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stivers；　in　order　to　discourage　the　multiplicity　of　small

transactions。　The　person　who　neglects　to　balance　his　account

twice　in　the　year　forfeits　twenty…five　guilders。　The　person　who

orders　a　transfer　for　more　than　is　upon　his　account；　is　obliged

to　pay　three　per　cent　for　the　sum　overdrawn；　and　his　order　is　set

aside　into　the　bargain。　The　bank　is　supposed；　too；　to　make　a

considerable　profit　by　the　sale　of　the　foreign　coin　or　bullion

which　sometimes　falls　to　it　by　the　expiring　of　receipts；　and

which　is　always　kept　till　it　can　be　sold　with　advantage。　It　makes

a　profit　likewise　by　selling　bank　money　at　five　per　cent　agio；

and　buying　it　in　at　four。　These　different　emoluments　amount　to　a

good　deal　more　than　what　is　necessary　for　paying　the　salaries　of

officers；　and　defraying　the　expense　of　management。　What　is　paid

for　the　keeping　of　bullion　upon　receipts　is　alone　supposed　to

amount　to　a　neat　annual　revenue　of　between　one　hundred　and　fifty

thousand　and　two　hundred　thousand　guilders。　Public　utility；

however；　and　not　revenue；　was　the　original　object　of　this

institution。　Its　object　was　to　relieve　the　merchants　from　the

inconvenience　of　a　disadvantageous　exchange。　The　revenue　which

has　arisen　from　it　was　unforeseen；　and　may　be　considered　as

accidental。　But　it　is　now　time　to　return　from　this　long

digression；　into　which　I　have　been　insensibly　led　in　endeavouring

to　explain　the　reasons　why　the　exchange　between　the　countries

which　pay　in　what　is　called　bank　money；　and　those　which　pay　in

common　currency；　should　generally　appear　to　be　in　favour　of　the

former　and　against　the　latter。　The　former　pay　in　a　species　of

money　of　which　the　intrinsic　value　is　always　the　same；　and

exactly　agreeable　to　the　standard　of　their　respective　mints；　the

latter　is　a　species　of　money　of　which　the　intrinsic　value　is

continually　varying；　and　is　almost　always　more　or　less　below　that

standard。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　PART　2

　　　　　　　Of　the　Unreasonableness　of　those　extraordinary　Restraints

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　upon　other　Principles　

　　　　　IN　the　foregoing　part　of　this　chapter　I　have　endeavoured　to

show；　even　upon　the　principles　of　the　commercial　system；　how

unnecessary　it　is　to　lay　extraordinary　restraints　upon　the

importation　of　goods　from　those　countries　with　which　the　balance

of　trade　is　supposed　to　be　disadvantageous。

　　　　　Nothing；　however；　can　be　more　absurd　than　this　whole

doctrine　of　the　balance　of　trade；　upon　which；　not　only　these

restraints；　but　almost　all　the　other　regulations　of　commerce　are

founded。　When　two　places　trade　with　one　another；　this　doctrine

supposes　that；　if　the　balance　be　even；　neither　of　them　either

loses　or　gains；　but　if　it　leans　in　any　degree　to　one　side；　that

one　of　them　loses　and　the　other　gains　in　proportion　to　its

declension　from　the　exact　equilibrium。　Both　suppositions　are

false。　A　trade　which　is　forced　by　means　of　bounties　and

monopolies　may　be　and　commonly　is　disadvantageous　to　the　country

in　whose　favour　it　is　meant　to　be　established；　as　I　shall

endeavour　to　show　hereafter。　But　that　trade　which；　without　force

or　constraint；　is　naturally　and　regularly　carried　on　between　any

two　places　is　always　advantageous；　though　not　always　equally　so；

to　both。

　　　　　By　advantage　or　gain；　I　understand　not　the　increase　of　the

quantity　of　gold　and　silver；　but　that　of　the　exchangeable　value

of　the　annual　produce　of　the　land　and　labour　of　the　country；　or

the　increase　of　the　annual　revenue　of　its　inhabitants。

　　　　　If　the　balance　be　even；　and　if　the　trade　between　the　two

places　consist　altogether　in　the　exchange　of　their　native

commodities；　they　will；　upon　most　occasions；　not　only　both　gain；

but　they　will　gain　equally；　or　very　near　equally；　each　will　in

this　case　afford　a　market　for　a　part　of　the　surplus　produce　of

the　other；　each　will　replace　a　capital　which　had　been　employed　in

raising　and　preparing　for　the　market　this　part　of　the　surplus

produce　of　the　other；　and　which　had　been　distributed　among；　and

given　revenue　and　maintenance　to　a　certain　number　of　its

inhabitants。　Some　part　of　the　inhabitants　of　each；　therefore；

will　indirectly　derive　their　revenue　and　maintenance　from　the

other。　As　the　commodities　exchanged；　too；　are　supposed　to　be　of

equal　value；　so　the　two　capitals　employed　in　the　trade　will；　upon

most　occasions；　be　equal；　or　very　nearly　equal；　and　both　being

employed　in　raising　the　native　commodities　of　the　two　countries；

the　revenue　and　maintenance　which　their　distribution　will　afford

to　the　inhabitants　of　each　will　be　equal；　or　very　nearly　equal。

This　revenue　and　maintenance；　thus　mutually　afforded；　will　be

greater　or　smaller　in　proportion　to　the　extent　of　their　dealings。

If　these　should　annually　amount　to　an　hundred　thousand　pounds；

for　example；　or　to　a　million　on　each　side；　each　of　them　would

afford　an　annual　revenue　in　the　one　case　of　an　hundred　thousand

pounds；　in　the　other　of　a　million；　to　the　inhabitants　of　the

other。

　　　　　If　their　trade　should　be　of　such　a　nature　that　one　of　them

exported　to　the　other　nothing　but　native　commodities；　while　the

returns　of　that　other　consisted　altogether　in　foreign　goods；　the

balance；　in　this　case；　would　still　be　supposed　even；　commodities

being　paid　for　with　commodities。　They　would；　in　this　case　too；

both　gain；　but　they　would　not　gain　equally；　and　the　inhabitants

of　the　country　which　exported　nothing　but　native　commodities

would　derive　the　greatest　revenue　from　the　trade。　If　England；　for

example；　should　import　from　France　nothing　but　the　native

commodities　of　that　country；　and；　not　having　such　commodities　of

its　own　as　were　in　demand　there；　should　annually　repay　them　by

sending　thither　a　large　quantity　of　foreign　goods；　tobacco；　we

shall　suppose；　and　East　India　goods；　this　trade；　though　it　would

give　some　revenue　to　the　inhabitants　of　both　countries；　would

give　more　to　those　of　France　than　to　those　of　England。　The　whole

French　capital　annually　employed　in　it　would　annually　be

distributed　among　the　people　of　France。　But　that　part　of　the

English　capital　only　which　was　employed　in　producing　the　English

commodities　with　which　those　foreign　goods　were　purchased　would

be　annually　distributed　among　the　people　of　England。　The　greater

part　of　it　would　replace　the　capitals　which　had　been　employed　in

Virginia；　Indostan；　and　China；　and　which　had　given　revenue　and

maintenance　to　the　of　those　distant　countries。　If　the　capitals

were　equal；　or　nearly　equal；　therefore　this　employment　of　the

French　capital　would　augment　much　more　the　revenue　of　the　people

of　France　than　that　of　the　English　capital　would　the　revenue　of

the　people　of　England。　France　would　in　this　case　carry　on　a

direct　foreign　trade　of　consumption　with　England；　whereas　England

would　carry　on　a　round…about　trade　of　the　same　kind　with　France。

The　different　effects　of　a　capital　employed　in　the　direct　and　of

one　employed　in　the　round…about　foreign　trade　of　consumption　have

already　been　fully　explained。

　　　　　There　is　not；　probably；　between　any　two　countries　a　trade

which　consists　altogether　in　the　exchange　either　of　native

commodities　on　both　sides；　or　of　native　commodities　on　one　side

and　of　foreign　goods　on　the　other。　Almost　all　countries　exchange

with　one　another　partly　native　and　partly　foreign　goods。　That

country；　however；　in　whose　cargoes　there　is　the　greatest

proportion　of　native；　and　the　least　of　foreign　goods；　will　always

be　the　principal　gainer。

　　　　　If　it　was　not　with　tobacco　and　East　India　goods；　but　with

gold　and　silver；　that　England　paid　for　the　commodities　annually

imported　from　France；　the　balance；　in　this　case；　would　be

supposed　uneven；　commodities　not　being　paid　for　with　commodities；

but　with　gold　and　silver。　The　trade；　however；　would；　in　this

case；　as　in　the　foregoing；　give　some　revenue　to　the　inhabitants

of　both　countries；　but　more　to　those　of　France　than　to　those　of

England。　It　would　give　some　revenue　to　those　of　England。　The

capital　which　had　been　employed　in　producing　the　English　goods

that　purchased　this　gold　and　silver；　the　capital　which　had　been

distributed　among；　and　given　revenue　to；　certain　inhabitants　of

England；　would　thereby　be　replaced　and　enabled　to　continue　that

employment。　The　whole　capital　of　England　would　no　more　be

diminished　by　this　exportation　of　gold　and　silver　than　by　the

exportation　of　an　equal　value　of　any　other　goods。　On　the

contrary；　it　would　in　most　cases　be　augmented。　No　goods　are　sent

abroad　but　those　for　which　the　demand　is　supposed　to　be　greater

abroad　than　at　home；　and　of　which　the　returns　consequently；　it　is

expected；　will　be　of　more　value　at　home　than　the　commodities

exported。　If　the　tobacco　which；　in　England；　is　worth　only　a

hundred　thousand　pounds；　when　sent　to　France　will　purchase　wine

which　is；　in　England；　worth　a　hundred　and　ten　thousand；　this

exchange　will　equally　augment　the　capital　of　England　by　ten

thousand　pounds。　If　a　hundred　thousand　pounds　of　English　gold；　in

the　same　manner；　purchase　French　wine　which；　in　England；　is　worth

a　hundred　and　ten　thousand；　this　exchange　will　equally　augment

the　capital　of　England