a discourse on method-第7节

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：　accordingly；　it　but　remained　that　it　had　been　placed　in　me　by　a　nature　which　was　in　reality　more　perfect　than　mine；　and　which　even　possessed　within　itself　all　the　perfections　of　which　I　could　form　any　idea；　that　is　to　say；　in　a　single　word；　which　was　God。　　And　to　this　I　added　that；　since　I　knew　some　perfections　which　I　did　not　possess；　I　was　not　the　only　being　in　existence　（I　will　here；　with　your　permission；　freely　use　the　terms　of　the　schools）；　but；　on　the　contrary；　that　there　was　of　necessity　some　other　more　perfect　Being　upon　whom　I　was　dependent；　and　from　whom　I　had　received　all　that　I　possessed；　for　if　I　had　existed　alone；　and　independently　of　every　other　being；　so　as　to　have　had　from　myself　all　the　perfection；　however　little；　which　I　actually　possessed；　I　should　have　been　able；　for　the　same　reason；　to　have　had　from　myself　the　whole　remainder　of　perfection；　of　the　want　of　which　I　was　conscious；　and　thus　could　of　myself　have　become　infinite；　eternal；　immutable；　omniscient；　all…powerful；　and；　in　fine；　have　possessed　all　the　perfections　which　I　could　recognize　in　God。　　For　in　order　to　know　the　nature　of　God　（whose　existence　has　been　established　by　the　preceding　reasonings）；　as　far　as　my　own　nature　permitted；　I　had　only　to　consider　in　reference　to　all　the　properties　of　which　I　found　in　my　　mind　some　idea；　whether　their　possession　was　a　mark　of　perfection；　and　I　was　assured　that　no　one　which　indicated　any　imperfection　was　in　him；　and　that　none　of　the　rest　was　awanting。　　Thus　I　perceived　that　doubt；　inconstancy；　　sadness；　and　such　like；　could　not　be　found　in　God；　since　I　myself　would　have　been　happy　to　be　free　from　them。　Besides；　I　had　ideas　of　many　sensible　and　corporeal　things；　for　although　I　might　suppose　that　I　was　dreaming；　and　that　all　which　I　saw　or　imagined　was　false；　I　could　not；　nevertheless；　deny　that　the　ideas　were　in　reality　in　my　thoughts。　　But；　because　I　had　already　very　clearly　recognized　in　myself　that　the　intelligent　nature　is　distinct　from　the　corporeal；　and　as　I　observed　that　all　composition　is　an　evidence　of　dependency；　and　that　a　state　of　dependency　is　manifestly　a　state　of　imperfection；　I　therefore　determined　that　it　could　not　be　a　perfection　in　God　to　be　compounded　of　these　two　natures　and　that　consequently　he　was　not　so　compounded；　but　that　if　there　were　any　bodies　in　the　world；　or　even　any　intelligences；　or　other　natures　that　were　not　wholly　perfect；　their　existence　depended　on　his　power　in　such　a　way　that　they　could　not　subsist　without　him　for　a　single　moment。

I　was　disposed　straightway　to　search　for　other　truths　and　when　I　had　represented　to　myself　the　object　of　the　geometers；　which　I　conceived　to　be　a　continuous　body　or　a　space　indefinitely　extended　in　length；　breadth；　and　height　or　depth；　divisible　into　divers　parts　which　admit　of　different　figures　and　sizes；　and　of　being　moved　or　transposed　in　all　manner　of　ways　（for　all　this　the　geometers　suppose　to　be　in　the　object　they　contemplate）；　I　went　over　some　of　their　simplest　demonstrations。　　And；　in　the　first　place；　I　observed；　that　the　great　certitude　which　by　common　consent　is　accorded　to　these　demonstrations；　is　founded　solely　upon　this；　that　they　are　clearly　conceived　in　accordance　with　the　rules　I　have　already　laid　down　In　the　next　place；　I　perceived　that　there　was　nothing　at　all　in　these　demonstrations　which　could　assure　me　of　the　existence　of　their　object：　thus；　for　example；　supposing　a　triangle　to　be　given；　I　distinctly　perceived　that　its　three　angles　were　necessarily　equal　to　two　right　angles；　but　I　did　not　on　that　account　perceive　anything　which　could　assure　me　that　any　triangle　existed：　　while；　on　the　contrary；　recurring　to　the　examination　of　the　idea　of　a　Perfect　Being；　I　found　that　the　existence　of　the　Being　was　comprised　in　the　idea　in　the　same　way　that　the　equality　of　its　three　angles　to　two　right　angles　is　comprised　in　the　idea　of　a　triangle；　or　as　in　the　idea　of　a　sphere；　the　equidistance　of　all　points　on　its　surface　from　the　center；　or　even　still　more　clearly；　and　that　consequently　it　is　at　least　as　certain　that　God；　who　is　this　Perfect　Being；　is；　or　exists；　as　any　demonstration　of　geometry　can　be。

But　the　reason　which　leads　many　to　persuade　them　selves　that　there　is　a　difficulty　in　knowing　this　truth；　and　even　also　in　knowing　what　their　mind　really　is；　is　that　they　never　raise　their　thoughts　above　sensible　objects；　and　are　so　accustomed　to　consider　nothing　except　by　way　of　imagination；　which　is　a　mode　of　thinking　limited　to　material　objects；　that　all　that　is　not　imaginable　seems　to　them　not　intelligible。　　The　truth　of　this　is　sufficiently　manifest　from　the　single　circumstance；　that　the　philosophers　of　the　schools　accept　as　a　maxim　that　there　is　nothing　in　the　understanding　which　was　not　previously　in　the　senses；　in　which　however　it　is　certain　that　the　ideas　of　God　and　of　the　soul　have　never　been；　and　it　appears　to　me　that　they　who　make　use　of　their　imagination　to　comprehend　these　ideas　do　exactly　the　some　thing　as　if；　in　order　to　hear　sounds　or　smell　odors；　they　strove　to　avail　themselves　of　their　eyes；　unless　indeed　that　there　is　this　difference；　that　the　sense　of　sight　does　not　afford　us　an　inferior　assurance　to　those　of　smell　or　hearing；　in　place　of　which；　neither　our　imagination　nor　our　senses　can　give　us　assurance　of　anything　unless　our　understanding　intervene。

Finally；　if　there　be　still　persons　who　are　not　sufficiently　persuaded　of　the　existence　of　God　and　of　the　soul；　by　the　reasons　I　have　adduced；　I　am　desirous　that　they　should　know　that　all　the　other　propositions；　of　the　truth　of　which　they　deem　themselves　perhaps　more　assured；　as　that　we　have　a　body；　and　that　there　exist　stars　and　an　earth；　and　such　like；　are　less　certain；　for；　although　we　have　a　moral　assurance　of　these　things；　which　is　so　strong　that　there　is　an　appearance　of　extravagance　in　doubting　of　their　existence；　yet　at　the　same　time　no　one；　unless　his　intellect　is　impaired；　can　deny；　when　the　question　relates　to　a　metaphysical　certitude；　that　there　is　sufficient　reason　to　exclude　entire　assurance；　in　the　observation　that　when　asleep　we　can　in　the　same　way　imagine　ourselves　possessed　of　another　body　and　that　we　see　other　stars　and　another　earth；　when　there　is　nothing　of　the　kind。　　For　how　do　we　know　that　the　thoughts　which　occur　in　dreaming　are　false　rather　than　those　other　which　we　experience　when　awake；　since　the　former　are　often　not　less　vivid　and　distinct　than　the　latter？　And　though　men　of　the　highest　genius　study　this　question　as　long　as　they　please；　I　do　not　believe　that　they　will　be　able　to　give　any　reason　which　can　be　sufficient　to　remove　this　doubt；　unless　they　presuppose　the　existence　of　God。　　For；　in　the　first　place　even　the　principle　which　I　have　already　taken　as　a　rule；　viz。；　that　all　the　things　which　we　clearly　and　distinctly　conceive　are　true；　is　certain　only　because　God　is　or　exists　and　because　he　is　a　Perfect　Being；　and　because　all　that　we　possess　is　derived　from　him：　　whence　it　follows　that　our　ideas　or　notions；　which　to　the　extent　of　their　clearness　and　distinctness　are　real；　and　proceed　from　God；　must　to　that　extent　be　true。　　Accordingly；　whereas　we　not　infrequently　have　ideas　or　notions　in　which　some　falsity　is　contained；　this　can　only　be　the　case　with　such　as　are　to　some　extent　confused　and　obscure；　and　in　this　proceed　from　nothing　（participate　of　negation）；　that　is；　exist　in　us　thus　confused　because　we　are　not　wholly　perfect。　　And　it　is　evident　that　it　is　not　less　repugnant　that　falsity　or　imperfection；　in　so　far　as　it　is　imperfection；　should　proceed　from　God；　than　that　truth　or　perfection　should　proceed　from　nothing。　　But　if　we　did　not　know　that　all　which　we　possess　of　real　and　true　proceeds　from　a　Perfect　and　Infinite　Being；　however　clear　and　distinct　our　ideas　might　be；　we　should　have　no　ground　on　that　account　for　the　assurance　that　they　possessed　the　perfection　of　being　true。

But　after　the　knowledge　of　God　and　of　the　soul　has　rendered　us　certain　of　this　rule；　we　can　easily　understand　that　the　truth　of　the　thoughts　we　experience　when　awake；　ought　not　in　the　slightest　degree　to　be　called　in　question　on　account　of　the　illusions　of　our　dreams。　　For　if　it　happened　that　an　individual；　even　when　asleep；　had　some　very　distinct　idea；　as；　for　example；　if　a　geometer　should　discover　some　new　demonstration；　the　circumstance　of　his　being　asleep　would　not　militate　against　its　truth；　and　as　for　the　most　ordinary　error　of　our　dreams；　which　consists　in　their　representing　to　us　various　objects　in　the　same　way　as　our　external　senses；　this　is　not　prejudicial；　since　it　leads　us　very　properly　to　suspect　the　truth　of　the　ideas　of　sense；　for　we　are　not　infrequently　deceived　in　the　same　manner　when　awake；　as　when　persons　in　the　jaundice　see　all　objects　yellow；　or　when　the　stars　or　bodies　at　a　great　distance　appear　to　us　much　smaller　than　they　are。　　For；　in　fine；　whether　awake　or　asleep；　we　ought　never　to　allow　ourselves　to　be　persuaded　of　the　truth　of　anything　unless　on　the　evidence　of　our　reason。　　And　it　must　be　noted　that　I　say　of　our　reason；　and　not　of　our　imagination　or　of　our　senses：　　thus；　for　example；　although　we　very　clearly　see　the　sun；　we　ought　not　therefore　to　determine　that　it　is　only　of　the　size　which　our　sense　of　sight　presents；　and　we　may　very　dis