thoughts on the present discontents-第15节

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declared　that　the　true　legal　sense　of　the　country　was　contained　in
the　minority；　on　that　occasion；　and　might；　on　a　resistance　to　a　vote
of　incapacity；　be　contained　in　any　minority。

When　any　construction　of　law　goes　against　the　spirit　of　the
privilege　it　was　meant　to　support；　it　is　a　vicious　construction。　　It
is　material　to　us　to　be　represented　really　and　bona　fide；　and　not　in
forms；　in　types；　and　shadows；　and　fictions　of　law。　　The　right　of
election　was　not　established　merely　as　a　MATTER　OF　FORM；　to　satisfy
some　method　and　rule　of　technical　reasoning；　it　was　not　a　principle
which　might　substitute　a　Titius　or　a　Maevius；　a　John　Doe　or　Richard
Roe；　in　the　place　of　a　man　specially　chosen；　not　a　principle　which
was　just　as　well　satisfied　with　one　man　as　with　another。　　It　is　a
right；　the　effect　of　which　is　to　give　to　the　people　that　man；　and
that　man　only；　whom　by　their　voices；　actually；　not　constructively
given；　they　declare　that　they　know；　esteem；　love；　and　trust。　　This
right　is　a　matter　within　their　own　power　of　judging　and　feeling；　not
an　ens　rationis　and　creature　of　law：　　nor　can　those　devices；　by
which　anything　else　is　substituted　in　the　place　of　such　an　actual
choice；　answer　in　the　least　degree　the　end　of　representation。

I　know　that　the　courts　of　law　have　made　as　strained　constructions　in
other　cases。　　Such　is　the　construction　in　common　recoveries。　　The
method　of　construction　which　in　that　case　gives　to　the　persons　in
remainder；　for　their　security　and　representative；　the　door…keeper；
crier；　or　sweeper　of　the　Court；　or　some　other　shadowy　being　without
substance　or　effect；　is　a　fiction　of　a　very　coarse　texture。　　This
was　however　suffered；　by　the　acquiescence　of　the　whole　kingdom；　for
ages；　because　the　evasion　of　the　old　Statute　of　Westminster；　which
authorised　perpetuities；　had　more　sense　and　utility　than　the　law
which　was　evaded。　　But　an　attempt　to　turn　the　right　of　election　into
such　a　farce　and　mockery　as　a　fictitious　fine　and　recovery；　will；　I
hope；　have　another　fate；　because　the　laws　which　give　it　are
infinitely　dear　to　us；　and　the　evasion　is　infinitely　contemptible。

The　people　indeed　have　been　told；　that　this　power　of　discretionary
disqualification　is　vested　in　hands　that　they　may　trust；　and　who
will　be　sure　not　to　abuse　it　to　their　prejudice。　　Until　I　find
something　in　this　argument　differing　from　that　on　which　every　mode
of　despotism　has　been　defended；　I　shall　not　be　inclined　to　pay　it
any　great　compliment。　　The　people　are　satisfied　to　trust　themselves
with　the　exercise　of　their　own　privileges；　and　do　not　desire　this
kind　intervention　of　the　House　of　Commons　to　free　them　from　the
burthen。　　They　are　certainly　in　the　right。　　They　ought　not　to　trust
the　House　of　Commons　with　a　power　over　their　franchises；　because　the
constitution；　which　placed　two　other　co…ordinate　powers　to　control
it；　reposed　no　such　confidence　in　that　body。　　It　were　a　folly　well
deserving　servitude　for　its　punishment；　to　be　full　of　confidence
where　the　laws　are　full　of　distrust；　and　to　give　to　an　House　of
Commons；　arrogating　to　its　sole　resolution　the　most　harsh　and　odious
part　of　legislative　authority；　that　degree　of　submission　which　is
due　only　to　the　Legislature　itself。

When　the　House　of　Commons；　in　an　endeavour　to　obtain　new　advantages
at　the　expense　of　the　other　orders　of　the　State；　for　the　benefits　of
the　COMMONS　AT　LARGE；　have　pursued　strong　measures；　if　it　were　not
just；　it　was　at　least　natural；　that　the　constituents　should　connive
at　all　their　proceedings；　because　we　were　ourselves　ultimately　to
profit。　　But　when　this　submission　is　urged　to　us；　in　a　contest
between　the　representatives　and　ourselves；　and　where　nothing　can　be
put　into　their　scale　which　is　not　taken　from　ours；　they　fancy　us　to
be　children　when　they　tell　us　they　are　our　representatives；　our　own
flesh　and　blood；　and　that　all　the　stripes　they　give　us　are　for　our
good。　　The　very　desire　of　that　body　to　have　such　a　trust　contrary　to
law　reposed　in　them；　shows　that　they　are　not　worthy　of　it。　　They
certainly　will　abuse　it；　because　all　men　possessed　of　an
uncontrolled　discretionary　power　leading　to　the　aggrandisement　and
profit　of　their　own　body　have　always　abused　it：　　and　I　see　no
particular　sanctity　in　our　times；　that　is　at　all　likely；　by　a
miraculous　operation；　to　overrule　the　course　of　nature。

But　we　must　purposely　shut　our　eyes；　if　we　consider　this　matter
merely　as　a　contest　between　the　House　of　Commons　and　the　Electors。
The　true　contest　is　between　the　Electors　of　the　Kingdom　and　the
Crown；　the　Crown　acting　by　an　instrumental　House　of　Commons。　　It　is
precisely　the　same；　whether　the　Ministers　of　the　Crown　can
disqualify　by　a　dependent　House　of　Commons；　or　by　a　dependent　court
of　STAR　CHAMBER；　or　by　a　dependent　court　of　King's　Bench。　　If　once
Members　of　Parliament　can　be　practically　convinced　that　they　do　not
depend　on　the　affection　or　opinion　of　the　people　for　their　political
being；　they　will　give　themselves　over；　without　even　an　appearance　of
reserve；　to　the　influence　of　the　Court。

Indeed；　a　Parliament　unconnected　with　the　people；　is　essential　to　a
Ministry　unconnected　with　the　people；　and　therefore　those　who　saw
through　what　mighty　difficulties　the　interior　Ministry　waded；　and
the　exterior　were　dragged；　in　this　business；　will　conceive　of　what
prodigious　importance；　the　new　corps　of　KING'S　MEN　held　this
principle　of　occasional　and　personal　incapacitation；　to　the　whole
body　of　their　design。

When　the　House　of　Commons　was　thus　made　to　consider　itself　as　the
master　of　its　constituents；　there　wanted　but　one　thing　to　secure
that　House　against　all　possible　future　deviation　towards　popularity；
an　unlimited　fund　of　money　to　be　laid　out　according　to　the　pleasure
of　the　Court。


To　complete　the　scheme　of　bringing　our　Court　to　a　resemblance　to　the
neighbouring　Monarchies；　it　was　necessary；　in　effect；　to　destroy
those　appropriations　of　revenue；　which　seem　to　limit　the　property；
as　the　other　laws　had　done　the　powers；　of　the　Crown。　　An　opportunity
for　this　purpose　was　taken；　upon　an　application　to　Parliament　for
payment　of　the　debts　of　the　Civil　List；　which　in　1769　had　amounted
to　513；000　pounds。　　Such　application　had　been　made　upon　former
occasions；　but　to　do　it　in　the　former　manner　would　by　no　means
answer　the　present　purpose。

Whenever　the　Crown　had　come　to　the　Commons　to　desire　a　supply　for
the　discharging　of　debts　due　on　the　Civil　List；　it　was　always　asked
and　granted　with　one　of　the　three　following　qualifications；
sometimes　with　all　of　them。　　Either　it　was　stated　that　the　revenue
had　been　diverted　from　its　purposes　by　Parliament；　or　that　those
duties　had　fallen　short　of　the　sum　for　which　they　were　given　by
Parliament；　and　that　the　intention　of　the　Legislature　had　not　been
fulfilled；　or　that　the　money　required　to　discharge　the　Civil　List
debt　was　to　be　raised　chargeable　on　the　Civil　List　duties。　　In　the
reign　of　Queen　Anne；　the　Crown　was　found　in　debt。　　The　lessening　and
granting　away　some　part　of　her　revenue　by　Parliament　was　alleged　as
the　cause　of　that　debt；　and　pleaded　as　an　equitable　ground　（such　it
certainly　was）；　for　discharging　it。　　It　does　not　appear　that　the
duties　which　wore　then　applied　to　the　ordinary　Government　produced
clear　above　580；000　pounds　a　year；　because；　when　they　were
afterwards　granted　to　George　the　First；　120；000　pounds　was　added；　to
complete　the　whole　to　700；000　pounds　a　year。　　Indeed　it　was　then
asserted；　and；　I　have　no　doubt；　truly；　that　for　many　years　the　nett
produce　did　not　amount　to　above　550；000　pounds。　　The　Queen's
extraordinary　charges　were　besides　very　considerable；　equal；　at
least；　to　any　we　have　known　in　our　time。　　The　application　to
Parliament　was　not　for　an　absolute　grant　of　money；　but　to　empower
the　Queen　to　raise　it　by　borrowing　upon　the　Civil　List　funds。

The　Civil　List　debt　was　twice　paid　in　the　reign　of　George　the　First。
The　money　was　granted　upon　the　same　plan　which　had　been　followed　in
the　reign　of　Queen　Anne。　　The　Civil　List　revenues　were　then
mortgaged　for　the　sum　to　be　raised；　and　stood　charged　with　the
ransom　of　their　own　deliverance。

George　the　Second　received　an　addition　to　his　Civil　List。　　Duties
were　granted　for　the　purpose　of　raising　800；000　pounds　a　year。　　It
was　not　until　he　had　reigned　nineteen　years；　and　after　the　last
rebellion；　that　he　called　upon　Parliament　for　a　discharge　of　the
Civil　List　debt。　　The　extraordinary　charges　brought　on　by　the
rebellion；　account　fully　for　the　necessities　of　the　Crown。　　However；
the　extraordinary　charges　of　Government　were　not　thought　a　ground
fit　to　be　relied　on。　　A　deficiency　of　the　Civil　List　duties　for
several　years　before　was　stated　as　the　principal；　if　not　the　sole；
ground　on　which　an　application　to　Parliament　could　be　justified。
About　this　time　the　produce　of　these　duties　had　fallen　pretty　low；
and　even　upon　an　average　of　the　whole　reign　they　never　produced
800；000　pounds　a　year　clear　to　the　Treasury。

That　Prince　reigned　fourteen　years　afterwards：　　not　only　no　new
demands　were　made；　but　with　so　much　good　order　were　his　revenues　and
expenses　regulated；　that；　although　many　parts　of　the　establishment
of　the　Court　were　upon　a　larger　and　more　liberal　s