a theologico-political treatise [part iv]-第16节
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authorities； the ecclesiastics were obliged to teach it to the emperors
themselves as they had defined it： wherefore they easily gained recognition
as its teachers and interpreters； and the church pastors were looked upon as
vicars of God。 （92） The ecclesiastics took good care that the Christian
kings should not assume their authority； by prohibiting marriage to the
chief ministers of religion and to its highest interpreter。 （93） They
furthermore elected their purpose by multiplying the dogmas of religion to
such an extent and so blending them with philosophy that their chief
interpreter was bound to be a skilled philosopher and theologian； and to
have leisure for a host of idle speculations： conditions which could only be
fulfilled by a private individual with much time on his hands。
（19：94） Among the Hebrews things were very differently arranged： for their
Church began at the same time as their dominion； and Moses； their absolute
ruler； taught religion to the people； arranged their sacred rites； and chose
their spiritual ministers。 （95） Thus the royal authority carried very great
weight with the people； and the kings kept a firm hold on their spiritual
prerogatives。
（19：96） Although； after the death of Moses； no one held absolute sway； yet
the power of deciding both in matters spiritual and matters temporal was in
the hands of the secular chief； as I have already pointed out。 （97） Further；
in order that it might be taught religion and piety； the people was bound to
consult the supreme judge no less than the high priest （Deut。 xvii：9； 11）。
（98） Lastly； though the kings had not as much power as Moses； nearly the
whole arrangement and choice of the sacred ministry depended on their
decision。 （99） Thus David arranged the whole service of the Temple （see 1
Chron。 xxviii：11； 12； &c。）； from all the Levites he chose twenty…four
thousand for the sacred psalms； six thousand of these formed the
body from which were chosen the judges and proctors； four thousand were
porters； and four thousand to play on instruments （see 1 Chron。 xxiii：4； 5）。
（100） He further divided them into companies （of whom he chose the chiefs）；
so that each in rotation； at the allotted time； might perform the sacred
rites。 （101） The priests he also divided into as many companies； I will not
go through the whole catalogue； but refer the reader to 2 Chron。 viii：13；
where it is stated； 〃Then Solomon offered burnt offerings to the Lord 。 。 。
。 。 after a certain rate every day； offering according to the commandments
of Moses；〃 and in verse 14； 〃And he appointed； according to the order
of David his father； the courses of the priests to their service 。 。 。 。
。 。 for so had David the man of God commanded。〃 （102） Lastly； the historian
bears witness in verse 15： 〃And they departed not from the commandment of
the king unto the priests and Levites concerning any matter； or
concerning the treasuries。〃
＇19：6＇ （103） From these and other histories of the kings it is abundantly
evident； that the whole practice of religion and the sacred ministry
depended entirely on the commands of the king。
（19：104） When I said above that the kings had not the same right as Moses to
elect the high priest； to consult God without intermediaries； and to condemn
the prophets who prophesied during their reign； I said so simply because the
prophets could； in virtue of their mission； choose a new king and give
absolution for regicide； not because they could call a king who offended
against the law to judgment； or could rightly act against him ＇Endnote 33＇。
（19：105） Wherefore if there had been no prophets who； in virtue of a special
revelation； could give absolution for regicide； the kings would have
possessed absolute rights over all matters both spiritual and temporal。
（106） Consequently the rulers of modern times； who have no prophets and
would not rightly be bound in any case to receive them （for they are not
subject to Jewish law）； have absolute possession of the spiritual
prerogative； although they are not celibates； and they will always retain
it； if they will refuse to allow religious dogmas to be unduly multiplied or
confounded with philosophy。
＇20：0＇ CHAPTER XX … THAT IN A FREE STATE EVERY MAN
MAY THINK WHAT HE LIKES； AND SAY WHAT HE THINKS。
＇20：1＇ （1） If men's minds were as easily controlled as their tongues； every
king would sit safely on his throne； and government by compulsion would
cease； for every subject would shape his life according to the intentions of
his rulers； and would esteem a thing true or false； good or evil； just or
unjust； in obedience to their dictates。 （2） However； we have shown already
（Chapter XVII。） that no man's mind can possibly lie wholly at the
disposition of another； for no one can willingly transfer his natural right
of free reason and judgment； or be compelled so to do。 （3） For this
reason government which attempts to control minds is accounted tyrannical；
and it is considered an abuse of sovereignty and a usurpation of the rights
of subjects； to seek to prescribe what shall be accepted as true； or
rejected as false； or what opinions should actuate men in their worship of
God。 （4） All these questions fall within a man's natural right； which he
cannot abdicate even with his own consent。
（20：5） I admit that the judgment can be biassed in many ways； and to an
almost incredible degree； so that while exempt from direct external control
it may be so dependent on another man's words； that it may fitly be said to
be ruled by him； but although this influence is carried to great lengths； it
has never gone so far as to invalidate the statement； that every man's
understanding is his own； and that brains are as diverse as palates。
（20：6） Moses； not by fraud； but by Divine virtue； gained such a hold over
the popular judgment that he was accounted superhuman； and believed to speak
and act through the inspiration of the Deity； nevertheless； even he could
not escape murmurs and evil interpretations。 （7） How much less then can
other monarchs avoid them！ （8） Yet such unlimited power； if it exists at
all； must belong to a monarch； and least of all to a democracy； where the
whole or a great part of the people wield authority collectively。 （9） This
is a fact which I think everyone can explain for himself。
（20：10） However unlimited； therefore； the power of a sovereign may be；
however implicitly it is trusted as the exponent of law and religion； it can
never prevent men from forming judgments according to their intellect； or
being influenced by any given emotion。 （11） It is true that it has the right
to treat as enemies all men whose opinions do not； on all subjects； entirely
coincide with its own； but we are not discussing its strict rights； but its
proper course of action。 （12） I grant that it has the right to rule in the
most violent manner； and to put citizens to death for very trivial causes；
but no one supposes it can do this with the approval of sound judgment。 （13）
Nay； inasmuch as such things cannot be done without extreme peril to itself；
we may even deny that it has the absolute power to do them； or；
consequently； the absolute right； for the rights of the sovereign are
limited by his power。
＇20：2＇ （14） Since； therefore； no one can abdicate his freedom of judgment
and feeling； since every man is by indefeasible natural right the master of
his own thoughts； it follows that men thinking in diverse and contradictory
fashions； cannot； without disastrous results； be compelled to speak only
according to the dictates of the supreme power。 （15） Not even the most
experienced； to say nothing of the multitude； know how to keep silence。 （16）
Men's common failing is to confide their plans to others； though there be
need for secrecy； so that a government would be most harsh which deprived
the individual of his freedom of saying and teaching what he thought； and
would be moderate if such freedom were granted。 （17） Still we cannot deny
that authority may be as much injured by words as by actions； hence；
although the freedom we are discussing cannot be entirely denied to
subjects； its unlimited concession would be most baneful； we must；
therefore； now inquire； how far such freedom can and ought to be conceded
without danger to the peace of the state； or the power of the rulers； and
this； as I said at the beginning of Chapter XVI。； is my principal object。
（18） It follows； plainly； from the explanation given above； of the
foundations of a state； that the ultimate aim of government is not to
rule； or restrain； by fear； nor to exact obedience； but contrariwise； to
free every man from fear； that he may live in all possible securi
