on sense and the sensible-第7节

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！




be　the　case　＇that　there　are　magnitudes；　physically　real；　but　without



sensible　quality＇；　it　seems　to　tell　in　favour　of　the　atomistic



hypothesis；　for　thus；　indeed；　＇by　accepting　this　hypothesis＇；　the



question　＇with　which　this　chapter　begins＇　might　be　solved



＇negatively＇。　But　it　is　impossible　＇to　accept　this　hypothesis＇。　Our



views　on　the　subject　of　atoms　are　to　be　found　in　our　treatise　on



Movement。



　　The　solution　of　these　questions　will　bring　with　it　also　the　answer



to　the　question　why　the　species　of　Colour；　Taste；　Sound；　and　other



sensible　qualities　are　limited。　For　in　all　classes　of　things　lying



between　extremes　the　intermediates　must　be　limited。　But　contraries　are



extremes；　and　every　object　of　sense…perception　involves　contrariety：



e。g。　in　Colour；　White　x　Black；　in　Savour；　Sweet　x　Bitter；　and　in　all



the　other　sensibles　also　the　contraries　are　extremes。　Now；　that



which　is　continuous　is　divisible　into　an　infinite　number　of　unequal



parts；　but　into　a　finite　number　of　equal　parts；　while　that　which　is



not　per　se　continuous　is　divisible　into　species　which　are　finite　in



number。　Since　then；　the　several　sensible　qualities　of　things　are　to　be



reckoned　as　species；　while　continuity　always　subsists　in　these；　we



must　take　account　of　the　difference　between　the　Potential　and　the



Actual。　It　is　owing　to　this　difference　that　we　do　not　＇actually＇　see



its　ten…thousandth　part　in　a　grain　of　millet；　although　sight　has



embraced　the　whole　grain　within　its　scope；　and　it　is　owing　to　this；



too；　that　the　sound　contained　in　a　quarter…tone　escapes　notice；　and



yet　one　hears　the　whole　strain；　inasmuch　as　it　is　a　continuum；　but　the



interval　between　the　extreme　sounds　＇that　bound　the　quarter…tone＇



escapes　the　ear　＇being　only　potentially　audible；　not　actually＇。　So；　in



the　case　of　other　objects　of　sense；　extremely　small　constituents　are



unnoticed；　because　they　are　only　potentially　not　actually　＇perceptible



e。g。＇　visible；　unless　when　they　have　been　parted　from　the　wholes。　So



the　footlength　too　exists　potentially　in　the　two…foot　length；　but



actually　only　when　it　has　been　separated　from　the　whole。　But　objective



increments　so　small　as　those　above　might　well；　if　separated　from　their



totals；　＇instead　of　achieving　'actual'　exisistence＇　be　dissolved　in



their　environments；　like　a　drop　of　sapid　moisture　poured　out　into



the　sea。　But　even　if　this　were　not　so　＇sc。　with　the　objective



magnitude＇；　still；　since　the　＇subjective＇　of　sense…perception　is　not



perceptible　in　itself；　nor　capable　of　separate　existence　（since　it



exists　only　potentially　in　the　more　distinctly　perceivable　whole　of



sense…perception）；　so　neither　will　it　be　possible　to　perceive



＇actually＇　its　correlatively　small　object　＇sc。　its　quantum　of



pathema　or　sensible　quality＇　when　separated　from　the　object…total。　But



yet　this　＇small　object＇　is　to　be　considered　as　perceptible：　for　it



is　both　potentially　so　already　＇i。e。　even　when　alone＇；　and　destined　to



be　actually　so　when　it　has　become　part　of　an　aggregate。　Thus；



therefore；　we　have　shown　that　some　magnitudes　and　their　sensible



qualities　escape　notice；　and　the　reason　why　they　do　so；　as　well　as　the



manner　in　which　they　are　still　perceptible　or　not　perceptible　in



such　cases。　Accordingly　then　when　these　＇minutely　subdivided＇



sensibles　have　once　again　become　aggregated　in　a　whole　in　such　a



manner；　relatively　to　one　another；　as　to　be　perceptible　actually；



and　not　merely　because　they　are　in　the　whole；　but　even　apart　from



it；　it　follows　necessarily　＇from　what　has　been　already　stated＇　that



their　sensible　qualities；　whether　colours　or　tastes　or　sounds；　are



limited　in　number。



　　One　might　ask：…　do　the　objects　of　sense…perception；　or　the



movements　proceeding　from　them　（＇since　movements　there　are；＇　in



whichever　of　the　two　ways　＇viz。　by　emanations　or　by　stimulatory



kinesis＇　sense…perception　takes　place）；　when　these　are　actualized



for　perception；　always　arrive　first　at　a　spatial　middle　point　＇between



the　sense…organ　and　its　object＇；　as　Odour　evidently　does；　and　also



Sound？　For　he　who　is　nearer　＇to　the　odorous　object＇　perceives　the



Odour　sooner　＇than　who　is　farther　away＇；　and　the　Sound　of　a　stroke



reaches　us　some　time　after　it　has　been　struck。　Is　it　thus　also　with　an



object　seen；　and　with　Light？　Empedocles；　for　example；　says　that　the



Light　from　the　Sun　arrives　first　in　the　intervening　space　before　it



comes　to　the　eye；　or　reaches　the　Earth。　This　might　plausibly　seem　to



be　the　case。　For　whatever　is　moved　＇in　space＇；　is　moved　from　one　place



to　another；　hence　there　must　be　a　corresponding　interval　of　time



also　in　which　it　is　moved　from　the　one　place　to　the　other。　But　any



given　time　is　divisible　into　parts；　so　that　we　should　assume　a　time



when　the　sun's　ray　was　not　as　yet　seen；　but　was　still　travelling　in



the　middle　space。



　　Now；　even　if　it　be　true　that　the　acts　of　'hearing'　and　'having



heard'；　and；　generally；　those　of　'perceiving'　and　'having



perceived'；　form　co…instantaneous　wholes；　in　other　words；　that　acts　of



sense…perception　do　not　involve　a　process　of　becoming；　but　have



their　being　none　the　less　without　involving　such　a　process；　yet；



just　as；　＇in　the　case　of　sound＇；　though　the　stroke　which　causes　the



Sound　has　been　already　struck；　the　Sound　is　not　yet　at　the　ear　（and



that　this　last　is　a　fact　is　further　proved　by　the　transformation　which



the　letters　＇viz。　the　consonants　as　heard＇　undergo　＇in　the　case　of



words　spoken　from　a　distance＇；　implying　that　the　local　movement



＇involved　in　Sound＇　takes　place　in　the　space　between　＇us　and　the



speaker＇；　for　the　reason　why　＇persons　addressed　from　a　distance＇　do



not　succeed　in　catching　the　sense　of　what　is　said　is　evidently　that



the　air　＇sound　wave＇　in　moving　towards　them　has　its　form　changed）



＇granting　this；　then；　the　question　arises＇：　is　the　same　also　true　in



the　case　of　Colour　and　Light？　For　certainly　it　is　not　true　that　the



beholder　sees；　and　the　object　is　seen；　in　virtue　of　some　merely



abstract　relationship　between　them；　such　as　that　between　equals。　For



if　it　were　so；　there　would　be　no　need　＇as　there　is＇　that　either　＇the



beholder　or　the　thing　beheld＇　should　occupy　some　particular　place；



since　to　the　equalization　of　things　their　being　near　to；　or　far



from；　one　another　makes　no　difference。



　　Now　this　＇travelling　through　successive　positions　in　the　medium＇　may



with　good　reason　take　place　as　regards　Sound　and　Odour；　for　these；



like　＇their　media＇　Air　and　Water；　are　continuous；　but　the　movement



of　both　is　divided　into　parts。　This　too　is　the　ground　of　the　fact　that



the　object　which　the　person　first　in　order　of　proximity　hears　or



smells　is　the　same　as　that　which　each　subsequent　person　perceives；



while　yet　it　is　not　the　same。



　　Some；　indeed；　raise　a　question　also　on　these　very　points；　they



declare　it　impossible　that　one　person　should　hear；　or　see；　or　smell；



the　same　object　as　another；　urging　the　impossibility　of　several



persons　in　different　places　hearing　or　smelling　＇the　same　object＇；　for



the　one　same　thing　would　＇thus＇　be　divided　from　itself。　The　answer



is　that；　in　perceiving　the　object　which　first　set　up　the　motion…　e。g。



a　bell；　or　frankincense；　or　fire…　all　perceive　an　object　numerically



one　and　the　same；　while；　of　course；　in　the　special　object　perceived



they　perceive　an　object　numerically　different　for　each；　though



specifically　the　same　for　all；　and　this；　accordingly；　explains　how　it



is　that　many　persons　together　see；　or　smell；　or　hear　＇the　same



object＇。　These　things　＇the　odour　or　sound　proper＇　are　not　bodies；　but



an　affection　or　process　of　some　kind　（otherwise　this　＇viz。



simultaneous　perception　of　the　one　object　by　many＇　would　not　have



been；　as　it　is；　a　fact　of　experience）　though；　on　the　other　hand；　they



each　imply　a　body　＇as　their　cause＇。



　　But　＇though　sound　and　odour　may　travel；＇　with　regard　to　Light　the



case　is　different。　For　Light　has　its　raison　d'etre　in　the　being　＇not



becoming＇　of　something；　but　it　is　not　a　movement。　And　in　general；　even



in　qualitative　change　the　case　is　different　from　what　it　is　in　local



movement　＇both　being　different　species　of　kinesis＇。　Local　movements；



of　course；　arrive　first　at　a　point　midway　before　reaching　their　goal



（and　Sound；　it　is　currently　believed；　is　a　movement　of　something



locally　moved）；　but　we　cannot　go　on　to　assert　this　＇arrival　at　a　point



midway＇　like　manner　of　things　which　undergo　qualitative　change。　For



this　kind　of　change　may　conceivably　take　place　in　a　thing　all　at　once；



without　one　half　of　it　being　changed　before　the　other；　e。g。　it　is



conceivable　that　water　should　be　frozen　simultaneously　in　every



part。　But　still；　for　all　that；　if　the　body　which　is　heated　or　frozen



is　extensive；　each　part　of　it　successively　is　affected　by　the　part



contiguous；　while　the　part　first　cha