democracy in america-1-第111节
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n had scarcely begun; and the fact of Southern slavery was accepted by men of all parties; even in the States where there were no slaves: and that was unquestionably the view taken by all the States and by all American statesmen at the time of the adoption of the Constitution; in 1789。 But in the course of thirty years a great change took place; and the North refused to perpetuate what had become the 〃peculiar institution〃 of the South; especially as it gave the South a species of aristocratic preponderance。 The result was the ratification; in December; 1865; of the celebrated 13th article or amendment of the Constitution; which declared that 〃neither slavery nor involuntary servitude … except as a punishment for crime … shall exist within the United States。〃 To which was soon afterwards added the 15th article; 〃The right of citizens to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States; or by any State; on account of race; color; or previous servitude。〃 The emancipation of several millions of negro slaves without compensation; and the transfer to them of political preponderance in the States in which they outnumber the white population; were acts of the North totally opposed to the interests of the South; and which could only have been carried into effect by conquest。 … Translator's Note。''
Reason for which the preponderating force lies in the States rather than in the Union … The Union will only last as long as all the States choose to belong to it … Causes which tend to keep them united … Utility of the Union to resist foreign enemies; and to prevent the existence of foreigners in America … No natural barriers between the several States … No conflicting interests to divide them … Reciprocal interests of the Northern; Southern; and Western States … Intellectual ties of union … Uniformity of opinions … Dangers of the Union resulting from the different characters and the passions of its citizens … Character of the citizens in the South and in the North … The rapid growth of the Union one of its greatest dangers … Progress of the population to the Northwest … Power gravitates in the same direction … Passions originating from sudden turns of fortune … Whether the existing Government of the Union tends to gain strength; or to lose it … Various signs of its decrease … Internal improvements … Waste lands … Indians … The Bank … The Tariff … General Jackson。
The maintenance of the existing institutions of the several States depends in some measure upon the maintenance of the Union itself。 It is therefore important in the first instance to inquire into the probable fate of the Union。 One point may indeed be assumed at once: if the present confederation were dissolved; it appears to me to be incontestable that the States of which it is now composed would not return to their original isolated condition; but that several unions would then be formed in the place of one。 It is not my intention to inquire into the principles upon which these new unions would probably be established; but merely to show what the causes are which may effect the dismemberment of the existing confederation。
With this object I shall be obliged to retrace some of the steps which I have already taken; and to revert to topics which I have before discussed。 I am aware that the reader may accuse me of repetition; but the importance of the matter which still remains to be treated is my excuse; I had rather say too much; than say too little to be thoroughly understood; and I prefer injuring the author to slighting the subject。
The legislators who formed the Constitution of 1789 endeavored to confer a distinct and preponderating authority upon the federal power。 But they were confined by the conditions of the task which they had undertaken to perform。 They were not appointed to constitute the government of a single people; but to regulate the association of several States; and; whatever their inclinations might be; they could not but divide the exercise of sovereignty in the end。
In order to understand the consequences of this division; it is necessary to make a short distinction between the affairs of the Government。 There are some objects which are national by their very nature; that is to say; which affect the nation as a body; and can only be intrusted to the man or the assembly of men who most completely represent the entire nation。 Amongst these may be reckoned war and diplomacy。 There are other objects which are provincial by their very nature; that is to say; which only affect certain localities; and which can only be properly treated in that locality。 Such; for instance; is the budget of a municipality。 Lastly; there are certain objects of a mixed nature; which are national inasmuch as they affect all the citizens who compose the nation; and which are provincial inasmuch as it is not necessary that the nation itself should provide for them all。 Such are the rights which regulate the civil and political condition of the citizens。 No society can exist without civil and political rights。 These rights therefore interest all the citizens alike; but it is not always necessary to the existence and the prosperity of the nation that these rights should be uniform; nor; consequently; that they should be regulated by the central authority。
There are; then; two distinct categories of objects which are submitted to the direction of the sovereign power; and these categories occur in all well…constituted communities; whatever the basis of the political constitution may otherwise be。 Between these two extremes the objects which I have termed mixed may be considered to lie。 As these objects are neither exclusively national nor entirely provincial; they may be obtained by a national or by a provincial government; according to the agreement of the contracting parties; without in any way impairing the contract of association。
The sovereign power is usually formed by the union of separate individuals; who compose a people; and individual powers or collective forces; each representing a very small portion of the sovereign authority; are the sole elements which are subjected to the general Government of their choice。 In this case the general Government is more naturally called upon to regulate; not only those affairs which are of essential national importance; but those which are of a more local interest; and the local governments are reduced to that small share of sovereign authority which is indispensable to their prosperity。
But sometimes the sovereign authority is composed of preorganized political bodies; by virtue of circumstances anterior to their union; and in this case the provincial governments assume the control; not only of those affairs which more peculiarly belong to their province; but of all; or of a part of the mixed affairs to which allusion has been made。 For the confederate nations which were independent sovereign States before their union; and which still represent a very considerable share of the sovereign power; have only consented to cede to the general Government the exercise of those rights which are indispensable to the Union。
When the national Government; independently of the prerogatives inherent in its nature; is invested with the right of regulating the affairs which relate partly to the general and partly to the local interests; it possesses a preponderating influence。 Not only are its own rights extensive; but all the rights which it does not possess exist by its sufferance; and it may be apprehended that the provincial governments may be deprived of their natural and necessary prerogatives by its influence。
When; on the other hand; the provincial governments are invested with the power of regulating those same affairs of mixed interest; an opposite tendency prevails in society。 The preponderating force resides in the province; not in the nation; and it may be apprehended that the national Government may in the end be stripped of the privileges which are necessary to its existence。
Independent nations have therefore a natural tendency to centralization; and confederations to dismemberment。
It now only remains for us to apply these general principles to the American Union。 The several States were necessarily possessed of the right of regulating all exclusively provincial affairs。 Moreover these same States retained the rights of determining the civil and political competency of the citizens; or regulating the reciprocal relations of the members of the community; and of dispensing justice; rights which are of a general nature; but which do not necessarily appertain to the national Government。 We have shown that the Government of the Union is invested with the power of acting in the name of the whole nation in those cases in which the nation has to appear as a single and undivided power; as; for instance; in foreign relations; and in offering a common resistance to a common enemy; in short; in conducting those affairs which I have styled exclusively national。
In this division of the rights of sovereignty; the share of the Union seems at first sight to be more considerable than that of the States; but a more attentive investigation shows it to be less so。 The undertakings of the Government of the Union