the spirit of laws-第18节

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ed　to　inspire　them　with　the　love　of　industry　and　labour。　Solon　made　idleness　a　crime；　and　insisted　that　each　citizen　should　give　an　account　of　his　manner　of　getting　a　livelihood。　And；　indeed；　in　a　well…regulated　democracy；　where　people's　expenses　should　extend　only　to　what　is　necessary；　every　one　ought　to　have　it；　for　how　should　their　wants　be　otherwise　supplied？

7。　Other　Methods　of　favouring　the　Principle　of　Democracy。　An　equal　division　of　lands　cannot　be　established　in　all　democracies。　There　are　some　circumstances　in　which　a　regulation　of　this　nature　would　be　impracticable；　dangerous；　and　even　subversive　of　the　constitution。　We　are　not　always　obliged　to　proceed　to　extremes。　If　it　appears　that　this　division　of　lands；　which　was　designed　to　preserve　the　people's　morals；　does　not　suit　the　democracy；　recourse　must　be　had　to　other　methods。

If　a　permanent　body　be　established　to　serve　as　a　rule　and　pattern　of　manners；　a　senate；　to　which　years；　virtue；　gravity；　and　eminent　services　procure　admittance；　the　senators；　by　being　exposed　to　public　view　like　the　statues　of　the　gods；　must　naturally　inspire　every　family　with　sentiments　of　virtue。

Above　all；　this　senate　must　steadily　adhere　to　the　ancient　institutions；　and　mind　that　the　people　and　the　magistrates　never　swerve　from　them。

The　preservation　of　the　ancient　customs　is　a　very　considerable　point　in　respect　to　manners。　Since　a　corrupt　people　seldom　perform　any　memorable　actions；　seldom　establish　societies；　build　cities；　or　enact　laws；　on　the　contrary；　since　most　institutions　are　derived　from　people　whose　manners　are　plain　and　simple；　to　keep　up　the　ancient　customs　is　the　way　to　preserve　the　original　purity　of　morals。

Besides；　if　by　some　revolution　the　state　has　happened　to　assume　a　new　form；　this　seldom　can　be　effected　without　infinite　pains　and　labour；　and　hardly　ever　by　idle　and　debauched　persons。　Even　those　who　had　been　the　instruments　of　the　revolution　were　desirous　it　should　be　relished；　which　is　difficult　to　compass　without　good　laws。　Hence　it　is　that　ancient　institutions　generally　tend　to　reform　the　people's　manners；　and　those　of　modern　date　to　corrupt　them。　In　the　course　of　a　long　administration；　the　descent　to　vice　is　insensible；　but　there　is　no　reascending　to　virtue　without　making　the　most　generous　efforts。

It　has　been　questioned　whether　the　members　of　the　senate　we　are　speaking　of　ought　to　be　for　life　or　only　chosen　for　a　time。　Doubtless　they　ought　to　be　for　life；　as　was　the　custom　at　Rome；＇15＇　at　Sparta；＇16＇　and　even　at　Athens。　For　we　must　not　confound　the　senate　at　Athens；　which　was　a　body　that　changed　every　three　months；　with　the　Areopagus；　whose　members；　as　standing　patterns；　were　established　for　life。

Let　this　be　therefore　a　general　maxim；　that　in　a　senate　designed　to　be　a　rule；　and　the　depository；　as　it　were；　of　manners；　the　members　ought　to　be　chosen　for　life：　in　a　senate　intended　for　the　administration　of　affairs；　the　members　may　be　changed。

The　spirit；　says　Aristotle；　waxes　old　as　well　as　the　body。　This　reflection　holds　good　only　in　regard　to　a　single　magistrate；　but　cannot　be　applied　to　a　senatorial　assembly。

At　Athens；　besides　the　Areopagus；　there　were　guardians　of　the　public　morals；　as　well　as　of　the　laws。＇17＇　At　Sparta；　all　the　old　men　were　censors。　At　Rome；　the　censorship　was　committed　to　two　particular　magistrates。　As　the　senate　watched　over　the　people；　the　censors　were　to　have　an　eye　over　the　people　and　the　senate。　Their　office　was　to　reform　the　corruptions　of　the　republic；　to　stigmatise　indolence；　to　censure　neglects；　and　to　correct　mistakes；　as　to　flagrant　crimes；　these　were　left　to　the　punishment　of　the　laws。

That　Roman　law　which　required　the　accusations　in　cases　of　adultery　to　be　public　was　admirably　well　calculated　for　preserving　the　purity　of　morals；　it　intimidated　married　women；　as　well　as　those　who　were　to　watch　over　their　conduct。

Nothing　contributes　more　to　the　preservation　of　morals　than　an　extreme　subordination　of　the　young　to　the　old。　Thus　they　are　both　restrained；　the　former　by　their　respect　for　those　of　advanced　age；　and　the　latter　by　their　regard　for　themselves。

Nothing　gives　a　greater　force　to　the　law　than　a　perfect　subordination　between　the　citizens　and　the　magistrate。　〃The　great　difference　which　Lycurgus　established　between　Sparta　and　the　other　cities；〃　says　Xenophon；＇18＇　〃consists　chiefly　in　the　obedience　the　citizens　show　to　their　laws；　they　run　when　the　magistrate　calls　them。　But　at　Athens　a　rich　man　would　be　highly　displeased　to　be　thought　dependent　on　the　magistrate。〃

Paternal　authority　is　likewise　of　great　use　towards　the　preservation　of　morals。　We　have　already　observed　that　in　a　republic　there　is　not　so　coercive　a　force　as　in　other　governments。　The　laws　must　therefore　endeavour　to　supply　this　defect　by　some　means　or　other；　and　this　is　done　by　paternal　authority。

Fathers　at　Rome　had　the　power　of　life　and　death　over　their　children。＇19＇　At　Sparta；　every　father　had　a　right　to　correct　another　man's　child。

Paternal　authority　ended　at　Rome　together　with　the　republic。　In　monarchies；　where　such　a　purity　of　morals　is　not　required；　they　are　controlled　by　no　other　authority　than　that　of　the　magistrates。

The　Roman　laws；　which　accustomed　young　people　to　dependence；　established　a　long　minority。　Perhaps　we　are　mistaken　in　conforming　to　this　custom；　there　is　no　necessity　for　so　much　constraint　in　monarchies。

This　very　subordination　in　a　republic　might　make　it　necessary　for　the　father　to　continue　in　the　possession　of　his　children's　fortune　during　life；　as　was　the　custom　at　Rome。　But　this　is　not　agreeable　to　the　spirit　of　monarchy。

8。　In　what　Manner　the　Laws　should　relate　to　the　Principle　of　Government　in　an　Aristocracy。　If　the　people　are　virtuous　in　an　aristocracy；　they　enjoy　very　nearly　the　same　happiness　as　in　a　popular　government；　and　the　state　grows　powerful。　But　as　a　great　share　of　virtue　is　very　rare　where　men's　fortunes　are　so　unequal；　the　laws　must　tend　as　much　as　possible　to　infuse　a　spirit　of　moderation；　and　endeavour　to　re…establish　that　equality　which　was　necessarily　removed　by　the　constitution。

The　spirit　of　moderation　is　what　we　call　virtue　in　an　aristocracy；　it　supplies　the　place　of　the　spirit　of　equality　in　a　popular　state。

As　the　pomp　and　splendour　with　which　kings　are　surrounded　form　a　part　of　their　power；　so　modesty　and　simplicity　of　manners　constitute　the　strength　of　an　aristocratic　nobility。＇20＇　When　they　affect　no　distinction；　when　they　mix　with　the　people；　dress　like　them；　and　with　them　share　all　their　pleasures；　the　people　are　apt　to　forget　their　subjection　and　weakness。

Every　government　has　its　nature　and　principle。　An　aristocracy　must　not　therefore　assume　the　nature　and　principle　of　monarchy；　which　would　be　the　case　were　the　nobles　to　be　invested　with　personal　privileges　distinct　from　those　of　their　body；　privileges　ought　to　be　for　the　senate；　and　simple　respect　for　the　senators。

In　aristocratic　governments　there　are　two　principal　sources　of　disorder：　excessive　inequality　between　the　governors　and　the　governed；　and　the　same　inequality　between　the　different　members　of　the　body　that　governs。　From　these　two　inequalities；　hatreds　and　jealousies　arise；　which　the　laws　ought　ever　to　prevent　or　repress。

The　first　inequality　is　chiefly　when　the　privileges　of　the　nobility　are　honourable　only　as　they　are　ignominious　to　the　people。　Such　was　the　law　at　Rome　by　which　the　patricians　were　forbidden　to　marry　plebeians；＇21＇　a　law　that　had　no　other　effect　than　to　render　the　patricians　on　the　one　side　more　haughty；　and　on　the　other　more　odious。　The　reader　may　see　what　advantages　the　tribunes　derived　thence　in　their　harangues。

This　inequality　occurs　likewise　when　the　condition　of　the　citizens　differs　with　regard　to　taxes；　which　may　happen　in　four　different　ways：　when　the　nobles　assume　the　privilege　of　paying　none；　when　they　commit　frauds　to　exempt　themselves；＇22＇　when　they　engross　the　public　money；　under　pretence　of　rewards　or　appointments　for　their　respective　employments；　in　fine；　when　they　render　the　common　people　tributary；　and　divide　among　their　own　body　the　profits　arising　from　the　several　subsidies。　This　last　case　is　very　rare；　an　aristocracy　so　instituted　would　be　the　most　intolerable　of　all　governments。

While　Rome　inclined　towards　aristocracy；　she　avoided　all　these　inconveniences。　The　magistrates　never　received　any　emoluments　from　their　office。　The　chief　men　of　the　republic　were　taxed　like　the　rest；　nay；　more　heavily；　and　sometimes　the　taxes　fell　upon　them　alone。　In　fine；　far　from　sharing　among　themselves　the　revenues　of　the　state；　all　they　could　draw　from　the　public　treasure；　and　all　the　wealth　that　fortune　flung　into　their　laps；　they　bestowed　freely　on　the　people；　to　be　excused　from　accepting　public　honours。＇23＇

It　is　a　fundamental　maxim　that　largesses　are　pernicious　to　the　people　in　a　democracy；　but　salutary　in　an　aristocratic　government。　The　former　make　them　forget　they　are　citizens；　the　latter　bring　them　to　a　sense　of　it。　If　the　revenues　of　the　state　are　not　distributed　among　the　people；　they　must　be　convinced　at　least　of　their　being　well　administered：　to　feast　their　eyes　with　the　public　treasure　is　with　them　the　same　thing　almost　as　enjoying　it。　The　golden　chain　displ