thoughts on the present discontents-第17节

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opened　by　the　precedent；　and　to　be　wrought　by　the　principle　of　the
late　payment　of　the　debts　of　the　Civil　List。　　The　power　of
discretionary　disqualification　by　one　law　of　Parliament；　and　the
necessity　of　paying　every　debt　of　the　Civil　List　by　another　law　of
Parliament；　if　suffered　to　pass　unnoticed；　must　establish　such　a
fund　of　rewards　and　terrors　as　will　make　Parliament　the　best
appendage　and　support　of　arbitrary　power　that　ever　was　invented　by
the　wit　of　man。　　This　is　felt。　　The　quarrel　is　begun　between　the
Representatives　and　the　People。　　The　Court　Faction　have　at　length
committed　them。

In　such　a　strait　the　wisest　may　well　be　perplexed；　and　the　boldest
staggered。　　The　circumstances　are　in　a　great　measure　new。　　We　have
hardly　any　landmarks　from　the　wisdom　of　our　ancestors　to　guide　us。
At　best　we　can　only　follow　the　spirit　of　their　proceeding　in　other
cases。　　I　know　the　diligence　with　which　my　observations　on　our
public　disorders　have　been　made。　　I　am　very　sure　of　the　integrity　of
the　motives　on　which　they　are　published：　　I　cannot　be　equally
confident　in　any　plan　for　the　absolute　cure　of　those　disorders；　or
for　their　certain　future　prevention。　　My　aim　is　to　bring　this　matter
into　more　public　discussion。　　Let　the　sagacity　of　others　work　upon
it。　　It　is　not　uncommon　for　medical　writers　to　describe　histories　of
diseases；　very　accurately；　on　whose　cure　they　can　say　but　very
little。

The　first　ideas　which　generally　suggest　themselves　for　the　cure　of
Parliamentary　disorders　are；　to　shorten　the　duration　of　Parliaments；
and　to　disqualify　all；　or　a　great　number　of　placemen；　from　a　seat　in
the　House　of　Commons。　　Whatever　efficacy　there　may　be　in　those
remedies；　I　am　sure　in　the　present　state　of　things　it　is　impossible
to　apply　them。　　A　restoration　of　the　right　of　free　election　is　a
preliminary　indispensable　to　every　other　reformation。　　What
alterations　ought　afterwards　to　be　made　in　the　constitution　is　a
matter　of　deep　and　difficult　research。

If　I　wrote　merely　to　please　the　popular　palate；　it　would　indeed　be
as　little　troublesome　to　me　as　to　another　to　extol　these　remedies；
so　famous　in　speculation；　but　to　which　their　greatest　admirers　have
never　attempted　seriously　to　resort　in　practice。　　I　confess　them；
that　I　have　no　sort　of　reliance　upon　either　a　Triennial　Parliament
or　a　Place…bill。　　With　regard　to　the　former；　perhaps；　it　might
rather　serve　to　counteract　than　to　promote　the　ends　that　are
proposed　by　it。　　To　say　nothing　of　the　horrible　disorders　among　the
people　attending　frequent　elections；　I　should　be　fearful　of
committing；　every　three　years；　the　independent　gentlemen　of　the
country　into　a　contest　with　the　Treasury。　　It　is　easy　to　see　which
of　the　contending　parties　would　be　ruined　first。　　Whoever　has　taken
a　careful　view　of　public　proceedings；　so　as　to　endeavour　to　ground
his　speculations　on　his　experience；　must　have　observed　how
prodigiously　greater　the　power　of　Ministry　is　in　the　first　and　last
session　of　a　Parliament；　than　it　is　in　the　intermediate　periods；
when　Members　sit　a　little　on　their　seats。　　The　persons　of　the
greatest　Parliamentary　experience；　with　whom　I　have　conversed；　did
constantly；　in　canvassing　the　fate　of　questions；　allow　something　to
the　Court　side；　upon　account　of　the　elections　depending　or　imminent。
The　evil　complained　of；　if　it　exists　in　the　present　state　of　things；
would　hardly　be　removed　by　a　triennial　Parliament：　　for；　unless　the
influence　of　Government　in　elections　can　be　entirely　taken　away；　the
more　frequently　they　return；　the　more　they　will　harass　private
independence；　the　more　generally　men　will　be　compelled　to　fly　to　the
settled　systematic　interest　of　Government；　and　to　the　resources　of　a
boundless　Civil　List。　　Certainly　something　may　be　done；　and　ought　to
be　done；　towards　lessening　that　influence　in　elections；　and　this
will　be　necessary　upon　a　plan　either　of　longer　or　shorter　duration
of　Parliament。　　But　nothing　can　so　perfectly　remove　the　evil；　as　not
to　render　such　contentions；　foot　frequently　repeated；　utterly
ruinous；　first　to　independence　of　fortune；　and　then　to　independence
of　spirit。　　As　I　am　only　giving　an　opinion　on　this　point；　and　not　at
all　debating　it　in　an　adverse　line；　I　hope　I　may　be　excused　in
another　observation。　　With　great　truth　I　may　aver　that　I　never
remember　to　have　talked　on　this　subject　with　any　man　much　conversant
with　public　business　who　considered　short　Parliaments　as　a　real
improvement　of　the　Constitution。　　Gentlemen；　warm　in　a　popular
cause；　are　ready　enough　to　attribute　all　the　declarations　of　such
persons　to　corrupt　motives。　　But　the　habit　of　affairs；　if；　on　one
hand；　it　tends　to　corrupt　the　mind；　furnishes　it；　on　the　other；　with
the；　means　of　better　information。　　The　authority　of　such　persons
will　always　have　some　weight。　　It　may　stand　upon　a　par　with　the
speculations　of　those　who　are　less　practised　in　business；　and　who；
with　perhaps　purer　intentions；　have　not　so　effectual　means　of
judging。　　It　is　besides　an　effect　of　vulgar　and　puerile　malignity　to
imagine　that　every　Statesman　is　of　course　corrupt：　　and　that　his
opinion；　upon　every　constitutional　point；　is　solely　formed　upon　some
sinister　interest。

The　next　favourite　remedy　is　a　Place…bill。　　The　same　principle
guides　in　both：　　I　mean　the　opinion　which　is　entertained　by　many　of
the　infallibility　of　laws　and　regulations；　in　the　cure　of　public
distempers。　　Without　being　as　unreasonably　doubtful　as　many　are
unwisely　confident；　I　will　only　say；　that　this　also　is　a　matter　very
well　worthy　of　serious　and　mature　reflection。　　It　is　not　easy　to
foresee　what　the　effect　would　be　of　disconnecting　with　Parliament；
the　greatest　part　of　those　who　hold　civil　employments；　and　of　such
mighty　and　important　bodies　as　the　military　and　naval
establishments。　　It　were　better；　perhaps；　that　they　should　have　a
corrupt　interest　in　the　forms　of　the　constitution；　than　they　should
have　none　at　all。　　This　is　a　question　altogether　different　from　the
disqualification　of　a　particular　description　of　Revenue　Officers
from　seats　in　Parliament；　or；　perhaps；　of　all　the　lower　sorts　of
them　from　votes　in　elections。　　In　the　former　case；　only　the　few　are
affected；　in　the　latter；　only　the　inconsiderable。　　But　a　great
official；　a　great　professional；　a　great　military　and　naval　interest；
all　necessarily　comprehending　many　people　of　the　first　weight；
ability；　wealth；　and　spirit；　has　been　gradually　formed　in　the
kingdom。　　These　new　interests　must　be　let　into　a　share　of
representation；　else　possibly　they　may　be　inclined　to　destroy　those
institutions　of　which　they　are　not　permitted　to　partake。　　This　is
not　a　thing　to　be　trifled　with：　　nor　is　it　every　well…meaning　man
that　is　fit　to　put　his　hands　to　it。　　Many　other　serious
considerations　occur。　　I　do　not　open　them　here；　because　they　are　not
directly　to　my　purpose；　proposing　only　to　give　the　reader　some　taste
of　the　difficulties　that　attend　all　capital　changes　in　the
Constitution；　just　to　hint　the　uncertainty；　to　say　no　worse；　of
being　able　to　prevent　the　Court；　as　long　as　it　has　the　means　of
influence　abundantly　in　its　power；　from　applying　that　influence　to
Parliament；　and　perhaps；　if　the　public　method　were　precluded；　of
doing　it　in　some　worse　and　more　dangerous　method。　　Underhand　and
oblique　ways　would　be　studied。　　The　science　of　evasion；　already
tolerably　understood；　would　then　be　brought　to　the　greatest
perfection。　　It　is　no　inconsiderable　part　of　wisdom；　to　know　how
much　of　an　evil　ought　to　be　tolerated；　lest；　by　attempting　a　degree
of　purity　impracticable　in　degenerate　times　and　manners；　instead　of
cutting　off　the　subsisting　ill　practices；　new　corruptions　might　be
produced　for　the　concealment　and　security　of　the　old。　　It　were
better；　undoubtedly；　that　no　influence　at　all　could　affect　the　mind
of　a　Member　of　Parliament。　　But　of　all　modes　of　influence；　in　my
opinion；　a　place　under　the　Government　is　the　least　disgraceful　to
the　man　who　holds　it；　and　by　far　the　most　safe　to　the　country。　　I
would　not　shut　out　that　sort　of　influence　which　is　open　and　visible；
which　is　connected　with　the　dignity　and　the　service　of　the　State；
when　it　is　not　in　my　power　to　prevent　the　influence　of　contracts；　of
subscriptions；　of　direct　bribery；　and　those　innumerable　methods　of
clandestine　corruption；　which　are　abundantly　in　the　hands　of　the
Court；　and　which　will　be　applied　as　long　as　these　means　of
corruption；　and　the　disposition　to　be　corrupted；　have　existence
amongst　us。　　Our　Constitution　stands　on　a　nice　equipoise；　with　steep
precipices　and　deep　waters　upon　all　sides　of　it。　　In　removing　it
from　a　dangerous　leaning　towards　one　side；　there　may　be　a　risk　of
oversetting　it　on　the　other。　　Every　project　of　a　material　change　in
a　Government　so　complicated　as　ours；　combined　at　the　same　time　with
external　circumstances　still　more　complicated；　is　a　matter　full　of
difficulties；　in　which　a　considerate　man　will　not　be　too　ready　to
decide；　a　prudent　man　too　ready　to　undertake；　or　an　honest　man　too
ready　to　promise。　　They　do　not　respect　the　public　nor　themselves；
who　engage　for　more　than　they　are　sure　that　they　ought　to　attempt；
or　that　they　are　able　to　perform。　　These　are　my　sentiments；　weak
perhaps；　but　honest