wealbk05-第62节

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those　times　of　violence　and　disorder；　besides；　it　was　convenient

to　have　a　hoard　of　money　at　hand；　that　in　case　they　should　be

driven　from　their　own　home　they　might　have　something　of　known

value　to　carry　with　them　to　some　place　of　safety。　The　same

violence　which　made　it　convenient　to　hoard　made　it　equally

convenient　to　conceal　the　hoard。　The　frequency　of　treasure…trove；

or　of　treasure　found　of　which　no　owner　was　known；　sufficiently

demonstrates　the　frequency　in　those　times　both　of　hoarding　and　of

concealing　the　board。　Treasure…trove　was　then　considered　as　an

important　branch　of　the　revenue　of　the　sovereign。　All　the

treasure…trove　of　the　kingdom　would　scarce　perhaps　in　the　present

times　make　an　important　branch　of　the　revenue　of　a　private

gentleman　of　a　good　estate。

　　　　　The　same　disposition　to　save　and　to　hoard　prevailed　in　the

sovereign　as　well　as　in　the　subjects。　Among　nations　to　whom

commerce　and　manufactures　are　little　known；　the　sovereign；　it　has

already　been　observed　in　the　fourth　book；　is　in　a　situation　which

naturally　disposes　him　to　the　parsimony　requisite　for

accumulation。　In　that　situation　the　expense　even　of　a　sovereign

cannot　be　directed　by　that　vanity　which　delights　in　the　gaudy

finery　of　a　court。　The　ignorance　of　the　times　affords　but　few　of

the　trinkets　in　which　that　finery　consists。　Standing　armies　are

not　then　necessary；　so　that　the　expense　even　of　a　sovereign；　like

that　of　any　other　great　lord；　can　be　employed　in　scarce　anything

but　bounty　to　his　tenants　and　hospitality　to　his　retainers。　But

bounty　and　hospitality　very　seldom　lead　to　extravagance；　though

vanity　almost　always　does。　All　the　ancient　sovereigns　of　Europe

accordingly；　it　has　already　been　observed；　had　treasures。　Every

Tartar　chief　in　the　present　times　is　said　to　have　one。

　　　　　In　a　commercial　country　abounding　with　every　sort　of

expensive　luxury；　the　sovereign；　in　the　same　manner　as　almost　all

the　great　proprietors　in　his　dominions；　naturally　spends　a　great

part　of　his　revenue　in　purchasing　those　luxuries。　His　own　and　the

neighbouring　countries　supply　him　abundantly　with　all　the　costly

trinkets　which　compose　the　splendid　but　insignificant　pageantry

of　a　court。　For　the　sake　of　an　inferior　pageantry　of　the　same

kind；　his　nobles　dismiss　their　retainers；　make　their　tenants

independent；　and　become　gradually　themselves　as　insignificant　as

the　greater　part　of　the　wealthy　burghers　in　his　dominions。　The

same　frivolous　passions　which　influence　their　conduct　influence

his。　How　can　it　be　supposed　that　he　should　be　the　only　rich　man

in　his　dominions　who　is　insensible　to　pleasures　of　this　kind？　If

he　does　not；　what　he　is　very　likely　to　do；　spend　upon　those

pleasures　so　great　a　part　of　his　revenue　as　to　debilitate　very

much　the　defensive　power　of　the　state；　it　cannot　well　be　expected

that　he　should　not　spend　upon　them　all　that　part　of　it　which　is

over　and　above　what　is　necessary　for　supporting　that　defensive

power。　His　ordinary　expense　becomes　equal　to　his　ordinary

revenue；　and　it　is　well　if　it　does　not　frequently　exceed　it。　The

amassing　of　treasure　can　no　longer　be　expected；　and　when

extraordinary　exigencies　require　extraordinary　expenses；　he　must

necessarily　call　upon　his　subjects　for　an　extraordinary　aid。　The

present　and　the　late　king　of　Prussia　are　the　only　great　princes

of　Europe　who；　since　the　death　of　Henry　IV　of　France　in　1610；　are

supposed　to　have　amassed　any　considerable　treasure。　The　parsimony

which　leads　to　accumulation　has　become　almost　as　rare　in

republican　as　in　monarchical　governments。　The　Italian　republics；

the　United　Provinces　of　the　Netherlands；　are　all　in　debt。　The

canton　of　Berne　is　the　single　republic　in　Europe　which　has

amassed　any　considerable　treasure。　The　other　Swiss　republics　have

not。　The　taste　for　some　sort　of　pageantry；　for　splendid

buildings；　at　least；　and　other　public　ornaments；　frequently

prevails　as　much　in　the　apparently　sober　senate…house　of　a　little

republic　as　in　the　dissipated　court　of　the　greatest　king。

　　　　　The　want　of　parsimony　in　time　of　peace　imposes　the　necessity

of　contracting　debt　in　time　of　war。　When　war　comes；　there　is　no

money　in　the　treasury　but　what　is　necessary　for　carrying　on　the

ordinary　expense　of　the　peace　establishment。　In　war　an

establishment　of　three　of　four　times　that　expense　becomes

necessary　for　the　defence　of　the　state；　and　consequently　a

revenue　three　or　four　times　greater　than　the　peace　revenue。

Supposing　that　the　sovereign　should　have；　what　he　scarce　ever

has；　the　immediate　means　of　augmenting　his　revenue　in　proportion

to　the　augmentation　of　his　expense；　yet　still　the　produce　of　the

taxes；　from　which　this　increase　of　revenue　must　be　drawn；　will

not　begin　to　come　into　the　treasury　till　perhaps　ten　or　twelve

months　after　they　are　imposed。　But　the　moment　in　which　war

begins；　or　rather　the　moment　in　which　it　appears　likely　to　begin；

the　army　must　be　augmented；　the　fleet　must　be　fitted　out；　the

garrisoned　towns　must　be　put　into　a　posture　of　defence；　that

army；　that　fleet；　those　garrisoned　towns　must　be　furnished　with

arms；　ammunition；　and　provisions。　An　immediate　and　great　expense

must　be　incurred　in　that　moment　of　immediate　danger；　which　will

not　wait　for　the　gradual　and　slow　returns　of　the　new　taxes。　In

this　exigency　government　can　have　no　other　resource　but　in

borrowing。

　　　　　The　same　commercial　state　of　society　which；　by　the　operation

of　moral　causes；　brings　government　in　this　manner　into　the

necessity　of　borrowing；　produces　in　the　subjects　both　an　ability

and　an　inclination　to　lend。　If　it　commonly　brings　along　with　it

the　necessity　of　borrowing；　it　likewise　brings　along　with　it　the

facility　of　doing　so。

　　　　　A　country　abounding　with　merchants　and　manufacturers

necessarily　abounds　with　a　set　of　people　through　whose　hands　not

only　their　own　capitals；　but　the　capitals　of　all　those　who　either

lend　them　money；　or　trust　them　with　goods；　pass　as　frequently；　or

more　frequently；　than　the　revenue　of　a　private　man；　who；　without

trade　or　business；　lives　upon　his　income；　passes　through　his

hands。　The　revenue　of　such　a　man　can　regularly　pass　through　his

hands　only　once　in　a　year。　But　the　whole　amount　of　the　capital

and　credit　of　a　merchant；　who　deals　in　a　trade　of　which　the

returns　are　very　quick；　may　sometimes　pass　through　his　hands　two；

three；　or　four　times　a　year。　A　country　abounding　with　merchants

and　manufacturers；　therefore；　necessarily　abounds　with　a　set　of

people　who　have　it　at　all　times　in　their　power　to　advance；　if

they　choose　to　do　so；　a　very　large　sum　of　money　to　government。

Hence　the　ability　in　the　subjects　of　a　commercial　state　to　lend。

　　　　　Commerce　and　manufactures　can　seldom　flourish　long　in　any

state　which　does　not　enjoy　a　regular　administration　of　justice；

in　which　the　people　do　not　feel　themselves　secure　in　the

possession　of　their　property；　in　which　the　faith　of　contracts　is

not　supported　by　law；　and　in　which　the　authority　of　the　state　is

not　supposed　to　be　regularly　employed　in　enforcing　the　payment　of

debts　from　all　those　who　are　able　to　pay。　Commerce　and

manufactures；　in　short；　can　seldom　flourish　in　any　state　in　which

there　is　not　a　certain　degree　of　confidence　in　the　justice　of

government。　The　same　confidence　which　disposes　great　merchants

and　manufacturers；　upon　ordinary　occasions；　to　trust　their

property　to　the　protection　of　a　particular　government；　disposes

them；　upon　extraordinary　occasions；　to　trust　that　government　with

the　use　of　their　property。　By　lending　money　to　government；　they

do　not　even　for　a　moment　diminish　their　ability　to　carry　on　their

trade　and　manufactures。　On　the　contrary；　they　commonly　augment

it。　The　necessities　of　the　state　render　government　upon　most

occasions　willing　to　borrow　upon　terms　extremely　advantageous　to

the　lender。　The　security　which　it　grants　to　the　original　creditor

is　made　transferable　to　any　other　creditor；　and；　from　the

universal　confidence　in　the　justice　of　the　state；　generally　sells

in　the　market　for　more　than　was　originally　paid　for　it。　The

merchant　or　monied　man　makes　money　by　lending　money　to

government；　and　instead　of　diminishing；　increases　his　trading

capital。　He　generally　considers　it　as　a　favour；　therefore；　when

the　administration　admits　him　to　a　share　in　the　first

subscription　for　a　new　loan。　Hence　the　inclination　or　willingness

in　the　subjects　of　a　commercial　state　to　lend。

　　　　　The　government　of　such　a　state　is　very　apt　to　repose　itself

upon　this　ability　and　willingness　of　its　subjects　to　lend　it

their　money　on　extraordinary　occasions。　It　foresees　the　facility

of　borrowing；　and　therefore　dispenses　itself　from　the　duty　of

saving。

　　　　　In　a　rude　state　of　society　there　are　no　great　mercantile　or

manufacturing　capitals。　The　individuals　who　hoard　whatever　money

they　can　save；　and　who　conceal　their　hoard；　do　so　from　a　distrust

of　the　justice　of　government；　from　a　fear　that　if　it　was　known

that　they　had　a　hoard；　and　where　that