thoughts on the present discontents-第13节

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


the　House　of　Commons　religiously　true　to　its　first　principles；　I
would　not　argue　for　carrying　it　to　a　total　oblivion　of　them。　　This
has　been　the　great　scheme　of　power　in　our　time。　　They　who　will　not
conform　their　conduct　to　the　public　good；　and　cannot　support　it　by
the　prerogative　of　the　Crown；　have　adopted　a　new　plan。　　They　have
totally　abandoned　the　shattered　and　old…fashioned　fortress　of
prerogative；　and　made　a　lodgment　in　the　stronghold　of　Parliament
itself。　　If　they　have　any　evil　design　to　which　there　is　no　ordinary
legal　power　commensurate；　they　bring　it　into　Parliament。　　In
Parliament　the　whole　is　executed　from　the　beginning　to　the　end。　　In
Parliament　the　power　of　obtaining　their　object　is　absolute；　and　the
safety　in　the　proceeding　perfect：　　no　rules　to　confine；　no　after
reckonings　to　terrify。　　Parliament　cannot　with　any　great　propriety
punish　others　for　things　in　which　they　themselves　have　been
accomplices。　　Thus　the　control　of　Parliament　upon　the　executory
power　is　lost；　because　Parliament　is　made　to　partake　in　every
considerable　act　of　Government。　　IMPEACHMENT；　THAT　GREAT　GUARDIAN　OF
THE　PURITY　OF　THE　CONSTITUTION；　IS　IN　DANGER　OF　BEING　LOST；　EVEN　TO
THE　IDEA　OF　IT。

By　this　plan　several　important　ends　are　answered　to　the　Cabal。　　If
the　authority　of　Parliament　supports　itself；　the　credit　of　every　act
of　Government；　which　they　contrive；　is　saved；　but　if　the　act　be　so
very　odious　that　the　whole　strength　of　Parliament　is　insufficient　to
recommend　it；　then　Parliament　is　itself　discredited；　and　this
discredit　increases　more　and　more　that　indifference　to　the
constitution；　which　it　is　the　constant　aim　of　its　enemies；　by　their
abuse　of　Parliamentary　powers；　to　render　general　among　the　people。
Whenever　Parliament　is　persuaded　to　assume　the　offices　of　executive
Government；　it　will　lose　all　the　confidence；　love；　and　veneration
which　it　has　ever　enjoyed；　whilst　it　was　supposed　the　CORRECTIVE　and
CONTROL　of　the　acting　powers　of　the　State。　　This　would　be　the　event；
though　its　conduct　in　such　a　perversion　of　its　functions　should　be
tolerably　just　and　moderate；　but　if　it　should　be　iniquitous；
violent；　full　of　passion；　and　full　of　faction；　it　would　be
considered　as　the　most　intolerable　of　all　the　modes　of　tyranny。

For　a　considerable　time　this　separation　of　the　representatives　from
their　constituents　went　on　with　a　silent　progress；　and　had　those；
who　conducted　the　plan　for　their　total　separation；　been　persons　of
temper　and　abilities　any　way　equal　to　the　magnitude　of　their　design；
the　success　would　have　been　infallible；　but　by　their　precipitancy
they　have　laid　it　open　in　all　its　nakedness；　the　nation　is　alarmed
at　it；　and　the　event　may　not　be　pleasant　to　the　contrivers　of　the
scheme。　　In　the　last　session；　the　corps　called　the　KING'S　FRIENDS
made　a　hardy　attempt　all　at　once；　TO　ALTER　THE　RIGHT　OF　ELECTION
ITSELF；　to　put　it　into　the　power　of　the　House　of　Commons　to　disable
any　person　disagreeable　to　them　from　sitting　in　Parliament；　without
any　other　rule　than　their　own　pleasure；　to　make　incapacities；　either
general　for　descriptions　of　men；　or　particular　for　individuals；　and
to　take　into　their　body；　persons　who　avowedly　had　never　been　chosen
by　the　majority　of　legal　electors；　nor　agreeably　to　any　known　rule
of　law。

The　arguments　upon　which　this　claim　was　founded　and　combated；　are
not　my　business　here。　　Never　has　a　subject　been　more　amply　and　more
learnedly　handled；　nor　upon　one　side；　in　my　opinion；　more
satisfactorily；　they　who　are　not　convinced　by　what　is　already
written　would　not　receive　conviction　THOUGH　ONE　AROSE　FROM　THE　DEAD。

I　too　have　thought　on　this　subject；　but　my　purpose　here；　is　only　to
consider　it　as　a　part　of　the　favourite　project　of　Government；　to
observe　on　the　motives　which　led　to　it；　and　to　trace　its　political
consequences。

A　violent　rage　for　the　punishment　of　Mr。　Wilkes　was　the　pretence　of
the　whole。　　This　gentleman；　by　setting　himself　strongly　in
opposition　to　the　Court　Cabal；　had　become　at　once　an　object　of　their
persecution；　and　of　the　popular　favour。　　The　hatred　of　the　Court
party　pursuing；　and　the　countenance　of　the　people　protecting　him；　it
very　soon　became　not　at　all　a　question　on　the　man；　but　a　trial　of
strength　between　the　two　parties。　　The　advantage　of　the　victory　in
this　particular　contest　was　the　present；　but　not　the　only；　nor　by
any　means；　the　principal；　object。　　Its　operation　upon　the　character
of　the　House　of　Commons　was　the　great　point　in　view。　　The　point　to
be　gained　by　the　Cabal　was　this：　　that　a　precedent　should　be
established；　tending　to　show；　THAT　THE　FAVOUR　OF　THE　PEOPLE　WAS　NOT
SO　SURE　A　ROAD　AS　THE　FAVOUR　OF　THE　COURT　EVEN　TO　POPULAR　HONOURS
AND　POPULAR　TRUSTS。　　A　strenuous　resistance　to　every　appearance　of
lawless　power；　a　spirit　of　independence　carried　to　some　degree　of
enthusiasm；　an　inquisitive　character　to　discover；　and　a　bold　one　to
display；　every　corruption　and　every　error　of　Government；　these　are
the　qualities　which　recommend　a　man　to　a　seat　in　the　House　of
Commons；　in　open　and　merely　popular　elections。　　An　indolent　and
submissive　disposition；　a　disposition　to　think　charitably　of　all　the
actions　of　men　in　power；　and　to　live　in　a　mutual　intercourse　of
favours　with　them；　an　inclination　rather　to　countenance　a　strong　use
of　authority；　than　to　bear　any　sort　of　licentiousness　on　the　part　of
the　people；　these　are　unfavourable　qualities　in　an　open　election　for
Members　of　Parliament。

The　instinct　which　carries　the　people　towards　the　choice　of　the
former；　is　justified　by　reason；　because　a　man　of　such　a　character；
even　in　its　exorbitancies；　does　not　directly　contradict　the　purposes
of　a　trust；　the　end　of　which　is　a　control　on　power。　　The　latter
character；　even　when　it　is　not　in　its　extreme；　will　execute　this
trust　but　very　imperfectly；　and；　if　deviating　to　the　least　excess；
will　certainly　frustrate　instead　of　forwarding　the　purposes　of　a
control　on　Government。　　But　when　the　House　of　Commons　was　to　be　new
modelled；　this　principle　was　not　only　to　be　changed；　but　reversed。
Whist　any　errors　committed　in　support　of　power　were　left　to　the　law；
with　every　advantage　of　favourable　construction；　of　mitigation；　and
finally　of　pardon；　all　excesses　on　the　side　of　liberty；　or　in
pursuit　of　popular　favour；　or　in　defence　of　popular　rights　and
privileges；　were　not　only　to　be　punished　by　the　rigour　of　the　known
law；　but　by　a　DISCRETIONARY　proceeding；　which　brought　on　THE　LOSS　OF
THE　POPULAR　OBJECT　ITSELF。　　Popularity　was　to　be　rendered；　if　not
directly　penal；　at　least　highly　dangerous。　　The　favour　of　the　people
might　lead　even　to　a　disqualification　of　representing　them。　　Their
odium　might　become；　strained　through　the　medium　of　two　or　three
constructions；　the　means　of　sitting　as　the　trustee　of　all　that　was
dear　to　them。　　This　is　punishing　the　offence　in　the　offending　part。
Until　this　time；　the　opinion　of　the　people；　through　the　power　of　an
Assembly；　still　in　some　sort　popular；　led　to　the　greatest　honours
and　emoluments　in　the　gift　of　the　Crown。　　Now　the　principle　is
reversed；　and　the　favour　of　the　Court　is　the　only　sure　way　of
obtaining　and　holding　those　honours　which　ought　to　be　in　the
disposal　of　the　people。

It　signifies　very　little　how　this　matter　may　be　quibbled　away。
Example；　the　only　argument　of　effect　in　civil　life；　demonstrates　the
truth　of　my　proposition。　　Nothing　can　alter　my　opinion　concerning
the　pernicious　tendency　of　this　example；　until　I　see　some　man　for
his　indiscretion　in　the　support　of　power；　for　his　violent　and
intemperate　servility；　rendered　incapable　of　sitting　in　parliament。
For　as　it　now　stands；　the　fault　of　overstraining　popular　qualities；
and；　irregularly　if　you　please；　asserting　popular　privileges；　has
led　to　disqualification；　the　opposite　fault　never　has　produced　the
slightest　punishment。　　Resistance　to　power　has　shut　the　door　of　the
House　of　Commons　to　one　man；　obsequiousness　and　servility；　to　none。

Not　that　I　would　encourage　popular　disorder；　or　any　disorder。　　But　I
would　leave　such　offences　to　the　law；　to　be　punished　in　measure　and
proportion。　　The　laws　of　this　country　are　for　the　most　part
constituted；　and　wisely　so；　for　the　general　ends　of　Government；
rather　than　for　the　preservation　of　our　particular　liberties。
Whatever　therefore　is　done　in　support　of　liberty；　by　persons　not　in
public　trust；　or　not　acting　merely　in　that　trust；　is　liable　to　be
more　or　less　out　of　the　ordinary　course　of　the　law；　and　the　law
itself　is　sufficient　to　animadvert　upon　it　with　great　severity。
Nothing　indeed　can　hinder　that　severe　letter　from　crushing　us；
except　the　temperaments　it　may　receive　from　a　trial　by　jury。　　But　if
the　habit　prevails　of　GOING　BEYOND　THE　LAW；　and　superseding　this
judicature；　of　carrying　offences；　real　or　supposed；　into　the
legislative　bodies；　who　shall　establish　themselves　into　COURTS　OF
CRIMINAL　EQUITY；　（so　THE　STAR　CHAMBER　has　been　called　by　Lord
Bacon；）　all　the　evils　of　the　STAR　Chamber　are　revived。　　A　large　and
liberal　construction　in　ascertaining　offences；　and　a　discretionary
power　in　punishing　them；　is　the　idea　of　criminal　equity；　which　is　in
truth　a　monster　in　Jurisprudence。　　It　signifies　nothing　whether　a
court　for　this　purpose　be　a　Com