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employment　may　be　as　necessary　for　the　welfare　of　the　society　as

a　near　one；　the　goods　which　the　distant　employment　deals　in　being

necessary；　perhaps；　for　carrying　on　many　of　the　nearer

employments。　But　if　the　profits　of　those　who　deal　in　such　goods

are　above　their　proper　level；　those　goods　will　be　sold　dearer

than　they　ought　to　be；　or　somewhat　above　their　natural　price；　and

all　those　engaged　in　the　nearer　employments　will　be　more　or　less

oppressed　by　this　high　price。　Their　interest；　therefore；　in　this

case　requires　that　some　stock　should　be　withdrawn　from　those

nearer　employments；　and　turned　towards　that　distant　one；　in　order

to　reduce　its　profits　to　their　proper　level；　and　the　price　of　the

goods　which　it　deals　in　to　their　natural　price。　In　this

extraordinary　case；　the　public　interest　requires　that　some　stock

should　be　withdrawn　from　those　employments　which　in　ordinary

cases　are　more　advantageous；　and　turned　towards　one　which　in

ordinary　cases　is　less　advantageous　to　the　public；　and　in　this

extraordinary　case　the　natural　interests　and　inclinations　of　men

coincide　as　exactly　with　the　public　interest　as　in　all　other

ordinary　cases；　and　lead　them　to　withdraw　stock　from　the　near；

and　to　turn　it　towards　the　distant　employment。

　　　　　It　is　thus　that　the　private　interests　and　passions　of

individuals　naturally　dispose　them　to　turn　their　stocks　towards

the　employments　which　in　ordinary　cases　are　most　advantageous　to

the　society。　But　if　from　this　natural　preference　they　should　turn

too　much　of　it　towards　those　employments；　the　fall　of　profit　in

them　and　the　rise　of　it　in　all　others　immediately　dispose　them　to

alter　this　faulty　distribution。　Without　any　intervention　of　law；

therefore；　the　private　interests　and　passions　of　men　naturally

lead　them　to　divide　and　distribute　the　stock　of　every　society

among　all　the　different　employments　carried　on　in　it　as　nearly　as

possible　in　the　proportion　which　is　most　agreeable　to　the

interest　of　the　whole　society。

　　　　　All　the　different　regulations　of　the　mercantile　system

necessarily　derange　more　or　less　this　natural　and　most

advantageous　distribution　of　stock。　But　those　which　concern　the

trade　to　America　and　the　East　Indies　derange　it　perhaps　more　than

any　other；　because　the　trade　to　those　two　great　continents

absorbs　a　greater　quantity　of　stock　than　any　two　other　branches

of　trade。　The　regulations；　however；　by　which　this　derangement　is

effected　in　those　two　different　branches　of　trade　are　not

altogether　the　same。　Monopoly　is　the　great　engine　of　both；　but　it

is　a　different　sort　of　monopoly。　Monopoly　of　one　kind　or　another；

indeed；　seems　to　be　the　sole　engine　of　the　mercantile　system。

　　　　　In　the　trade　to　America　every　nation　endeavours　to　engross

as　much　as　possible　the　whole　market　of　its　own　colonies　by

fairly　excluding　all　other　nations　from　any　direct　trade　to　them。

During　the　greater　part　of　the　sixteenth　century；　the　Portuguese

endeavoured　to　manage　the　trade　to　the　East　Indies　in　the　same

manner；　by　claiming　the　sole　right　of　sailing　in　the　Indian　seas；

on　account　of　the　merit　of　having　first　found　out　the　road　to

them。　The　Dutch　still　continue　to　exclude　all　other　European

nations　from　any　direct　trade　to　their　spice　islands。　Monopolies

of　this　kind　are　evidently　established　against　all　other　European

nations；　who　are　thereby　not　only　excluded　from　a　trade　to　which

it　might　be　convenient　for　them　to　turn　some　part　of　their　stock；

but　are　obliged　to　buy　the　goods　which　that　trade　deals　in

somewhat　dearer　than　if　they　could　import　them　themselves

directly　from　the　countries　which　produce　them。

　　　　　But　since　the　fall　of　the　power　of　Portugal；　no　European

nation　has　claimed　the　exclusive　right　of　sailing　in　the　Indian

seas；　of　which　the　principal　ports　are　now　open　to　the　ships　of

all　European　nations。　Except　in　Portugal；　however；　and　within

these　few　years　in　France；　the　trade　to　the　East　Indies　has　in

every　European　country　been　subjected　to　an　exclusive　company。

Monopolies　of　this　kind　are　properly　established　against　the　very

nation　which　erects　them。　The　greater　part　of　that　nation　are

thereby　not　only　excluded　from　a　trade　to　which　it　might　be

convenient　for　them　to　turn　some　part　of　their　stock；　but　are

obliged　to　buy　the　goods　which　that　trade　deals　somewhat　dearer

than　if　it　was　open　and　free　to　all　their　countrymen。　Since　the

establishment　of　the　English　East　India　Company；　for　example；　the

other　inhabitants　of　England；　over　and　above　being　excluded　from

the　trade；　must　have　paid　in　the　price　of　the　East　India　goods

which　they　have　consumed；　not　only　for　all　the　extraordinary

profits　which　the　company　may　have　made　upon　those　goods　in

consequence　of　their　monopoly；　but　for　all　the　extraordinary

waste　which　the　fraud　and　abuse；　inseparable　from　the　management

of　the　affairs　of　so　great　a　company；　must　necessarily　have

occasioned。　The　absurdity　of　this　second　kind　of　monopoly；

therefore；　is　much　more　manifest　than　that　of　the　first。

　　　　　Both　these　kinds　of　monopolies　derange　more　or　less　the

natural　distribution　of　the　stock　of　the　society；　but　they　do　not

always　derange　it　in　the　same　way。

　　　　　Monopolies　of　the　first　kind　always　attract　to　the

particular　trade　in　which　they　are　established　a　greater

proportion　of　the　stock　of　the　society　than　what　would　go　to　that

trade　of　its　own　accord。

　　　　　Monopolies　of　the　second　kind　may　sometimes　attract　stock

towards　the　particular　trade　in　which　they　are　established；　and

sometimes　repel　it　from　that　trade　according　to　different

circumstances。　In　poor　countries　they　naturally　attract　towards

that　trade　more　stock　than　would　otherwise　go　to　it。　In　rich

countries　they　naturally　repel　from　it　a　good　deal　of　stock　which

would　otherwise　go　to　it。

　　　　　Such　poor　countries　as　Sweden　and　Denmark；　for　example；

would　probably　have　never　sent　a　single　ship　to　the　East　Indies

had　not　the　trade　been　subjected　to　an　exclusive　company。　The

establishment　of　such　a　company　necessarily　encourages

adventurers。　Their　monopoly　secures　them　against　all　competitors

in　the　home　market；　and　they　have　the　same　chance　for　foreign

markets　with　the　traders　of　other　nations。　Their　monopoly　shows

them　the　certainty　of　a　great　profit　upon　a　considerable　quantity

of　goods；　and　the　chance　of　a　considerable　profit　upon　a　great

quantity。　Without　such　extraordinary　encouragement；　the　poor

traders　of　such　poor　countries　would　probably　never　have　thought

of　hazarding　their　small　capitals　in　so　very　distant　and

uncertain　an　adventure　as　the　trade　to　the　East　Indies　must

naturally　have　appeared　to　them。

　　　　　Such　a　rich　country　as　Holland；　on　the　contrary；　would

probably；　in　the　case　of　a　free　trade；　send　many　more　ships　to

the　East　Indies　than　it　actually　does。　The　limited　stock　of　the

Dutch　East　India　Company　probably　repels　from　that　trade　many

great　mercantile　capitals　which　would　otherwise　go　to　it。　The

mercantile　capital　of　Holland　is　so　great　that　it　is；　as　it　were；

continually　overflowing；　sometimes　into　the　public　funds　of

foreign　countries；　sometimes　into　loans　to　private　traders　and

adventurers　of　foreign　countries；　sometimes　into　the　most

round…about　foreign　trades　of　consumption；　and　sometimes　into　the

carrying　trade。　All　near　employments　being　completely　filled　up；

all　the　capital　which　can　be　placed　in　them　with　any　tolerable

profit　being　already　placed　in　them；　the　capital　of　Holland

necessarily　flows　towards　the　most　distant　employments。　The　trade

to　the　East　Indies；　if　it　were　altogether　free；　would　probably

absorb　the　greater　part　of　this　redundant　capital。　The　East

Indies　offer　a　market　for　the　manufactures　of　Europe　and　for　the

gold　and　silver　as　well　as　for　several　other　productions　of

America　greater　and　more　extensive　than　both　Europe　and　America

put　together。

　　　　　Every　derangement　of　the　natural　distribution　of　stock　is

necessarily　hurtful　to　the　society　in　which　it　takes　place；

whether　it　be　by　repelling　from　a　particular　trade　the　stock

which　would　otherwise　go　to　it；　or　by　attracting　towards　a

particular　trade　that　which　would　not　otherwise　come　to　it。　If；

without　any　exclusive　company；　the　trade　of　Holland　to　the　East

Indies　would　be　greater　than　it　actually　is；　that　country　must

suffer　a　considerable　loss　by　part　of　its　capital　being　excluded

from　the　employment　most　convenient　for　that　part。　And　in　the

same　manner；　if；　without　an　exclusive　company；　the　trade　of

Sweden　and　Denmark　to　the　East　Indies　would　be　less　than　it

actually　is；　or；　what　perhaps　is　more　probable；　would　not　exist

at　all；　those　two　countries　must　likewise　suffer　a　considerable

loss　by　part　of　their　capital　being　drawn　into　an　employment

which　must　be　more　or　less　unsuitable　to　their　present

circumstances。　Better　for　them；　perhaps；　in　their　present

circumstances；　to　buy　East　India　goods　of　other　nations；　even

though　they　should　pay　somewhat　dearer；　than　to　turn　so　great　a

part　of　their　small　capital　to　so　very　distant　a　trade；　in　which

the　returns　are　so　very　slow；　in　which　that　capital　can　maintain

so　smal