the sequel of appomattox-第16节

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


　whites　about　their　sins　in　regard　to　slavery　and　to　point　out　to　them　how　far　in　their　general　ignorance　and　backwardness　they　fell　short　of　enlightened　people。

The　Bureau　courts　were　frequently　conducted　in　an　〃illegal　and　oppressive　manner；〃　with　〃decided　partiality　for　the　colored　people；　without　regard　to　justice。〃　For　this　reason　they　were　suspended　for　a　time　in　Louisiana　and　Georgia　by　General　Steedman　and　General　Fullerton；　and　cases　were　then　sent　before　military　courts。　Men　of　the　highest　character　were　dragged　before　the　Bureau　tribunals　upon　frivolous　complaints；　were　lectured；　abused；　ridiculed；　and　arbitrarily　fined　or　otherwise　punished。　The　jurisdiction　of　the　Bureau　courts　weakened　the　civil　courts　and　their　frequent　interference　in　trivial　matters　was　not　conducive　to　a　return　to　normal　conditions。

The　inferior　agents；　not　sufficiently　under　the　control　of　their　superiors；　were　responsible　for　a　great　deal　of　this　bad　feeling。　Many　of　them　held　radical　opinions　as　to　the　relations　of　the　races；　and　inculcated　these　views　in　their　courts；　in　the　schools；　and　in　the　new　Negro　churches。　Some　were　charged　with　even　causing　strikes　and　other　difficulties　in　order　to　be　bought　off　by　the　whites。　The　tendency　of　their　work　was　to　create　in　the　Negroes　a　pervasive　distrust　of　the　whites。

The　prevalent　delusion　in　regard　to　an　impending　division　of　the　lands　among　the　blacks　had　its　origin　in　the　operation　of　the　war…time　confiscation　laws；　in　some　of　the　Bureau　legislation；　and　in　General　Sherman's　Sea　Island　order；　but　it　was　further　fostered　by　the　agents　until　most　blacks　firmly　believed　that　each　head　of　a　family　was　to　get　〃40　acres　and　a　mule。〃　This　belief　seriously　interfered　with　industry　and　resulted　also　in　widespread　swindling　by　rascals　who　for　years　made　a　practice　of　selling　fraudulent　deeds　to　land　with　red；　white；　and　blue　sticks　to　mark　off　the　bounds　of　a　chosen　spot　on　the　former　master's　plantation。　The　assistant　commissioners　labored　hard　to　disabuse　the　minds　of　the　Negroes；　but　their　efforts　were　often　neutralized　by　the　unscrupulous　attitude　of　the　agents。

As　the　contest　over　reconstruction　developed　in　Washington；　the　officials　of　the　Bureau　soon　recognized　the　political　possibilities　of　their　institution。　After　midyear　of　1866；　the　Bureau　became　a　political　machine　for　the　purpose　of　organizing　the　blacks　into　the　Union　League；　where　the　rank　and　file　were　taught　that　reenslavement　would　follow　Democratic　victories。　Nearly　all　of　the　Bureau　agents　aided　in　the　administration　of　the　reconstruction　acts　in　1867　and　in　the　organization　of　the　new　state　and　local　governments　and　became　officials　under　the　new　regime。　They　were　the　chief　agents　in　capturing　the　solid　Negro　vote　for　the　Republican　party。

Neither　of　the　two　plans　for　guiding　the　freedmen　into　a　place　in　the　social　orderthe　〃Black　Laws〃　and　the　Freedmen's　Bureauwas　successful。　The　former　contained　a　program　which　was　better　suited　to　actual　conditions　and　which　might　have　succeeded　if　it　had　been　given　a　fair　trial。　These　laws　were　a　measure　of　the　extent　to　which　the　average　white　would　then　go　in　〃accepting　the　situation〃　so　far　as　the　blacks　were　concerned。　And　on　the　whole　the　recognition　of　Negro　rights　made　in　these　laws；　and　made　at　a　time　when　the　whites　believed　that　they　were　free　to　handle　the　situation；　was　remarkably　fair。　The　Negroes　lately　released　from　slavery　were　admitted　to　the　enjoyment　of　the　same　rights　as　the　whites　as　to　legal　protection　of　life；　liberty；　and　property；　as　to　education　and　as　to　the　family　relation；　limited　only　by　the　clear　recognition　of　the　principles　of　political　inferiority　and　social　separation。　Unhappily　this　legislation　was　not　put　to　the　test　of　practical　experience　because　of　the　Freedmen's　Bureau；　it　was　nevertheless　skillfully　used　to　arouse　the　dominant　Northern　party　to　a　course　of　action　which　made　impossible　any　further　effort　to　treat　the　race　problem　with　due　consideration　to　actual　local　conditions。

Much　of　the　work　of　the　Freedmen's　Bureau　was　of　only　temporary　benefit　to　both　races。　The　results　of　its　more　permanent　work　were　not　generally　good。　The　institution　was　based　upon　the　assumption　that　the　Negro　race　must　be　protected　from　the　white　race。　In　its　organization　and　administration　it　was　an　impossible　combination　of　the　practical　and　the　theoretical；　of　opportunism　and　humanitarianism；　of　common　sense　and　idealism。　It　failed　to　exert　a　permanently　wholesome　influence　because　its　lesser　agents　were　not　held　to　strict　accountability　by　their　superiors。　Under　these　agents　the　alienation　of　the　two　races　began；　and　the　ill　feelings　then　aroused　were　destined　to　persist　into　a　long　and　troubled　future。



CHAPTER　V。　THE　VICTORY　OF　THE　RADICALS

The　soldiers　who　fought　through　the　war　to　victory　or　to　defeat　had　been　at　home　nearly　two　years　before　the　radicals　developed　sufficient　strength　to　carry　through　their　plans　for　a　revolutionary　reconstruction　of　the　Southern　states。　At　the　end　of　the　war；　a　majority　of　the　Northern　people　would　have　supported　a　settlement　in　accordance　with　Lincoln's　policy。　Eight　months　later　a　majority；　but　a　smaller　one；　would　have　supported　Johnson's　work　had　it　been　possible　to　secure　a　popular　decision　on　it。　How　then　did　the　radicals　gain　the　victory　over　the　conservatives？　The　answer　to　this　question　is　given　by　James　Ford　Rhodes　in　terms　of　personalities：　〃Three　men　are　responsible　for　the　Congressional　policy　of　Reconstruction：　Andrew　Johnson；　by　his　obstinacy　and　bad　behavior；　Thaddeus　Stevens；　by　his　vindictiveness　and　parliamentary　tyranny；　Charles　Sumner；　by　his　pertinacity　in　a　misguided　humanitarianism。〃　The　President　stood　alone　in　his　responsibility；　but　his　chief　opponents　were　the　ablest　leaders　of　a　resolute　band　of　radicals。

Radicalism　did　not　begin　in　the　Administration　of　Andrew　Johnson。　Lincoln　had　felt　its　covert　opposition　throughout　the　war；　but　he　possessed　the　faculty　of　weakening　his　opponents；　while　Johnson's　conduct　usually　multiplied　the　number　and　the　strength　of　his　enemies。　At　first　the　radicals　criticized　Lincoln's　policy　in　regard　to　slavery；　and　after　the　Emancipation　Proclamation　they　shifted　their　attack　to　his　〃ten　percent〃　plan　for　organizing　the　state　governments　as　outlined　in　the　Proclamation　of　December　1863。　Lincoln's　course　was　distasteful　to　them　because　he　did　not　admit　the　right　of　Congress　to　dictate　terms；　because　of　his　liberal　attitude　towards　former　Confederates；　and　because　he　was　conservative　on　the　Negro　question。　A　schism　among　the　Republican　supporters　of　the　war　was　with　difficulty　averted　in　1864；　when　Fremont　threatened　to　lead　the　radicals　in　opposition　to　the　〃Union〃　party　of　the　President　and　his　conservative　policy。

The　breach　was　widened　by　the　refusal　of　Congress　to　admit　representatives　from　Arkansas　and　Louisiana　in　1864　and　to　count　the　electoral　vote　of　Louisiana　and　Tennessee　in　1865。　The　passage　of　the　Wade…Davis　reconstruction　bill　in　July　1864；　and　the　protests　of　its　authors　after　Lincoln's　pocket　veto　called　attention　to　the　growing　opposition。　Severe　criticism　caused　Lincoln　to　withdraw　the　propositions　which　he　had　made　in　April　1865；　with　regard　to　the　restoration　of　Virginia。　In　his　last　public　speech；　he　referred　with　regret　to　the　growing　spirit　of　vindictiveness　toward　the　South。　Much　of　the　opposition　to　Lincoln's　Southern　policy　was　based　not　on　radicalism；　that　is；　not　on　any　desire　for　a　revolutionary　change　in　the　South；　but　upon　a　belief　that　Congress　and　not　the　executive　should　be　entrusted　with　the　work　of　reorganizing　the　Union。　Many　congressional　leaders　were　willing　to　have　Congress　itself　carry　through　the　very　policies　which　Lincoln　had　advocated；　and　a　majority　of　the　Northern　people　would　have　endorsed　them　without　much　caring　who　was　to　execute　them。

The　murder　of　Lincoln；　the　failure　of　the　radicals　to　shape　Johnson's　policy　as　they　had　hoped；　and　the　continuing　reaction　against　the　excessive　expansion　of　the　executive　power　added　strength　to　the　opposition。　But　it　was　a　long　fight　before　the　radical　leaders　won。　Their　victory　was　due　to　adroit　tactics　on　their　own　part　and　to　mistakes；　bad　judgment；　and　bad　manners　on　the　part　of　the　President。　When　all　hope　of　controlling　Johnson　had　been　given　up；　Thaddeus　Stevens　and　other　leaders　of　similar　views　began　to　contrive　means　to　circumvent　him。　On　December　1；　1865；　before　Congress　met；　a　caucus　of　radicals　held　in　Washington　agreed　that　a　joint　committee　of　the　two　Houses　should　be　selected　to　which　should　be　referred　matters　relating　to　reconstruction。　This　plan　would　thwart　the　more　conservative　Senate　and　gain　a　desirable　delay　in　which　the　radicals　might　develop　their　campaign。　The　next　day　at　a　caucus　of　the　Union　party　the　plan　went　through　without　arousing　the　suspicion　of　the　supporters　of　the　Administration。　Next；　through　the　influence　of　Stevens；　Edward　McPherson；　the　clerk　of　the　House；　omitted　from　the　roll　call　of　the　House　the　names　of　the　members　from　the　South。　The　radical　program　was　then　adopted　and　a　week　later　the　Senate　concurred　in　the　action　of　the　House　as　to　the　appointment　of　a　Joint　Committee　on　Reconstruction。

On　the　issues　before　Congress