wealbk04-第52节

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with　which　it　was　necessary　to　supply　them；　and　to　the　expense　of

a　very　considerable　naval　force　which　was　constantly　kept　up；　in

order　to　guard；　from　the　smuggling　vessels　of　other　nations；　the

immense　coast　of　North　America；　and　that　of　our　West　Indian

islands。　The　whole　expense　of　this　peace　establishment　was　a

charge　upon　the　revenue　of　Great　Britain；　and　was；　at　the　same

time；　the　smallest　part　of　what　the　dominion　of　the　colonies　has

cost　the　mother　country。　If　we　would　know　the　amount　of　the

whole；　we　must　add　to　the　annual　expense　of　this　peace

establishment　the　interest　of　the　sums　which；　in　consequence　of

her　considering　her　colonies　as　provinces　subject　to　her

dominion；　Great　Britain　has　upon　different　occasions　laid　out

upon　their　defence。　We　must　add　to　it；　in　particular；　the　whole

expense　of　the　late　war；　and　a　great　part　of　that　of　the　war

which　preceded　it。　The　late　war　was　altogether　a　colony　quarrel；

and　the　whole　expense　of　it；　in　whatever　part　of　the　world　it　may

have　been　laid　out；　whether　in　Germany　or　the　East　Indies；　ought

justly　to　be　stated　to　the　account　of　the　colonies。　It　amounted

to　more　than　ninety　millions　sterling；　including　not　only　the　new

debt　which　was　contracted；　but　the　two　shillings　in　the　pound

additional　land　tax；　and　the　sums　which　were　every　year　borrowed

from　the　sinking　fund。　The　Spanish　war；　which　began　in　1739；　was

principally　a　colony　quarrel。　Its　principal　object　was　to　prevent

the　search　of　the　colony　ships　which　carried　on　a　contraband

trade　with　the　Spanish　Main。　This　whole　expense　is；　in　reality；　a

bounty　which　has　been　given　in　order　to　support　a　monopoly。　The

pretended　purpose　of　it　was　to　encourage　the　manufactures；　and　to

increase　the　commerce　of　Great　Britain。　But　its　real　effect　has

been　to　raise　the　rate　of　mercantile　profit；　and　to　enable　our

merchants　to　turn　into　a　branch　of　trade；　of　which　the　returns

are　more　slow　and　distant　than　those　of　the　greater　part　of　other

trades；　a　greater　proportion　of　their　capital　than　they　otherwise

would　have　done；　two　events　which；　if　a　bounty　could　have

prevented；　it　might　perhaps　have　been　very　well　worth　while　to

give　such　a　bounty。

　　　　　Under　the　present　system　of　management；　therefore；　Great

Britain　derives　nothing　but　loss　from　the　dominion　which　she

assumes　over　her　colonies。

　　　　　To　propose　that　Great　Britain　should　voluntarily　give　up　all

authority　over　her　colonies；　and　leave　them　to　elect　their　own

magistrates；　to　enact　their　own　laws；　and　to　make　peace　and　war

as　they　might　think　proper；　would　be　to　propose　such　a　measure　as

never　was；　and　never　will　be　adopted；　by　any　nation　in　the　world。

No　nation　ever　voluntarily　gave　up　the　dominion　of　any　province；

how　troublesome　soever　it　might　be　to　govern　it；　and　how　small

soever　the　revenue　which　it　afforded　might　be　in　proportion　to

the　expense　which　it　occasioned。　Such　sacrifices；　though　they

might　frequently　be　agreeable　to　the　interest；　are　always

mortifying　to　the　pride　of　every　nation；　and　what　is　perhaps　of

still　greater　consequence；　they　are　always　contrary　to　the

private　interest　of　the　governing　part　of　it；　who　would　thereby

be　deprived　of　the　disposal　of　many　places　of　trust　and　profit；

of　many　opportunities　of　acquiring　wealth　and　distinction；　which

the　possession　of　the　most　turbulent；　and；　to　the　great　body　of

the　people；　the　most　unprofitable　province　seldom　fails　to

afford。　The　most　visionary　enthusiast　would　scarce　be　capable　of

proposing　such　a　measure　with　any　serious　hopes　at　least　of　its

ever　being　adopted。　If　it　was　adopted；　however；　Great　Britain

would　not　only　be　immediately　freed　from　the　whole　annual　expense

of　the　peace　establishment　of　the　colonies；　but　might　settle　with

them　such　a　treaty　of　commerce　as　would　effectually　secure　to　her

a　free　trade；　more　advantageous　to　the　great　body　of　the　people；

though　less　so　to　the　merchants；　than　the　monopoly　which　she　at

present　enjoys。　By　thus　parting　good　friends；　the　natural

affection　of　the　colonies　to　the　mother　country　which；　perhaps；

our　late　dissensions　have　well　nigh　extinguished；　would　quickly

revive。　It　might　dispose　them　not　only　to　respect；　for　whole

centuries　together；　that　treaty　of　commerce　which　they　had

concluded　with　us　at　parting；　but　to　favour　us　in　war　as　well　as

in　trade；　and；　instead　of　turbulent　and　factious　subjects；　to

become　our　most　faithful；　affectionate；　and　generous　allies；　and

the　same　sort　of　parental　affection　on　the　one　side；　and　filial

respect　on　the　other；　might　revive　between　Great　Britain　and　her

colonies；　which　used　to　subsist　between　those　of　ancient　Greece

and　the　mother　city　from　which　they　descended。

　　　　　In　order　to　render　any　province　advantageous　to　the　empire

to　which　it　belongs；　it　ought　to　afford；　in　time　of　peace；　a

revenue　to　the　public　sufficient　not　only　for　defraying　the　whole

expense　of　its　own　peace　establishment；　but　for　contributing　its

proportion　to　the　support　of　the　general　government　of　the

empire。　Every　province　necessarily　contributes；　more　or　less；　to

increase　the　expense　of　that　general　government。　If　any

particular　province；　therefore；　does　not　contribute　its　share

towards　defraying　this　expense；　an　unequal　burden　must　be　thrown

upon　some　other　part　of　the　empire。　The　extraordinary　revenue；

too；　which　every　province　affords　to　the　public　in　time　of　war；

ought；　from　parity　of　reason；　to　bear　the　same　proportion　to　the

extraordinary　revenue　of　the　whole　empire　which　its　ordinary

revenue　does　in　time　of　peace。　That　neither　the　ordinary　nor

extraordinary　revenue　which　Great　Britain　derives　from　her

colonies；　bears　this　proportion　to　the　whole　revenue　of　the

British　empire；　will　readily　be　allowed。　The　monopoly；　it　has

been　supposed；　indeed；　by　increasing　the　private　revenue　of　the

people　of　Great　Britain；　and　thereby　enabling　them　to　pay　greater

taxes；　compensates　the　deficiency　of　the　public　revenue　of　the

colonies。　But　this　monopoly；　I　have　endeavoured　to　show；　though　a

very　grievous　tax　upon　the　colonies；　and　though　it　may　increase

the　revenue　of　a　particular　order　of　men　in　Great　Britain；

diminishes　instead　of　increasing　that　of　the　great　body　of　the

people；　and　consequently　diminishes　instead　of　increasing　the

ability　of　the　great　body　of　the　people　to　pay　taxes。　The　men；

too；　whose　revenue　the　monopoly　increases；　constitute　a

particular　order；　which　it　is　both　absolutely　impossible　to　tax

beyond　the　proportion　of　other　orders；　and　extremely　impolitic

even　to　attempt　to　tax　beyond　that　proportion；　as　I　shall

endeavour　to　show　in　the　following　book。　No　particular　resource；

therefore；　can　be　drawn　from　this　particular　order。

　　　　　The　colonies　may　be　taxed　either　by　their　own　assemblies；　or

by　the　Parliament　of　Great　Britain。

　　　　　That　the　colony　assemblies　can　ever　be　so　managed　as　to　levy

upon　their　constituents　a　public　revenue　sufficient　not　only　to

maintain　at　all　times　their　own　civil　and　military　establishment；

but　to　pay　their　proper　proportion　of　the　expense　of　the　general

government　of　the　British　empire　seems　not　very　probable。　It　was

a　long　time　before　even　the　Parliament　of　England；　though　placed

immediately　under　the　eye　of　the　sovereign；　could　be　brought

under　such　a　system　of　management；　or　could　be　rendered

sufficiently　liberal　in　their　grants　for　supporting　the　civil　and

military　establishments　even　of　their　own　country。　It　was　only　by

distributing　among　the　particular　Members　of　Parliament　a　great

part　either　of　the　offices；　or　of　the　disposal　of　the　offices

arising　from　this　civil　and　military　establishment；　that　such　a

system　of　management　could　be　established　even　with　regard　to　the

Parliament　of　England。　But　the　distance　of　the　colony　assemblies

from　the　eye　of　the　sovereign；　their　number；　their　dispersed

situation；　and　their　various　constitutions；　would　render　it　very

difficult　to　manage　them　in　the　same　manner；　even　though　the

sovereign　had　the　same　means　of　doing　it；　and　those　means　are

wanting。　It　would　be　absolutely　impossible　to　distribute　among

all　the　leading　members　of　all　the　colony　assemblies　such　a

share；　either　of　the　offices　or　of　the　disposal　of　the　offices

arising　from　the　general　government　of　the　British　empire；　as　to

dispose　them　to　give　up　their　popularity　at　home；　and　to　tax

their　constituents　for　the　support　of　that　general　government；　of

which　almost　the　whole　emoluments　were　to　be　divided　among　people

who　were　strangers　to　them。　The　unavoidable　ignorance　of

administration；　besides；　concerning　the　relative　importance　of

the　different　members　of　those　different　assemblies；　the　offences

which　must　frequently　be　given；　the　blunders　which　must

constantly　be　committed　in　attempting　to　manage　them　in　this

manner；　seems　to　render　such　a　system　of　management　altogether

impracticable　with　regard　to　them。

　　　　　The　colony　assemblies；　besides；　cannot　be　supposed　the

proper　judges　of　what　is　necessary　for　the　defence　and　support　of

the　whole　empire。　The　care　of　that　defence　and　support　is　not

entrusted　to　them。　It　is　not　their　busines