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much　beyond　what　was　necessary　for　the　payment　of　the　tax。　The

final　payment；　instead　of　falling　upon　the　shopkeeper；　would　have

fallen　upon　the　consumer；　with　a　considerable　overcharge　to　the

profit　of　the　shopkeeper。　For　these　reasons　the　project　of　a　tax

upon　shops　was　laid　aside；　and　in　the　room　of　it　was　substituted

the　subsidy；　1759。

　　　　　What　in　France　is　called　the　personal　taille　is；　perhaps；

the　most　important　tax　upon　the　profits　of　stock　employed　in

agriculture　that　is　levied　in　any　part　of　Europe。

　　　　　In　the　disorderly　state　of　Europe　during　the　prevalence　of

the　feudal　government；　the　sovereign　was　obliged　to　content

himself　with　taxing　those　who　were　too　weak　to　refuse　to　pay

taxes。　The　great　lords；　though　willing　to　assist　him　upon

particular　emergencies；　refused　to　subject　themselves　to　any

constant　tax；　and　he　was　not　strong　enough　to　force　them。　The

occupiers　of　land　all　over　Europe　were；　the　greater　part　of　them；

originally　bondmen。　Through　the　greater　part　of　Europe　they　were

gradually　emancipated。　Some　of　them　acquired　the　property　of

landed　estates　which　they　held　by　some　base　or　ignoble　tenure；

sometimes　under　the　king；　and　sometimes　under　some　other　great

lord；　like　the　ancient　copy…holders　of　England。　Others　without

acquiring　the　property；　obtained　leases　for　terms　of　years　of　the

lands　which　they　occupied　under　their　lord；　and　thus　became　less

dependent　upon　him。　The　great　lords　seem　to　have　beheld　the

degree　of　prosperity　and　independency　which　this　inferior　order

of　men　had　thus　come　to　enjoy　with　a　malignant　and　contemptuous

indignation；　and　willingly　consented　that　the　sovereign　should

tax　them。　In　some　countries　this　tax　was　confined　to　the　lands

which　were　held　in　property　by　an　ignoble　tenure；　and；　in　this

case；　the　taille　was　said　to　be　real。　The　land…tax　established　by

the　late　King　of　Sardinia；　and　the　taille　in　the　provinces　of

Languedoc；　Provence；　Dauphine；　and　Brittany；　in　the　generality　of

Montauban；　and　in　the　elections　of　Agen　and　Comdom；　as　well　as　in

some　other　districts　of　France；　are　taxes　upon　lands　held　in

property　by　an　ignoble　tenure。　In　other　countries　the　tax　was

laid　upon　the　supposed　profits　of　all　those　who　held　in　farm　or

lease　lands　belonging　to　other　people；　whatever　might　be　the

tenure　by　which　the　proprietor　held　them；　and　in　this　case　the

taille　was　said　to　be　personal。　In　the　greater　part　of　those

provinces　of　France　which　are　called　the　Countries　of　Elections

the　taille　is　of　this　kind。　The　real　taille；　as　it　is　imposed

only　upon　a　part　of　the　lands　of　the　country；　is　necessarily　an

unequal；　but　it　is　not　always　an　arbitrary　tax；　though　it　is　so

upon　some　occasions。　The　personal　taille；　as　it　is　intended　to　be

proportioned　to　the　profits　of　a　certain　class　of　people　which

can　only　be　guessed　at；　is　necessarily　both　arbitrary　and

unequal。

　　　　　In　France　the　personal　taille　at　present　（1775）　annually

imposed　upon　the　twenty　generalities　called　the　Countries　of

Elections　amounts　to　40；107；239　livres；　16　sous。　The　proportion

in　which　this　sum　is　assessed　upon　those　different　provinces

varies　from　year　to　year　according　to　the　reports　which　are　made

to　the　king's　council　concerning　the　goodness　or　badness　of　the

crops；　as　well　as　other　circumstances　which　may　either　increase

or　diminish　their　respective　abilities　to　pay。　Each　generality　it

divided　into　a　certain　number　of　elections；　and　the　proportion　in

which　the　sum　imposed　upon　the　whole　generality　is　divided　among

those　different　elections　varies　likewise　from　year　to　year

according　to　the　reports　made　to　the　council　concerning　their

respective　abilities。　It　seems　impossible　that　the　council；　with

the　best　intentions；　can　ever　proportion　with　tolerable　exactness

either　of　those　two　assessments　to　the　real　abilities　of　the

province　or　district　upon　which　they　are　respectively　laid。

Ignorance　and　misinformation　must　always；　more　or　less；　mislead

the　most　upright　council。　The　proportion　which　each　parish　ought

to　support　of　what　is　assessed　upon　the　whole　election；　and　that

which　each　individual　ought　to　support　of　what　is　assessed　upon

his　particular　parish；　are　both　in　the　same　manner　varied；　from

year　to　year；　according　as　circumstances　are　supposed　to　require。

These　circumstances　are　judged　of；　in　the　one　case；　by　the

officers　of　the　election；　in　the　other　by　those　of　the　parish；

and　both　the　one　and　the　other　are；　more　or　less；　under　the

direction　and　influence　of　the　intendant。　Not　only　ignorance　and

misinformation；　but　friendship；　party　animosity；　and　private

resentment　are　said　frequently　to　mislead　such　assessors。　No　man

subject　to　such　a　tax；　it　is　evident；　can　ever　be　certain；　before

he　is　assessed；　of　what　he　is　to　pay。　He　cannot　even　be　certain

after　he　is　assessed。　If　any　person　has　been　taxed　who　ought　to

have　been　exempted；　or　if　any　person　has　been　taxed　beyond　his

proportion；　though　both　must　pay　in　the　meantime；　yet　if　they

complain；　and　make　good　their　complaints；　the　whole　parish　is

reimposed　next　year　in　order　to　reimburse　them。　If　any　of　the

contributors　become　bankrupt　or　insolvent；　the　collector　is

obliged　to　advance　his　tax；　and　the　whole　parish　is　reimposed

next　year　in　order　to　reimburse　the　collector。　If　the　collector

himself　should　become　bankrupt；　the　parish　which　elects　him　must

answer　for　his　conduct　to　the　receiver　general　of　the　election。

But；　as　it　might　be　troublesome　for　the　receiver　to　prosecute　the

whole　parish；　he　takes　at　his　choice　five　or　six　of　the　richest

contributors　and　obliges　them　to　make　good　what　had　been　lost　by

the　insolvency　of　the　collector。　The　parish　is　afterwards

reimposed　in　order　to　reimburse　those　five　or　six。　Such

reimpositions　are　always　over　and　above　the　taille　of　the

particular　year　in　which　they　are　laid　on。

　　　　　When　a　tax　is　imposed　upon　the　profits　of　stock　in　a

particular　branch　of　trade；　the　traders　are　all　careful　to　bring

no　more　goods　to　market　than　what　they　can　sell　at　a　price

sufficient　to　reimburse　them　for　advancing　the　tax。　Some　of　them

withdraw　a　part　of　their　stocks　from　the　trade；　and　the　market　is

more　sparingly　supplied　than　before。　The　price　of　the　goods

rises；　and　the　final　payment　of　the　tax　falls　upon　the　consumer。

But　when　a　tax　is　imposed　upon　the　profits　of　stock　employed　in

agriculture；　it　is　not　the　interest　of　the　farmers　to　withdraw

any　part　of　their　stock　from　that　employment。　Each　farmer

occupies　a　certain　quantity　of　land；　for　which　hi　pays　rent。　For

the　proper　cultivation　of　this　land　a　certain　quantity　of　stock

is　necessary；　and　by　withdrawing　any　part　of　this　necessary

quantity；　the　farmer　is　not　likely　to　be　more　able　to　pay　either

the　rent　or　the　tax。　In　order　to　pay　the　tax；　it　can　never　be　his

interest　to　diminish　the　quantity　of　his　produce；　nor

consequently　to　supply　the　market　more　sparingly　than　before。　The

tax；　therefore；　will　never　enable　him　to　raise　the　price　of　his

produce　so　as　to　reimburse　himself　by　throwing　the　final　payment

upon　the　consumer。　The　farmer；　however；　must　have　his　reasonable

profit　as　well　as　every　other　dealer；　otherwise　he　must　give　up

the　trade。　After　the　imposition　of　a　tax　of　this　kind；　he　can　get

this　reasonable　profit　only　by　paying　less　rent　to　the　landlord。

The　more　he　is　obliged　to　pay　in　the　way　of　tax　the　less　he　can

afford　to　pay　in　the　way　of　rent。　A　tax　of　this　kind　imposed

during　the　currency　of　a　lease　may；　no　doubt；　distress　or　ruin

the　farmer。　Upon　the　renewal　of　the　lease　it　must　always　fall

upon　the　landlord。

　　　　　In　the　countries　where　the　personal　taille　takes　place；　the

farmer　is　commonly　assessed　in　proportion　to　the　stock　which　he

appears　to　employ　in　cultivation。　He　is；　upon　this　account；

frequently　afraid　to　have　a　good　team　of　horses　or　oxen；　but

endeavours　to　cultivate　with　the　meanest　and　most　wretched

instruments　of　husbandry　that　he　can。　Such　is　his　distrust　in　the

justice　of　his　assessors　that　he　counterfeits　poverty；　and　wishes

to　appear　scarce　able　to　pay　anything　for　fear　of　being　obliged

to　pay　too　much。　By　this　miserable　policy　he　does　not；　perhaps；

always　consult　his　own　interest　in　the　most　effectual　manner；　and

he　probably　loses　more　by　the　diminution　of　his　produce　than　he

saves　by　that　of　his　tax。　Though；　in　consequence　of　this　wretched

cultivation；　the　market　is；　no　doubt；　somewhat　worse　supplied；

yet　the　small　rise　of　price　which　may　occasion；　as　it　is　not

likely　even　to　indemnify　the　farmer　for　the　diminution　of　his

produce；　it　is　still　less　likely　to　enable　him　to　pay　more　rent

to　the　landlord。　The　public；　the　farmer；　the　landlord；　all　suffer

more　or　less　by　this　degraded　cultivation。　That　the　personal

taille　tends；　in　many　different　ways；　to　discourage　cultivation；

and　consequently　to　dry　up　the　principal　source　of　the　wealth　of

every　great　country；　I　have　already　had　occasion　to　observe　in

the　third　book　of　this　Inquiry。