democracy in america-1-第112节
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re attentive investigation shows it to be less so。 The undertakings of the Government of the Union are more vast； but their influence is more rarely felt。 Those of the provincial governments are comparatively small； but they are incessant； and they serve to keep alive the authority which they represent。 The Government of the Union watches the general interests of the country； but the general interests of a people have a very questionable influence upon individual happiness； whilst provincial interests produce a most immediate effect upon the welfare of the inhabitants。 The Union secures the independence and the greatness of the nation； which do not immediately affect private citizens； but the several States maintain the liberty； regulate the rights； protect the fortune； and secure the life and the whole future prosperity of every citizen。
The Federal Government is very far removed from its subjects； whilst the provincial governments are within the reach of them all； and are ready to attend to the smallest appeal。 The central Government has upon its side the passions of a few superior men who aspire to conduct it； but upon the side of the provincial governments are the interests of all those second…rate individuals who can only hope to obtain power within their own State； and who nevertheless exercise the largest share of authority over the people because they are placed nearest to its level。 The Americans have therefore much more to hope and to fear from the States than from the Union； and； in conformity with the natural tendency of the human mind； they are more likely to attach themselves to the former than to the latter。 In this respect their habits and feelings harmonize with their interests。
When a compact nation divides its sovereignty； and adopts a confederate form of government； the traditions； the customs； and the manners of the people are for a long time at variance with their legislation； and the former tend to give a degree of influence to the central government which the latter forbids。 When a number of confederate states unite to form a single nation； the same causes operate in an opposite direction。 I have no doubt that if France were to become a confederate republic like that of the United States； the government would at first display more energy than that of the Union； and if the Union were to alter its constitution to a monarchy like that of France； I think that the American Government would be a long time in acquiring the force which now rules the latter nation。 When the national existence of the Anglo…Americans began； their provincial existence was already of long standing； necessary relations were established between the townships and the individual citizens of the same States； and they were accustomed to consider some objects as common to them all； and to conduct other affairs as exclusively relating to their own special interests。
The Union is a vast body which presents no definite object to patriotic feeling。 The forms and limits of the State are distinct and circumscribed； since it represents a certain number of objects which are familiar to the citizens and beloved by all。 It is identified with the very soil； with the right of property and the domestic affections； with the recollections of the past； the labors of the present； and the hopes of the future。 Patriotism； then； which is frequently a mere extension of individual egotism； is still directed to the State； and is not excited by the Union。 Thus the tendency of the interests； the habits； and the feelings of the people is to centre political activity in the States； in preference to the Union。
It is easy to estimate the different forces of the two governments； by remarking the manner in which they fulfil their respective functions。 Whenever the government of a State has occasion to address an individual or an assembly of individuals； its language is clear and imperative； and such is also the tone of the Federal Government in its intercourse with individuals； but no sooner has it anything to do with a State than it begins to parley； to explain its motives and to justify its conduct； to argue； to advise； and； in short； anything but to command。 If doubts are raised as to the limits of the constitutional powers of each government； the provincial government prefers its claim with boldness； and takes prompt and energetic steps to support it。 In the mean while the Government of the Union reasons； it appeals to the interests； to the good sense； to the glory of the nation； it temporizes； it negotiates； and does not consent to act until it is reduced to the last extremity。 At first sight it might readily be imagined that it is the provincial government which is armed with the authority of the nation； and that Congress represents a single State。
The Federal Government is； therefore； notwithstanding the precautions of those who founded it； naturally so weak that it more peculiarly requires the free consent of the governed to enable it to subsist。 It is easy to perceive that its object is to enable the States to realize with facility their determination of remaining united； and； as long as this preliminary condition exists； its authority is great； temperate； and effective。 The Constitution fits the Government to control individuals； and easily to surmount such obstacles as they may be inclined to offer； but it was by no means established with a view to the possible separation of one or more of the States from the Union。
If the sovereignty of the Union were to engage in a struggle with that of the States at the present day； its defeat may be confidently predicted； and it is not probable that such a struggle would be seriously undertaken。 As often as a steady resistance is offered to the Federal Government it will be found to yield。 Experience has hitherto shown that whenever a State has demanded anything with perseverance and resolution； it has invariably succeeded； and that if a separate government has distinctly refused to act； it was left to do as it thought fit。 *z
＇Footnote z： See the conduct of the Northern States in the war of 1812。 〃During that war；〃 says Jefferson in a letter to General Lafayette； 〃four of the Eastern States were only attached to the Union； like so many inanimate bodies to living men。〃＇
But even if the Government of the Union had any strength inherent in itself； the physical situation of the country would render the exercise of that strength very difficult。 *a The United States cover an immense territory； they are separated from each other by great distances； and the population is disseminated over the surface of a country which is still half a wilderness。 If the Union were to undertake to enforce the allegiance of the confederate States by military means； it would be in a position very analogous to that of England at the time of the War of Independence。
＇Footnote a： The profound peace of the Union affords no pretext for a standing army； and without a standing army a government is not prepared to profit by a favorable opportunity to conquer resistance； and take the sovereign power by surprise。 ＇This note； and the paragraph in the text which precedes； have been shown by the results of the Civil War to be a misconception of the writer。＇＇
However strong a government may be； it cannot easily escape from the consequences of a principle which it has once admitted as the foundation of its constitution。 The Union was formed by the voluntary agreement of the States； and； in uniting together； they have not forfeited their nationality； nor have they been reduced to the condition of one and the same people。 If one of the States chose to withdraw its name from the contract； it would be difficult to disprove its right of doing so； and the Federal Government would have no means of maintaining its claims directly； either by force or by right。 In order to enable the Federal Government easily to conquer the resistance which may be offered to it by any one of its subjects； it would be necessary that one or more of them should be specially interested in the existence of the Union； as has frequently been the case in the history of confederations。
If it be supposed that amongst the States which are united by the federal tie there are some which exclusively enjoy the principal advantages of union； or whose prosperity depends on the duration of that union； it is unquestionable that they will always be ready to support the central Government in enforcing the obedience of the others。 But the Government would then be exerting a force not derived from itself； but from a principle contrary to its nature。 States form confederations in order to derive equal advantages from their union； and in the case just alluded to； the Federal Government would derive its power from the unequal distribution of those benefits amongst the States。
If one of the confederate States have acquired a preponderance sufficiently great to enable it to take exclusive possession of the central authority； it will consider the other States as subject provinces； and it will cause its own supremacy to be respected under the borrowed name of the sovereignty of the Union。 Great things may then be done in the name of the Federal Government； but in real
