phaedo-第10节

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Phaedo；　I　suppose　that　these　fair　locks　of　yours　will　be　severed。



　　Yes；　Socrates；　I　suppose　that　they　will；　I　replied。



　　Not　so　if　you　will　take　my　advice。



　　What　shall　I　do　with　them？　I　said。



　　To…day；　he　replied；　and　not　to…morrow；　if　this　argument　dies　and



cannot　be　brought　to　life　again　by　us；　you　and　I　will　both　shave　our



locks；　and　if　I　were　you；　and　could　not　maintain　my　ground　against



Simmias　and　Cebes；　I　would　myself　take　an　oath；　like　the　Argives；



not　to　wear　hair　any　more　until　I　had　renewed　the　conflict　and



defeated　them。



　　Yes；　I　said；　but　Heracles　himself　is　said　not　to　be　a　match　for　two。



　　Summon　me　then；　he　said；　and　I　will　be　your　Iolaus　until　the　sun



goes　down。



　　I　summon　you　rather；　I　said；　not　as　Heracles　summoning　Iolaus；　but



as　Iolaus　might　summon　Heracles。



　　That　will　be　all　the　same；　he　said。　But　first　let　us　take　care



that　we　avoid　a　danger。



　　And　what　is　that？　I　said。



　　The　danger　of　becoming　misologists；　he　replied；　which　is　one　of



the　very　worst　things　that　can　happen　to　us。　For　as　there　are



misanthropists　or　haters　of　men；　there　are　also　misologists　or



haters　of　ideas；　and　both　spring　from　the　same　cause；　which　is



ignorance　of　the　world。　Misanthropy　arises　from　the　too　great



confidence　of　inexperience；　you　trust　a　man　and　think　him　altogether



true　and　good　and　faithful；　and　then　in　a　little　while　he　turns　out　to



be　false　and　knavish；　and　then　another　and　another；　and　when　this



has　happened　several　times　to　a　man；　especially　within　the　circle　of



his　most　trusted　friends；　as　he　deems　them；　and　he　has　often　quarreled



with　them；　he　at　last　hates　all　men；　and　believes　that　no　one　has



any　good　in　him　at　all。　I　dare　say　that　you　must　have　observed　this。



　　Yes；　I　said。



　　And　is　not　this　discreditable？　The　reason　is　that　a　man；　having　to



deal　with　other　men；　has　no　knowledge　of　them；　for　if　he　had　knowledge



he　would　have　known　the　true　state　of　the　case；　that　few　are　the



good　and　few　the　evil；　and　that　the　great　majority　are　in　the　interval



between　them。



　　How　do　you　mean？　I　said。



　　I　mean；　he　replied；　as　you　might　say　of　the　very　large　and　very



small；　that　nothing　is　more　uncommon　than　a　very　large　or　a　very　small



man；　and　this　applies　generally　to　all　extremes；　whether　of　great



and　small；　or　swift　and　slow；　or　fair　and　foul；　or　black　and　white：



and　whether　the　instances　you　select　be　men　or　dogs　or　anything



else；　few　are　the　extremes；　but　many　are　in　the　mean　between　them。　Did



you　never　observe　this？



　　Yes；　I　said；　I　have。



　　And　do　you　not　imagine；　he　said；　that　if　there　were　a　competition　of



evil；　the　first　in　evil　would　be　found　to　be　very　few？



　　Yes；　that　is　very　likely；　I　said。



　　Yes；　that　is　very　likely；　he　replied；　not　that　in　this　respect



arguments　are　like　men…there　I　was　led　on　by　you　to　say　more　than　I



had　intended；　but　the　point　of　comparison　was　that　when　a　simple　man



who　has　no　skill　in　dialectics　believes　an　argument　to　be　true　which



he　afterwards　imagines　to　be　false；　whether　really　false　or　not；　and



then　another　and　another；　he　has　no　longer　any　faith　left；　and　great



disputers；　as　you　know；　come　to　think；　at　last　that　they　have　grown　to



be　the　wisest　of　mankind；　for　they　alone　perceive　the　utter



unsoundness　and　instability　of　all　arguments；　or；　indeed；　of　all



things；　which；　like　the　currents　in　the　Euripus；　are　going　up　and　down



in　never…ceasing　ebb　and　flow。



　　That　is　quite　true；　I　said。



　　Yes；　Phaedo；　he　replied；　and　very　melancholy　too；　if　there　be　such　a



thing　as　truth　or　certainty　or　power　of　knowing　at　all；　that　a　man



should　have　lighted　upon　some　argument　or　other　which　at　first



seemed　true　and　then　turned　out　to　be　false；　and　instead　of　blaming



himself　and　his　own　want　of　wit；　because　he　is　annoyed；　should　at　last



be　too　glad　to　transfer　the　blame　from　himself　to　arguments　in



general；　and　forever　afterwards　should　hate　and　revile　them；　and



lose　the　truth　and　knowledge　of　existence。



　　Yes；　indeed；　I　said；　that　is　very　melancholy。



　　Let　us；　then；　in　the　first　place；　he　said；　be　careful　of　admitting



into　our　souls　the　notion　that　there　is　no　truth　or　health　or



soundness　in　any　arguments　at　all；　but　let　us　rather　say　that　there　is



as　yet　no　health　in　us；　and　that　we　must　quit　ourselves　like　men　and



do　our　best　to　gain　health…you　and　all　other　men　with　a　view　to　the



whole　of　your　future　life；　and　I　myself　with　a　view　to　death。　For　at



this　moment　I　am　sensible　that　I　have　not　the　temper　of　a　philosopher；



like　the　vulgar；　I　am　only　a　partisan。　For　the　partisan；　when　he　is



engaged　in　a　dispute；　cares　nothing　about　the　rights　of　the



question；　but　is　anxious　only　to　convince　his　hearers　of　his　own



assertions。　And　the　difference　between　him　and　me　at　the　present



moment　is　only　this…that　whereas　he　seeks　to　convince　his　hearers　that



what　he　says　is　true；　I　am　rather　seeking　to　convince　myself；　to



convince　my　hearers　is　a　secondary　matter　with　me。　And　do　but　see



how　much　I　gain　by　this。　For　if　what　I　say　is　true；　then　I　do　well



to　be　persuaded　of　the　truth；　but　if　there　be　nothing　after　death；



still；　during　the　short　time　that　remains；　I　shall　save　my　friends



from　lamentations；　and　my　ignorance　will　not　last；　and　therefore　no



harm　will　be　done。　This　is　the　state　of　mind；　Simmias　and　Cebes；　in



which　I　approach　the　argument。　And　I　would　ask　you　to　be　thinking　of



the　truth　and　not　of　Socrates：　agree　with　me；　if　I　seem　to　you　to　be



speaking　the　truth；　or　if　not；　withstand　me　might　and　main；　that　I　may



not　deceive　you　as　well　as　myself　in　my　enthusiasm；　and；　like　the　bee；



leave　my　sting　in　you　before　I　die。



　　And　now　let　us　proceed；　he　said。　And　first　of　all　let　me　be　sure



that　I　have　in　my　mind　what　you　were　saying。　Simmias；　if　I　remember



rightly；　has　fears　and　misgivings　whether　the　soul；　being　in　the



form　of　harmony；　although　a　fairer　and　diviner　thing　than　the　body；



may　not　perish　first。　On　the　other　hand；　Cebes　appeared　to　grant



that　the　soul　was　more　lasting　than　the　body；　but　he　said　that　no



one　could　know　whether　the　soul；　after　having　worn　out　many　bodies；



might　not　perish　herself　and　leave　her　last　body　behind　her；　and



that　this　is　death；　which　is　the　destruction　not　of　the　body　but　of



the　soul；　for　in　the　body　the　work　of　destruction　is　ever　going　on。



Are　not　these；　Simmias　and　Cebes；　the　points　which　we　have　to



consider？



　　They　both　agreed　to　this　statement　of　them。



　　He　proceeded：　And　did　you　deny　the　force　of　the　whole　preceding



argument；　or　of　a　part　only？



　　Of　a　part　only；　they　replied。



　　And　what　did　you　think；　he　said；　of　that　part　of　the　argument　in



which　we　said　that　knowledge　was　recollection　only；　and　inferred



from　this　that　the　soul　must　have　previously　existed　somewhere　else



before　she　was　enclosed　in　the　body？　Cebes　said　that　he　had　been



wonderfully　impressed　by　that　part　of　the　argument；　and　that　his



conviction　remained　unshaken。　Simmias　agreed；　and　added　that　he



himself　could　hardly　imagine　the　possibility　of　his　ever　thinking



differently　about　that。



　　But；　rejoined　Socrates；　you　will　have　to　think　differently；　my



Theban　friend；　if　you　still　maintain　that　harmony　is　a　compound；　and



that　the　soul　is　a　harmony　which　is　made　out　of　strings　set　in　the



frame　of　the　body；　for　you　will　surely　never　allow　yourself　to　say



that　a　harmony　is　prior　to　the　elements　which　compose　the　harmony。



　　No；　Socrates；　that　is　impossible。



　　But　do　you　not　see　that　you　are　saying　this　when　you　say　that　the



soul　existed　before　she　took　the　form　and　body　of　man；　and　was　made　up



of　elements　which　as　yet　had　no　existence？　For　harmony　is　not　a　sort



of　thing　like　the　soul；　as　you　suppose；　but　first　the　lyre；　and　the



strings；　and　the　sounds　exist　in　a　state　of　discord；　and　then



harmony　is　made　last　of　all；　and　perishes　first。　And　how　can　such　a



notion　of　the　soul　as　this　agree　with　the　other？



　　Not　at　all；　replied　Simmias。



　　And　yet；　he　said；　there　surely　ought　to　be　harmony　when　harmony　is



the　theme　of　discourse。



　　There　ought；　replied　Simmias。



　　But　there　is　no　harmony；　he　said；　in　the　two　propositions　that



knowledge　is　recollection；　and　that　the　soul　is　a　harmony。　Which　of



them；　then；　will　you　retain？



　　I　think；　he　replied；　that　I　have　a　much　stronger　faith；　Socrates；　in



the　first　of　the　two；　which　has　been　fully　demonstrated　to　me；　than　in



the　latter；　which　has　not　been　demonstrated　at　all；　but　rests　only



on　probable　and　plausible　grounds；　and　I　know　too　well　that　these



arguments　from　probabilities　are　impostors；　and　unless　great　caution



is　observed　in　the　use　of　them　they　are　apt　to　be　deceptive…in



geometry；　and　in　other　things　too。　But　the　doctrine　of　knowledge　and



recollection　has　been　proven　to　me