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judges　indeed　might；　in　this　case；　be　under　the　temptation　of

multiplying　unnecessarily　the　proceedings　upon　every　cause；　in

order　to　increase；　as　much　as　possible；　the　produce　of　such　a

stamp…duty。　It　has　been　the　custom　in　modern　Europe　to　regulate；

upon　most　occasions；　the　payment　of　the　attorneys　and　clerks　of

court　according　to　the　number　of　pages　which　they　had　occasion　to

write；　the　court；　however；　requiring　that　each　page　should

contain　so　many　lines；　and　each　line　so　many　words。　In　order　to

increase　their　payment；　the　attorneys　and　clerks　have　contrived

to　multiply　words　beyond　all　necessity；　to　the　corruption　of　the

law　language　of；　I　believe；　every　court　of　justice　in　Europe。　A

like　temptation　might　perhaps　occasion　a　like　corruption　in　the

form　of　law　proceedings。

　　　　　But　whether　the　administration　of　justice　be　so　contrived　as

to　defray　its　own　expense；　or　whether　the　judges　be　maintained　by

fixed　salaries　paid　to　them　from　some　other　fund；　it　does　not

seem　necessary　that　the　person　or　persons　entrusted　with　the

executive　power　should　be　charged　with　the　management　of　that

fund；　or　with　the　payment　of　those　salaries。　That　fund　might

arise　from　the　rent　of　landed　estates；　the　management　of　each

estate　being　entrusted　to　the　particular　court　which　was　to　be

maintained　by　it。　That　fund　might　arise　even　from　the　interest　of

a　sum　of　money；　the　lending　out　of　which　might；　in　the　same

manner；　be　entrusted　to　the　court　which　was　to　be　maintained　by

it。　A　part；　though　indeed　but　a　small　part；　of　the　salary　of　the

judges　of　the　Court　of　Session　in　Scotland　arises　from　the

interest　of　a　sum　of　money。　The　necessary　instability　of　such　a

fund　seems；　however；　to　render　it　an　improper　one　for　the

maintenance　of　an　institution　which　ought　to　last　for　ever。

　　　　　The　separation　of　the　judicial　from　the　executive　power

seems　originally　to　have　arisen　from　the　increasing　business　of

the　society；　in　consequence　of　its　increasing　improvement。　The

administration　of　justice　became　so　laborious　and　so　complicated

a　duty　as　to　require　the　undivided　attention　of　the　persons　to

whom　it　was　entrusted。　The　person　entrusted　with　the　executive

power　not　having　leisure　to　attend　to　the　decision　of　private

causes　himself；　a　deputy　was　appointed　to　decide　them　in　his

stead。　In　the　progress　of　the　Roman　greatness；　the　consul　was　too

much　occupied　with　the　political　affairs　of　the　state　to　attend

to　the　administration　of　justice。　A　praetor；　therefore；　was

appointed　to　administer　it　in　his　stead。　In　the　progress　of　the

European　monarchies　which　were　founded　upon　the　ruins　of　the

Roman　empire；　the　sovereigns　and　the　great　lords　came　universally

to　consider　the　administration　of　justice　as　an　office　both　too

laborious　and　too　ignoble　for　them　to　execute　in　their　own

persons。　They　universally；　therefore；　discharged　themselves　of　it

by　appointing　a　deputy；　bailiff；　or　judge。

　　　　　When　the　judicial　is　united　to　the　executive　power；　it　is

scarce　possible　that　justice　should　not　frequently　be　sacrificed

to　what　is　vulgarly　called　polities。　The　persons　entrusted　with

the　great　interests　of　the　state　may；　even　without　any　corrupt

views；　sometimes　imagine　it　necessary　to　sacrifice　to　those

interests　the　rights　of　a　private　man。　But　upon　the　impartial

administration　of　justice　depends　the　liberty　of　every

individual；　the　sense　which　he　has　of　his　own　security。　In　order

to　make　every　individual　feel　himself　perfectly　secure　in　the

possession　of　every　right　which　belongs　to　him；　it　is　not　only

necessary　that　the　judicial　should　be　separated　from　the

executive　power；　but　that　it　should　be　rendered　as　much　as

possible　independent　of　that　power。　The　judge　should　not　be

liable　to　be　removed　from　his　office　according　to　the　caprice　of

that　power。　The　regular　the　good…will　or　even　upon　the　good

economy　payment　of　his　salary　should　not　depend　upon　of　that

power。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　PART　3

　　　　　　　Of　the　Expense　of　Public　Works　and　Public　Institutions　

　　　　　THE　third　and　last　duty　of　the　sovereign　or　commonwealth　is

that　of　erecting　and　maintaining　those　public　institutions　and

those　public　works；　which；　though　they　may　be　in　the　highest

degree　advantageous　to　a　great　society；　are；　however；　of　such　a

nature　that　the　profit　could　never　repay　the　expense　to　any

individual　or　small　number　of　individuals；　and　which　it　therefore

cannot　be　expected　that　any　individual　or　small　number　of

individuals　should　erect　or　maintain。　The　performance　of　this

duty　requires；　too；　very　different　degrees　of　expense　in　the

different　periods　of　society。

　　　　　After　the　public　institutions　and　public　works　necessary　for

the　defence　of　the　society；　and　for　the　administration　of

justice；　both　of　which　have　already　been　mentioned；　the　other

works　and　institutions　of　this　kind　are　chiefly　those　for

facilitating　the　commerce　of　the　society；　and　those　for　promoting

the　instruction　of　the　people。　The　institutions　for　instruction

are　of　two　kinds：　those　for　the　education　of　youth；　and　those　for

the　instruction　of　people　of　all　ages。　The　consideration　of　the

manner　in　which　the　expense　of　those　different　sorts　of　public；

works　and　institutions　may　be　most　properly　defrayed　will　divide

this　third　part　of　the　present　chapter　into　three　different

articles。　　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ARTICLE　1

　　　　　　Of　the　Public　Works　and　Institutions　for　facilitating　the

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Commerce　of　the　Society

　　　　　　And；　first；　of　those　which　are　necessary　for　facilitating

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Commerce　in　general。　

　　　　　That　the　erection　and　maintenance　of　the　public　works　which

facilitate　the　commerce　of　any　country；　such　as　good　roads；

bridges；　navigable　canals；　harbours；　etc。；　must　require　very

different　degrees　of　expense　in　the　different　periods　of　society

is　evident　without　any　proof。　The　expense　of　making　and

maintaining　the　public　roads　of　any　country　must　evidently

increase　with　the　annual　produce　of　the　land　and　labour　of　that

country；　or　with　the　quantity　and　weight　of　the　goods　which　it

becomes　necessary　to　fetch　and　carry　upon　those　roads。　The

strength　of　a　bridge　must　be　suited　to　the　number　and　weight　of

the　carriages　which　are　likely　to　pass　over　it。　The　depth　and　the

supply　of　water　for　a　navigable　canal　must　be　proportioned　to　the

number　and　tonnage　of　the　lighters　which　are　likely　to　carry

goods　upon　it；　the　extent　of　a　harbour　to　the　number　of　the

shipping　which　are　likely　to　take　shelter　in　it。

　　　　　It　does　not　seem　necessary　that　the　expense　of　those　public

works　should　be　defrayed　from　that　public　revenue；　as　it　is

commonly　called；　of　which　the　collection　and　application　is　in

most　countries　assigned　to　the　executive　power。　The　greater　part

of　such　public　works　may　easily　be　so　managed　as　to　afford　a

particular　revenue　sufficient　for　defraying　their　own　expense；

without　bringing　any　burden　upon　the　general　revenue　of　the

society。

　　　　　A　highway；　a　bridge；　a　navigable　canal；　for　example；　may　in

most　cases　be　both　made　and　maintained　by　a　small　toll　upon　the

carriages　which　make　use　of　them：　a　harbour；　by　a　moderate

port…duty　upon　the　tonnage　of　the　shipping　which　load　or　unload

in　it。　The　coinage；　another　institution　for　facilitating

commerce；　in　many　countries；　not　only　defrays　its　own　expense；

but　affords　a　small　revenue　or　seignorage　to　the　sovereign。　The

post…office；　another　institution　for　the　same　purpose；　over　and

above　defraying　its　own　expense；　affords　in　almost　all　countries

a　very　considerable　revenue　to　the　sovereign。

　　　　　When　the　carriages　which　pass　over　a　highway　or　a　bridge；

and　the　lighters　which　sail　upon　a　navigable　canal；　pay　toll　in

proportion　to　their　weight　or　their　tonnage；　they　pay　for　the

maintenance　of　those　public　works　exactly　in　proportion　to　the

wear　and　tear　which　they　occasion　of　them。　It　seems　scarce

possible　to　invent　a　more　equitable　way　of　maintaining　such

works。　This　tax　or　toll　too；　though　it　is　advanced　by　the

carrier；　is　finally　paid　by　the　consumer；　to　whom　it　must　always

be　charged　in　the　price　of　the　goods。　As　the　expense　of　carriage；

however；　is　very　much　reduced　by　means　of　such　public　works；　the

goods；　notwithstanding　the　toll　come　cheaper　to　the　consumer　than

the；　could　otherwise　have　done；　their　price　not　being　so　much

raised　by　the　toll　as　it　is　lowered　by　the　cheapness　of　the

carriage。　The　person　who　finally　pays　this　tax；　therefore；　gains

by　the　application　more　than　he　loses　by　the　payment　of　it。　His

payment　is　exactly　in　proportion　to　his　gain。　It　is　in　reality　no

more　than　a　part　of　that　gain　which　he　is　obliged　to　give　up　in

order　to　get　the　rest。　It　seems　impossible　to　imagine　a　more

equitable　method　of　raising　a　tax。

　　　　　When　the　toll　upon　carriages　of　luxury　upon　coaches；

post…chaises；　etc。；　is　made　somewhat　higher　in　proportion　to

their　weight　than　upon　carriages　of　necessary　use；　such　as　carts；