democracy in america-1-第36节
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nd a House of Representatives。 A spirit of conciliation prescribed the observance of distinct principles in the formation of these two assemblies。 I have already shown that two contrary interests were opposed to each other in the establishment of the Federal Constitution。 These two interests had given rise to two opinions。 It was the wish of one party to convert the Union into a league of independent States； or a sort of congress； at which the representatives of the several peoples would meet to discuss certain points of their common interests。 The other party desired to unite the inhabitants of the American colonies into one sole nation； and to establish a Government which should act as the sole representative of the nation； as far as the limited sphere of its authority would permit。 The practical consequences of these two theories were exceedingly different。
The question was； whether a league was to be established instead of a national Government； whether the majority of the State； instead of the majority of the inhabitants of the Union； was to give the law： for every State； the small as well as the great； would then remain in the full enjoyment of its independence； and enter the Union upon a footing of perfect equality。 If； however； the inhabitants of the United States were to be considered as belonging to one and the same nation； it would be just that the majority of the citizens of the Union should prescribe the law。 Of course the lesser States could not subscribe to the application of this doctrine without； in fact； abdicating their existence in relation to the sovereignty of the Confederation； since they would have passed from the condition of a co…equal and co…legislative authority to that of an insignificant fraction of a great people。 But if the former system would have invested them with an excessive authority； the latter would have annulled their influence altogether。 Under these circumstances the result was； that the strict rules of logic were evaded； as is usually the case when interests are opposed to arguments。 A middle course was hit upon by the legislators； which brought together by force two systems theoretically irreconcilable。
The principle of the independence of the States prevailed in the formation of the Senate； and that of the sovereignty of the nation predominated in the composition of the House of Representatives。 It was decided that each State should send two senators to Congress； and a number of representatives proportioned to its population。 *n It results from this arrangement that the State of New York has at the present day forty representatives and only two senators； the State of Delaware has two senators and only one representative； the State of Delaware is therefore equal to the State of New York in the Senate； whilst the latter has forty times the influence of the former in the House of Representatives。 Thus； if the minority of the nation preponderates in the Senate；。 it may paralyze the decisions of the majority represented in the other House； which is contrary to the spirit of constitutional government。
＇Footnote n： Every ten years Congress fixes anew the number of representatives which each State is to furnish。 The total number was 69 in 1789； and 240 in 1833。 （See 〃American Almanac；〃 1834； p。 194。） The Constitution decided that there should not be more than one representative for every 30；000 persons； but no minimum was fixed on。 The Congress has not thought fit to augment the number of representatives in proportion to the increase of population。 The first Act which was passed on the subject （April 14； 1792： see 〃Laws of the United States；〃 by Story； vol。 i。 p。 235） decided that there should be one representative for every 33；000 inhabitants。 The last Act； which was passed in 1832； fixes the proportion at one for 48；000。 The population represented is composed of all the free men and of three…fifths of the slaves。
＇The last Act of apportionment； passed February 2； 1872； fixes the representation at one to 134；684 inhabitants。 There are now （1875） 283 members of the lower House of Congress； and 9 for the States at large； making in all 292 members。 The old States have of course lost the representatives which the new States have gained。 … Translator's Note。＇＇
These facts show how rare and how difficult it is rationally and logically to combine all the several parts of legislation。 In the course of time different interests arise； and different principles are sanctioned by the same people； and when a general constitution is to be established； these interests and principles are so many natural obstacles to the rigorous application of any political system； with all its consequences。 The early stages of national existence are the only periods at which it is possible to maintain the complete logic of legislation； and when we perceive a nation in the enjoyment of this advantage； before we hasten to conclude that it is wise； we should do well to remember that it is young。 When the Federal Constitution was formed； the interests of independence for the separate States； and the interest of union for the whole people； were the only two conflicting interests which existed amongst the Anglo…Americans； and a compromise was necessarily made between them。
It is； however； just to acknowledge that this part of the Constitution has not hitherto produced those evils which might have been feared。 All the States are young and contiguous； their customs； their ideas； and their exigencies are not dissimilar； and the differences which result from their size or inferiority do not suffice to set their interests at variance。 The small States have consequently never been induced to league themselves together in the Senate to oppose the designs of the larger ones； and indeed there is so irresistible an authority in the legitimate expression of the will of a people that the Senate could offer but a feeble opposition to the vote of the majority of the House of Representatives。
It must not be forgotten； on the other hand； that it was not in the power of the American legislators to reduce to a single nation the people for whom they were making laws。 The object of the Federal Constitution was not to destroy the independence of the States； but to restrain it。 By acknowledging the real authority of these secondary communities （and it was impossible to deprive them of it）； they disavowed beforehand the habitual use of constraint in enforcing g the decisions of the majority。 Upon this principle the introduction of the influence of the States into the mechanism of the Federal Government was by no means to be wondered at； since it only attested the existence of an acknowledged power； which was to be humored and not forcibly checked。
A Further Difference Between The Senate And The House Of Representatives
The Senate named by the provincial legislators； the Representatives by the people … Double election of the former； single election of the latter … Term of the different offices … Peculiar functions of each House。
The Senate not only differs from the other House in the principle which it represents； but also in the mode of its election； in the term for which it is chosen； and in the nature of its functions。 The House of Representatives is named by the people； the Senate by the legislators of each State； the former is directly elected； the latter is elected by an elected body； the term for which the representatives are chosen is only two years； that of the senators is six。 The functions of the House of Representatives are purely legislative； and the only share it takes in the judicial power is in the impeachment of public officers。 The Senate co…operates in the work of legislation； and tries those political offences which the House of Representatives submits to its decision。 It also acts as the great executive council of the nation； the treaties which are concluded by the President must be ratified by the Senate； and the appointments he may make must be definitely approved by the same body。 *o
＇Footnote o： See 〃The Federalist；〃 Nos。 52…56； inclusive； Story； pp。 199…314； Constitution of the United States； sects。 2 and 3。＇ The Executive Power *p
＇Footnote p： See 〃The Federalist；〃 Nos。 67…77； Constitution of the United States； art。 2； Story； p。 315； pp。 615…780； Kent's 〃Commentaries；〃 p。 255。＇
Dependence of the President … He is elective and responsible … He is free to act in his own sphere under the inspection； but not under the direction； of the Senate … His salary fixed at his entry into office … Suspensive veto。
The American legislators undertook a difficult task in attempting to create an executive power dependent on the majority of the people； and nevertheless sufficiently strong to act without restraint in its own sphere。 It was indispensable to the maintenance of the republican form of government that the representative of the executive power should be subject to the will of the nation。
The President is an elective magistrate。 His honor； his property； his liberty； and his life are the securities which the people has for the temperate use of his power。 But in the exercise of his authority he cannot be said to be perfectly independent； the Senate takes cognizance of h
