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with which it was necessary to supply them; and to the expense of

a very considerable naval force which was constantly kept up; in

order to guard; from the smuggling vessels of other nations; the

immense coast of North America; and that of our West Indian

islands。 The whole expense of this peace establishment was a

charge upon the revenue of Great Britain; and was; at the same

time; the smallest part of what the dominion of the colonies has

cost the mother country。 If we would know the amount of the

whole; we must add to the annual expense of this peace

establishment the interest of the sums which; in consequence of

her considering her colonies as provinces subject to her

dominion; Great Britain has upon different occasions laid out

upon their defence。 We must add to it; in particular; the whole

expense of the late war; and a great part of that of the war

which preceded it。 The late war was altogether a colony quarrel;

and the whole expense of it; in whatever part of the world it may

have been laid out; whether in Germany or the East Indies; ought

justly to be stated to the account of the colonies。 It amounted

to more than ninety millions sterling; including not only the new

debt which was contracted; but the two shillings in the pound

additional land tax; and the sums which were every year borrowed

from the sinking fund。 The Spanish war; which began in 1739; was

principally a colony quarrel。 Its principal object was to prevent

the search of the colony ships which carried on a contraband

trade with the Spanish Main。 This whole expense is; in reality; a

bounty which has been given in order to support a monopoly。 The

pretended purpose of it was to encourage the manufactures; and to

increase the commerce of Great Britain。 But its real effect has

been to raise the rate of mercantile profit; and to enable our

merchants to turn into a branch of trade; of which the returns

are more slow and distant than those of the greater part of other

trades; a greater proportion of their capital than they otherwise

would have done; two events which; if a bounty could have

prevented; it might perhaps have been very well worth while to

give such a bounty。

     Under the present system of management; therefore; Great

Britain derives nothing but loss from the dominion which she

assumes over her colonies。

     To propose that Great Britain should voluntarily give up all

authority over her colonies; and leave them to elect their own

magistrates; to enact their own laws; and to make peace and war

as they might think proper; would be to propose such a measure as

never was; and never will be adopted; by any nation in the world。

No nation ever voluntarily gave up the dominion of any province;

how troublesome soever it might be to govern it; and how small

soever the revenue which it afforded might be in proportion to

the expense which it occasioned。 Such sacrifices; though they

might frequently be agreeable to the interest; are always

mortifying to the pride of every nation; and what is perhaps of

still greater consequence; they are always contrary to the

private interest of the governing part of it; who would thereby

be deprived of the disposal of many places of trust and profit;

of many opportunities of acquiring wealth and distinction; which

the possession of the most turbulent; and; to the great body of

the people; the most unprofitable province seldom fails to

afford。 The most visionary enthusiast would scarce be capable of

proposing such a measure with any serious hopes at least of its

ever being adopted。 If it was adopted; however; Great Britain

would not only be immediately freed from the whole annual expense

of the peace establishment of the colonies; but might settle with

them such a treaty of commerce as would effectually secure to her

a free trade; more advantageous to the great body of the people;

though less so to the merchants; than the monopoly which she at

present enjoys。 By thus parting good friends; the natural

affection of the colonies to the mother country which; perhaps;

our late dissensions have well nigh extinguished; would quickly

revive。 It might dispose them not only to respect; for whole

centuries together; that treaty of commerce which they had

concluded with us at parting; but to favour us in war as well as

in trade; and; instead of turbulent and factious subjects; to

become our most faithful; affectionate; and generous allies; and

the same sort of parental affection on the one side; and filial

respect on the other; might revive between Great Britain and her

colonies; which used to subsist between those of ancient Greece

and the mother city from which they descended。

     In order to render any province advantageous to the empire

to which it belongs; it ought to afford; in time of peace; a

revenue to the public sufficient not only for defraying the whole

expense of its own peace establishment; but for contributing its

proportion to the support of the general government of the

empire。 Every province necessarily contributes; more or less; to

increase the expense of that general government。 If any

particular province; therefore; does not contribute its share

towards defraying this expense; an unequal burden must be thrown

upon some other part of the empire。 The extraordinary revenue;

too; which every province affords to the public in time of war;

ought; from parity of reason; to bear the same proportion to the

extraordinary revenue of the whole empire which its ordinary

revenue does in time of peace。 That neither the ordinary nor

extraordinary revenue which Great Britain derives from her

colonies; bears this proportion to the whole revenue of the

British empire; will readily be allowed。 The monopoly; it has

been supposed; indeed; by increasing the private revenue of the

people of Great Britain; and thereby enabling them to pay greater

taxes; compensates the deficiency of the public revenue of the

colonies。 But this monopoly; I have endeavoured to show; though a

very grievous tax upon the colonies; and though it may increase

the revenue of a particular order of men in Great Britain;

diminishes instead of increasing that of the great body of the

people; and consequently diminishes instead of increasing the

ability of the great body of the people to pay taxes。 The men;

too; whose revenue the monopoly increases; constitute a

particular order; which it is both absolutely impossible to tax

beyond the proportion of other orders; and extremely impolitic

even to attempt to tax beyond that proportion; as I shall

endeavour to show in the following book。 No particular resource;

therefore; can be drawn from this particular order。

     The colonies may be taxed either by their own assemblies; or

by the Parliament of Great Britain。

     That the colony assemblies can ever be so managed as to levy

upon their constituents a public revenue sufficient not only to

maintain at all times their own civil and military establishment;

but to pay their proper proportion of the expense of the general

government of the British empire seems not very probable。 It was

a long time before even the Parliament of England; though placed

immediately under the eye of the sovereign; could be brought

under such a system of management; or could be rendered

sufficiently liberal in their grants for supporting the civil and

military establishments even of their own country。 It was only by

distributing among the particular Members of Parliament a great

part either of the offices; or of the disposal of the offices

arising from this civil and military establishment; that such a

system of management could be established even with regard to the

Parliament of England。 But the distance of the colony assemblies

from the eye of the sovereign; their number; their dispersed

situation; and their various constitutions; would render it very

difficult to manage them in the same manner; even though the

sovereign had the same means of doing it; and those means are

wanting。 It would be absolutely impossible to distribute among

all the leading members of all the colony assemblies such a

share; either of the offices or of the disposal of the offices

arising from the general government of the British empire; as to

dispose them to give up their popularity at home; and to tax

their constituents for the support of that general government; of

which almost the whole emoluments were to be divided among people

who were strangers to them。 The unavoidable ignorance of

administration; besides; concerning the relative importance of

the different members of those different assemblies; the offences

which must frequently be given; the blunders which must

constantly be committed in attempting to manage them in this

manner; seems to render such a system of management altogether

impracticable with regard to them。

     The colony assemblies; besides; cannot be supposed the

proper judges of what is necessary for the defence and support of

the whole empire。 The care of that defence and support is not

entrusted to them。 It is not their busines

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