　termini　and　inclusively　comprehended　in　the
expulsion；　is　not　the　incapacity　voted　in　the　expulsion？　　Are　they
not　convertible　terms？　and；　if　incapacity　is　voted　to　be　inherent　in
expulsion；　if　expulsion　be　arbitrary；　incapacity　is　arbitrary　also。
I　have；　therefore；　shown　that　the　power　of　incapacitation　is　a
legislative　power；　I　have　shown　that　legislative　power　does　not
belong　to　the　House　of　Commons；　and；　therefore；　it　follows　that　the
House　of　Commons　has　not　a　power　of　incapacitation。

I　know　not　the　origin　of　the　House　of　Commons；　but　am　very　sure　that
it　did　not　create　itself；　the　electors　wore　prior　to　the　elected；
whose　rights　originated　either　from　the　people　at　large；　or　from
some　other　form　of　legislature；　which　never　could　intend　for　the
chosen　a　power　of　superseding　the　choosers。

If　you　have　not　a　power　of　declaring　an　incapacity　simply　by　the
mere　act　of　declaring　it；　it　is　evident　to　the　most　ordinary　reason
you　cannot　have　a　right　of　expulsion；　inferring；　or　rat