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But as we descend towards the South; to those States in which the constitution of society is more modern and less strong; where instruction is less general; and where the principles of morality; of religion; and of liberty are less happily combined; we perceive that the talents and the virtues of those who are in authority become more and more rare。

Lastly; when we arrive at the new South…western States; in which the constitution of society dates but from yesterday; and presents an agglomeration of adventurers and speculators; we are amazed at the persons who are invested with public authority; and we are led to ask by what force; independent of the legislation and of the men who direct it; the State can be protected; and society be made to flourish。

There are certain laws of a democratic nature which contribute; nevertheless; to correct; in some measure; the dangerous tendencies of democracy。  On entering the House of Representatives of Washington one is struck by the vulgar demeanor of that great assembly。  The eye frequently does not discover a man of celebrity within its walls。  Its members are almost all obscure individuals whose names present no associations to the mind: they are mostly village lawyers; men in trade; or even persons belonging to the lower classes of society。  In a country in which education is very general; it is said that the representatives of the people do not always know how to write correctly。

At a few yards' distance from this spot is the door of the Senate; which contains within a small space a large proportion of the celebrated men of America。  Scarcely an individual is to be perceived in it who does not recall the idea of an active and illustrious career: the Senate is composed of eloquent advocates; distinguished generals; wise magistrates; and statesmen of note; whose language would at all times do honor to the most remarkable parliamentary debates of Europe。

What then is the cause of this strange contrast; and why are the most able citizens to be found in one assembly rather than in the other?  Why is the former body remarkable for its vulgarity and its poverty of talent; whilst the latter seems to enjoy a monopoly of intelligence and of sound judgment? Both of these assemblies emanate from the people; both of them are chosen by universal suffrage; and no voice has hitherto been heard to assert in America that the Senate is hostile to the interests of the people。  From what cause; then; does so startling a difference arise?  The only reason which appears to me adequately to account for it is; that the House of Representatives is elected by the populace directly; and that the Senate is elected by elected bodies。  The whole body of the citizens names the legislature of each State; and the Federal Constitution converts these legislatures into so many electoral bodies; which return the members of the Senate。  The senators are elected by an indirect application of universal suffrage; for the legislatures which name them are not aristocratic or privileged bodies which exercise the electoral franchise in their own right; but they are chosen by the totality of the citizens; they are generally elected every year; and new members may constantly be chosen who will employ their electoral rights in conformity with the wishes of the public。  But this transmission of the popular authority through an assembly of chosen men operates an important change in it; by refining its discretion and improving the forms which it adopts。  Men who are chosen in this manner accurately represent the majority of the nation which governs them; but they represent the elevated thoughts which are current in the community; the propensities which prompt its nobler actions; rather than the petty passions which disturb or the vices which disgrace it。

The time may be already anticipated at which the American Republics will be obliged to introduce the plan of election by an elected body more frequently into their system of representation; or they will incur no small risk of perishing miserably amongst the shoals of democracy。

And here I have no scruple in confessing that I look upon this peculiar system of election as the only means of bringing the exercise of political power to the level of all classes of the people。  Those thinkers who regard this institution as the exclusive weapon of a party; and those who fear; on the other hand; to make use of it; seem to me to fall into as great an error in the one case as in the other。

Influence Which The American Democracy Has Exercised On The Laws Relating To Elections

When elections are rare; they expose the State to a violent crisis … When they are frequent; they keep up a degree of feverish excitement … The Americans have preferred the second of these two evils … Mutability of the laws …Opinions of Hamilton and Jefferson on this subject。

When elections recur at long intervals the State is exposed to violent agitation every time they take place。  Parties exert themselves to the utmost in order to gain a prize which is so rarely within their reach; and as the evil is almost irremediable for the candidates who fail; the consequences of their disappointed ambition may prove most disastrous; if; on the other hand; the legal struggle can be repeated within a short space of time; the defeated parties take patience。  When elections occur frequently; their recurrence keeps society in a perpetual state of feverish excitement; and imparts a continual instability to public affairs。 


Thus; on the one hand the State is exposed to the perils of a revolution; on the other to perpetual mutability; the former system threatens the very existence of the Government; the latter is an obstacle to all steady and consistent policy。  The Americans have preferred the second of these evils to the first; but they were led to this conclusion by their instinct much more than by their reason; for a taste for variety is one of the characteristic passions of democracy。  An extraordinary mutability has; by this means; been introduced into their legislation。  Many of the Americans consider the instability of their laws as a necessary consequence of a system whose general results are beneficial。  But no one in the United States affects to deny the fact of this instability; or to contend that it is not a great evil。

Hamilton; after having demonstrated the utility of a power which might prevent; or which might at least impede; the promulgation of bad laws; adds: 〃It might perhaps be said that the power of preventing bad laws includes that of preventing good ones; and may be used to the one purpose as well as to the other。  But this objection will have little weight with those who can properly estimate the mischiefs of that inconstancy and mutability in the laws which form the greatest blemish in the character and genius of our governments。〃 (Federalist; No。 73。) And again in No。 62 of the same work he observes: 〃The facility and excess of law…making seem to be the diseases to which our governments are most liable。 。 。 。 The mischievous effects of the mutability in the public councils arising from a rapid succession of new members would fill a volume: every new election in the States is found to change one…half of the representatives。  From this change of men must proceed a change of opinions and of measures; which forfeits the respect and confidence of other nations; poisons the blessings of liberty itself; and diminishes the attachment and reverence of the people toward a political system which betrays so many marks of infirmity。〃 

Jefferson himself; the greatest Democrat whom the democracy of America has yet produced; pointed out the same evils。  〃The instability of our laws;〃 said he in a letter to Madison; 〃is really a very serious inconvenience。  I think that we ought to have obviated it by deciding that a whole year should always be allowed to elapse between the bringing in of a bill and the final passing of it。  It should afterward be discussed and put to the vote without the possibility of making any alteration in it; and if the circumstances of the case required a more speedy decision; the question should not be decided by a simple majority; but by a majority of at least two…thirds of both houses。〃

Public Officers Under The Control Of The Democracy In America  Simple exterior of the American public officers … No official costume … All public officers are remunerated … Political consequences of this system … No public career exists in America … Result of this。

Public officers in the United States are commingled with the crowd of citizens; they have neither palaces; nor guards; nor ceremonial costumes。 This simple exterior of the persons in authority is connected not only with the peculiarities of the American character; but with the fundamental principles of that society。  In the estimation of the democracy a government is not a benefit; but a necessary evil。  A certain degree of power must be granted to public officers; for they would be of no use without it。  But the ostensible semblance of authority is by no means indispensable to the conduct of affairs; and it is needlessly offensive to the susceptibility of the public。  The public officers themselves are well aware that they only 

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