democracy in america-1-第50节
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supposes in the people whom it is meant to govern。 The government of the Union depends entirely upon legal fictions； the Union is an ideal nation which only exists in the mind； and whose limits and extent can only be discerned by the understanding。
When once the general theory is comprehended； numberless difficulties remain to be solved in its application； for the sovereignty of the Union is so involved in that of the States that it is impossible to distinguish its boundaries at the first glance。 The whole structure of the Government is artificial and conventional； and it would be ill adapted to a people which has not been long accustomed to conduct its own affairs； or to one in which the science of politics has not descended to the humblest classes of society。 I have never been more struck by the good sense and the practical judgment of the Americans than in the ingenious devices by which they elude the numberless difficulties resulting from their Federal Constitution。 I scarcely ever met with a plain American citizen who could not distinguish； with surprising facility； the obligations created by the laws of Congress from those created by the laws of his own State； and who； after having discriminated between the matters which come under the cognizance of the Union and those which the local legislature is competent to regulate； could not point out the exact limit of the several jurisdictions of the Federal courts and the tribunals of the State。
The Constitution of the United States is like those exquisite productions of human industry which ensure wealth and renown to their inventors； but which are profitless in any other hands。 This truth is exemplified by the condition of Mexico at the present time。 The Mexicans were desirous of establishing a federal system； and they took the Federal Constitution of their neighbors； the Anglo…Americans； as their model； and copied it with considerable accuracy。 *s But although they had borrowed the letter of the law； they were unable to create or to introduce the spirit and the sense which give it life。 They were involved in ceaseless embarrassments between the mechanism of their double government； the sovereignty of the States and that of the Union perpetually exceeded their respective privileges； and entered into collision； and to the present day Mexico is alternately the victim of anarchy and the slave of military despotism。
＇Footnote s： See the Mexican Constitution of 1824。＇
The second and the most fatal of all the defects I have alluded to； and that which I believe to be inherent in the federal system； is the relative weakness of the government of the Union。 The principle upon which all confederations rest is that of a divided sovereignty。 The legislator may render this partition less perceptible； he may even conceal it for a time from the public eye； but he cannot prevent it from existing； and a divided sovereignty must always be less powerful than an entire supremacy。 The reader has seen in the remarks I have made on the Constitution of the United States that the Americans have displayed singular ingenuity in combining the restriction of the power of the Union within the narrow limits of a federal government with the semblance and； to a certain extent； with the force of a national government。 By this means the legislators of the Union have succeeded in diminishing； though not in counteracting the natural danger of confederations。
It has been remarked that the American Government does not apply itself to the States； but that it immediately transmits its injunctions to the citizens； and compels them as isolated individuals to comply with its demands。 But if the Federal law were to clash with the interests and the prejudices of a State； it might be feared that all the citizens of that State would conceive themselves to be interested in the cause of a single individual who should refuse to obey。 If all the citizens of the State were aggrieved at the same time and in the same manner by the authority of the Union； the Federal Government would vainly attempt to subdue them individually； they would instinctively unite in a common defence； and they would derive a ready…prepared organization from the share of sovereignty which the institution of their State allows them to enjoy。 Fiction would give way to reality； and an organized portion of the territory might then contest the central authority。 *t The same observation holds good with regard to the Federal jurisdiction。 If the courts of the Union violated an important law of a State in a private case； the real； if not the apparent； contest would arise between the aggrieved State represented by a citizen and the Union represented by its courts of justice。 *u
＇Footnote t： ＇This is precisely what occurred in 1862； and the following paragraph describes correctly the feelings and notions of the South。 General Lee held that his primary allegiance was due； not to the Union； but to Virginia。＇＇
＇Footnote u： For instance； the Union possesses by the Constitution the right of selling unoccupied lands for its own profit。 Supposing that the State of Ohio should claim the same right in behalf of certain territories lying within its boundaries； upon the plea that the Constitution refers to those lands alone which do not belong to the jurisdiction of any particular State； and consequently should choose to dispose of them itself； the litigation would be carried on in the names of the purchasers from the State of Ohio and the purchasers from the Union； and not in the names of Ohio and the Union。 But what would become of this legal fiction if the Federal purchaser was confirmed in his right by the courts of the Union； whilst the other competitor was ordered to retain possession by the tribunals of the State of Ohio？＇
He would have but a partial knowledge of the world who should imagine that it is possible； by the aid of legal fictions； to prevent men from finding out and employing those means of gratifying their passions which have been left open to them； and it may be doubted whether the American legislators； when they rendered a collision between the two sovereigns less probable； destroyed the cause of such a misfortune。 But it may even be affirmed that they were unable to ensure the preponderance of the Federal element in a case of this kind。 The Union is possessed of money and of troops； but the affections and the prejudices of the people are in the bosom of the States。 The sovereignty of the Union is an abstract being； which is connected with but few external objects； the sovereignty of the States is hourly perceptible； easily understood； constantly active； and if the former is of recent creation； the latter is coeval with the people itself。 The sovereignty of the Union is factitious； that of the States is natural； and derives its existence from its own simple influence； like the authority of a parent。 The supreme power of the nation only affects a few of the chief interests of society； it represents an immense but remote country； and claims a feeling of patriotism which is vague and ill defined； but the authority of the States controls every individual citizen at every hour and in all circumstances； it protects his property； his freedom； and his life； and when we recollect the traditions； the customs； the prejudices of local and familiar attachment with which it is connected； we cannot doubt of the superiority of a power which is interwoven with every circumstance that renders the love of one's native country instinctive in the human heart。
Since legislators are unable to obviate such dangerous collisions as occur between the two sovereignties which coexist in the federal system； their first object must be； not only to dissuade the confederate States from warfare； but to encourage such institutions as may promote the maintenance of peace。 Hence it results that the Federal compact cannot be lasting unless there exists in the communities which are leagued together a certain number of inducements to union which render their common dependence agreeable； and the task of the Government light； and that system cannot succeed without the presence of favorable circumstances added to the influence of good laws。 All the peoples which have ever formed a confederation have been held together by a certain number of common interests； which served as the intellectual ties of association。
But the sentiments and the principles of man must be taken into consideration as well as his immediate interests。 A certain uniformity of civilization is not less necessary to the durability of a confederation than a uniformity of interests in the States which compose it。 In Switzerland the difference which exists between the Canton of Uri and the Canton of Vaud is equal to that between the fifteenth and the nineteenth centuries； and； properly speaking； Switzerland has never possessed a federal government。 The union between these two cantons only subsists upon the map； and their discrepancies would soon be perceived if an attempt were made by a central authority to prescribe the same laws to the whole territory。
One of the circumstances which most powerfully contribute to support the Federal Government in America is that the States have not only
