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the　whole　empire。　The　care　of　that　defence　and　support　is　not

entrusted　to　them。　It　is　not　their　business；　and　they　have　no

regular　means　of　information　concerning　it。　The　assembly　of　a

province；　like　the　vestry　of　a　parish；　may　judge　very　properly

concerning　the　affairs　of　its　own　particular　district；　but　can

have　no　proper　means　of　judging　concerning　those　of　the　whole

empire。　It　cannot　even　judge　properly　concerning　the　proportion

which　its　own　province　bears　to　the　whole　empire；　or　concerning

the　relative　degree　of　its　wealth　and　importance　compared　with

the　other　provinces；　because　those　other　provinces　are　not　under

the　inspection　and　superintendency　of　the　assembly　of　a

particular　province。　What　is　necessary　for　the　defence　and

support　of　the　whole　empire；　and　in　what　proportion　each　part

ought　to　contribute；　can　be　judged　of　only　by　that　assembly　which

inspects　and　superintends　the　affairs　of　the　whole　empire。

　　　　　It　has　been　proposed；　accordingly；　that　the　colonies　should

be　taxed　by　requisition；　the　Parliament　of　Great　Britain

determining　the　sum　which　each　colony　ought　to　pay；　and　the

provincial　assembly　assessing　and　levying　it　in　the　way　that

suited　best　the　circumstances　of　the　province。　What　concerned　the

whole　empire　would　in　this　way　be　determined　by　the　assembly

which　inspects　and　superintends　the　affairs　of　the　whole　empire；

and　the　provincial　affairs　of　each　colony　might　still　be

regulated　by　its　own　assembly。　Though　the　colonies　should　in　this

case　have　no　representatives　in　the　British　Parliament；　yet；　if

we　may　judge　by　experience；　there　is　no　probability　that　the

Parliamentary　requisition　would　be　unreasonable。　The　Parliament

of　England　has　not　upon　any　occasion　shown　the　smallest

disposition　to　overburden　those　parts　of　the　empire　which　are　not

represented　in　Parliament。　The　islands　of　Guernsey　and　Jersey；

without　any　means　of　resisting　the　authority　of　Parliament；　are

more　lightly　taxed　than　any　part　of　Great　Britain。　Parliament　in

attempting　to　exercise　its　supposed　right；　whether　well　or　ill

grounded；　of　taxing　the　colonies；　has　never　hitherto　demanded　of

them　anything　which　even　approached　to　a　just　proportion　to　what

was　paid　by　their　fellow　subjects　at　home。　If　the　contribution　of

the　colonies；　besides；　was　to　rise　or　fall　in　proportion　to　the

rise　or　fall　of　the　land　tax；　Parliament　could　not　tax　them

without　taxing　at　the　same　time　its　own　constituents；　and　the

colonies　might　in　this　case　be　considered　as　virtually

represented　in　Parliament。

　　　　　Examples　are　not　wanting　of　empires　in　which　all　the

different　provinces　are　not　taxed；　if　I　may　be　allowed　the

expression；　in　one　mass；　but　in　which　the　sovereign　regulates　the

sum　which　each　province　ought　to　pay；　and　in　some　provinces

assesses　and　levies　it　as　he　thinks　proper；　while　in　others；　he

leaves　it　to　be　assessed　and　levied　as　the　respective　states　of

each　province　shall　determine。　In　some　provinces　of　France；　the

king　not　only　imposes　what　taxes　he　thinks　proper；　but　assesses

and　levies　them　in　the　way　he　thinks　proper。　From　others　he

demands　a　certain　sum；　but　leaves　it　to　the　states　of　each

province　to　assess　and　levy　that　sum　as　they　think　proper。

According　to　the　scheme　of　taxing　by　requisition；　the　Parliament

of　Great　Britain　would　stand　nearly　in　the　same　situation　towards

the　colony　assemblies　as　the　King　of　France　does　towards　the

states　of　those　provinces　which　still　enjoy　the　privilege　of

having　states　of　their　own；　the　provinces　of　France　which　are

supposed　to　be　the　best　governed。

　　　　　But　though；　according　to　this　scheme；　the　colonies　could

have　no　just　reason　to　fear　that　their　share　of　the　public

burdens　should　ever　exceed　the　proper　proportion　to　that　of　their

fellow…citizens　at　home；　Great　Britain　might　have　just　reason　to

fear　that　it　never　would　amount　to　that　proper　proportion。　The

Parliament　of　Great　Britain　has　not　for　some　time　past　had　the

same　established　authority　in　the　colonies；　which　the　French　king

has　in　those　provinces　of　France　which　still　enjoy　the　privilege

of　having　states　of　their　own。　The　colony　assemblies；　if　they

were　not　very　favourably　disposed　（and　unless　more　skilfully

managed　than　they　ever　have　been　hitherto；　they　are　not　very

likely　to　be　so）　might　still　find　many　pretences　for　evading　or

rejecting　the　most　reasonable　requisitions　of　Parliament。　A

French　war　breaks　out；　we　shall　suppose；　ten　millions　must

immediately　be　raised　in　order　to　defend　the　seat　of　the　empire。

This　sum　must　be　borrowed　upon　the　credit　of　some　Parliamentary

fund　mortgaged　for　paying　the　interest。　Part　of　this　fund

Parliament　proposes　to　raise　by　a　tax　to　be　levied　in　Great

Britain；　and　part　of　it　by　a　requisition　to　all　the　different

colony　assemblies　of　America　and　the　West　Indies。　Would　people

readily　advance　their　money　upon　the　credit　of　a　fund；　which

partly　depended　upon　the　good　humour　of　all　those　assemblies；　far

distant　from　the　seat　of　the　war；　and　sometimes；　perhaps；

thinking　themselves　not　much　concerned　in　the　event　of　it？　Upon

such　a　fund　no　more　money　would　probably　be　advanced　than　what

the　tax　to　be　levied　in　Great　Britain　might　be　supposed　to　answer

for。　The　whole　burden　of　the　debt　contracted　on　account　of　the

war　would　in　this　manner　fall；　as　it　always　has　done　hitherto；

upon　Great　Britain；　upon　a　part　of　the　empire；　and　not　upon　the

whole　empire。　Great　Britain　is；　perhaps；　since　the　world　began；

the　only　state　which；　as　it　has　extended　its　empire；　has　only

increased　its　expense　without　once　augmenting　its　resources。

Other　states　have　generally　disburdened　themselves　upon　their

subject　and　subordinate　provinces　of　the　most　considerable　part

of　the　expense　of　defending　the　empire。　Great　Britain　has

hitherto　suffered　her　subject　and　subordinate　provinces　to

disburden　themselves　upon　her　of　almost　this　whole　expense。　In

order　to　put　Great　Britain　upon　a　footing　of　equality　with　her

own　colonies；　which　the　law　has　hitherto　supposed　to　be　subject

and　subordinate；　it　seems　necessary；　upon　the　scheme　of　taxing

them　by　Parliamentary　requisition；　that　Parliament　should　have

some　means　of　rendering　its　requisitions　immediately　effectual；

in　case　the　colony　assemblies　should　attempt　to　evade　or　reject

them；　and　what　those　means　are；　it　is　not　very　easy　to　conceive；

and　it　has　not　yet　been　explained。

　　　　　Should　the　Parliament　of　Great　Britain；　at　the　same　time；　be

ever　fully　established　in　the　right　of　taxing　the　colonies；　even

independent　of　the　consent　of　their　own　assemblies；　the

importance　of　those　assemblies　would　from　that　moment　be　at　an

end；　and　with　it；　that　of　all　the　leading　men　of　British　America。

Men　desire　to　have　some　share　in　the　management　of　public　affairs

chiefly　on　account　of　the　importance　which　it　gives　them。　Upon

the　power　which　the　greater　part　of　the　leading　men；　the　natural

aristocracy　of　every　country；　have　of　preserving　or　defending

their　respective　importance；　depends　the　stability　and　duration

of　every　system　of　free　government。　In　the　attacks　which　those

leading　men　are　continually　making　upon　the　importance　of　one

another；　and　in　the　defence　of　their　own；　consists　the　whole　play

of　domestic　faction　and　ambition。　The　leading　men　of　America；

like　those　of　all　other　countries；　desire　to　preserve　their　own

importance。　They　feel；　or　imagine；　that　if　their　assemblies；

which　they　are　fond　of　calling　parliaments；　and　of　considering　as

equal　in　authority　to　the　Parliament　of　Great　Britain；　should　be

so　far　degraded　as　to　become　the　humble　ministers　and　executive

officers　of　that　Parliament；　the　greater　part　of　their　own

importance　would　be　at　end。　They　have　rejected；　therefore；　the

proposal　of　being　taxed　by　Parliamentary　requisition；　and　like

other　ambitious　and　high…spirited　men；　have　rather　chosen　to　draw

the　sword　in　defence　of　their　own　importance。

　　　　　Towards　the　declension　of　the　Roman　republic；　the　allies　of

Rome；　who　had　borne　the　principal　burden　of　defending　the　state

and　extending　the　empire；　demanded　to　be　admitted　to　all　the

privileges　of　Roman　citizens。　Upon　being　refused；　the　social　war

broke　out。　During　the　course　of　that　war；　Rome　granted　those

privileges　to　the　greater　part　of　them　one　by　one；　and　in

proportion　as　they　detached　themselves　from　the　general

confederacy。　The　Parliament　of　Great　Britain　insists　upon　taxing

the　colonies；　and　they　refuse　to　be　taxed　by　a　Parliament　in

which　they　are　not　represented。　If　to　each　colony；　which　should

detach　itself　from　the　general　confederacy；　Great　Britain　should

allow　such　a　number　of　representatives　as　suited　the　proportion

of　what　is　contributed　to　the　public　revenue　of　the　empire；　in

consequence　of　its　being　subjected　to　the　same　taxes；　and　in

compensation　admitted　to　the　same　freedom　of　trade　with　its

fellow…subjects　at　home；　the　number　of　its　representatives　to　be

augmented　as　the　proportion　of　its　contribution　might　afterwards

augment；　a　new　method　of　acquiring　importance；　a　new　and　more

dazzling　object　of　ambition　would　be　presented　to　the　leadi