democracy in america-1-第39节

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a　powerful　kingdom。　　Before　we　can　discuss　the　absolute　advantages　of　the　elective　system　we　must　make　preliminary　inquiries　as　to　whether　the　geographical　position；　the　laws；　the　habits；　the　manners；　and　the　opinions　of　the　people　amongst　whom　it　is　to　be　introduced　will　admit　of　the　establishment　of　a　weak　and　dependent　executive　government；　for　to　attempt　to　render　the　representative　of　the　State　a　powerful　sovereign；　and　at　the　same　time　elective；　is；　in　my　opinion；　to　entertain　two　incompatible　designs。　To　reduce　hereditary　royalty　to　the　condition　of　an　elective　authority；　the　only　means　that　I　am　acquainted　with　are　to　circumscribe　its　sphere　of　action　beforehand；　gradually　to　diminish　its　prerogatives；　and　to　accustom　the　people　to　live　without　its　protection。　　Nothing；　however；　is　further　from　the　designs　of　the　republicans　of　Europe　than　this　course：　as　many　of　them　owe　their　hatred　of　tyranny　to　the　sufferings　which　they　have　personally　undergone；　it　is　oppression；　and　not　the　extent　of　the　executive　power；　which　excites　their　hostility；　and　they　attack　the　former　without　perceiving　how　nearly　it　is　connected　with　the　latter。　

Hitherto　no　citizen　has　shown　any　disposition　to　expose　his　honor　and　his　life　in　order　to　become　the　President　of　the　United　States；　because　the　power　of　that　office　is　temporary；　limited；　and　subordinate。　　The　prize　of　fortune　must　be　great　to　encourage　adventurers　in　so　desperate　a　game。　　No　candidate　has　as　yet　been　able　to　arouse　the　dangerous　enthusiasm　or　the　passionate　sympathies　of　the　people　in　his　favor；　for　the　very　simple　reason　that　when　he　is　at　the　head　of　the　Government　he　has　but　little　power；　but　little　wealth；　and　but　little　glory　to　share　amongst　his　friends；　and　his　influence　in　the　State　is　too　small　for　the　success　or　the　ruin　of　a　faction　to　depend　upon　the　elevation　of　an　individual　to　power。

The　great　advantage　of　hereditary　monarchies　is；　that　as　the　private　interest　of　a　family　is　always　intimately　connected　with　the　interests　of　the　State；　the　executive　government　is　never　suspended　for　a　single　instant；　and　if　the　affairs　of　a　monarchy　are　not　better　conducted　than　those　of　a　republic；　at　least　there　is　always　some　one　to　conduct　them；　well　or　ill；　according　to　his　capacity。　　In　elective　States；　on　the　contrary；　the　wheels　of　government　cease　to　act；　as　it　were；　of　their　own　accord　at　the　approach　of　an　election；　and　even　for　some　time　previous　to　that　event。　　The　laws　may　indeed　accelerate　the　operation　of　the　election；　which　may　be　conducted　with　such　simplicity　and　rapidity　that　the　seat　of　power　will　never　be　left　vacant；　but；　notwithstanding　these　precautions；　a　break　necessarily　occurs　in　the　minds　of　the　people。

At　the　approach　of　an　election　the　head　of　the　executive　government　is　wholly　occupied　by　the　coming　struggle；　his　future　plans　are　doubtful；　he　can　undertake　nothing　new；　and　the　he　will　only　prosecute　with　indifference　those　designs　which　another　will　perhaps　terminate。　　〃I　am　so　near　the　time　of　my　retirement　from　office；〃　said　President　Jefferson　on　the　21st　of　January；　1809　（six　weeks　before　the　election）；　〃that　I　feel　no　passion；　I　take　no　part；　I　express　no　sentiment。　　It　appears　to　me　just　to　leave　to　my　successor　the　commencement　of　those　measures　which　he　will　have　to　prosecute；　and　for　which　he　will　be　responsible。〃

On　the　other　hand；　the　eyes　of　the　nation　are　centred　on　a　single　point；　all　are　watching　the　gradual　birth　of　so　important　an　event。　　The　wider　the　influence　of　the　executive　power　extends；　the　greater　and　the　more　necessary　is　its　constant　action；　the　more　fatal　is　the　term　of　suspense；　and　a　nation　which　is　accustomed　to　the　government；　or；　still　more；　one　used　to　the　administrative　protection　of　a　powerful　executive　authority　would　be　infallibly　convulsed　by　an　election　of　this　kind。　　In　the　United　States　the　action　of　the　Government　may　be　slackened　with　impunity；　because　it　is　always　weak　and　circumscribed。　*u

＇Footnote　u：　＇This；　however；　may　be　a　great　danger。　　The　period　during　which　Mr。　Buchanan　retained　office；　after　the　election　of　Mr。　Lincoln；　from　November；　1860；　to　March；　1861；　was　that　which　enabled　the　seceding　States　of　the　South　to　complete　their　preparations　for　the　Civil　War；　and　the　Executive　Government　was　paralyzed。　　No　greater　evil　could　befall　a　nation。　…Translator's　Note。＇＇

One　of　the　principal　vices　of　the　elective　system　is　that　it　always　introduces　a　certain　degree　of　instability　into　the　internal　and　external　policy　of　the　State。　　But　this　disadvantage　is　less　sensibly　felt　if　the　share　of　power　vested　in　the　elected　magistrate　is　small。　　In　Rome　the　principles　of　the　Government　underwent　no　variation；　although　the　Consuls　were　changed　every　year；　because　the　Senate；　which　was　an　hereditary　assembly；　possessed　the　directing　authority。　　If　the　elective　system　were　adopted　in　Europe；　the　condition　of　most　of　the　monarchical　States　would　be　changed　at　every　new　election。　　In　America　the　President　exercises　a　certain　influence　on　State　affairs；　but　he　does　not　conduct　them；　the　preponderating　power　is　vested　in　the　representatives　of　the　whole　nation。　　The　political　maxims　of　the　country　depend　therefore　on　the　mass　of　the　people；　not　on　the　President　alone；　and　consequently　in　America　the　elective　system　has　no　very　prejudicial　influence　on　the　fixed　principles　of　the　Government。　　But　the　want　of　fixed　principles　is　an　evil　so　inherent　in　the　elective　system　that　it　is　still　extremely　perceptible　in　the　narrow　sphere　to　which　the　authority　of　the　President　extends。

The　Americans　have　admitted　that　the　head　of　the　executive　power；　who　has　to　bear　the　whole　responsibility　of　the　duties　he　is　called　upon　to　fulfil；　ought　to　be　empowered　to　choose　his　own　agents；　and　to　remove　them　at　pleasure：　the　legislative　bodies　watch　the　conduct　of　the　President　more　than　they　direct　it。　　The　consequence　of　this　arrangement　is；　that　at　every　new　election　the　fate　of　all　the　Federal　public　officers　is　in　suspense。　　Mr。　Quincy　Adams；　on　his　entry　into　office；　discharged　the　majority　of　the　individuals　who　had　been　appointed　by　his　predecessor：　and　I　am　not　aware　that　General　Jackson　allowed　a　single　removable　functionary　employed　in　the　Federal　service　to　retain　his　place　beyond　the　first　year　which　succeeded　his　election。　　It　is　sometimes　made　a　subject　of　complaint　that　in　the　constitutional　monarchies　of　Europe　the　fate　of　the　humbler　servants　of　an　Administration　depends　upon　that　of　the　Ministers。　　But　in　elective　Governments　this　evil　is　far　greater。　　In　a　constitutional　monarchy　successive　ministries　are　rapidly　formed；　but　as　the　principal　representative　of　the　executive　power　does　not　change；　the　spirit　of　innovation　is　kept　within　bounds；　the　changes　which　take　place　are　in　the　details　rather　than　in　the　principles　of　the　administrative　system；　but　to　substitute　one　system　for　another；　as　is　done　in　America　every　four　years；　by　law；　is　to　cause　a　sort　of　revolution。　　As　to　the　misfortunes　which　may　fall　upon　individuals　in　consequence　of　this　state　of　things；　it　must　be　allowed　that　the　uncertain　situation　of　the　public　officers　is　less　fraught　with　evil　consequences　in　America　than　elsewhere。　　It　is　so　easy　to　acquire　an　independent　position　in　the　United　States　that　the　public　officer　who　loses　his　place　may　be　deprived　of　the　comforts　of　life；　but　not　of　the　means　of　subsistence。

I　remarked　at　the　beginning　of　this　chapter　that　the　dangers　of　the　elective　system　applied　to　the　head　of　the　State　are　augmented　or　decreased　by　the　peculiar　circumstances　of　the　people　which　adopts　it。　　However　the　functions　of　the　executive　power　may　be　restricted；　it　must　always　exercise　a　great　influence　upon　the　foreign　policy　of　the　country；　for　a　negotiation　cannot　be　opened　or　successfully　carried　on　otherwise　than　by　a　single　agent。　The　more　precarious　and　the　more　perilous　the　position　of　a　people　becomes；　the　more　absolute　is　the　want　of　a　fixed　and　consistent　external　policy；　and　the　more　dangerous　does　the　elective　system　of　the　Chief　Magistrate　become。　The　policy　of　the　Americans　in　relation　to　the　whole　world　is　exceedingly　simple；　for　it　may　almost　be　said　that　no　country　stands　in　need　of　them；　nor　do　they　require　the　co…operation　of　any　other　people。　　Their　independence　is　never　threatened。　　In　their　present　condition；　therefore；　the　functions　of　the　executive　power　are　no　less　limited　by　circumstances　than　by　the　laws；　and　the　President　may　frequently　change　his　line　of　policy　without　involving　the　State　in　difficulty　or　destruction。

Whatever　the　prerogatives　of　the　executive　power　may　be；　the　period　which　immediately　precedes　an　election　and　the　moment　of　its　duration　must　always　be　considered　as　a　national　crisis；　which　is　perilous　in　proportion　to　the　internal　embarrassments　and　the　external　dangers　of　the　country。　　Few　of　the　nations　of　Europe　could　escape　the　calamities　of　anarchy　or　of　conquest　every　time　they　might　have　to　elect　a　new　sovereign。　　In　America　society　is　so　constituted　that　it　can　stand　without　assistance　upon　its　own　basis；　nothing　is　to　be　feared　from　the　pressure　of　external　dangers；　and　the　election　of　the　President　is　a　cause　of　agitation；　but　not　of　ruin。

Mode　Of